

**CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS)**  
**REPORT ON**  
**NATIONAL SEMINAR ON**  
**INDIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: REMEMBERING THE PAST TO LOOK INTO**  
**THE FUTURE**

**General**

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies organized a one day seminar on “India-China Relationship: Remembering the Past to look into the Future” on 23rd November 2012 at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. Maj Gen (Retd) Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM, Director CLAWS delivered the welcome address. His Excellency Gen (Retd) JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, and Governor of Arunachal Pradesh delivered the keynote address. The Indo-China Seminar reflected on the Battle of 1962 in the context of various reasons responsible for India’s failure and a vigorous analysis over what the future beckons us to do. The defense capabilities of India were seen in the light of that of China, the contentious issues prevalent between the two were discussed, the co-operation that exists between Military and political leadership at present in India was closely observed. It therefore revolved around how India’s foreign policy towards China can be directed towards risk reduction for potential conflict. The seminar was attended by serving and retired officers of all three services, members of the strategic community and the defense industry sector.

**Inaugural Session**

**Keynote Address- His Excellency Gen JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM,**  
**Governor of Arunachal Pradesh**

The 1962 war was an unmitigated disaster which laid bare the ineptness in evolving our strategy as also the inability of our leadership -- political, military,

intelligence agencies and the civil services -- to read the Chinese designs and intentions, and the lack of preparedness of the military and the nation to face the challenge posed by China's aggression. In his book 'Prepare or Perish', Gen KV Krishna Rao, a distinguished former Army Chief and later Governor of Jammu and Kashmir has stated that, the Indian government "deluded itself into believing that the Chinese would not resort to a war to settle the border problem".

Enough has been written about the background, causes and lessons learnt from that war, but these issues again factor in today's deliberations and meaningful deductions drawn thereupon. Given their geo-strategic location, size, population, resources and potential, the relations between India and China assume the highest importance for peace, prosperity and stability of the region and the world at large. The challenges that impact the relations between the two nations are:

- An unresolved boundary along the Himalayas
- Chinese perception of a US-India strategy to contain China.
- The possibility of diversion of waters of rivers emanating from Tibet.
- A latent potential for unrest in Tibet, which comes to the surface from time to time.
- The political and economic dimensions of two rising powers of Asia -- rivalry or competition -- for markets and resources.

On the other hand, there are positive factors that would usher convergence of interests and cooperation such as:

- Improved bilateral relations due to the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership Agreement of 2005.
- The new leadership in China will give great importance to relations with India, as stated by Wen Jiabao recently.
- Growing trade and commerce which could touch \$100 billion by 2015, a phenomenal increase from \$0.35 billion in 1992. Of necessity, the trade imbalance has to be set right, so that it is a win-win for both nations.
- A growing understanding amongst the leadership of the two nations that peace and stability is imperative to bring up the socio-economic conditions of millions of their people.

- Greater sense of responsibility coming in the wake of recognition of having acquired or in the process of acquiring the status of powerful nations in the region and globally.
- An understanding that there is "enough space for growth", as stated by the respective prime ministers of both countries.
- Enhancement of military power of both sides, albeit the Chinese having a definite edge at present, and the deterrence value of nuclear weapons.
- Challenge posed by the altitude and terrain in Tibet region that would inhibit the deployment of the full might of either side (an imperative to facilitate a decisive result in a conflict situation) and thereby, act as a restraining factor.

A comprehensive review of the boundary issue between India and China brings out, first, that India's northern boundary is essentially a product of environmental and historical factors operating over centuries, secondly, that although parts of the boundary had already become traditional even before the British rule, other sectors took their present shape under the impact of new threats from inner Asia in the 19th and early 20th century and the new concepts of security which the British brought with them, and thirdly, that the end product was by and large, the formulation of the principle of the highest crest line or watershed of the northern mountain system as the boundary for political purposes.

### **Reconciling differences**

The Sino-Indian border issue needs to be addressed on a faster pace. For years both sides have been adopting fixed positions. The visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 was a landmark event, laying the foundation for a more vibrant bilateral relationship. It resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquility along the border in 1993, during the visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. The two sides agree that a border settlement must be fair and equitable. The question arises as to how to reconcile the known differences within a reasonable timeframe.

During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003, both countries forged a commitment at the highest level to move ahead purposefully and resolve the boundary question peacefully. The two sides agreed to appoint a special representative to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework of a boundary settlement. Meanwhile, peace and tranquility would be maintained in the border areas by strengthening mechanisms on the ground. To resolve a complex problem like this, no straight

forward or universally applicable principle can be rigidly applied. Geography does not follow cardinal directions or make available an unbroken chain of a mountain system to create an undisputable boundary. Although the Great Himalaya is a formidable barrier going in an arc, there are important rivers cutting across from Tibet to the Indian plains with attendant problems of defining the boundary in certain areas. Hence, any mutually acceptable solution will have to be an exercise carried out objectively and pragmatically, based on the agreement on political parameters and guiding principles signed in 2005.

A new equation is emerging in the balance of power in the world, with the centre of gravity shifting towards Asia. The cooperation in the field of defence has also grown phenomenally consequent to the highly significant Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation that was signed during the visit of then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Beijing in 2006. Important aspects of this MoU were given concrete shape during my visit as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee with a tri-service delegation to China in May 2007. We were able to take our military to military engagement to an unprecedented high and we agreed to hold the first-ever defence dialogue and also settled upon the modalities of joint training. For army officers of our generation and our predecessors who had been through the 1962 showdown, this was something incredible. The same may have been the case on the Chinese side.

There are regular exchanges of officers undergoing training in both countries, goodwill visits and engagement of defence experts in various seminars and conferences. Besides this, military observers have been permitted by both sides to attend military exercises and manoeuvres. As part of the confidence building exercise for ensuring peace and tranquility on the border, troops of both countries hold sports and cultural meets regularly, particularly during national day celebrations and flag meetings at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

In another dimension, we need to have a careful look at the existing structure of our national security apparatus and defence management at the strategic level. The institutionalisation of the military component of this apparatus in the decision-making loop is unexceptional. This would ensure that expert military advice is available to the national leadership and policy-makers, as is the case in other major democratic nations.

## **Military diplomacy**

While formulating and conducting foreign policy, particularly in our fairly volatile neighbourhood and also in those countries where the military is all-powerful, military diplomacy and the views of the service chiefs would prove to be invaluable. Timely advice can help in the prevention of a security situation from snowballing out of control. In a few security related situations in the past, the armed forces were not quite aware of the big picture or were caught unprepared or without having the desired readiness levels when asked to execute a mission. Such instances are not in the best interests of the nation and hence, should be scrupulously avoided as far as possible. An integrated team with officials from the services and the ministries of defence, external affairs, finance and home makes good sense. Equally important is the need to have integrated teams within the army, navy and air force at the theatre commands and at the service HQs. Once this model has matured over a few years, we could have in place a Chief of Defence Staff by 2020, with the operational responsibility of the armed forces and the accountability that goes with it.

Well-orchestrated military diplomacy can help in the achievement of our foreign policy goals and in addressing our national security concerns. I have been a great advocate of involving the armed forces during the evolution and formulation of our foreign policy with respect to our neighbouring countries. This will further our national interests, build mutual trust and confidence, and thereby engender peace and stability in the region. This is particularly true in the case of countries where the military has an overarching role in policy-making or governance.

## **Probability of a war**

Hypothetically, in the eventuality of a localised border conflict that some experts articulate, would it be restricted to the border alone as was the case in 1962, or would it engulf the Tibetan theatre and beyond on both sides of the Himalayas and carry the risk of being blown into a larger conflagration between two nuclear powers? What would be the impact of employment of air power, missiles, space, psychological, cyber and electronic warfare? How would the issue of logistics, including stocking of weapons, ammunition, equipment, supplies and effects of high altitude and climate on the shelf life affect the conduct of operations? What measures are needed to ensure that we are not surprised again and our eyes and ears on land and in space are qualitatively state-of-the-art? These are some of the questions that deserve to be deliberated in greater detail.

Many theorists have been predicting a war between China and India. First it was supposed to have happened after the Beijing Olympics. Then it was forecast to for 2012 and now some talk of 2020. Many of these analysts haven't seen the Himalayan region on either side or merely undertaken whistle-stop tours in fair weather. To comprehend the true dimensions of fighting in this region, one has to see the conditions during winters when snow and blizzards make life impossible or in monsoons when it rains for days on end and small streams become raging torrents washing away bridges and parts of roads. These arm-chair strategists should understand that no modern war can be fought unless it is thought through in its entirety and more importantly only if the initiator is convinced that it can be won. Further, to start a nuclear war would be the height of folly.

However, we cannot afford to be complacent or let our guard down. In fact, we should continue to modernise and enhance the capabilities of our armed forces and improve border infrastructure, strengthen intelligence agencies and provide them state-of-the-art wherewithal for giving real-time intelligence and thereby enhance our capability to face the challenges of the future appropriately. We should not forget the truism that "strength begets respect".

Overall, barring the border war of 1962, relations between the two Asian giants have been generally friendly. At times there has been friction on the border issue, but mature and statesmanlike leadership on both sides has ensured that such problems are resolved peacefully through dialogue at the highest level. The landmark agreements of 1993, 1996, 2003 and signing of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005, are aimed at maintaining peace and tranquility on the borders while addressing the boundary question and enhancing mutual trust and understanding. China has become our largest trading partner with trade worth US\$ 61.7 billion taking place in 2010. There is tremendous scope for enhancing bilateral relations and reaching a consensus on other vital global issues like maritime security climate, control, financial order and sustainable development. The military to military cooperation could form a pivot in our relations with China for enabling a secure and stable environment for the good of both nations and the region.

## **SESSION I - A Window to The Past**

### **Opening Remarks by Chairperson – Gen VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), former COAS, Indian Army**

Improved bilateral relations between India and China and the new leadership post Wen Jiabao will give new dimensions to the political contours. The military cooperation between the two countries is gaining momentum, security personnel from either side have been exposed to several Defence operations and tactics. Indian intelligence services have to be strengthened to avoid the lapses that one witnessed in 1962. There is a need to maintain peace and tranquility in the border, maritime security and sustainable development will play an integral role for India to counter Chinese aggression in future.

India needs to learn lessons from the past failing which moving ahead will be unstable and strategically incorrect. India needs to: -

- Involve armed forces in foreign policy deliberations.
- Take steps to ensure that we are not surprised again.
- Evolve a role for media in conflict situations.
- Determine the contours of a war in high altitudes.
- Determine the impact of air power and cyber war.

### **A brief of the 1962 Conflict and its Aftermath: Maj Gen Ashok Kalyan Verma, AVSM, (Retd)**

The debacle of 1962 war provides some vital details about the Chinese tactics. It is extremely important that India learn from its failure in the war. The unpreparedness of the military at Namka Chu was immensely responsible for our downfall.

Both PM Jawaharlal Nehru and the then Defense Minister Krishna Menon misconstrued Chinese capabilities to wage a war. They also misjudged Chinese intentions in Ladakh.

The Chinese tactical movement, their endurance and their motivation as professional soldiers was of a high order. Indian forces were not numerically grossly inferior as there were 12000 Indian soldiers pitted against 22000 Chinese soldiers. Indian weakness lay not in numbers but in equipping of the force, logistic infrastructure and higher direction of war. As a result, India lost 221 officers and 5100 soldiers in the conflict. The Chinese intelligence services had done their homework during the 1944 Tibetan operations in terms of effectively studying the area to be attacked and incorporating guides at every level. India needs to study the method and the strategy used by the Chinese armed forces to infiltrate into defense occupied areas. The study of the Chinese strategy during the Korean war could have yielded significant inputs in the 1962 war; unfortunately, this was never attempted.

To ensure that we learn the right lessons, we must declassify all material and records pertaining to the war to enable study by both the military and civilian scholars. Only then can appropriate lessons be drawn from the conflict. The following points also need to be noted: -

- The battle of 1962 was not a reaction to the setting up of forward posts by India. The Chinese had been preparing to wage a war against India from a very long time
- How the Chinese armed forces operate still needs to be learnt by our military.
- There is a need to study our military history and improve upon our strategic culture.

### **The Battle of Namka Chu: Lt. Gen Ravi Eipe, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)**

Fifty years after the battle of 1962, China still remains a major aggressor. The contentious issues between India and China, which prevailed then, still exist like the modern economic rivalry, unrest in Tibet, Indo- US relations and such. The Battle of Namka Chu was the first battle fought on the 20<sup>th</sup> October in the



Kameng Sector. This battle had a major impact on the outcome of the war. India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru had put forth the forward policy, which required the armed forces to reclaim own territory by establishing posts close to the McMahon line. The dispute in this area revolved around Thagla Ridge. The Chinese claimed it was on the Tibetan side and India claimed it was on its side of the McMahon line. Accordingly, in 1959 an Assam Rifles post was established at Khinzemane. The Chinese disputed it and a force of 200 Chinese pushed back the weak Indian force towards the bridge on the Nyamjang Chu at Drokung Samba, which they claimed was the McMahon line. After the Chinese left, the Indians again reoccupied the post. The Chinese again tried to dislodge the post but this time they were resisted by the Assam Rifles. This time they withdrew and started a chain of diplomatic exchanges between the two Governments.

On September 8<sup>th</sup> the Chinese troops laid siege to the Assam Rifles Post at a place called Dholu, South of the Namka Chu River. The Indian armed forces were ordered to evict the Chinese forces from the Thag La range. However, 7 Infantry Brigade could not implement any effective plans or strategy to counter the Chinese due to lack of knowledge of tracks, lack of men, lack of weapons and an insurmountable Chinese power. By 08 October the brigade finally concentrated around the Thag La ridge and established a post at a place called Tseng Jong on the Thagla Ridge on 9 October. The Chinese reacted strongly and overran the post the next day. Government reluctance to issue orders to stay operations across the Namka Chu led to the brigade holding positions on the river line which were not defensible and were dominated by heights on both sides. The Indian troops suffered because of lack of preparation, mismatched rations, and archaic weapons. While the Indian troops were subjected to rough terrain and climate, the Chinese had better conditions on their side; they had built a road, which facilitated supplies via mules and motor transport. They had been building a complete division armed with artillery, mortars, something the Indians were not aware of at all. When the Chinese attacked the positions on 20 October,

preceded by heavy shelling, despite stiff resistance put up by the defenders, the positions fell in a few hours of fighting. Lessons from the battle are as under: -

- India failed to assess enemy intentions.
- The failure at Namka Chu had a rippling effect at other places.
- Intelligence capability against the Chinese needs to be strengthened.
- A focus on cyber and other electronic warfare is imperative.
- The principle of deception by the Chinese needs to be strategically analysed. They were successful in concealing their preparation to wage a war against India very effectively.
- Trust deficit between the military and political leadership needs to be addressed.

**50 years of 1962 war: A comparative analysis of the political relationship between India and China, then and now: Inder Malhotra, Journalist and former Editor, The Times of India**

There was no political relationship, which existed between Indian and China in the 60s. India had reached a certain amount of understanding with China only during the Second World War. Instead of relying on the western point of view, we should have an understanding of our foreign policy towards China. An interesting example to show lack of strategic analysis in respect to China was that of University Grants Commission which had kept no record of doctorates who are studying Chinese policies.

The 1954 agreement between India and China could have been used as an effective instrument to make the Chinese accept borderlines, but Nehru refused to raise the dispute and took a diplomatic stance. We should have known that we are on dangerous grounds after Dalai Lama came to India in 1959 and that the Chinese would not appreciate India's support to Tibetan rebels. While Nehru believed that we should not be deluded by the friendship that exists between the two countries, he still claimed that Chinese will do nothing tangible against the Indian interests.

In 1979, when the Chinese invaded Vietnam, they were determined to teach them a lesson as they did to Indians, but the Vietnamese were prepared to counter the Chinese attack. We had underestimated the military capabilities of China. We must not repeat the same mistake of misinformation as in the 1962 war. It's imperative to have adequate defence capability; as of now, there is a considerable gap that exists between Indian and Chinese military capability which needs to be bridged. In our military calculations, we also cannot ignore the China- Pakistan nuclear nexus.

There was a time when China was interested in settling the border disputes, but not anymore. This can be seen by the fact that the special representatives appointed to resolve the issue in 2003, have shown no progress till date. In 2005, PM Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao arrived at a consensus not to disturb the settled population in Arunachal Pradesh while deriving a political consensus on the dispute. China occupies Aksai Chin and is perhaps not interested in attacking India but will put pressure on us.

The following points were highlighted: -

- Importance of Collegiate and institutional decision-making.
- BN Malik, the then Director IB, were more concerned with policy making than with their prime function of gathering intelligence and providing intelligence inputs to the government.
- Policies should be made more realistically.

**Infirmities in Higher Defence Management: Has the situation been addressed?: Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak, AVSM, VSM (Retd)**

The monumental disconnect, inept and ill-informed military and political leadership needs to be addressed. During the war, there were hardly any inputs available at the Indian Intelligence services and BN Malik had links and indirectly relied on CIA for strategic information, who anyway knew little of the Chinese.

Nehru's biggest failure perhaps was not using the air force during the war. Lack of integration in the armed forces and their decision-making exists even today. A flawed political leadership also prevailed during the war of 1947 and 1948 (J&K, Goa) where Nehru dismissed an army Chief for not informing him about what had happened in the war. In the Goa operations of 1961, Krishna Menon as the defence minister had issued certain instructions, which ensured that the Air Force and the Navy were not informed about the operations.

An analysis of the role of opposition also indicates that it should have been more sensitive to the military aspect. Some other facets which merit attention are: -

- Krishna Menon had directed that no file record should be kept of the various meeting and seminars, which were organised during that period.
- There was no Legislative mandate for accountability.
- Non- employment of combat air power had adverse consequences for the country.
- No air threat assessment had been carried out. There was absence of Intelligence on PLAAF.
- Damaging role of armed forces leadership

The advisors to the political leadership are still not well informed in terms of strategic understanding and strategic neighbourhood. No body looks at the researchers and think tanks for the role they play in defense services. The standing Committee on Defense lacks the spirit to integrate the forces. Progressive changes are moving at a snail's pace. The strategies should be thought far ahead, the question of single force operations should be completely ruled out in future conflict situations. The following needs to be noted: -

- Lessons should be learnt from 1962 on the integration aspect.
- Military inputs must be taken while taking policy decisions affecting the Services. The military on its part must stand up against unsound political judgment impinging on military operations.
- Armed Forces must be Integrated to achieve synergy in operations.

- Shaping and managing a strategic neighbourhood. Armed Forces officers should be integrated at the policy making level.
- There should be a Minister of Intelligence.
- There should be a Parliamentary Defense Review Commission.

### **Assessing the Military capabilities of India and China in 1962 and 2012: Maj Gen GD Bakshi, SM, VSM (Retd)**

The air power of the two countries in 1962, fell in China's favor, with 1500 Jet Fighters with PLAAF against 559 Indian jet fighters but in reality IAF had an edge. IAF could have attacked the Chinese road arteries and their troop and artillery concentrations because they had heavily suffered on their front due to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Air power could have seriously disrupted the Chinese offensive capacity but the deep-rooted conviction in our elite that China would not attack and was merely play-acting and complete paralysed any sort of thinking once the war started.

A comparative analysis of the Indian and the Chinese armed forces(PLA) further reaffirmed that there was lack of preparation, lack of weapons, lack of manpower on the Indian front. The Defence expenditure of China as in 2009 was 98.8 billion dollar as compared to 36.6 billion dollar in India. A key destabiliser seems to be China waging a proxy war through Pakistan, which has also given them the design as well as tested their Nuclear weapon in 1990.

China has improved its military infrastructure in Tibet and can now buildup 34 divisions in just one season. Two major railroads in Tibet are under construction and railway line is being extended from Lhasa to Shigatse. India's entire threat perception against China needs a rethink. The Chinese view on limited war suggests that the PLA has been engaged in a deliberate and dedicated effort to improve all aspects of its capabilities in order to deter a range of political adversaries and if necessary, prosecute limited conflicts in Asia.

While the conventional battlefield is a preferred way of waging a war for the Chinese which envisages very high levels of force usage, India has witnessed a

sharp decline in conventional warfare post nuclear tests. Certain Conflict scenarios for the future could be-

- Limited Border Conflict over J&K /Arunachal Pradesh.
- Major war over Brahmaputra water division.
- Limited war: J&K/Sikkim/ALP/RALP based on Tibetan issue/Border dispute. Cyber/Conventional tipped missile attacks.

## **Discussion**

The discussion focused on the status of maps study in India and the role media played in the battle of 1962. There were also questions raised on the deliberate procrastination in settling the border dispute also assessing if India itself is interested in a solution. There were concerns raised over the poor role of military and political leadership in the 62 war, while also addressing the role of diplomacy, if any. Majority agreed upon the need stand up against unsound strategic decisions.

Certain viewpoints, which emerged in due course of discussion, were: -

- There is certain progress made on the maps. The entire border is mapped and digitised but several incorrect depictions on the maps need to be addressed.
- The media in 1962 was as ill-informed as the Government and the military leadership.
- K Subramanian should be thanked for his efforts in strategic thinking otherwise India had no history of strategic thinking before.
- Chinese have no interest in settling the border disputes, we have to defend it.
- Great deal of literature needs to be reexamined to study the Chinese forces and their tactic which had such a devastating effect on India.
- There was no great scope for diplomacy from 1954 to 1962. GOI was doing everything under wrap, and policies were made without consulting the armed forces.

- There has to be a greater interaction between the military and Ministry of External Affairs.
- Ministry of Defense must stop becoming a post office between the military and MEA.
- Tri forces need to be integrated.
- The whole Nation in the Nehru period was of the belief that Chinese had cheated on India.
- Decision making has to be faster, the system needs to be changed

## **Session- II: Looking into the Future**

### **Remarks by Chairperson - Gen NC Vij, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd), former COAS**

China is modernising her armed forces in an aggressive manner with a defense budget that is four and a half times more than the defense budget of India. Even in the field of international relations, China is assertive in pushing its point of view. China has settled all its land disputes with most of the countries but the land disputes with India have not been resolved. India has good trade relations with China. In 2001-02, India-China trade was less than \$3 billion. This increased to \$75.6 billion in the last fiscal, registering a 25-fold increase. However, increase in trade is no indicator of a permanent peace. India must remain militarily well prepared against China.

### **Current Contextualisation of the Strategic Setting of India-China Relations and the Rivalry in the Himalaya: Dr. Monika Chansoria**

The remnants of the 1962 war left room for nothing but guarded suspicion that India has about People's Republic of China (PRC). China launched punitive strikes against India in the Western and Eastern Sectors and perhaps handed over India one of its worst military defeat ever. There have been cases where the Chinese leadership has claimed military pre-emption as a strategic defensive act.

China's grand strategy from the past age till date has two facets. Firstly, strategic deception that China's politico-military brass has taken, and secondly, military surprise. 1962 War is a case in point.

The relationship between Beijing and New Delhi in the late 1950s was on a downward spiral especially with the Dalai Lama coming into India. Tibet was an important factor that led to 1962 War. Strategy behind Mao's decision to launch an offensive against India in 1962 is argued to have had limited military aim; the PLA was used by Mao as an instrument to achieve his more important political objective of consolidating the revolution. Other political objectives of the 1962 War included:

- To cast a humiliating defeat on India. Mao was determined to cut India to size.
- To undermine and challenge the tenants of pluralism, democracy, liberalism that India was describing to the world.
- To grapple with the internal economic calamities and widespread famine facing China at that point in time.

In the current contextualisation of the 1962 War, one can find that there is a high sense of rivalry between China and India though in an understated manner. There is an acknowledgement that there are strategic adversarial elements in India-China relations. It is extremely critical to understand the outlook of the modern day political-military elite of China. China's hard power realists argue that for strengthening comprehensive national power, focus has to be particularly on the military and economic dimensions.

Political-military intensity displayed by China through its decision-making elite has been visible especially to India. There is rhetoric in China's state-owned media that was prevalent even in pre-1962 War. This rhetoric warns India of potential confrontation. Even fifty years since the 1962 War, the conditions between India and China are far from being congenial.

China's ambitions to dominate Asia by exhibiting its politico-military might are very much prevalent. China's in-roads into traditional sphere of Indian influence such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Myanmar is a case in



point. China's military aggressive design and exponential increase in investment of various development projects in Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir is a great concern for India. Further, China continues to remain non-committal when it comes to explaining its position vis-à-vis the nuclear arming of Pakistan. This in turn exhibits a very expansionist Chinese geo-strategic agenda in Gilgit-Baltistan region and India needs to take cognizance of this.

In the staple visa issue, China in a very categorical sense is trying to provide diplomatic support in Pakistan's position of Jammu and Kashmir. India needs to strongly oppose this and take stern action. In the issue of Chinese arms, there is free flow of Chinese arms for arming insurgents in India's North-Eastern region. In the present times, Chinese made arms increasingly flow into the guerilla ranks in North-Eastern India. Many Pakistani based terrorist organisations also rely on Chinese arms and ammunitions.

The continuing security clampdown across Tibet reflects the continuing harsh Chinese crackdown that was prevalent even during 1959-62 periods. Indications of placement of medium range ballistic missiles in the Tibet Autonomous Region also exist. These developments echo long term military and strategic motives of China.

### **China's Defence Doctrine and its Implications for India: Brig Narendra Kumar**

China has become a pivot around which the fate of the globe is going to be decided in this century and the next. Significant to the Indian context is the philosophy of control of territory from where China's military doctrine flows. There are historical perspectives wherein in the past sixty years China has looked at its military doctrine from. These are:

- Korean War, 1962 War, and the Vietnam War. The doctrine of People's War driven by Mao was not against India but against Soviet invasion. Subsequently, during the Vietnam War, they realised that this doctrine is inadequate.

- Emergence of Deng Xiaoping. There was a departure from Mao's philosophy. Doctrine of people's war under modern conditions came into being. This doctrine was also directed towards Soviet Union with a difference. China will not embark upon stopping the Soviets at the border and not allow them to enter their heartland.
- Operation Desert Storm, disintegration of Soviet Union and the Taiwan crisis. This led to the culmination of doctrine of local war under hi-tech condition where they talked about joint operations.

The disintegration of Soviet Union sort of fanned off the threat to China. This saw the coming into being of the doctrine of local wars – a war zone limited to a region. There are four principles of the war zone campaign. These are:

- External calm and internal intensity. This is based on deception and calibrated diplomacy and tailored strategy ambiguity.
- Elite war and sharp arms. This is based on absorption and use of technology, surprise and rapid response with a view to capture key objectives.
- Initiatives by striking first. This depended upon speed, lethality and carefully chosen targets and point of decision.

The center of gravity is based on a number of fault lines to mentally, psychologically and militarily imbalance and to cause decision-making dilemma. Accordingly, the center of gravity of China is not located in one particular corner or region of China but located in its economic upsurge. There are certain security challenges facing China. These are:

- The PLA must be able to deal with the internal security unrest everyday.
- The PLA must give option to China's political leadership for accession of Taiwan.
- PLA must develop credible defence to protect its economic center of gravity.
- Concern of India figures along with other countries such as Japan, the United States, and Russia.

- The timeline of China's military doctrine and security apparatus are:
- Neo-time contingency, PLA must be able to perform task today – rapid response force, readiness at all given times.
- Security threat from present time to fifteen years.
- Long term security concern from present time to twenty years.

As far as implications to India are concerned, there are several factors under which India could see a possible conflict situation. These are:

- Increased intervention in South China Sea.
- Escalation of water disputes.
- Post-Dalai Lama, Internal stability may have external deflection.
- If China wants to display military hegemony in the sub-continent or if there is a collusion of Pakistan with China in the event of India-Pakistan conflict.

Certain aspects on how China could use their military doctrine on India. These are:

- Exterior maneuver that is already in vogue.
- Employment of tools beyond military sphere. i.e. Cyber aspect.
- No-Contact war. Intimidation, military exercise, cyber attack, positioning of strategic weapons, collusion with Pakistan.
- Unleashing the War Zone Campaign.

Certain measure that India can adopt to counter China's military doctrine. These are:

- Competing strategy. This is not deterrence in the real sense. The fact is that India need to start and work out on this on urgent basis.
- Military modernization must move on a rapid pace.
- India must develop mountain warfare capabilities.
- India must enhance its nuclear forces for effective deterrence capabilities.
- There should be development in the field of infrastructure for land forces
- The strategic autonomy of India will be questioned if India does not build matching mountain warfare capabilities.

## **Chinese Strategic Capabilities to include Space and Cyber Space and its impact on India: Air Marshall M Matheswaran.**

India's rise will always be seen as a threat to China. The threat to China over the absolute control of Tibet and Xingjiang is a very important facet and if this does not get resolved, there will be no peace between India and China ever. Rapid growth of India as an economic power will automatically transform into technological and military power. The assumption of China's hold over Tibet and Xingjiang ever since the Dalai Lama came to India and set up its government in exile is being viewed by China with suspicion. Boundary dispute happen to be just a fuse ready to be lit anytime China wants to.

India came into having a common border with China when China occupied Tibet and the seed of conflict was sown. More importantly, the conflict situation emanated when India did not recognise China's occupation of Tibet. Therefore, the logic and practical way of dealing with China is to build a capability that deters China effectively and practically.

Mao evolved the People's War concept out of two compulsions. Firstly, the focus on integrated China. Secondly, people were poor and therefore there was no other option but to rely on guerilla tactics.

The concept was overturned once Deng Xiaoping came into the picture and he saw modernisation plan with focus on economy as the first and technology as the second. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated the process of changing the doctrine. People's war became people's war in the modern condition, thereafter, it became local war, thereafter, local war under modern technological conditions and finally in the present times, it is local war under informational condition. But what is more important to note here is Deng Xiaoping's transformation of people's militia into professional armed forces.

China's aerospace capabilities have leaped frogged enormously in the last fifteen years. They have graduated into launching manned flights to docking capabilities and they will have a space station by about 2020. This is going to have serious military implications. The ability to actually have persistent surveillance over areas of interest is a serious concern to India.

When India looks at this combined with changes in the operational doctrine and strategies that are now being practiced, India need to be very clear that we cannot take China lightly in terms of their technological mastery as well as their modern operational doctrinal development and strategies. Further, China has three-prong approach to cyber security:

- To deter any adversary by penetrating their critical systems.
- Technology espionage. Penetrate into advance countries particularly the United States and gather technologies that they want.
- Industrial espionage.

**Policy Options for India in the context of increased Chinese Military Capability: Ambassador Satish Chandra.**

In determining any country's policy option vis-à-vis its neighbour, that country must not only merely take into account the neighbour's increased military capabilities but also its intent. The trajectory of China's military modernisation overtime will work against India as India will not be able to match China dollar for dollar in terms of such build up.

With China's rising stature in the world stage, its military buildup is inevitable and may be primarily directed at the United States. The fact remains that India cannot remain unconcerned about the buildup as it can be used against us. The extent to which we should be concerned about China's military buildup must be determined by its intent towards India. The reasons for China's inimical relations with India includes:

- a) Rapid up-gradation of infrastructure in Tibet and the undertaking of the military buildup of the area along with India specific military exercises.
- b) Reluctance to settle land and boundary disputes with India. India is the only country with which China continues to have such disputes.
- c) The presence of PLA in Jammu and Kashmir; claims that the Sino-Indian border is only some 2000 km, thus questioning the legality of India's position in Ladakh and Kashmir.

- d) China has been completely unresponsive to the accommodation that India has shown to China in more than one occasion.
- e) In view of China's overwhelming military superiority and inimical position, India has three types of policy options. These are:
  - a) The business as usual approach. This policy option is characterised by somewhat casual military modernisation programme and the adoption of hedging policy in relation to other powers like the United States. This policy option is based on the hope that in the absence of any provocative steps by India, China will not take any aggressive steps against India. This option also screams of appeasement.
  - b) Reciprocal China centric build up coupled with diplomatic engagement. This approach will entail a very comprehensive focus on China centric military buildup while retaining all the element of our existing policy. This is more likely to deter China's military adventurism.
  - c) India standing tall policy. This should be India's preferred approach. There should be a very rapid military modernisation across the forces. It should take care of threats, developments on the Tibet side. Military leadership need to strategise vulnerable points in which counter attack can be effectuated by the Indian armed forces not merely on land but also by sea, particularly damaging China's sea links of communication or strangulating those if the need arise.

Certain factors which must not be ignored and which has to be a very special focus is India's nuclear forces. This needs to be vastly upgraded. Chief of Defence Staff should be created because in the absence of this post there are problems in developing India's nuclear forces.

Since China has a propensity to use Pakistan as a proxy, some sort of signaling is essential that, should Pakistan use nuclear weapon against India, China need not necessarily be exempt. India should also think of neutralising China's military superiority through adoption of asymmetric warfare and guerilla tactics.

India needs to work on the Tibet card. More so, India needs to be more supportive to the human rights issue facing Tibet. The increasing economic ties

between India and China have to be welcomed but this trade relation is grossly imbalanced in favour of China as India is exporting raw materials while importing manufactured goods.

Finally, adoption of the policy options outlined earlier could invite China's wrath and there may be counter measures too which could be painful in the short run. But in the long run, such policies will stand up and it is a prerequisite that in the adoption of such policies, India will need to clean up its act in providing better governance with rapid economic growth.

### **Discussion**

It was highlighted that providing military capabilities, strategic reserves, and infrastructure are time consuming possibilities. For the execution of such possibilities, it is highly likely that there will be a change in scenario by the time all these actually come into place. There was also curiosity on whether India can come up with policies in solving boundary disputes not only through negotiations but through generating public opinion. Certain responses include:

- a) China has avoided resolution or solving of disputes with India. As a matter of fact, it is only with India that China needs to resolve its boundary disputes. However, the problems with China are not only pertaining to the boundary issues, rather the totality of the problem lies with China's striving towards a possible hegemon of the region.
- b) In order to seriously deter China's capabilities, India must develop strong cyber capabilities and ways of getting into asymmetric warfare.
- c) The India specific war-games that China carry out is worrisome. India has to come up with an appropriate response.
- d) Sino-Pakistan attack on India is a potential threat.

### **Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson**

China's modernisation took place in 2004 and by 2025 they will achieve their desired levels of modernisation. Certain factors should be adhered to in order to deal with China's capability enhancements. Some suggestions are:

- a) India should raise a strike corps.
- b) There is a need to upgrade India's ammunition holding.
- c) India needs to check her missile systems.
- d) The adoption of asymmetric warfare could be deciding factor.
- e) Cyber command is the need of the hour.
- f) India should build its counter-missile defence systems.
- g) There should be a build up on missile systems and precision ammunitions.
- h) Services in India should be made part of National Strategic Planning Committee.
- i) There should be a regular presentation by the three Chiefs on the preparedness of India's forces.
- j) National leadership should be made a part of such presentation on preparedness of India's forces.