

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)
NATIONAL SECURITY REFORMS: A DECADE AFTER THE GoM REPORT
SEMINAR REPORT

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on 'National Security Reforms: A Decade after the GoM Report' on 11 May 2011 at Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. Held in two sessions, the conference gathered noted experts on the subject to look at the background and status of implementation of the report a decade after it was submitted. Apart from other issues, special attention was given to intelligence reforms, financial management, defence procurement and the way ahead. The session was chaired by Gen VP Malik (Retd); the panelists included Amb Satish Chandra, former Dy NSA, Mr. NS Sisodia, Director General, IDSA, Lt Gen Kamal Davar, (Retd), former DG, DIA, Mr. Vinod Misra, former Secretary, Defence (Finance) and Lt Gen SS Mehta, (Retd), former GOC-in-C Western Command. Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, CAS and Chairman COSC delivered the Keynote Address. The seminar was well attended by serving and retired officers of all three Services, and members of the strategic community.

Inaugural Session

Welcome Remarks: Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director CLAWS

It is exactly ten years since the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the Report of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on 'Reforming the National Security System'. The GoM appointed 4 Task Forces to look into intelligence, defence management, internal security and border management respectively, and address critiques made of India's security establishment by the Kargil Review Committee. All four Task Forces made extremely pragmatic recommendations on time. The GoM considered them and made a report of recommendations, which were approved by the CCS. This seminar is aimed at taking stock of the process of implementation.

Keynote Address: Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, PVSM, VSM, ADC, Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Air Staff

It is a great pleasure to share some of my thoughts on the subject with you. It is a very tricky issue, but very close to our heart. We discuss this everywhere and everyday – on what has been done and what needs to be done. It is a ticklish issue as I am also a serving CAS (Chief of Air Staff) as also the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

To put things in perspective, we have to look at the subject in its geo-political context. Economic interests are interconnected; energy security is paramount and is becoming increasingly vital. Radicalism in West Asia and in our neighbourhood is increasing. We are now in post-Osama era and the future relations among key countries are getting

redefined. Pakistan is looking at new and innovative ways to engage the United States in this period.

Coming to the subject, what are we doing to manage national security? Kargil brought out some inadequacies in our national security apparatus. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) did a commendable job in bringing to the fore several issues that require urgent attention. The GoM considered it and came out with far reaching recommendations. There are three issues that occupy pride of place:

- *Jointness*: Kargil brought home to us the lacuna in our security system. The Integrated Defence Staff was created and it has been doing a good job. Chiefs of Staff Committee has helped in integrating the forces in many ways. But some tricky issues still remain. The trick lies in perfecting integral core competencies of our forces. Developing effective interface is crucial. It is important to have increased understanding of each other's strengths and weaknesses. More has to be done with jointness in thinking, training, execution, etc. There is ample scope for improvement. It is vital to rise above petty turf wars. Enhancing capability, flexibility and adaptability is what requires attention.
- *Integration of MoD with Armed Forces*: A lot is required to be done in this area. It is in the interest of national security to do so. Regular politico-military interaction is required to sort out complex security issues. At present, there is no such interface. One good thing that has happened in the recent past is participation of Service Chiefs in the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security). It is a positive step and a beginning of sorts.
- *Creation of CDS*: Existing system without CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) has been working well. Four wars were fought without any glitches. But now, some think that CDS is important. It is considered as the only ill and a major lacuna of defence reforms. Many say the Air Force is deadly against CDS. We are for CDS, but what we need is change in the present form that has been proposed. It has to be a single- point military advisory to the Government and should have enough authority to perform its duties. It is important to ask which model of CDS to adopt? Every country has a different model. Should CDS be focused on operations? For this we need high technology. Or should CDS take care of planning and leave operations to the respective Chiefs? We cannot blindly adopt any particular model. It requires a lot of thought process involving all stakeholders. If closely looked from this perspective, the delay is understandable. Reforms cannot be introduced in haste. As of now, there is no consensus on the exact role of CDS. The first step in this regard should be to strengthen the present Chiefs of Staff system. Setting up new structures is not a solution. On the other hand, streamlining present structures and cutting short red tape are important.

To sum up, we are in the process of finalising a National Security Doctrine. We have to sort it out first. Then we need to publish a White Paper on defence. Then, it is important

to truly integrate MoD and the Armed Forces. We should have a separate defence cadre for the Defence Ministry. We need to empower the present unified commands. We should start a debate on national security issues in a serious way. We should institutionalise politico-military interface without further delay.

I hope the seminar would deliberate all of these issues and come out with pragmatic recommendations.

Session 1

Background to GoM Report – Amb Satish Chandra

The last comprehensive review on national security took place ten years ago. It is reported that a new review is likely to take place in the near future. In April 1999, the NSC (National Security Council) system was established. The Kargil Review Committee was tasked to review events up to Kargil itself. The remit was rather limited. Only 28 recommendations were made. One of these recommendations was a call for a thorough review of national security following which the GoM was established to view national security in entirety. The thought was that this indeed was a historic opportunity to do the job. A conscious decision was taken to address only the traditional aspects of security rather than taking a holistic view.

All four separate Task Forces comprised people from outside the government barring defence. The Chairman of the respective Task Force's made a presentation to the GoM and 95 per cent of their recommendations were approved. The speed with which these committees carried out their work was commendable. The Kargil Review Committee report was put out in five months and the GoM report was put out in ten months. It certainly was an arduous exercise. The government at the Centre at that time should be credited for not influencing the working of the Committee. Virtually all recommendations except the demand for a CDS were accepted by the CCS chaired by the Prime Minister. It is no secret that the Air Force at that point opposed the appointment of a CDS. There was active lobbying going on. Though the GoM recommended formation of a CDS, the Congress Party also opposed it and therefore PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee did not take action and put this issue aside. In fact, even JN Dixit advocated in favour of a CDS.

The argument was that if the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee can do the job – so why need the CDS? The need is primarily for carrying out, augmenting and strengthening the strategic capability of India. Till April 2005, approximately 60 per cent of 340 recommendations were either fully or substantially implemented as indicated by the concerned implementing authority. There was an intelligence coordination group set up in mid-2001 whose purpose was to coordinate and task intelligence and annual evaluation exercises. In 2005, this entity fell out. The Mumbai terror attacks could perhaps have been avoided had this organisation been there. Similarly, the National Information Board was established in 2002 for national policy formulations on information warfare and cyber security. This organisation, too, fell into disuse. In the realm of border management, there were numerous reforms such as “one border, one

force” that still have a long way to go. The recommendations which have not been implemented till date include, issuing of multi-purpose national ID cards, establishment of a National Maritime Commission, upgradation of infrastructure in the border areas and establishment of specialised marine police.

GOM Report of 2001: Progress towards implementation: Mr N S Sisodia, Director General IDSA

This seminar by CLAWS to review the progress made in the implementation of the GoM report of 2001 is a welcome step. It is an irony that hardly anything gets implemented based on committee reports. The defence acquisition reports which are generally classified are never seen by the respective successors and end up biting the dust in some almirah of the concerned department. However one can say that the GOM report has seen a great deal of progress.

The report on defence management had 75 recommendations, of which 59 have been implemented, eight are pending after consultation with political parties and rest are pending or under progress since then. However, the spirit of implementation is lacking.

The Kargil Review Committee was set up post-crisis; there was huge compulsion to bring in the changes to avoid embarrassment to government. The report was declassified and placed in the public domain leading to public pressure. The GoM more or less concurrently reviewed it and imparted great deal of seriousness. As the report was monitored by the NSCS (National Security Council Secretariat), it led to some degree of satisfaction. Many researchers are of the view that the non-implementation of various committee reports is a normal phenomenon in bureaucracies the world over as the approach gets influenced by own notion of power, perks, opposition to change and guarding of own turf. Any decision which enhances the status, growth, expansion, and enhancement of resources of an organisation gets implemented quickly. However, any proposal relating to pruning of powers, increasing accountability or perceived loss of status, face maximum resistance.

The recommendation of establishing the office of CDS has been historically opposed by the Indian Air Force, albeit for objective reasons. There may also be apprehension that the size and the domination of Army will dilute the status of the Air Force. Gen JJ Singh, as Chief of Army staff had also expressed his reservation, perhaps based on the response and lack of enthusiasm from the Service Headquarter based on its functional experience with the Headquarters of Integrated Defence Staff and also due to the functional inadequacy of the integration of service Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence.

Abolition of military farms, ordnance factories and certain laboratories of DRDO (Defence Research & Development Organisation), where private sector/industry can perform much better also continue to be opposed. Where turfs are affected, clever reasons can be found to oppose the implementation of the recommendations. On the other hand the Andaman and Nicobar Command, SFC (Strategic Forces Command)

and IDS (Integrated Defence Staff) were created quickly as it resulted in new posts. The IDS has however failed to achieve its full potential. Many observers are of the view that some of the posts are treated as a dumping ground for officers. A lot remains to be done with respect to jointmanship and integrated planning. Similarly, the intelligence agencies of the services have not been truly amalgamated and still continue to function separately.

Overall, some headway has been made on many issues/ recommendations, and many processes are under evolution. As per the GoM, a review was to be carried out after five years by a high level committee. However, this has still to take place. This needs to be carried out periodically.

A major problem is a lack of proper planning and a culture of implementation at the government level. The tenth five year plan for defence was approved in its fourth year, whereas the eleventh five year plan is yet to be approved. Even at the services level, the plans are merely aggregation of what has been proposed by the three services. There is no *inter se* priority based on the holistic reviews in the absence of a CDS having power/clout to overrule. A great deal also needs to be done on integration to meet the challenges of modern warfare. The aspect of establishment of integrated commands should also be looked into seriously.

Q & A

The shape of integration of the Service Headquarters with MoD requires to be debated. The interpretation of integration at the time of its inception differs from what it is being interpreted today. Perhaps there is a value in having system of checks; the lack of specialisation of the civilian bureaucracy at MOD is also a concern. It may be prudent to go through the systems adopted by various western countries and devise a system based on our needs after detailed study.

Session 2

Reforms for Energising Indian intelligence: Lt Gen Kamal Davar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), former DG DIA

History is replete with cases of political, military, and national security setbacks which are attributed to intelligence failures. This however, not always is the case. Intelligence is a vital tool and essential ingredient of statecraft of any government for maintaining national security. However, we fail to accord it requisite priority till the time we are harshly surprised.

Creation of the Directorate General of Security (DGS) and later, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) after the 1962 and 1965 wars and establishment of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) post-Kargil War of 1999 have been the defining moments in Indian Intelligence Reforms. The Girish Saxena Committee formed as task force on intelligence as fallout of the KRC put out a report on the country's intelligence apparatus

in 2001. It recommended an overhaul of technical, imaging, signal and electronic counter-intelligence capabilities. The recommendations were almost wholly accepted by the Group of Ministers (GoM). However, the progress report on their implementation after a decade is not heartening. The report was not made public and therefore the Government did not face as much pressure from the public for speedy implementation as it did for other task force recommendations. New organisations were created but due thought has not been given to their effective functioning. The spirit of implementation is more important than the implementation itself.

The Saxena Committee had called for a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and a Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) to be set up under the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The MAC was to collect and coordinate terrorism-related information and the JTFI was to share the information with state governments. Both are functional, but reportedly under-staffed and under-equipped.

The committee had also recommended setting up of Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with DG, DIA being the principal military intelligence adviser to the Chief of Staff's Committee and the Raksha Mantri. DIA was established with the Signals Intelligence Directorate and the Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) under it. The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was established in March 2003. However, the Army, Air Force and Naval intelligence directorate continue to maintain their identity thereby creating problems in the smooth functioning of DIA which in any case has not taken off fully due to non-appointment of CDS by the government till date.

The Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) that had been established based on recommendations of the Committee has been in disuse since 2005. ICG was meant to be a supervisory body for tasking the intelligence agencies to collect the inputs as per requirement of the consumer and to ensure that agencies completed their task. Initially NSCS and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was merged and then recreated in 2005 from within NSCS thereby putting ICG in disuse. Most of these actions have been crisis driven and momentous.

The changed geopolitical and strategic environment has brought new challenges to the Indian Intelligence. Some of the measures which we need to take are:

- Set up a Blue Ribbon commission with members not only from government but also experts from all walks of life for review and monitoring.
- Upgrade our technical as well as human intelligence capabilities.
- Police reforms are long overdue and need implementation.
- Recruitment and selection of man power to intelligence agencies needs a fresh look. Linguistic skill of intelligence personnel have assumed greater importance in today's world. It is imperative that experts from all walks of life be incorporated in intelligence setup with due regards to security of information.
- National Investigation Agency (NIA) is not the correct antidote for current problems. We have enough post-incident investigative agencies. We need an agency on the lines of FBI suitably armed, equipped and legally empowered to

prevent terrorism, carry out counter-terrorism strikes and to prosecute captured terrorists under Indian Laws.

- National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) established by present Home Minister needs legislative support to have legal and executive power. The states will share their databases with NCTC only if law is passed empowering NCTC to ask for it.
- National Intelligence Authority (NIA) need to be appointed who will receive inputs from all agencies and after due analysis will pass it to National Security Advisor (NSA) who in turn would brief the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

In the end, it is once again reiterated that a concerted and holistic approach to reforms is needed rather than a crisis driven and piecemeal approach.

Financial Management and Defence Procurement – The Challenges Ahead: Vinod Misra

The Arun Singh Committee of 1990s vintage was the first comprehensive attempt to examine some of the core concerns which face defence decision-makers. A number of concerns were addressed: higher defence organisation, the resource base that was needed to fund defence modernisation and revenue activity, acquisitions and procurement, manpower, logistics and various maintenance support services, financial management and economic issues – a very comprehensive exercise. While it's not really relevant to go into why it couldn't be progressed later, it was more elaborate in scope than the 2001 effort – fortunately undertaken by the same person. There is, then, a fair degree of commonality in the issues examined.

Some lasting reforms have been implemented after the 2001 review. The most important of them is a dedicated defence acquisitions organisation – the Director General of Acquisitions, Procurement Wing. This was recommended in the 1991 and 2001 reports, and exists as a vibrant organisation today. Also, a very elaborate defence procurement procedure was put into place – which had earlier been left only to minor individual and institutional memories. But soon after the 1991 report, certain guidelines were issued, regulating defence procurement. But it was really post-2001 that a DPP (Defence Procurement Procedure) was put into place. Of course, it has undergone several amendments, in line with the experience acquired. Also in place are the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Strategic Forces Command, Andaman & Nicobar Command – and the emphasis on long-range planning. Some sporadic attempts had been made in the past in this direction, but since independence, no long-term plan of a scope longer than five years had been put into place. It was only after 2001 that long-term integrated perspective plans of the three services were put in place, and supposedly coordinated by the IDS, before it was examined and processed further by the MoD. So all these changes have occurred as a result of the 2001 GoM.

To get some perspective on the topic concerned, certain numbers need to be made clear. The defence outlay, as is known, is somewhere in the neighbourhood of Rs 164,000 crore currently. Over the last 10 years or so, there has been a growth rate of over 10 per cent per annum in this outlay. Capital outlay accounts for 42 per cent of the

current budget for the defence services, and 58 per cent is for revenue. This is a fairly optimum blend, and further improvement should not be expected. Of the capital, nearly 80 per cent or more is the provision for modernisation – currently, at about Rs 53,000 crore. In 1998-99, the total outlay used to be Rs 8,600 crore; Rs 10,000 crore in 1999-2000, and has really gone up in the last few years. Assuming a growth rate of 15 per cent per annum in capital outlay – average growth over the last ten years has been 19 per cent – and 10 per cent in revenue, a growth rate of 12 per cent per annum – higher than the current one of 11.6 per cent – in overall defence budget is realisable. On the basis of these assumptions, the likely capital acquisitions outlay over the next ten years would be in the neighbourhood of \$ 240 billion. The overall budget for defence could be \$ 635 billion, aggregated for the next ten years, based on these projections.

The offset obligations, which have come in as an integral part of the policy frame, at the minimum of 30 per cent – it can be mandated at a higher level, on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in the case of the MMRCA, which is at 50 per cent – the amount of investment inflows would be in the magnitude of \$ 80 to 100 billion over the next ten years. This could be the money available for a large-scale transformation of the defence sector, the industrial base and much else.

The first challenge in financial management is resource allocation – how much can be spared, given the GDP growth rate, the spending in other sectors, and so on. Because of the rapid growth in GDP, and though the defence share comes down to below 2 per cent, it is still good enough. So the declining share of the GDP for defence should not be of much concern. Also, the constant challenge of ensuring adequate allocation for revenue and capital – as stated previously, equilibrium has been reached. Some of the best practices of financial management which concern India are: LTIPP (Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan). While it is taking place for the first time, and there's a 15-years long-term plan in place – only lip service is being paid for the cause of jointness. The inclination is there, but with each service feeling the inadequacy of resources, the dialogue has not made much headway. But it was recognised in the formulation of the 11th Plan, and has been repeatedly emphasised; the services are conscious of the advantages, in terms of logistics support, training, weapon choices [quantity and quality] – and the necessity of proceeding in a unified manner, as opposed to acquiring parallel capabilities. In terms of the intrinsic planning effort, a lot more due diligence is taking place, by way of comparisons with force levels, with traditional adversaries, the kinds of modernisations and capacity-building underway; thereby, the blend of quantity-quality required to take place. That, indeed, is the biggest challenge of the financial management process – how to develop an optimal mix of capabilities in quantitative and qualitative terms, the kind of technologies and capabilities available worldwide, and the ones relevant to the Indian setting.

Efficiencies are also being sought in the areas of logistics and supply chain management. Unfortunately, India has not begun developing alternatives and making cost-effective choices to meet mission objectives. It requires a different orientation than in operation at present. It has happened in a few cases, so India is not devoid of capabilities in that respect. Every acquisition proposal needs to be evaluated on that

basis, and that means applying operational research techniques, planning methodology, so on and so forth. Project management efficiencies need to be developed to a higher degree of utility in the Indian setting. The core concern is of enhancing serviceability and readiness levels – much money is being spent ostensibly to procure spares for efficient upkeep of the weapon systems India has, but serviceability levels are a matter of grave concern, no matter the rising outlays in revenue stores. So that requires a lot of effort on the part of individual services, independently and jointly. The concept of performance-based logistics is being debated in the same matter, whereby the responsibility for ensuring an assured level of readiness would be asked from the OEM or some outside agency. Those are, then, also essential reform measures, which would ensure value-for-money.

Augmentation of resources would also need to be addressed. Since India's capability gaps are significant and there is a long way to go before it has effective deterrence against all potential adversaries in a multi-front scenario, the collective focus has to be on realising those capabilities in the shortest possible time; i.e., spending those monies efficiently. But should the outlays be found deficient, in the past, long-term credit was being availed from the erstwhile USSR. This option is still available, and can be negotiated, whereby the impact of the level of resources can be staggered over a long period of time. Lease arrangements are also possible. Equity disinvestments possibilities are there, in the case of the defence PSUs, which would bring in greater sums in the government's coffers. Defence bonds could be floated, should there be dire necessity, to augment resource costs. Outsourcing could contribute to greater cost-effectiveness and bringing down the level of resources needs to keep a certain level of efficiency, if carried out carefully.

Targeting of lower life costs would generate additional resources for defence, but it would mean moving away from the import orientation, to a wider defence industrial base in the country. So those are different challenges to be faced, but these can augment the actual resources, which can be available to defence. ICT-efficiencies can be targeted, which can bring down wastages.

Acquisition concerns have affected the pace of modernisation – the historical malady is how to ensure a competitive setting, pitch it at a level to meet operational effectiveness, and not paying for frills – a huge challenge in itself. Hence, the criticality of the state of request for information – that stage has now been made mandatory, and frills would be discovered, as would the cut-off of qualitative features. The second major problem, especially for the army, is the long-time frame of trial evolution. It can be remedied by the formation of dedicated, multi-disciplinary teams, some degree of continuity, availability of ranges, ammunition and many others factors. It is possible to remedy, with conscious, deliberate and focussed effort on the part of all concerned. It has been recommended to mandate that 25 per cent of acquisitions be carried out through fast-track procedure route – which would cut some corners, but the FTP ensures that some induction takes place. The comprehensiveness of request for proposals (RFP) is again something required to be explored, because often that has affected modernisation, leading to concerns being discovered at a later stage, as opposed to pre-acquisition.

FDI – The current limits of Foreign Direct Investment at 26% needs to go up. Joint ventures are not worthwhile for companies to share technologies which they've developed over years, just so an Indian company/party can meet offset requirements. In the defence industrial base, unless Tier 1, 2, and 3 industries are developed consciously, for the long-term, with a stability of relationships, things will not fall in place. Improvements are required in contract terms – especially in TOT (Transfer of Technology), which are being addressed. In the quickest possible time-frame, one has to collaborate with the best-in-class world-wide, in R&D, design, engineering and production or even actual manufacturing – either through PSUs, ordnance factories, or even the private sector. Approvals by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) need to be brought to long-term, five-year and annual plans; else, there is no accountability for attaining targets, which have become an independent exercise. Oversight concerns need to be addressed in acquisitions so that its existence doesn't become the justification for not doing what acquisition functionaries have been tasked to do.

What Next: Looking Ahead – Lt Gen SS Mehta, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd), former GOC-in-C Western Command**

India has been generally reactive when it comes to formulating policies for defence reforms. Instead of flogging a dead horse, one needs to be innovative and creative. National security reforms must take into view the changing security landscape today. For instance due to globalisation there is increasing inter-dependability between nations of the world. Issues like cyber warfare and illegal trade merit greater and joint attention by nations. The emergence of state and non-state actors will also play an important role in potential conflicts in the 21st century.

Therefore, a nation that is defensible will remain insecure. This insecurity may stem from factors such as lack of water, oil and other natural resources and internal strife. There will be a scramble between nations for the world's depleting energy resources. The domain of cyberspace is increasingly acquiring importance. All the other five platforms of communication have to be integrated with it to achieve the desired goals.

We have to generate our own definition of nuclear warfare and desist from aping western terminologies such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), No-first use (NFU), etc as the conditions of conflict in our neighbourhood is vastly different from that of the West.

India is a technologically deficient country. It is lacking in a defence industrial base. We have to move towards self-reliance in defence production. A farewell to foreign arms is a necessity. There is a need to pursue reforms more pro-actively.

The common man should have an understanding of the notion of national security. We have to move away from deliberations remaining only limited to a select class of people in the country. There is a deficit of strategic vision in our country. Every citizen should be aware of his security environment.

It is a misnomer that expenditure on defence is at the expense of economic growth. On the other hand, affordable defence expenditure should be an engine for national growth.

Even without having a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a joint doctrine, training, systems and logistics command could come up. No CDS does not mean no progress.

There is also a need to harness the power of the fourth estate. They will increasingly have a role to play in national security as they are instrumental in forming perceptions. And perceptions today play an important part in decision making. Therefore, the armed forces cannot shy away from media management.

In a country where more than defence outlay worth nearly Rs 1500 crore falls under the category of non-planned expenditure and the 11th plan is yet to be approved, the possibility of having a Defence Planning Commission needs to be explored.

Finally, soldiers sign up for an unlimited liability contract and as there are no runners'-up in war, we should equip them with the best equipment. Also, there is a need to harness the potential of India's youth power – globally recognised as the greatest challenge posed by India. They are epitome of the spirit of: I can win and I will win.

Discussion

There is a need to de-classify reports from defence archives for a better understanding of defence issues and challenges for formulation measures for future reforms. De-classification is also an issue which has political notions attached to it. We do not have norms that can enable de-classification of information. Lack of information has hampered decision making.

As cyber security is emerging as a major challenge, there should be a single monitoring agency for information monitoring and improve co-ordination. Even Indian systems and not just US systems were hacked into by Chinese hackers. There is a need to guard against such electronic threats and at least develop a basic consciousness of cyber security. For instance, databases should not be stored on internet enabled systems.

Several reform measures were suggested post-Kargil but implementation has been lacking. The government has recognised the role of agents in the procurement system and the new Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) lays down guidelines for their role in the process.

Although procuring modern equipment and weaponry is important, one should remember that the man behind the gun is more important. Guts and glory has never been in short supply in the Indian Army. The feat achieved at Kargil is difficult to emulate by most countries in the world.

In revenue management linkages need to be improved to ensure higher serviceability and there is a need for more accountability.

