

**CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)**  
**REPORT ON**  
**ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON INTERNAL SECURITY**  
**13-14 SEP 2012**

**General**

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies organised a two day workshop on Internal Security from 13-14 Sep 2012 at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. The workshop was attended by select officers from the Armed Forces, Central Armed Police Forces and Intelligence agencies. Lt Gen KT Parnaik, PVSM, UYSM, VSM, GOC-in-C Northern Command delivered the keynote address. A book titled, "Naxal Violence: The Threat Within" was also released on the occasion.

**Keynote Address – Lt Gen KT Parnaik, PVSM, UYSM, VSM, GOC-in-C Northern Command**

National security has been of prime concern since independence. The dynamics of security underwent a change after partition of the country and the emergence of disputed land borders. The country was beset with numerous internal security challenges and insurgencies due to flawed policies and governance deficits. The emergence of communal politics has also led to insecurities, violence and break up of law and order in the society.

The present era is marked by receding insurgencies but increasing ethno-religious violence. The world recognises the threat posed by global terrorism as a common challenge but is divided on the approach to tackle it. The Af-Pak region has emerged as the epicentre of global terrorism. Our neighbourhood is in a continuous state of turmoil and the fault lines have led impetus to instability in the region. The situation is multifaceted and intricate and is likely to further deteriorate after the drawdown of coalition forces in 2014.

*Jammu & Kashmir.* There has been a marked reduction in the levels of infiltration and terrorist violence. The high voter turnout in all the recent elections indicates towards the general desire of the population to return to normalcy. Trends point to orchestrated mass agitations on issues of governance and increasing use of social media to instigate the public. From 2008 to 2010, mass agitations were aimed at bringing economic activity to a standstill with efforts being made to subvert the police and generally to provoke an Intifada style mass protest inside the Valley with an overall aim being to achieve secession of the Valley by 2016. The separatists, OGWs and the stone-pelters were identified as the key players in provoking an intifada type struggle. This strategy has been stalled and the present situation in J&K is characterised by an uneasy and awkward peace symbolised by increasing economic activity and decline in the levels of violence. The potential of minor incidents sparking off major protests however remains

high. In addition, a number of emotive issues such as AFSPA, mass graves and Truth and Reconciliation Commission have been introduced to keep the pot boiling. The need of the hour is to dominate the situation completely and prevent infiltration, maintain peace and slowly demolish the infrastructure of terrorism.

*North-East.* The influx of immigrants has introduced new economic, cultural and demographic dimensions to the problem of insurgency in the North east. There are nearly 79 insurgent groups active in the region and they have realised the futility of staying in the jungles. Therefore, a large number of them have signed the Suspension of Operations (SOO) agreement with the government. The talks with major insurgent groups like the ULFA and NDFB have not yielded any solution and the groups are looking at the NSCN (IM) model to remain under ceasefire. The protracted insurgency has become an industry and these groups are seeking political space by maintain a low profile. The state apparatus has been hijacked and a system of parallel economy and governance has been introduced by the SOO groups.

*Left-Wing Extremism (LWE).* LWE is emerging as a cogent threat to the country and its territory and complexity is enlarging. Nearly 223 districts in 20 states across the country are affected in some degree by LWE. In the year 2011, 464 civilians and 142 security force personnel were killed in nearly 1755 incidents of Maoist violence. Although Rs 315 crore have been sanctioned for security related expenditure, development is not possible in areas which are under the grip of the Maoists. The Maoist strategy remains to first carry out strategic defence, then graduate to strategic equilibrium and then on to strategic offensive. The aim is to first establish secret cells, declare liberated zones and then wield power. Political consensus on tackling LWE remains elusive due to the fragmented nature of polity in the country. National security challenges calls for a co-ordinated response, but the Centre's role remains limited due to constitutional constraints. The political impasse witnessed in the passing of the NCTC bill in Parliament is a case in point.

There is a growing external abetment of violence in the hinterland. The attack on Parliament and a series of bomb blasts in the country culminating in the terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26/11 are a testimony to this growing menace. There is a need to proactively target terrorist funding, logistics and communications. State police forces would be required in larger numbers and with better training and equipment to deal with the situation. The increased radicalisation of society and proliferation of home grown terror modules marked by a general deterioration of law and order and increased crime is a worrying trend. There is an intricate link between crime and terrorism. Cyber crime and the use of social media to misinform the public are challenges which will have to be countered. Our legal framework has a colonial legacy and is not in tune to combat multifarious threats. Political and judicial activism also needs to be checked as the political and judicial dimensions constitute a key aspect of carrying out security operations.

People are the centre of gravity in tackling any threat and there is a need to address causes and not the symptoms of a problem. There is a need for an Internal Security

doctrine to define the red lines of the problems. We have an internal security structure but it is not effective or implemented on the ground. The need for a separate Ministry for Internal Security to deal exclusively with security issues and a separate ministry for administration and other tasks can be debated further. There is a greater need to expedite police reforms and introduce regulatory and enforcement methods to deal with illegal immigrants. Also, pro-active Perception Management methods can be employed to gauge and prevent radicalisation in society.

## **Session I: Changing Trends in Sponsored Violence in J&K and Response Mechanisms**

### **Remarks by Chairperson – Prof Radha Kumar, Interlocutor on J&K**

It is evident that the street violence that rocked Kashmir for three successive summers in the years 2008-10 had some degree of sponsorship. It is also true that the agitations were concentrated in certain areas of the Valley and were not prevalent everywhere. The state has been witnessing a change towards peace since 2005 and this has prompted Pakistan to foment trouble. The MLA's in the state do now want to devolve powers to the Panchayati Raj institutions as they fear losing their political base. Another structural problem is the lack of training for Panchs and Sarpanchs. The militant threat to the panchs and sarpanchs is an immediate threat and must be addressed to prevent them from resigning from their elected positions. The Jammats have done a lot of work in muslim areas of Jammu region and is a part of a very organised Jammats and Hurriyat initiative.

The Public Safety Act (PSA) is much more draconian and should not be compared with AFSPA. A Central Law should govern the Armed forces and can also be incorporated into the Army Act. The central set of protections would operate for the whole country and not just for J&K. It should not be seen as a special power but as routine powers for the Army in any CI situation. This would take away the perception of the people that the AFSPA is directed against them.

A complete state control over aspect of life in the valley is contributing to a sense of isolation and radicalisation. The activities undertaken by the Army in Operation Sadhbhavna should be gradually handed over to NGOs. Pakistan Army must realise that the blowback effect on it would get worse post-2014 and should not think of diverting jihadis from Afghanistan to Kashmir.

### **Current Situation and Future Actions – Prof Navnita Behera, Department of Political Science, Delhi University**

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is as plural in linguistics, cultural difference, etc as the rest of India. Similarly, politics goes on irrespective of whose is in power. The Jammu and Kashmir and Central governments as well as Pakistan are important stakeholders in the state. The National Conference has traditionally been at the forefront of the political discourse in J&K and the internal balance of power has always been centered at

Srinagar. The basis lies in the constitutional parameters of J&K and power has always been wielded in favour of the valley and not Jammu or Ladakh. However, in the past decade, a heartening change has been witnessed where other political parties like the Congress and PDP are also wielding power in the state. The coalition form of government is bringing in certain political practices. As the political bases are spread out, the parties are learning to co-exist and reach out to each other. The high turnout in the elections immediately after the Amarnath Shrine Board agitations was a positive sign.

The political base of the PDP lies in South Kashmir. The rural base of the NC largely remains intact and that is the reason why it came to power in the last state assembly elections. The national parties have not been able to make a major impact in the valley. The separatists remain divided as ever. The Mirwaiz and Sajjad Lone factions have their own agendas while the Jammats are the primary base of Syed Ali Shah Geelani. They do not have any cohesive agenda nor are they learning their lessons well. The Jammats and PDP have a tacit understanding only during elections. In Ladakh, it is a case of revolving chairs between the Congress and the NC.

It is unlikely that the political logjam over dialogue can be overcome anytime soon. Pakistan is unable to take a major step in this regard as the civilian government has legitimacy but lacks power while the military has the power but no legitimacy. A narrow window of opportunity came when President Parvez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh carried out back channel talks for conflict resolution. Gen Musharraf had realised that his goal of 'Pakistan first' could not be pursued without giving up on the 'Kashmir first' policy of the government. However, Gen Kayani reversed this policy and firmly believes that the road to Kashmir lies via Afghanistan. The tap of militancy has only been turned off temporarily and can be turned on once again.

The last two years have witnessed peaceful summers due to pressure from the society whose income and livelihood was lost due to the cycle of violence and bandhs. There is an urgent need to circumvent the situation of political flux existing in the valley. The State Government's own Finance Commission report has not seen the light of day. The state police and security forces have learnt their lessons from the continuous seasons of protest but the government lacks a concrete strategy to deal with the situation. Even minor issues like the issuance of Dogra certificates and granting of refugee status have the potential of turning violent. The gains from the successful conduct of Panchayati Raj elections have been squandered away as the bodies have no powers to deliver goods on ground. The state government needs to answer why it is taking so much time to address a structural question and devolve powers to the Panchayats.

The Islamisation of the valley is not alarming but a real situation is unfolding which is not fully understood by everyone. Kashmir was the centre of eclectic Sufism before the advent of militancy. The government does not even have a record of the number of Ahle-Hadith madrassas that have mushroomed across the valley since 1990. In a recent survey carried on Kashmiri youth it emerged that 61 % of the respondents (in the age group of 18-35) listened to political sermons/jihadi speeches on their DVD players.

This is a disturbing trend and its implications need to be fully understood by the stakeholders of peace in J&K. There has been an increasing trend to use social media and the cyber space for political mobilisation during stone-pelting incidents. Facebook pages on poetry, etc, have proliferated on the internet. One such page titled, "College of Stone Pelting" was hosted by an individual sitting in Arizona, USA. This goes on to show the effect and potential of cyber space in provoking hatred and violence from anywhere in the world.

For the way ahead in Kashmir, there is a need to devolve power to the grassroots and focus more on delivery mechanisms and see whether the dividends are reaching out to the people. The Perception Management needs to shift from insurgency to development. The J&K Legislative Assembly should discuss the state constitution and come out with amendments. We need to strengthen what is in our own hands and set the ball rolling; the goal is within our reach.

### **Current Security Challenges & Mitigation – Brig KJS Dhillon, YSM, BGS 15 Corps**

Jammu and Kashmir has gone through important milestones in its history. The migration of Kashmiri pandits was a major blow to the secular fabric of the state. In the period before the advent of militancy, every school in the valley had at least two-three Kashmiri pandit teachers. The situation in J&K has undergone a marked change and there is a perceptible decline in the terrorist violence in the state, though a residual amount of terrorists are present to keep the situation alive.

The spread of wahhabism and radicalisation of society is a challenge. The Army's people friendly approach has led to greater acceptability among the people. There has been a concerted effort on part of the Army to minimise collateral damage and casualties to civilians. In the past two years, only two incidents of killing of civilians due to mistaken identity have taken place. Increased interest of the population in economic activities is reducing the influence of separatists and the vast majority in Kashmir realise the futility of armed struggle. Cyber space is increasingly being used to augment propaganda being carried out through mosques to keep the idea of 'Azadi' and feeling of victimhood alive.

The ISI-separatist-militant nexus exploit the media and stone-pelters as their tools to propagate violence. This nexus was greatly witnessed in the period 2008-10. The junior leadership of stone-pelters and OGWs are kept trained and active so that they do not go out of practice. National values and symbols, AFSPA and security forces are being attacked by radicalism and brinkmanship. The battleground is the Awam's mind and there is a need to attack the idea of Azadi. 80 per cent of the people in any conflict are a silent majority and that should be our centre of gravity.

There are 6.2 lakhs unemployed youth in J&K and 25,000 surrendered terrorists who are attempting to return via Nepal. It is difficult to judge their motivations and degree of radicalisation. Distorted and coloured opinions published in books and cyber jihad are being increasingly resorted to influence the minds of people.

The Unified Command structure is working well and has synergised the efforts of the administration, security forces and intelligence agencies. The strategy is to adopt a hard posture on the LC and a soft one in the hinterland. Only surgical and intelligence-based operations are being carried out to avoid collateral damage. Perception Management tools should be used to counter the idea of Azadi, radicalism and victimhood. At the same time, development and job opportunities and basic amenities should be provided to the people. The security forces have to be empowered to ensure protection.

### **Ears to the Ground (1) – Col Prashant Pande, CO 29 RR (GRENADIERS)**

There is a general decline in terrorism in the valley though recently there have been increased incidents in South Kashmir where the Army was directly targeted in Pampore and two soldiers were martyred. Governance deficits, lack of employment opportunities, daily disruptions and a perceived sense of heavy militarisation due to a large number of convoy movements to different parts of the state are some of the causes for the disaffection of the people. Solutions therefore lie in providing basic infrastructure and amenities to remove the insecurities of the common man.

Increased grenade attacks, threat campaigns from pasting of posters, targeted killings and direct engagement (Pampore attack) are posing challenges at the tactical level. The latter is an indicator that some consolidation has taken place among the militants and they are getting bolder to directly engage the security forces. The militants are targeting government projects and incidents of burning of shrines and desecration of holy books are attempts to provoke mass agitations.

The concept of operations have undergone a change and due to a responsive intelligence network there is more emphasis on carrying out surgical counter-terrorist operations with people outreach initiatives and proactive intervention. In addition to the terrorists, allegations of Human Rights violations and a hostile vernacular media, bandhs and agitations pose challenges. The emphasis is to carry out people-friendly operations and preventing HR violations. The administration has to increase its outreach and the media should project local icons at the national level. The separatist propaganda can be countered through debates. The outreach of FM radio should be expanded to cover all remote corners of the state. Synergy between various security agencies has improved on the ground. The intelligence agencies have to undertake measures to counter radicalisation and cyber jihad.

### **Ears to the Ground (2) – Col Sandeep Kapoor, CO 23 RR (RAJPUT)**

The terrorist infrastructure remains intact across the LC. Agitational dynamics, false HR allegations, missing persons/sleeper cells are the current trends in violence in J&K. Nearly 60 terrorists and 500 OGWs are active in 16 Corps Zone. The funeral of a local terrorist in Kishtwar who was involved in the Delhi High Court blast of 2011 was attended by 8000 people.

There is increased awareness among the people due to the penetration of mobile phones and reduced militancy. The activism of both the local and national media has increased. The district police have become energised and are also carrying out independent operations. The modus operandi of the terrorists are to re-group and rejuvenate the OGW network, establish new hideouts, arms caches and are making increased attempts at infiltration and recruiting local youth into militancy. The strategy of the OGWs is to exploit reduced tolerance among locals and level false HR allegations on security forces. The vernacular media is used to tarnish the image of the security forces.

The objectives of the security forces are to eliminate the residual terrorists, avoid triggers and prevent HR violations. Source mapping conferences are regularly held at the sector level in which representatives from all security and intelligence agencies participate. We need to guard against triggers, keep a strict watch on OGWs and separatists and maintain constant surveillance on Nepal returnees (militants who are returning from POK via Nepal) for their real motivations cannot be gauged.

## **Session II: Internal Security Challenges in LWE Areas**

### **Remarks by the Chairperson – Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (Retd), former GOC-in-C, Central Command**

Deprivation, exploitation, poverty and social injustice are the real threats to internal security. Naxals resort to violence to showcase their power with the intent to highlight the ineffectiveness of the state and central governments.

The year 2009 was the bloodiest with Maoists killing many state and central police personnel. 2010 followed suit with incidents like attack on Eastern Frontier Rifles at Silda camp and Chintalnar ambush where seventy six police personnel lost their lives. The year 2011 saw the Maoist taking Deputy Commissioner of Malkangiri as a hostage thereby using kidnapping as a bargaining tool. The year 2012 has already witnessed three kidnapping incidents besides killings, thereby setting a dangerous trend. The Maoist threat is hence of serious concern and needs to be urgently addressed. While dealing with the naxal threat, we must address the question of conflict management and resolution. The government should hasten the process of capacity building of the state police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).

### **Ground Report: Bastar Division – Mr Joy Oommen, former Chief Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh**

Naxalites are active in the Bastar region since the early 1970s. They gradually grew in strength taking advantage of absence or reach of administration in the interior areas. Crackdown by Andhra Pradesh on naxalite activities led to many of their cadres migrating to Chhattisgarh and providing leadership to naxal activities in the State. Since 2000 there has been an effort to militarize the armed component of the party - the People's Guerrilla Army with a view to launching attacks on the state apparatus. 15 of

27 districts in the state are affected in varying degrees. Significant consolidation has taken place in southern part of the State bordering Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. About 10,000 trained armed cadres and 40,000 Janmilitia/Sangam members are operating in Chhattisgarh. Attempts are being made to discourage tribal youths from joining Security Forces (SF) / killing of SPOs/SF Personnel.

Bastar is the most affected region. Out of 13 militarised naxal companies, 9 are operating in Bastar area, 2 in Jharkhand and 1 each in Orissa and Maharashtra. Out of approximate 80 independent military platoons, 50 are operating in Bastar region alone. The North Telangana Special Zonal Committee (NTSZC) has retreated to South Bastar area. Bastar has a geographic area of 40,000 sq. kms. Hilly forested area and poor communication has helped Maoists to use the area to hold training camps to impart militarized training. Jungles of Bastar are also being used for trial of rocket and mortars which they have fabricated. Chintalnar in Dantewada has been declared India capital of CPI (Maoist). The districts bordering Bastar in Orissa, A.P. and Maharashtra are the most Maoist affected districts. North Telengana affected Special Zonal Committee (NTSZC), Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) and Andhra Orissa Border Committee (AOB) operate here.

The latest trend among the Maoists has been to use sophisticated equipments like satellite phones and VHF sets for communication and use of IEDs. There is a plan to make extensive use of the internet for transmission of encrypted data. The Maoists have increased their targeting of government properties and are recruiting more women cadres. They are graduating from guerilla to mobile warfare and are establishing linkages with other extremist groups. Less aggressive but vocal front organisations and friendly NGOs are attempting to malign the state government and the Maoists are also infiltrating media, trade unions and NGOs. They are also trying to attract international attention by raising the bogey of human rights and are exacting extortion money from industrialists, businessmen and contractors. Kidnapping has emerged as a new bargaining weapon for the maoists. The overall development of the region has suffered as contractors and government servants are too scared to operate in Bastar.

Salwa Judum which literally means 'Peace March' was a spontaneous movement launched by the people in 2005. The maoists targeted the movement as it threatened their existence. CPI (maoist) in their document accepted 'Salwa Judum' movement as biggest threat to their existence after 1971.

The state government has been dealing firmly with the extremists since 2004. It is addressing the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts in a holistic manner. It is also ensuring inter-state coordination in dealing with the problem. Utmost priority has been accorded to rapid socio-economic development in the Naxal affected areas. A massive recruitment drive has increased the police force in past six years from 22,000 to 52,000. The Influence of naxalites has been minimised in Surguj region. The Integrated Development Plan of the Government of India is being optimized judiciously and nearly 40 % of the budget is being spent for tribal areas. Greater emphasis is being laid on harnessing solar energy and the Public Distribution System. 35 Kg Rice is being supplied at Re1 per kg to over 70% of the population in Tribal areas. Two universities are being set up at Jagdalpur and Ambikapur in addition to



establishing a medical college in Jagdalpur. Polytechnics are also being set up in Datewada. 2.1 lakh Patta's under Tribal Rights over Forest Land Act have been allocated and all Patta holders are being assisted with land development, agriculture and development schemes. Joint forest management groups have been set up to protect forests and steps have been taken to improve medical and healthcare facilities in tribal areas. Local girls are being appointed as mitanins and anganwadi workers. A Bastar Development Group headed by the Chief Secretary has been created to hasten development work in the region.

On the security front, the following measures have been undertaken:-

- Use of mass media to highlight the futility of Naxal violence.
- A comprehensive surrender and rehabilitation policy for the Naxals.
- Political sensitisation at national level.
- For legal assistance and support in the HC and SC a team of legal experts to advise on the relevant issues and to defend the same in courts.
- Legislation (Chhattisgarh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam 2005).
- Capacity & capability developments (Jungle Warfare College in Kanker).
- Modernisation of police force.
- Welfare and motivation measures for the security forces – 10 to 20% extra allowance.

### **Ground Report: Jharkhand – Mr Shivaji Mohan Cairae**

The genesis of the Maoist problem in undivided Bihar lay in caste clashes that took place in Gaya and then spread to other areas. In Jharkhand, 21 out of 24 districts of the state are affected by naxal violence. All districts except Khunti and Lohardaga have inter-state boundaries. The state has a total population of 2.70 crore and 1.7 crore comprises of SX/ST and OBCs. Lack of roads and exploitation of resources by few individuals have aggravated the maoist problem in the state. Jharkhand has tremendous national wealth in the form of mineral resources but the same has been exploited by a few people to become rich whereas others are badly exploited.

The People's War Group has acquired greater technical knowledge to handle mines and explosives. Extortion has become a major racket and means for the Maoists to gather funds. In one instance, it was found that out of Rs 64 Crore extorted from a district, only Rs 2 Lakhs were retained by the local cadres and the remaining amount was channeled to the Central Politburo. The state police, therefore decided to exploit this deficiency and create a division in the maoist ranks. The aim was to make the seven outfits that share booty in the state to fight among themselves. Attempts were made to infiltrate into their rank and file through the rural police and chowkidars. But, only five major inter-group clashes took place and the maoist leadership has managed to largely keep the cadres united.

There are nine major front organisations of the Maoists functional in Jharkhand but the CPI (M-L) is their most prominent and vocal supporter. There has to be political will to effectively tackle the maoist menace. Roads are the key in bringing development to a region as they help in bridging the communication divide. The police and security forces have to improve their training and firing abilities. The solution lies in carrying out long range patrols and maintaining constant domination in and outside forest areas to keep the maoists on the run.

### **Challenges in LWE Areas – Ms Shoma Chaudhury, Managing Editor, Tehelka**

There is a need to articulate the problem correctly. The Prime Minister's description of Maoist threat being the gravest internal security threat is very mono-dramatic. It is incorrect to term the areas under naxal influence as the 'Red Corridor'; it is at best a grey zone and the situation is a huge rebuke to our model of development and democracy. The Maoist dream of implanting the red flag over the red fort is a distant dream. Most of the Maoist cadres are tribals. Activists and human rights workers who are doggedly trying to bring out the root causes are being branded as sympathisers. The development model has been challenged at many places where no Maoist support exists. No Police force/security forces can tackle LWE. At the same time, the movement is extremely violent and extortionist and villagers are sandwiched between the maoists and security forces. The living conditions of people in the affected areas are very deplorable and malaria is the real killer in Abhujmadh. People want access to justice before development. The face of Indian democracy witnessed by these people is rapacious and draconian. Hundreds of tribals are languishing in jails for frivolous crimes and the state is denying them basic human rights. We are living in silos of information. At a place in Chhattisgarh, 22 Km length of a river has been fenced for corporate use. Sarkeguda is a model today of how villages should be where Gram Vikas Abhyan, PDS and PHC are working well. Unfortunately, only the maoists are speaking of PISA, tribal rights, pattas, innocent tribals languishing in jails, etc. Why does the government not talk about these issues ? It is essential for the state to not outlaw dissent. The maoists should not be called terrorists. Salwa Judum is not a spontaneous movement. Nearly 600 villages were burned or cleared and the unrest has died down ever since Salwa Judum was banned. Why are we arming the tribals and creating conditions for a civil war ?

### **Challenges for Conflict Resolution – Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Additional Director, CLAWS**

The CPI (Maoist) methodology of spreading their influence follows a mix of coercion and collusion. Over the past few decades they have achieved varying degrees of success in many parts of the country and unless checked, will create ever increasing circles of influence. Fault lines in society are effectively used by them to promote their agenda. All societies have fault lines and India is no different. But the Maoists, by propagating the cause of the downtrodden have taken ownership of such issues and are now perceived by many as being the sole representatives of the marginalised and weaker sections of society. They have filled the vacuum caused by a lack of governance in many of India's remote areas and are well entrenched in their strongholds.

The ideological battle can only be countered by an alternate ideology. If our democracy is to be projected as the alternate, then it must be seen to be a functional entity. This would require a visible and effective justice delivery mechanism, transparency in governance, empathy on the part of government officials and targeted socio economic development.

Interventions are required in terms of constitutional mandate for placing law and order on the concurrent list to enable taking on the Naxal challenge at a pan India level. Constitutional provisions in respect of protecting the rights of the local inhabitants need to be enforced in case of existing enabling provisions such as The Panchayats [Extension to Scheduled Areas] Act (PESA). The state must also ensure that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule under Article 244 of the Indian Constitution are implemented in letter and spirit. Tribal and forest rights need to be restored in full measure. Under the provisions of the Constitution, the President of India is empowered to seek a report from the state Governors on the tribals. The state has over the years failed in gaining information on the conditions of the tribals.

A vexed problem remains the issue of ownership of the anti-Maoist operations as law and order is a state subject, but the Naxal problem has to be addressed at an all India level. While the Maoists cadres have time and again displayed tremendous mobility in the Red Corridor, the affected states are severely hamstrung by boundaries and territorial jurisdiction issues. The 'law and order' approach being propagated both by the Centre and affected state governments requires to be revisited and the threat dealt with holistically across the length and breadth of the country. An amendment to the constitution to put law and order on the concurrent list would be an important step in dealing holistically with the problem.

Both at the centre and at the state level, a vision statement must spell out the goals to be achieved. This must then be translated into a long term perspective plan. One of the key challenges for development in these states is delivery. While this is a challenge across the whole of India, in the affected states the situation is far worse. Capacities for governance need to be created at the grass root level. There is a requirement of boosting up administrative cadre substantially in numbers as well as through training, supervision and accountability. When taken as a whole, government is bloated and over staffed. However, in core areas it is embarrassingly understaffed, leading to a crisis in capacity where it actually matters. This needs to be rectified.

Accountability and prevention of corruption are well established keys to good governance as well as development. A ground check is essential to see that government schemes have been implemented and are not merely paper exercises.

In the tribal heartland, industrialisation must not be mistaken for development. Few benefits of the economic exploitation of Central India's mineral wealth have trickled down to the tribals living in those areas. This must be rectified. In addition, tribal and forest rights need to be restored in full measure.

There is a need to reform the justice delivery system to ensure a better rate of convictions in the court of law. There is also a need to establish fast track courts/ mobile

courts in inaccessible areas on priority to address the grievances of the local people on priority and to prevent them from seeking redress from courts run by the Naxals.

A strong check on the activities of various NGOs and social organisations must be established. While it would be inappropriate to interfere in their functioning, there is certainly a requirement to ensure transparency in their functioning especially with respect to the flow of funds and types of activities undertaken. Today, we need to provide good governance in the worst of law and order environments.

Education must remain the principal intervention, particularly in Bihar and Jharkhand and in the entire tribal belt. While emphasis on infrastructure development such as roads, electricity and so on is important, it must be in conjunction with investment on development of human capital in terms of education and work skills. This will reduce pressure on migration and also provide substantial intangible gains in terms of social cohesion and reduction of conflict and tension within society.

A holistic approach to include development, security and rights (DSR) of the people needs to be incorporated instead of merely emphasising the dyad of development and security. Once 'rights' are incorporated into the development paradigm, the economic well being of the people can be progressed along with the protection of their identity, language, culture and way of life.

The corporate sector has been a major beneficiary of the wealth of these areas but has done precious little in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Leave alone CSR, most corporate have not even fulfilled a small percentage of their laid down contractual obligations. This factor needs to be addressed on priority with heavy financial penalties being imposed on defaulters. In addition, the local people must be central to the development effort and not the industry.

The Naxal challenge primarily remains that of development, governance and rights delivery. However, for the state to carry out its functions, it would have to neutralise the PLGA. The state police forces must remain the primary instruments of addressing security concerns within the state. They could be assisted by central police forces such as the CRPF and the BSF. However, leadership and training concerns must be addressed.

### **Shri MA Ganpati, JS Naxal Management, MHA**

The maoist problem emerged because of exploitation of the masses by a small group of people who control resources, justice delivery system and decision making. There will always be imperfections in a democracy. So, if there is some injustice, does that give some people the right to take up arms against the state ? On one hand they take up arms and on the other they talk about the Constitution. Does that give them any legitimacy ? Media persons cannot become activists and dilute the Maoist threat. The levels of violence and spread of LWE has been shrinking in many areas. They have peaked and will only go down now. The situation has improved in West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The state has more resources at its disposal and the Maoists can only operate in a vacuum. As soon as the political vacuum was filled in

West Bengal, the maoist support base collapsed within days. The development v/s security debate is a non-starter. Development activities can be carried out in areas where there is a low level of threat and it can take place in worst affected areas only after the security aspect has been addressed. The security vacuum in the red corridor is being filled gradually. Maoists flourish in certain pockets due to scant presence of security forces. For example, the DKSZC base area of the Maoists spread out in an area of 512 sq km had the deployment of only one company of CAPFs.

### **Session III: Conflict Resolution in North East India**

#### **Nagaland: Status of Ceasefire and Internal Dynamics – Maj Gen N George (Retd), Chairman, Cease Fire Supervisory Board (CFSB)**

In Nagaland, the past holds a number of valuable lessons for both government bodies and the strategic community. Nagaland is a state of various tribes and clans which are different from each other. Each tribe has a distinct tribal identity and this identity is dominant within the state. Only when people from the state have external dealings with entities such as Government of India does the common Naga identity come to the fore. In the legislature, there is hence proportional representation for Nagaland based on tribal quotas. Historically, various efforts were made to unify the Naga people, the earliest example of which is the American Evangelism of the early 17<sup>th</sup> century. Other attempts in this direction were the formation of Naga Club in 1918 and Naga National Council in 1946. The primary motivation for assertion of Naga identity and the subsequent demands for independence was the fear of being swamped by Indians from the mainland. This led to simmering tensions and eventually conflict in the 1950s. To preserve Naga identity, Nagaland became the 16<sup>th</sup> state of the Union in 1963.

There were various stages of conflict and ceasefires from 1964 to 1997. The NSCN was formed in 1980 after the splitting of NNC. Further splintering took place in 1988 with the formation of NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K). The 1997 ceasefire agreement was supposed to be a landmark deal but it had its shortcomings. The major shortcomings were:

- i) The Centre had a ceasefire with UG groups but the state was kept out of the loop.
- ii) UG groups had not abandoned secessionist agenda.
- iii) Weapons retained by UG groups.
- iv) Ground rules formulated were loaded with ambiguities.
- v) Ceasefire was not followed up with a sincere effort at conflict resolution.

Currently, the situation on ground is worrisome with increase in strength, weapons and financial resources of UG groups. Arrangements need to be put in place for disarmament and rehabilitation of demobilised underground groups. There has been a near total abdication of authority by the state and governmental civic bodies. NSCN (IM) which was on the ropes in 1997 is now dictating terms in any agreement of the Naga issue. There is an urgent need to mobilise popular support among the Naga community through elected representatives and revitalise the credibility of Government of India.

## **Manipur- Status Report: Brig Narender Kumar, SM, BGS, UB Area**

The current state of affairs in Manipur is depressing. In spite of abundant natural resources, land and water, the economy of the state is in shambles and serious deficits exist in food production, power availability and in trust. The state has great strategic value as it can form a land route to the ASEAN countries and act as an alternative to the Malacca Straits. Its per capita income at Rs 30,000 is low as compared to the national per capita income of Rs 48,000. It has only two important highways which are its economic lifeline. These highways are the theater of war for the warring rival groups which use these communication arteries to stifle economic growth and mobility of the state from time to time. This seriously aggravates the security situation in Manipur and the Government of India can no longer afford to drag its heels on the resolution of the Manipur issue.

Manipur is a state with a mix of numerous ethnic states within its boundaries. The issue of Manipur can only be ignored at our own risk. Some of the success stories which can be worked upon are the successful implementation of NREGA scheme, huge potential of the local populace and economic benefits that can accrue from the surplus natural resources. The list of failures includes peace, security and prosperity of the state.

Historically Manipur has been witness to three major movements for self- determination. The first was from 1819-26, the next at the time of Independence in 1947 and the third which continues till date is the Hizam Irabot inspired ideology which continues till date

The resolutions of the GoI are not working and nearly three generations of Manipuris have been lost in the process. People's demands have vacillated from complete sovereignty to the current demand of shared sovereignty. Although the levels of violence have gone down in the state, peace is a distant possibility. The capability of the insurgent groups has been eroded significantly and there are no more no-go zones in Manipur.

The insurgency in Manipur has seen many different cycles starting with the ideology based struggle of Hizam Irabot to industry style self-seeking leaders and finally the increasing influence of jihadi and LWE elements. Currently, most of the groups operating in Manipur are influenced by leftist ideology. Extortion, drug trafficking and weapon smuggling are the main instruments of raising money by the underground groups. Although direct violence has reduced in the state, the possibility of structural, institutional and cultural violence has increased.

Some recommendations for the state of Manipur which could help in achieving peace and prosperity with dignity are as under: -

- i) Invest in infrastructure and development projects to convert the state into a trade corridor.
- ii) Extraction and utilisation of natural resources especially Oil and Gas.
- iii) Strengthen education institutions.
- iv) Promote multi-cropping and new irrigation facilities.
- v) Improve communication and transportation network.

**Ears to the ground in North East – Col SS Shekhawat, KC, SC, SM, VSM  
CO 21 PARA (SF)**

Most of the insurgent groups and some sections of population in all North Eastern states have a feeling of disassociation from mainland India and the idea of being a citizen of India. The local populaces' feeling of alienation and fear of being swamped by people from the mainland has been exploited by insurgent groups to push their agenda of secession and armed struggle against their elected governments.

The main insurgent groups, Kukis, Nagas and Zoumis have been brought under Suspension of Operation (SOO) in Manipur. The Meitei is sheltered, armed and trained in camps from Myanmar. The insurgents are facing a leadership crisis with a dwindling cadre of new recruits. Extortion is the mainstay of financing and weapons are procured from foreign countries. The military situation in Manipur is under control and apart from valley based insurgent groups (VBIGs), all other have been brought under SOO. The so called "Liberated Zones" have been brought under state control. The overall situation is peaceful but comprehensive conflict resolution is still distant.

The insurgency in Assam is polarised on ethnic lines. The main groups are ULFA, NDFB, BLT-Christians and Hindu Bodos. In the recent past, there have been weak efforts at reviving the ULFA. The insurgents have established camps in highly remote areas and continue recruiting poor people for its cadre. The insurgents have been avoiding direct confrontation with security forces and are using sophisticated remotely detonated IEDs. ULFA has been broken and factionalised. Other insurgent groups such as NDFB and BLT have been brought under SOO. The military situation is under control and a mass secessionist or insurgent movement is highly unlikely.

The situation in Nagaland is one of turf control by various factions such as NSCN (IM), NSCN (K), NSCN (KK) and NSCN (U). The writ of these various factions runs in their respective areas of control. These groups also play a very important role in state politics and have the capability to create major law and order problems. Extortion and economic blockades are their weapons of choice to subjugate the local populace. The overall situation in Nagaland is under control and the GoI has to proactively assert its authority over the state.

The state of affairs in Arunachal Pradesh is also of turf control over revenue collection and cadre recruitment sources. The various factions operating in the state are NSCN (IM), NSCN (K), ULFA and VBIGs. The NSCN (K) has an agreement with the ULFA to provide passage to them in their area of control. The local population of the state is culturally very sophisticated. The youth basically want avenues to good employment and the means to live a more meaningful life. The population as a whole is averse to violence and trouble. The locals are fed up with the long drawn insurgency. The locals are aware of the economic development taking place across India and want to be a part of it. The demand is for peace, stability and prosperity. The insurgent focus is on making money rather than any ideology driven revolution. Conflict resolution will lie in the realm of peace and socio-economic development.

## **Assam: Status Report – Dr Sanjoy Hazarika**

Assam has approximately 2.5 per cent of India's population i.e. 30 million but has a huge displaced population of nearly 2 million. Assam is a tinderbox and the situation can get out of hand very quickly. The area has been simmering with a viscous conflict between the Bodos and Muslims. The problem vitiated after the partition of India in 1947 and the migration of Bangladeshi Muslims to Assam in large droves after the 1971 conflict.

Almost all conflicts in this area can be traced back to the problem of land and the associated reforms. Land lends identity to the residing locals and is of utmost importance to them. Land as a resource can lead to economic welfare but also a source of conflict and tension. Assam is a land strained state of India and with the illegal influx of large numbers of Bangladeshis in this region creates tension between the natives and the migrant population.

The political agenda of Congress in 1946 against the Muslim League was protection of land and crusade against illegal immigration. The means to the end was selective representation of information to the local populace and backing of efforts to forbid migration to the region.

The current situation in Assam is one of relative peace. In 2003, the Bodo Accord was signed in the hope of conflict resolution. The Accord had clauses which specifically protected Bodo rights and reserved seats for them in the state legislature. This led to significant increase in the political clout of the Bodo population. The Bodos are only 26-28 per cent of Assam's demographics. There is not one group in Assam which has a majority. The concentration of power in the hands of the Bodos has led to dissatisfaction among the nearly 70 percent of non-Bodo population. There has been a formation of a non-Bodo forum whose main demands are protection of rights and proportional political representation.

There has been criticism of the Army because of the perceived tendency to react too late in tension situations. It is widely accepted that the presence of Army has a pacifying and deterring effect on the troublemakers. Another area of concern is the discord and disconnect between the centre-state relations. There is recognition that the Bodo Accord of 2003 can't be scrapped but the trust deficit between the two communities needs to be bridged quickly and comprehensively.

## **Dr N Manoharan – External Linkages of NE Groups**

The geographical location of NE states lends itself to being prone to foreign influence as more than 90 percent of the border of states is with other countries including Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh and China. The region is the most isolated area of India and unresolved border disputes lead to high degree of volatility. The great arms bazaar of NE is a well-known and accepted fact which leads to further tensions and insurgency movements.

The foreign countries bordering the NE states provide material, financial, training and motivational support to the various insurgent groups. Left to themselves these



underground groups would have withered away with time but external assistance keeps them healthy and capable. The region has one of the most inhospitable terrains which act as easy shelters and camps for these insurgent groups. The problem of vast porous borders allows swift movement of men, money and weapons. Countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar are themselves underdeveloped and unable to contain cross border movement.

The process of integration, assimilation and economic development is work in progress in the NE states. The main motivations of external linkages for the insurgent groups are arms, finance, training, international recognition of their struggles and shelter and ideological indoctrination.

Maoist or left wing ideology is the prevalent philosophy in the NE region. Jihadi elements and ideology is also gaining ground rapidly. The countries which are directly involved in this region are Pakistan and China.

Some of the counter measures to lessen the influence of foreign countries are:

- i) Better border management to curb arms and funds.
- ii) Diplomatic and governmental initiatives through elected representatives to address the source of these insurgencies.
- iii) Enhancing the capability of our security forces and the underlying legal mechanisms.
- iv) Capacity building of state and civic bodies.
- v) Need to rapidly bring benefits of India's growth story to the NE.

#### **Session IV: Relevance of AFSPA and Unified Command Structure**

##### **Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1990: Relevance and Review – Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)**

The relevance of AFSPA has been much debated in the last couple of years. The need for the Act was felt due to inability of the state and local security forces to handle situations in various parts of India post-independence. According to the constitution, law and order is a state subject and under the jurisdiction of state police and other local security forces. The need to identify parts of India as disturbed areas and the follow on application of AFSPA with deployment of Army was to protect the soldiers from arbitrary and legal prosecution. The identification of an area as disturbed means that the administrative machinery in the state has failed and there is a need to employ the Army. The Indian Army needs legal protection to operate in these hostile areas and extraordinary situations.

The case against AFSPA is baseless and it is only the political elite who are responsible for the deployment of Army in disturbed areas. AFSPA is an enabling act which allows the Army to maintain operational effectiveness and efficiency. The need of AFSPA is as relevant today as it was in the past because of:

- i) Insurgency and terrorism in large parts of India
- ii) Inability of local administrative machinery in these states to tackle the menace

- iii) Disconnect in centre-state relations
- iv) Absence of comprehensive national internal security strategy
- v) Weak intelligence and border management

MoD and the Army are opposed to any major overhaul of the AFSPA as it will expose our soldiers operating in such dangerous environments to legal hassles and prosecution. MHA is rooting for major changes in AFSPA. There has been a lot of criticism of AFSPA in recent times mainly by the pro-Human Rights groups. Their main points of contention are Section 4 and Section 6 which allow Army to arrest suspects without warrant and the ability to prosecute Army personnel only after prior approval from central government respectively. What critics forget is that Army HQ has mandated all suspects who are arrested will be handed over to civilian authorities within 24 hours and that fire may be opened only in self-defence and that too when the source of terrorist or militant fire can be clearly identified.

Some of the recommendations to strengthen internal security are:

- i) Constitutional amendments required to smoothen and strengthen centre-state relations in matters of national security.
- ii) Appointment of MoS for internal security.
- iii) Formulation of comprehensive internal security strategy.
- iv) Joint intelligence sharing mechanisms such as NCTC.
- v) Streamline working of Unified Commands and JIC.
- vi) Modernise Army's, CAPFs and state police's counter insurgency capabilities.

### **Unified Command Structure- Benefits and Bane – Brig KJS Dhillon, YSM, HQ 15 Corps:**

The unified command structure in existence in J&K has been successful in achieving the goals set for it. The chief minister of J&K is at the head of the unified command structure. The second level constitutes the Army, state police, and CAPF heads along with the home secretary. The meetings known as core group meetings take place on a regular basis to discuss various pertinent issues to the security of J&K. The core group meetings are held under the following circumstances:

- i) Periodic - Once a month
- ii) Event based – Elections, Yatra
- iii) Special – Occasion based such as the killing of US Ambassador in Libya
- iv) Mini Core – Regular interaction between various security forces

These meetings help in sharing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) in real time, so as to understand the pulse of the 'Awaam' of J&K. The police of J&K have a very strong intelligence network which is complimented by the operational capability of the army to execute counter insurgency and anti-terrorists operations very effectively. The security forces work in tandem with the civilian administration to coordinate development works and impose the constitutional authority of the government.

The challenges to the Unified Command Structure vary in size and nature but can be surmounted with coordination and cooperation with all agencies involved. One of them is the ability to execute joint interrogations. Another is the mutual exploitation of intelligence resources by both police and army. There are variations in the working ethos of the various security forces which pose a challenge to integrated and coordinated efforts. The police is susceptible to local influence of population as well as politicians and if the operational effectiveness is not compromised, then army needs to be more understanding of their operating environment.

### **Winning Hearts and Minds: Ground Realities – Col Amit Tewatia, CO 16 DOGRA**

The strategy of winning hearts and minds (WHAM) of the local populace is at the core of any counter insurgency operation. WHAM in the Indian Army is implemented by using the resources of the military to develop cordial relations with the locals without compromising operational capability. WHAM is a long drawn process which is crucial in weaning away the support and recruitment base of insurgents.

The important characteristics of WHAM as practiced by the Indian Army are they help in garnering popular support in the area of operations, are willingly performed by the concerned units of the army, meets greatest needs of the locals with the greatest effort and last but not the least help in improving the image of GoI. Some of the WHAM projects being implemented by the Indian Army are:

- i) Op Sadbhavana- The project is funded by MoD and implemented by army units in area of operation. It is the biggest WHAM project undertaken by the army.
- ii) Op Samaritan- It is being funded by the MHA and there is restriction on using the funds only in notified areas
- iii) DGAR MCA (Military Civic Action)

The focus areas of all the above WHAM projects are education, health, community development, IT, women empowerment and skill development. 75 per cent of the funds go towards education and developmental projects. The impact of these WHAM projects have been significant in terms of galvanising the youth, providing semblance to governance, alienating insurgent groups and winning popular support for security forces and GoI.

### **Winning Hearts and Minds: Ground Realities – Col Arun Aggarwal, CO 14 RAJPUT**

The Indian Army is a facilitator and catalyst on the ground to execute the goodwill projects identified jointly by the state administration and the local populace. The implementation of WHAM projects are on a personal as well as societal level which lead to long term and hard earned goodwill for the security forces on ground. The basic philosophy behind the WHAM projects is to utilise heart as a weapon to win the game of minds.

WHAM was made an integral part of the sun-conventional warfare doctrine of the Indian Army released in 2006. The vision was that it would provide healing touch during conflict and win over the alienated sections of people in the conflict zone. WHAM is a people-oriented process for establishing human, social and political linkages for the common good, contributing to building the concept of nationhood.

Some of the initiatives undertaken as part of the WHAM scheme in the Longding area are:

- i) Surgical strikes in coordination with local security forces
- ii) Village evacuation drills in order to deny militants the human shield factor
- iii) Gainful employment of media to spread awareness
- iv) Greater involvement of army in development projects
- v) Sensitising army to local customs, traditions and festivals

There was a conscious effort to delink intelligence ops from WHAM as it creates a negative image in the minds of people. Wanchos are the main tribe residing in the Longding area and have Mongoloid features with strong tribal identity and affinity to land. The situation of these tribal people is aggravated by lack of development, rampant corruption, politico-militant nexus, limited ability of local police, drug addiction and long festering insurgency.

Op Sadbhavana was initiated to tackle the ills of the society and to provide purpose and meaningful employment particularly to the youth. Under Op Sadbhavana, four schools were renovated, girls' hostel upgraded at Tewai, two computer centres established at Pongchou and one medical camp set up in Ngamding. The efforts were hampered by unavailability of registered civilian contractors, strict CDA regulations and inability to follow up on the implemented projects. As part of Op Samaritan, toilet blocks were built at Pongchou. Some of the major constraints while implementing WHAM projects were:

- i) Limited funds for WHAM
- ii) Procedural delays and over cautious CDA/CFA staff
- iii) Non Availability of CDA registered civilian contractors
- iv) Inadequate civilian administration to enforce follow up, transparency and accountability
- v) Misperception that WHAM is the Army's attempt at self-projection

### **Shaping the Info Environment – Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Addl Director, CLAWS**

Winning wars in today's globalised world is not by itself enough. It is essential to also win the moral high ground in the public domain on a global scale. This is equally applicable to sub conventional conflict. In the battle for shaping attitudes and perceptions, the role of non-state actors is assuming greater significance. A key component of the strategy of non-state actors is to attract support from the population by attaching the insurgency to a 'popular cause', whipping up support on perceived cases of human rights violations, magnifying the failures of the state and the like. This makes it necessary to have a strategy in place to bring out an alternate narrative to

counter hostile designs. How this narrative will play out would remain the defining challenge for affected states and their militaries.

There is a need for an organisation at the national level for perception management tasks. Currently, the National Information Board (NIB) headed by the National Security Advisor (NSA) is responsible for psyops targeted at both internal and external audiences. The NIB functions through the National Task Force (NTF), which is responsible for overseeing psychological warfare and perception management efforts of the government. This structure is recommended to be changed and replaced with an apex body for directional guidance. This could be an empowered group of ministers with the Minister of Defence and Minister of Home Affairs being co-chairs. A new appointment having powers similar to the NSA called the NIA needs to be created who would be the member secretary in such an organisation. Below the apex body, an executive council, called the Office of Strategic Influence, headed by the NIA and having members from concerned ministries and the security forces is suggested.

The tasks for this GoM are suggested as under: -

- (a) Lay down national perception management policy.
- (b) Provide periodical directional guidance.
- (c) Review impact of perception management measures every six months.

The tasks for the executive council are as under: -

- (a) Draw up a perception management execution plan.
- (b) Review implementation of the plan every quarter.
- (c) Ensure inter-departmental and inter-ministerial coordination.
- (d) Allot funds for all projects to be executed.

This structure would then have to go down to the states and the Security forces in an appropriate manner for execution of policy decisions.

There would be a requirement for enunciating a clear doctrine for information operations. Human Resource Management would be another major challenge as personnel in the organisation would require experience and knowledge of target populations, such as language, cultural and religious sensibilities, lifestyles etc. The target audience would need to be analysed in terms of language spoken, cultural sensibilities, education levels and the like to enable appropriate message content and delivery. There must also be excellence in production and delivery means to ensure the message reaches its target base and has the desired impact. Granting autonomy to Doordarshan on the lines of the BBC could give it greater reach and say. Exploiting the potential of FM radio would also prove to be useful.

How the media operates and functions should be a part of the training curriculum of officer training from the YO Course stage onwards. This aspect could be coopted into the Army training in specified courses. It must form part of the professional development

not only of officers specialising in media relations but for the professional development of senior officers also who need to understand how they can use the media effectively as part of an overall campaign. Training must include developing leaders at all levels in such a way that they learn to thrive on chaos, complexity, and uncertainty. Commanders will have to accept the fact that they will be hit by negative publicity. The anti-dote to such effects is not a shunning of the media but embracing it and getting own viewpoints across to the target audience. The need to cope with this new reality must form an essential part of leadership training at all levels.

Finally and most importantly, perceptions in an insurgency environment are shaped by the action of troops on the ground and through repeated dissemination of information via multiple dissemination means. Both aspects have great importance and traction. However, no amount of messaging can make up for troop behaviour and conduct which is not in sync with the message. The drive to win 'hearts and minds' can be eminently successful as a media blitz only if it is supported by confirmatory action by troops on the ground. The necessity to educate troops on these aspects is hence of paramount importance. With respect to messaging, the need for truthful reporting assumes critical importance. Under no circumstances should the message convey expectations which the Army cannot fulfill.

#### **Concluding Remarks: Lt Gen Philip Campose, VSM, DG PP**

The session was very enlightening and educative. The eminent panel of speakers did a great job in bringing forth the challenges that are being faced by our troops on the ground every day in insurgency hit areas. The panellists also gave a lot of suggestions and recommendations based on their extensive research, which can be incorporated in one measure or the other by the governmental departments concerned and the defence forces too.

