

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)
ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON COUNTER INSURGENCY: A PERENNIAL THREAT
28-30 SEPTEMBER 2011

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies conducted its first annual workshop on Counter Insurgency: A Perennial Threat from 28-30 September 2011 at the CLAWS campus. Selected senior officers from the armed forces and central police organisations participated in the workshop.

Welcome Address: Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director, CLAWS

The Director highlighted the need for studying Counter Insurgency in today's scenario. India is besieged with externally aided insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the North East (NE). However, the Naxal insurgency in Central India is home grown and is gradually becoming the number one security threat to the state. The four key issues that need to be addressed to tackle the problem are:-

- Governance
- Security
- Development
- Perception Management

He articulated that our security strategy must be comprehensive at the national level. Unfortunately, Internal security does not even feature anywhere in our Constitution. The states have to ask for aid from the centre, however, the final execution is in the hand of the states. He emphasised that the workshop is a platform to bring together people from all the sectors, central forces, state and the army together and to discuss all these issues comprehensively.

Keynote Address: Lt Gen Rameshwar Yadav, VSM, Director General, Rashtriya Rifles

Lt General Rameshwar Yadav articulated that our national vision should be to evolve as a developed and contended nation, at peace with its neighbours and to attain its rightful place in the world order. He stated that our national aim should be to achieve economic, political, social and scientific development in a peaceful and secure internal environment, while playing a constructive role in enhancing peace and justice at the regional and global levels in keeping with our rightful place of prominence in the emerging world order.

While talking about the security complexities, he stressed that we have four internal fault lines (front) adding to the turbulences:-

- The divide between India and Bharat, where in the gap between the rich and the poor is huge, a root cause for most of the problems.

- Regional subversion /cleavages between various ethnic groups.
- Problems of Governance.
- Regional economic disparity.

In addition there are four external fronts that should be particularly taken care of:-

- Pakistan
- China
- Area between Pakistan and China
- Smaller neighbors

Indian Army is engaged in addressing all the security issues. However, with regard to insurgency/ terrorism in India there is an ambiguity. In case of J&K the internal dissent is being encouraged from Pakistan and the insurgency has a high element of external support. The socio-political problems and forceful coercion in the North East have become a way of life. The socio-economic issues predominate in the North Eastern region where the anti-national content is more prominent. In these areas, the sub conventional challenge lies in the political ambiguity, intransigent stance by insurgents/ rebels, inadequate synergy between government agencies and mass population base. External abetment of internal influences and enormity of our geography and societal diversity that includes a large number of stake holders, who refuse to budge from their demands have resulted in reduced political space for negotiations, thereby further aggravating the challenge.

The security challenge therefore is to operate in the entire sub conventional matrix transcending from traditional violent insurgency to sensitive socio political agitations in the public domain. In the law and order domain, during social agitation people's aspirations need to be looked after. Economic disparity needs to be addressed as it often manifests itself in the form of ethnic, religious, ideological and other forms of contemporary discontent. Consequently, in economically well off societies there are hardly any issues that generate acute conflict.

He expressed that the emergent insurgency or the agitation complex in J&K, NE and Left Wing Extremism (LWE) included political expression, social rallies/ activism, sub violent demonstration or agitations, coercive expression and grievance of governance, societal violence, proxy war/ terrorism/ insurgency and extreme violence. The solution in J&K, NE and LWE lay in the political and emotive domain and also in an enhanced interaction with rest of the country in the socio- economic domain.

Though both the political representatives and the insurgent groups want to gain power, the difference is that one wants to gain it by employing democratic means, while the other wants it through coercion. With the gaining of prominence, the civil society is not only in a position to fill in the socio-political gap but can also lead to interaction between the political representatives, insurgent groups and themselves. The credibility deficit among the existing interest groups may also catapult other socio-political organisations like students' bodies/ tribal/ civil society groups into prominence. The sign of credible political/ economic dispensation may result in proliferation of a positive environment, however the perceived lack of progress and quality governance may lead

to agitational tendencies. Therefore, the solution lies in the security forces being cognizant of the emerging security environment.

The salient aspects of the emerging situation at execution level are:-

- Higher propensity of 'low violence' sub conventional conflict.
- Enhanced requirement of higher situational awareness.
- Pre-eminence of technology driven intelligence.
- Enhanced mob demonstrations.
- Major challenge is locating and confirming identity of terrorists.
- Other essential concerns include: enhance transparency of military operations in the public domain like media audit, low tolerance-collateral damage, and inadequate socio-political indulgence.

Prognosis

- Army is supposed to be the last resort of the government and therefore it should not be the first response.
- The national strategic leverage lies in military deterrence capability.
- Diplomatic strategic pull is a function of deterrence paradigm and the commitment of the military in internal security challenges.
- Contingencies should be avoided.
- Emerging external threats and related national security perspective highlight force inadequacy which is divergent from the primary tasks and not in the national interest.
- There is a need to empower paramilitary and Central Police Organisations to handle internal security situations.

Lt Gen KT Parnaik UYSM, YSM, GoC-In-C Northern Command: The Security Challenges In J&K

The security concerns of J&K have been in focus for a very long time. The permanent solution to militancy is a long drawn effort as there are no magic wands or seemingly out of the box solutions. Although J&K lies at one edge of India's border, it is an emotive issue. It is in the heart of every Indian and is central to India's integrity. It is also a reflection of the country's secular ideology. Pakistan wishes to bridge the conventional disparity through the instrument of proxy war. Besides tying down a significant section of Indian Army, thereby reducing the conventional advantage also helps to keep the Pakistan Army in a pre-eminent position within Pakistan.

He emphasised that J&K would always remain an integral and inseparable part of our country and within this dynamic paradox, the Indian security forces need to find a way of functioning. Pakistan's strategy of keeping J&K on the boil has succeeded as India has not been able to solve this issue. One needs to ponder if a purely military solution is feasible or it requires a trilateral communication. There is a need to view the problem in a holistic manner, as numerous solutions like the Chenab formula or the four point solution offered by Musharraf have not been successful. Despite multiple solutions emerging from various sides, the issue largely remains unresolved.

There is a need to resolve the internal issues and isolate J&K from the external influence of Pakistan. The Indian Army is the largest stakeholder in J&K having fought four wars and being in a permanent state of conflict. It has been involved both in guarding the border as well as combating insurgency for a long time which has led to a slow evolution of its effective operational methodology to deal with the prevailing realities in J&K.

Pakistanis have relied heavily and have been fairly successful in creating a separatist *jehadi* ideology. Over the years, the 'residual terrorists' have managed to create a good infrastructure of over ground workers (OGWs) and sympathisers inside the state of J&K. There is a need to isolate J&K from external influences of Pakistan.

The proxy war by Pakistan has been an asymmetrical higher grade challenge. Pakistan's heavy reliance on *Jehadi* ideology and cult has been a cause of concern. The construction of the Border fence post Kargil and OP Parakram has had a lasting effect on curtailing a large number of infiltration attempts. Since 2003-2005, there has been a general decline in the militancy and at present we have the lowest statistics of violence which could generate a misplaced feeling of normalcy among the people. If the issue is not resolved quickly, we may lose this window of opportunity.

The General also discussed the present security environment, impact on operations, measures India could adopt and the likely future scenarios. It seems that Pakistan's commitment on her Western borders and the consequent thinning of forces on the Eastern Front have created a desire for dialogue. Pakistan is fighting their self created 'Frankenstein' monsters, who are now getting back at them. The Osama killing has led to their loss of face; however it is not the time for India to cash on it. The breather in J&K has led to resurgence of Peoples' aspirations, who want demilitarisation and fewer 'Human Rights' violations. However, these very issues are being enmeshed by some Non Government Organisations (NGOs) to target the security forces for their vested interests.

The unemployed youth is now not advocating *azadi*, but are agitating for road, water and jobs. Being a small government not all aspirants can land themselves a government job. Pakistan is also trying to shift to newer forms of agitation dynamics. In the year 2010, 107 innocent lives were lost in a span of 141 days in agitations orchestrated from across the border. Today the HR violations are almost down to nil as zero tolerance leads to no violation and no agitation. The Army has also equipped and trained the Central Police Organisations.

There exist vast disparities between FIRs lodged, official reports of missing persons and unmarked graves. The people when asked whether they want to be a part of the enquiry do not come forward, as most may have assisted in the harboring of the anti national elements and terrorists. The time is yet not right for revocation of the AFSPA as this may give us a Manipur like situation and destabilise last year's positive efforts. Army is there to defend the borders and to prevent the terrorists from building areas of resistance within the state.

Discussion

- The MoD, MEA and MHA need to be on the same page. Media needs to play a positive role and call the Pakistan bluff as their foreign minister first met the Hurriyat during her last visit; this is indeed axiomatic and ironic.
- Funds released need to be equitably utilised to obviate the disparity of development between the three regions and the state government.
- The Army is conducting specific intelligence-based and people friendly operations. Timings of even convoy and heavy vehicular movement has been regulated to facilitate the people's movement to their workplaces.
- The Army is quick and transparent in bringing its defaulters to justice and to educate the populace if someone is trying to implicate the organisation due to vested terrorist interests.
- The barter and drug related illegitimate money flows need to be monitored and the sleeper cells need to be identified.
- We need to address the way in which Pakistan handles POK and its Northern areas population.
- The army needs VOIP, GPRS and full body scanners and the capability to carry out covert operations.
- The Army needs to be on guard and watch for OGW activities and flow of finances to support the insurgency, the China-Pakistan nexus, anticipate triggers, check infiltration and build national synergy at the strategic level by adopting a manoeuvrist approach around article 370. Watch out for wahabism, radicalism, and the Kashmiri pandit migration. While keeping the awams mind at the forefront, engage in information warfare as the main front with a subsidiary effort of CI and CT operations. This would lead to the desired end state of own troops imbibing the requisite force ethos, the neutrals assisting in the destruction of the idea of secession and the adversary abandoning it altogether.

Dr NC Asthana IG CoBRA, CRPF HQ: Challenges faced by the State Police and the CPOs

Dr Asthana highlighted the challenges being faced by the state police and the CPOs not only in J&K, but in all theatres of insurgency, especially LWE. Naxals of today are armed with best of the weapons including foreign make though procurement of ammunition still remains a handicap for them. Being classic guerillas they are capable of living in jungles as well as in villages with ease. As they keep shifting their bases/ hide outs, it is difficult to nab them with the current inadequate force levels.

The restricted visibility and limitation on the usage of type of weapon in a thickly wooded country especially in the jungles of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, add to the operational difficulties and effectiveness of police forces. The easy access to explosives further compounds the problem. The terrain configuration restricts the effectiveness of line of sight communication to about 200 meters which in turn adversely affects the operational capabilities of the CPOs. The thick jungle terrain is an ideal place for planting IEDs as these can be concealed easily. Their detection is more difficult as vapour detection devices or the dogs do not work at times.

A few of the operational concerns identified while fighting in such terrain are:-

- IEDs could be found virtually anywhere.
- Based on the fact that the police avoids the jungle tracks , the extremists have been planting IEDs off-route.
- Bullets tend to deflect when fired through vegetation, thereby limiting their effectiveness
- Even non line of sight (NLOS) weapons like mortars are in-effective, as the shells strike branches both while ascending as well as descending and tend to get deflected.
- Foliage Penetration Radar on unmanned areal vehicle (UAV) is one of the solutions but the technology is at least a decade away from now.

The nature of IEDs generally used by the Naxals are pressure and command activated. Among the command activated devices, both wire controlled and remote controlled have been used, but the former being more abundant possibly because the mobile coverage in jungles is quite low. The Naxals have perfected the art of 'daisy chaining'. In one particular case, 189 IEDs were daisy chained within 675 meters and simultaneously exploded. IEDs have also been found buried under tarred surfaces of pucca roads, which is rather intriguing as contractors carrying out road repairs are threatened or co-opted in planting IEDs.

The nature of explosives being used in Naxal affected areas are generally not the military high explosives like TNT or RDX, but stable commercial slurries, emulsions and gels, all of which are easily and cheaply available. On account of their easy availability, large quantities of these explosives are being used in IEDs. Black powder has also

been used in huge quantities. They believe in de-capacitating vehicles and not getting directly embroiled in a conflict. The 'Awam-e-Jung', one of their mouth piece specifies that nine kg of explosives is required to breach the axle of an Mine Protection Vehicle (MPV). The various types of IEDs used by them are:-

- Satchel charge. It is a wire controlled device which could carry up to 7 to 8 kgs of explosives. It has a steel plate attached on one side of the bag in the form of a 'U' so as to direct the extent of the explosion. Heavy casualties can be inflicted with just one explosion.
- Traditional pipe bombs which work on the basis of friction.
- The IEDs are deployed in a manner so as not to blow up the vehicle but to create a hole, so that the vehicle tumbles down. The newly constructed roads are just concrete tops on mud tracks, hence the surface need not be uprooted while placing the IEDs.
- Bombs with steel boxes and sealed lids are also used.
- Blunderbuss, locally known as 'big gun' or 'challenger' is a cheap, portable remote controlled crude cannon which can be concealed absolutely anywhere. It uses black powder as an explosive content.

To conclude, the task of operating in the Naxal areas is an onerous one, which despite heavy casualties and enormous odds the CRPF is performing as per the requirements of the State government at the behest of the Centre in order to bring about normalcy.

Mr Wajahat Habibullah, Chairperson, National Commission for Minorities: Current Political Situation in J&K and Future Policy Options

The situation in J&K is relatively better as compared to the previous years. There are some positives as well as negatives. The positives include the political situation after a decade of introduction of a democratic structure.

The State has now passed through a decade of reforms and control situation; however the locals have enjoyed the fruits of democracy only intermittently. In this decade there has been turbulence and violence, the Amarnath Yatra agitations lead to the downfall of a Government, the divide and rift between the Muslim majority and the Hindu majority in Jammu is visible as also in Kashmir and to some extent in Ladakh. The young civil society and the political leadership are engaged in a constant tussle for their perceived rights without the use of weapons.

The young population of Kashmir, having seen a decade of violence before them is prone to protest violently. Will non-violence ever return? Since 2002 the coalition government has brought the different elements inside Kashmir together. Though participation of the people in elections have increased, the alienation of the general public from the political leadership still exists. There may be an opportunity now to bring in an effective Panchayat system.

The separatists came together and formed the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in 1993. They realised that they must seek a political resolution as they would not be able to handle a military resolution. They are dependent upon Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) for funding. They were dependent upon the ISI for funding. Pakistan is paying the price today in terms of not being a true Islamic state which is evident in case of instances like the Shaukat murder which was ISI motivated. Separatist arguments appeal to the young. It is evident from a visit in today's date to the 'Café Arabica' in Srinagar's Lal Chowk to observe the radicalisation of the youth i.e. the belief that Muslims will never get their rights and benefits.

Those Kashmiris who want independence have added to Pakistan's fears and one can therefore see increased radicalisation. Saudi money is being sent to Kashmir for radicalisation, taking firm roots in the activities of the Jamat-e-Islami. The youth are being indoctrinated by professing that as they are muslims they would not reap the benefits of a shining India. Therefore, the only way out is to join an Islamic state that will give them 'real' freedom.

The prospects of resolution are bright as the pro-independence element of J&K has realised that they have no choice but to resolve the issue with India, as India is an *azad* country and the facility of *azadi* is available to every Indian equally. How it will be achieved is for the separatists, the mainstream and the political leaders to deliberate upon, as is the saying 'masters of their own destiny'.

Discussion

- The separatist leaders are against the very basis of their own philosophy. They encourage participation of the people for their own concocted framework and combat developmental initiatives by the state. This has to in a coordinated effort by the Centre and the State governments checked and curtailed for the furtherance of achieving desired normalcy.
- The Chinese presence in POK has added another dimension to the problem. However, the prospects of resolution are bright because Kashmiris have realised that their best option would be with India since India is an *Azad* country. The situation is promising but the increasing radicalisation is not being addressed effectively.

Col AK Butail, CO 5 RR Bn: The Operational Predicaments At Ground Zero

Pakistan planned for and started to infuse the area with insurgents in 1989. Infiltration of militants was easy due to the porous borders and this advent of militancy signified the beginning of Low intensity conflict Operations (LICO).

The state government resigned in 1990 and President's rule was imposed in J&K. This led to a mass exodus of the minority community and the promulgation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The Army inducted two divisions to deal with the

CI situation. A need was soon felt for a permanent force due to the long drawn nature of the conflict. The Rashtriya Rifles (RR) was raised in 1990 with two sector headquarters and six battalions. Today there are five Force HQs, fifteen Sector HQs and sixty three battalions.

The force has to its credit apprehensions, killed and surrendered terrorists numbering around sixteen thousand, large number of weapons, ammunition and explosive recoveries, two hundred and twenty nine major honors and awards in the form of Ashok Chakras, Kirti Chakras and Shauriya Chakras as part of achievements of the force. Till date 3588 soldiers of the force have laid down their lives while combating the insurgency.

The environmental realities dictate that there was lawlessness and gun culture was eulogized/romanticised by the militants. The civil administration was inactive, subverted and ineffective. The State and Central agencies lacked unity of purpose; the polity had no credibility and found it difficult to evolve aim, objectives and plans. The police and the para military forces were ill trained, ill equipped and ineffective. The official Media was paralysed and the civil media was subverted. There was a potent improvised explosive device (IED) threat. The terrorist wins if he does not loose and the Army loses if it does not win.

The modus operandi of the CI units is that the initial deployment is hurried and frequently changed. The casualty rate is high. Aggressive response to situations leads to the insensitivity factor. It is perceived as a numbers game. We need to draw lessons from the past and mature the force by constantly upgrading tactics and skills. In the current environment there is a vibrant and responsive civil administration. The police force is professional and capable. This facilitates business to boom and tourism to thrive. There is active grassroots politics. Separatist agenda stands frustrated. There is subjective reporting and the information space is sensitive.

The disgruntled and unemployed youth show utter disregard for the law. It is an information means based environment and news flows fast due to improved communications. The public is instigated to carry out demonstrations as a tool to pressurise the security forces and the civil administration. There exists a percentage of the population which feels alienated due to real, imaginary and manipulated grievances. Militancy as compared to the earlier years is at its lowest. The assessed terrorist strategy remains at much the same levels as of the yester years.

Keeping the focus on operating parameters is of importance as population is the centre of gravity. There is a requirement of using minimum force and carry out Sadhbhavna, 'Jee Janab', and people friendly operations. The environmental challenges include operating in an environment of chronic conflict, ethnicity, religious and cultural disconnect amidst an aware and empowered population who are used for agitations and recreational rioting in which the Media is playing a subjective role. Militancy if compared to football is like making a hundred brilliant saves however, people tend to remember the one that gets past you.

There exist tangible organisational challenges of officer shortage, manpower management, fast tenure based activities and result requirements. Equipment like full body armor and night fighting capability are required. Training of the new inductees is a constant concern. There is very limited space for error; it is difficult to define tangibles as visible results are desired. Micro management is required and ground realities differ vis-à-vis ground realities.

Operational and tactical challenges include correct orientation of command, relevant, continuous and dynamic training, authentic and credible intelligence generation, focus on public relations, and media interaction as well as defining the parameters for engagement. There is a need to identify stress and prevent attrition in own rank and file. Coordination of synergies with other agencies is required. Supervision is required within own operating space. Terrorist and subversive activities need to be countered. There is a need to manage the post operation environment.

Administrative challenges include:-

- Harsh terrain and climatic conditions.
- Working round the clock under hostile and difficult living conditions.
- Limited availability of recreational facilities.
- Protracted separation from the families.
- Building up leadership at the junior commissioned officer level.
- Exposure to stress, traumatic experiences and management thereof.

Motivation of the troops is our biggest challenge as the man on the ground is performing to the best of his abilities. His faith and trust in the state is unflinching. He will readily uphold the country's honor at the cost of his life. He looks up to organisational support and strong leadership which will stand by him at all times. He needs to be reassured that his sacrifices will be honored by the nation.

Shri Mohsen Shahedi, Commandant 35 Bn CRPF: The Operational Predicaments at Ground Zero

There are a total of seventy CRPF Battalions in J&K, out of which there are fifteen battalions in Jammu, twenty seven in Srinagar and twenty eight battalions employed in operations. The static guards and guarding of vital installations takes about 32%, followed by law and order maintenance at 30%, CI operations at 18%, training at 12%, Road opening party duties at 7% and reserve duties at 1%. The CRPF has ever since 2001 killed 1284 terrorists, apprehended 2137 and seized large quantities of arms and ammunition (i.e.2204 arms and 13188 ammunition).They have suffered losses of 186 individuals who laid down their lives and 3836 who were wounded in operations.

The operating conditions include challenges of terrain and demography, response of the stake holders, administration and logistics issues, need for better standard operating procedures, deployment operations, intelligence inputs, the law and order scenario and legal protection to the force.

The terrain and demography present difficulties in tackling urban militancy as the areas are at times congested and densely populated. The population is itself of a floating nature. The terrorists are in possession of sophisticated weapons. There lies the threat of collateral damage during operations. It is difficult to carry out human terrain mapping. Infiltration from a porous border is still a major issue though on a reduced scale.

The stake holder's response unfolds the response of the local public, the police administration, the state government, the separatist groups and the Media. The administration and logistics issue of concern is the state of present accommodation the non availability of Battalion camping sites and training infrastructure. On top of all this there is constant pressure on the forces to vacate temporary accommodation in which they are currently housed.

The standard operating procedure provides for the maintenance of law and order as the primary responsibility of the state. Well before the deployment of the central para military force (CPMF) in the state for a long duration, the state shall finalise the operational, logistical and the infrastructural plan. The CPMF shall not be employed on normal law and order duty or static guard duties during their long term employment. Each operation is to be conducted in such a manner that the operational command of the CPMF is not diluted. Minimum company strength of CPMF shall be deployed in CI operations as a cohesive unit. The CPMF should be accompanied by state police personnel during all their movements.

On the aspect of intelligence based operations, CRPF intelligence setup is in a formative stage, little or no operations based intelligence is shared. The flow of intelligence from organisations like the special intelligence bureau (SIB) is slow and intelligence based operations are relevant only if there is freedom to operate and to interrogate. There is an acute law and order scenario issue when massive crowds are present and they resort to heavy stone pelting, firing from within the crowds, inadequate police component presence coupled with weak enforcement of orders and non availability of magistrate. There is no distinction in deployment of the JKP and CRPF.

The Pakistani flag is commonly used in massive processions and the instigators use abusive language. The women instigators at times play a major role as they know that lynching them is a difficult proposition. There is a need for a new SOP on law and order. Since Palestine is now gaining international recognition in certain international organizations, will J&K also follow? The youth of the state has been witness to lifelong terrorism and they do provide grievous injuries to CRPF personnel on duty in case if

restrained action is taken against them. From 2008 till date the stone pelting injuries sustained are to the tune of 3504.

The CRPF under adverse conditions is doing a commendable job. They, on orders, go about maintaining law and order in CI environment and win the hearts and the minds of the public by carrying out vast and varied civic action and sports propagation programs. They handle an opportunistic media. They need to be covered under the special provisions of the Cr. PC in J&K and enjoy protection under the CRPF Act. They need immunity from launching of mundane FIRs by miscreants and opportunists. The Government should reconsider granting the CRPF the AFSPA status too as provided to the Armed Forces in J&K. This would lead to reduction of civil inquiries and filing of PLI/ Writ petitions for the force. The CRPF has enough forthrightness and transparency to bring its guilty to book and is also building greater synergy and coordination with the state agencies while motivating its troops to maintain a fragile peace.

Discussion

- There exists a lack of synergetic effort. There is complete dependency on the local police forces.
- The operations and deployment lead to difficulties in ground appreciation, overstretched deployments which have reduced actual impact than that which is initially intended.
- Operations in city areas are limited and at times little heed is paid towards forethought and planning for operations.

Session III: Challenges of LWE

Mr KK Soan, DC Ranchi : Impact of Government Initiatives

Security means something more than the defence of a State's territory and sovereignty. The security of an individual has to be recognised side by side with that of states. In essence, security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives. Development is the ability of individuals, families and communities to make informed choices.

Left Wing Extremism is not a new phenomenon, but it has been there for more than four decades. This radical movement started with the same note of equality and equal/equitable distribution of opportunities and resources. It was alluring for the local people, who were genuinely fighting to have two square meals in a day or searching for safe drinking water or even crying for the medicines to fight with diarrhoea or malaria. But later on the ideology could not be translated into reality, because the ideology had taken backseat and now nepotism, personal feud, rivalry, vested interest and extortions have become the order of the day.

The ideology of equality has now faded away and the organisation appears to be visibly stratified. Though a very few hard core people are still attached to the basic ideology, the criminal elements are now commanding the organisation. A large number of weapon carriers/sympathisers are working for the organisation as bonded and marginal labourers.

At present, we are waging a war against extremists, but in future it will be a war of nerves. Until we identify the factors /circumstances responsible for making it the breeding ground of extremism and address it sensibly, it may continue. We must urgently address the causes instead of treating the symptoms. The following areas have been earmarked for special/round-the clock-emphasis: -

- Sensitivity towards the society and confidence building measures.
- Ideological unequivocality.
- Human Resource and Infrastructure Development like Education etc.
- Healthcare
- Improvement of rural roads and communication network
- Rural Electrification
- Irrigation Facilities
- Employment Generation

An unequivocal approach and attitude is required to provide development to the people. Interactive meets, eradication of absentee in administration at the grassroots. Human resource and infrastructure development are being given attention. Employment opportunities are being created at the village level. The measures adopted enhanced peoples' participation in the election process. Not a single polling official or police personnel along with common citizen were even injured on the poll day in Lok Sabha Election 2004 and Assembly Election 2005.

Every willing unskilled labourer is getting wage employment so migration has reduced to a great extent, resulting in basic issues like education, health, child care and women development becoming more meaningful. Due to communitisation and participatory development process, the local villagers are getting employment. Monitoring has become more meaningful and quality of the assets created has improved a lot. The advisors to the Commissioners appointed by the Apex Court in W.P. 196 of 2001 have acknowledged it.

Proposed Course of Action

- Address those issues raised by the extremists with priority which are possible to implement under the Constitutional provisions.
- Study and evaluate the extremist outfits' calendar of activities and prepare annual calendar of administration accordingly to address/counter the issues. Regular interaction/ coordination of development and security officials.

- Identification of all extremists, extortionists, criminal elements etc. and preparation of data base.
- Dissemination/exchange of information based on the data base at the village level (Decentralisation of information).
- Strong intelligence network and busting of the financial base, not only to gather and weigh/evaluate the information about the source of inflow of money but also its outflow and its mode and purpose of utilisation.
- Use of various resistance models without exposing the common man in direct confrontation with the extremists.
- Continuing the attempt to wean away the lowest segment of the outfit's viz. weapon carriers/sympathisers from extremism through proper rehabilitation mechanism. A better structured Surrender/Rehabilitation Policy is required to be in place.
- Modernisation and sensitisation of security/police personnel and Perception Management.
- No unilateral ceasefire from the state side. It strengthens the naxal outfits. If they prefer and take initiative unconditionally for ceasefire and peace talks, state should readily accept it.
- Controlling sensational presentation of the situation as being done by media and other agencies. Sensationalisation of the matter leads to very negative impact on governance.

Development and security are truly mutually inter-related. We need therefore, to evolve a combined strategy to deal simultaneously with the twin challenges of development and security within the framework of a democratic polity, committed to respect for all fundamental human freedoms and upholding of the rule of law.

The time has come therefore for the political, administrative, scientific and industrial communities to cooperate intensely with each other. There is a need to take stock of the entire situation in all sectors of security and emerge with a vision, integrated missions, policies, plans and programmes as a part of comprehensive security for the nation to be safe, prosperous and happy.

Maj Gen BD Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd): Employment Options for Army

India is a key swing state- one of the poles in the emerging multi-polar global security architecture. It faces no existential external threats (threats from China and Pakistan could at best lead to limited conventional conflicts against a nuclear backdrop).

India does however face existential threat from internal challenges. LWE is emerging as the key threat to India's internal security (PM's Feb 08 statement). Threat levels are escalating ominously and need to be checked in time. It flows out of the dangerous implications of our demographic growth which is creating a marked youth bulge. In historical terms, youth bulges have preceded bloody revolutions. LWE is also indicative of a disturbing rural-urban fault line. LWE now affects 202 out of India's 602 districts. This entails 22% of India's total land area and some 17 states of the Union.

India's demographic dividend would require at least 1 billion jobs to be created by 2026. The urban-rural divide is likely to increase and give fillip to movements like LWE if disenchantment grows among the youth of the rural areas.

The LWE affected areas coincide with the primary forest cover of the country. It is primarily a tribal insurgency as 85 % of India's tribes reside in Central and Peninsular India. From 1951-2005, some 50-60 million people have been displaced due to projects and tribals constitute some 40% of this group (some 20-24 million out of total tribal population of 80 million), of which only 18-20 % were rehabilitated. CPI (Maoist) and other splinter groups are estimated to have a strength of some 12-15,000 armed cadres. It has some 50,000-60,000 over ground workers and an overall weapon holding of some 14,000 assorted weapons.

Ability of Police/CPOs to tackle Insurgency

- Can Police/CPOs contain this type of lethal tribal insurgency in dense jungle terrain?
- Police Force has increased by 300,000. However imparting basic tactical skills with the existing training infrastructure will take 8-10 years.
- Organisational and culture wise, Police and CPOs are not suited for offensive CI-Operations. Nowhere else in the world, the police are tackling such tribal insurgency in jungle terrain.
- Is across the board transformation of organisational culture and ethos of the police force and CPOs possible in the desired time frame?
- If Army has to ultimately get involved, should it wait for CPOs/Police to fail or should it intervene now?
- Need to correlate external security scenario with the internal security situation.
- India is in a Two front scenario with China to the north and Pakistan to the west. Internal security is fast emerging as a third front. There is a need to tackle these threats sequentially and not concurrently.

There is a need for a whole of the Government approach to tackle the LWE problem. Much as the Army would not like to get involved, the setback suffered by the CRPF/Police may leave little option but to intervene. We need to take a long term view of the emerging threat in relation to our external threat scenario. In the 1980s, the Punjab crisis highlighted the need for 6 Army Divisions worth force for IS duties. The Rashtriya Rifles (RR) was created to fight insurgency in J&K. We now have six Divisions worth of RR plus Four Divisions worth of Assam Rifles (AR) embroiled in fighting insurgency. A minimum of six additional regular/RR Divisions on a long term basis is required to deal with LWE/Jihadi threat.

Modes of Army Employment

- Option One. Use Special Forces (SF) in a major way to eliminate leadership and target Naxals companies/platoons in Chhattisgarh responsible for the CRPF massacres. Use Satellite Imagery for water sources mapping and locating of People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) companies/platoons. Launch Heliborne Operations for surgical strikes.
- Option Two. Use upto Two Infantry (Inf) /RR Divisions to deal with eight core districts in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and Maharashtra for stabilisation operations for two/three years.
- Option Three. Raise upto six additional RR/Inf Divisions for Internal Security tasks. Establish Counter Insurgency Grid in peninsular India to secure road communication system and major population centres. Carryout bulk recruitment from tribal areas to provide employment and create reserves for conventional wars.

Prior to the deployment of the army, the following steps must be taken:-

- Districts to be declared disturbed.
- Armed Forces Special Powers Act to be invoked.
- Unified Command established in states concerned.
- All Police/CPMF placed in support.
- Major Sadbhavna type initiatives to win hearts & minds:
 - Medical Camps
 - Schools
 - Solar Lanterns
 - Distribute Transistors
 - TV Sets run on Solar Power

There is a vital need to retain an institutional memory and ensure transfer of experience gained by the Army to CPOs/Police. Need for greater inter-organisational interaction. There is no need to re-invent the wheel, the CI grid is a tried and tested model. In Lalgarh and Operation Green Hunt, we are seeing a new genre of 'Offensive Sweeps' a la Swat & Waziristan. These can ensure only short term neutralisation. Large scale operations compromise surprise and tend to waste resources. They often

amount to tokenism. In dense jungle terrain, this could lead to very high casualties and troop fatigue/demoralisation due to in-fructuous jungle bashing. It could also provide more weapons/ammunition to Naxals. Casualty ratio between Police/CPOs and Naxals has been adverse for the past three years in a row. This is a disturbing indicator. There is a need to debate timings/modes of military intervention. Do we put out the fire when it starts or wait for it to rage fully?

Mr MP Nathanael, Inspector General of Police (training), CRPF Headquarters, New Delhi : Assam Insurgency- Need to deal with Core Issues

There are a few conditions for insurgency which are all present currently in Assam. Following are the core conditions:

- Ideology
- Leadership
- Disaffection/unrest
- Foreign support
- Popular support

In addition, the reasons for disaffection in Assam include rampant corruption, lack of development, and presence of different races, religions and tribes. There is a strong feeling of alienation in the public which is coupled with a sense of distrust about intentions of New Delhi. When discussing the issue of Assam, it is important to trace the background of the insurgency.

ULFA was formed in Sivsagar on 7th april 1979 with Bhadreswar Gohain as the Chairman and Paresh Baruah as C-in-C of Military wing. They commenced military training roughly in 1982-1983. Their strength of armed wing was 4000 with about 200 sophisticated weapons and 1500 assorted weapons. Also, they had sanctuaries in Bhutan and Burma. Gohain won 1985 elections and Arobindo Rajkhowa took over as the Chairman. ULFA was greatly helped by ISI in terms of training. It was after the Operation Bajrang in 1990 followed by Ops Rhino in 1991, which resulted in major setbacks for ULFA and forced them to reduce their secessionist demand. Finally, the organisation was banned.

After the death of Hirakjyoti Mahanta, Dy. C-in-C, ULFA wanted cease-fire and talks started in January 1992. The authorities asked ULFA to deposit arms. As the cadres were not in support of this, the leaders slipped out of Assam to Bangladesh. The public support for ULFA dwindled due to the Bangla connection. Currently, the peace talks are on with government and Paresh Baruah is in Myanmar with about 200 men and is against the peace talks.

Another important aspect of the Assam problem was due to the Bodos uprising. Originally raised as Bodo Security Force in October 1986 and subsequently re-named as National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the outfit demanded "Sovereign Bodoland". In military ops conducted by the Bhutan army, 12 bodo camps were uprooted from Southern Bhutan.

NDFB has linkages with ULFA. The government had released the arrested General Secretary of NDFB, Govinda Basumatry for peace talks. Eventually, a tripartite ceasefire agreement was signed on 25 May 2005 in New Delhi and is extended from time to time. Ranjan Daimary, the leader fled to Bangladesh in 2008 and was arrested in June 2010 by the Bangladesh Police and was handed over to India. Order declaring NDFB as unlawful organization was issued by the government of India on 17 June 2011 as incidents of violence continued for period of 02 years from 22 November 2010. 63 people including 3 of security forces were killed in 168 incidents in 2008 and 31 were killed in 99 incidents upto June 2011.

NDFB has a cadre strength of about 180 with 100 weapons. It has dominance in Bodo dominated area of Kokrajhar, Chirang, Sonitpur, Karbi Anglong district. Presently, Bidei, the commander of Cental zone is reported to be active and is indulging in violence. Raffikang Goyari, the vice president was reportedly arrested in Bangladesh. A breakaway faction of United Peoples Democratic Front formed Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) in May 2004. The further split led to formation of KPLT (Karbi People Liberation tiger) in 2010. This outfit is reported to be indulging in violent activities. They killed five security men in April this year in Golaghat district. The group is largely operating in Nowgaon, Karbi Anglong and Golaghat districts. Due to pressure from the security forces, the cadres left their jungle hideouts and dwelt in villages, where some of its leaders have been killed.

DHD was formed in 1995 after cadres of Dimasas National Security Force surrendered from a breakaway faction led by Jewel Garlosa. They demanded Dimasas state. Jewel Garlosa was arrested in Bangladesh in June 2009.

Now under ceasefire agreement, the present situation is tense even though the incidents of violence have come down. Myanmar army launched operations against insurgent groups camping in Sagaing province of Myanmar and in one of such operations ULFA's mobile headquarter was destroyed. Presently, the militants are on a run and with pressure from neighbouring countries, they are losing their sanctuaries across the borders. Stillwell road that cuts through Myanmar from India to China may have a strategic role in maintenance of internal security in the region.

Government negotiations on with several militant groups are resulting in curb of violent activities to some extent. The core issues to be dealt are

- Development – cap by security forces.
- Corruption – to be rooted out.
- Alienate militants from the population.
- Coordinated ops to stifle the insurgent groups camping across the border.
- Instill a sense of security among the people.
- Equal opportunities for all.
- Generation of employment schemes.
- Coordination between security forces.

Brig Narendra Kumar, SM: Conflict in Manipur - Inherent Contradictions and Challenges to Peace

Myanmar is a strategically pivotal region for India. It gives access to India to soft underbelly of China and keeps China away from Bay of Bengal. Also, it is a Land Bridge to ASEAN and offers land access to Myanmar, Bhutan, Bangladesh & China. More importantly, it is a platform for projection of power and falls on the flight path of the Asian highway. However, there is lack of representation which can be illustrated through the fact that there are only 5% MPs from North-East. Manipur is land Locked and connected by 22 Km narrow stretch with rest of India.

All hill states of NE are connected with mainland India through Assam. The situation in Manipur can't be reviewed in Isolation, but In Conjunction with overall situation in North East especially Nagaland & Assam. Insecurity, Instability and Prosperity flows from the plains of Assam to other NE states. Following are a few peculiarities of the region:

- Land Locked state.
- No Railways.
- Three important National Highways
 - NH-2
 - NH- 53
 - NH-202
- All NHs up to Imphal valley are on the periphery dominated by rival ethnic groups and used as a leverage against state government.
- Conflict continues by remote, from outside.

Additionally, following are the salient aspects of the conflict:

- Length of the conflict and shifting goal posts.
- Inhospitable terrain.
- Free move regime.
- Grey territories in close proximity to IB.
- Home to the factors of modern Instability.
- Cross border & interstate linkages (proxy war).
- Terrorist of one state is icon in other.
- Residual combat potential of the UG org under SoO and CF is increasing.
- Foot prints of LWE and Jihadi elements becoming visible.
- Not entirely home grown insurgency.
- Part of unrestricted war with shades of political, social, cultural and economic insecurities.
- Less of people movement more of empire building by elites.
- No one is talking to public what they want.

Conflict in Manipur cannot be purely termed as an Insurgency, Social Conflict, Political Struggle or Economic Backwardness. Scepticism in the environment prevails that the Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Media and Security Forces have not been able to manage or contain insurgency. Dichotomy is that even if some UG group is in negotiation with the government, a splinter faction emerges to carry on with their agenda while the other is still engaged in the negotiations. Problem is social, political and economic deprivation; hence there is no military solution to this problem.

The situation in Manipur is dismal. Elites of three communities (Meitei, Naga and Kuki) are competing & contesting for political space. Ethnic and ideological boundaries have been carved which have dictated the contours of political boundaries. There is immense overlapping political space which has resulted in intense ethnic contest for space. Unfortunately, there is no endeavour for reconciliation. Insurgent organisations were set by contesting elites and ethnic nationalism is employed as the dominant ideology.

Following is a road map of sustainable peace in Manipur:

- No piecemeal solution.
- Peace committee for ethnic tensions.
- Synchronised politico-military actions.
- Military operation with human face.
- Rehabilitation of internally displaced people and surrendered insurgents.
- Disposal of cases against insurgents.
- Dry Up the channel of funding and resources.
- Diplomatic initiative for preventing safe havens.
- Reconstruction of state.
- Monitoring of peace process.
- Role of media.
- Strengthening of education set up, including professional education.
- Engagement of youth in economic activities.

Col Gautam Das (Retd): Nagaland - Can the Conflict be Resolved ?

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended the 30 years war between European powers. It set the stage for ending the war between Spain and France. The treaty introduced the concepts of sovereignty. This concept of sovereignty has been imposed on us by a different civilisation. The issue of Nagaland is different from that of J&K. China's assertiveness and pressure on areas in the North-East aggravates the issue. It should therefore be addressed with some urgency. To determine the demand of a Greater Nagalim, one has to take a step back into history and explore different solutions to the problem.

The Nagas are an ethnic community constituting 20 major resident tribes inhabiting areas from Tirap and Changlang in Arunachal Pradesh to the hill districts of Manipur. The North East region of our country is inhabited by people of various ethno-language

groups such as the Sinpos, Kachins, Chins, Thais, Ahoms, Monkhmer, etc. They belong to the same language group spoken in major South-East Asian countries like Myanmar and Thailand. The Sinpos in India inhabit areas of Upper Assam, the Kachins extend from Myanmar to Yunnan Province of China. The Ahoms became part of India after the annexation of Shan state. Therefore, all ethnic groups in the North East have some affinity with similar groups in South-East Asia and have some common origin, though different sects speak different dialects. The Nagas however belong to a completely different group. They do not have a common origin with the other communities in the North-East. They belong to the Tibeto-Burman school of language who migrated over a period of time and settled in the hill areas of present day Nagaland and Manipur. For want of a better name and because they were scantily dressed, they were called Nagas by the Plains people. Article 371 A and the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution accord them the status of a Scheduled Tribe (ST).

The British first came in contact with the Nagas when they were expanding their administration in the North-East in the lookout for tea producing areas. The British policy of creeping forward was adopted by India after independence. There is a need to take a re-look at some of those policies like that of the inner line and the East Frontier Regulations of 1873, etc which are still continuing. There is also a need to take a fresh look at the concept of the High Naga Council. We are not looking at alternate formulas. Steps cannot be taken in isolation. People have to know that they are being taken seriously. A holistic approach needs to be adopted.

The Nagas are highly democratic in their daily functioning, in their village councils, etc. Greater autonomy can be given to the Naga people. We should look at solutions within the constitution which allows the Nagas to lead a dignified life without pressure from the mainstream. A Piecemeal approach like entering into stand-still ceasefire agreements is not working. Allowing armed cadres in designated camps is also against the constitution. Expanding trade ties with South-East Asian countries as part of the Look East Policy will help in the economic alleviation of the people of the North East states.

Discussion

- Stillwell road needs to be upgraded to facilitate trade with South-East Asia. On the positive side, movement of anti-national elements is somewhat restricted due to the underdevelopment of this road.
- One agency should look after the economic development of the North-East which would bring about greater accountability and transparency in utilisation of development funds.
- Civil aid programmes by security forces is essential to wean away the population from the insurgents but it should be carried out by the concerned government agencies in the long run.

- Greater autonomy for Nagaland can set a bad precedence for similar demands from other communities in the country.
- The North-Eastern insurgencies arose due to illegal migrations, fostering of distinct tribal identities and disputes over sharing of essential economic resources. The North East region has 235 tribes which accentuates the sense of insecurity within the tribes. One tribe growing powerful in terms of political or economic clout is viewed as a threat by other tribes.
- Economic integration of the North Eastern states and developing surface transport links with Myanmar and Bangladesh would open up the North Eastern region to international trade. This would boost the regional as well as the National economy and eliminate the root causes of insurgency.
- Proactive operations need to be undertaken by security forces which target the insurgent leadership. A sense of security has to be provided to the population to make him feel part of the mainstream.