

CENTRE OF LAND WARFARE STUDIES, NEW DELHI

TALK CUM DISCUSSION

FIGHTING TO THE END: THE PAKISTAN ARMY'S WAY OF WAR

BY

DR C CHRISTINE FAIR

SEMINAR HALL, CLAWS

15 JULY 2014

EXCERPTS

Welcome Remarks by Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd), Director CLAWS

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I extend a very warm welcome to all of you today for a talk by C Christine Fair on her book *Fighting To The End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. A book that perhaps should become essential reading for all officers of the Indian Armed forces as it gives out a perfect analysis of the psyche of the Pakistan Army.

Dr C Christine Fair, Assistant Professor, George Town University, USA

I started writing the book in 2011 but I have been studying Pakistan since 1991. I began stumbling upon some of the questions in this book in 2000 when I was working with the Rand Corporation working on a Kargil project. What struck me is that, when one looks at what Pakistan does and how Pakistan does it: it continues to fight the same war with the same set of assumptions and the same outcome. In other words it doesn't seem capable of having a learning process. It seems to persist in its revisionism even though the likelihood of it ever attaining, even modestly, any of its goals is actually becoming less probable not more probable. Not only that the tools that it has developed which I call '*Jihad under a nuclear umbrella*' are actually now harming the state itself.

The Pakistani's love to howl that they have a terror problem and I say yes it is a problem and it is your problem. There would be no Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) if the Pakistani's had not nurtured a menagerie of Deobandi militant groups. Some of whom have turned against the state following the events of 9/11.

I am not a political scientist, but I work with a lot of political scientists and have spoken to a lot of political scientist while working on this project. Political science literature is actually pretty straight forward: it simply poses a question. We expect states to get rid of policies that don't work and especially when those policies imperil the state. Pakistan's revisionism is really quite a puzzle,

there are very few states where the revisionism has persisted over such a durational time and with such pernicious outputs. This was essentially my research question, since I am not a political scientist; my evidentiary basis with which I approach this puzzle was really textual. I am trained as South Asian languages and civilization person. I have collections of Pakistan defence publications since 2000, or maybe a little bit before that.

This work really draws from a set of military publications in which Pakistanis discuss amongst themselves things that are relevant to themselves. These books and documents like the green book/Pakistan Army journal – these aren't books that are meant for me and they are not meant for you. And I think they are a more honest source of information and data about what this institution thinks than for example interviews. Some of my colleagues overly rely on interviews. Now interviews are very problematic, I have been going to Pakistan since 1991 although obviously I can't go back as I got blacklisted. I found interviews with them to be of dubious quality as essentially they use this as an opportunity to spread propaganda and they will say things that they want you to believe. And of course the more times you go to Pakistan you become much more to decipher this.

I actually found my interviews with the Pakistani military personnel to be not very useful because of the deception they were actively waging. By the time someone from the Pakistani army interacts with someone like me, and this is even truer for a defence counterpart or even a state department counterpart. They have so thoroughly been vetted by the ISI and they know their brief. You will find very little variation from person to person because they know what they are supposed to say. The only time you will ever get a glimpse of an unscripted point of view is when you happen to catch a major who hasn't gone through the rigorous ISI camp and he happens to say something that disagrees with the official point of view. Or in one case when I was in South Waziristan in 2010, on our way back to Islamabad, because they knew I spoke Urdu they let me listen to the conversations of the pilot. And when we crossed the Indus they said – "*Mashallah Indus khad gaya*" (thank god we crossed the Indus). Afterwards I asked them about what they meant and they said: *it used to be that we went to that side of the country the Pashtuns were known for their civility, hospitality and now we are afraid to go*. It would be in moments like that, that I would catch them off guard and here things like that. For the most part, my evidence is really drawing from their publications.

What I take on in the book is this conventional wisdom and I focus upon the United States. Because I would argue that the United States along with India, China, Saudi Arabia are probably the most important influencers in terms of what Pakistan does, and are the most important countries in terms of incentivising what Pakistan does and how it does it and using what resources.

My book is mainly focusing on American audience, which is the most important audience for me to influence. The conventional wisdom in the United States is that Pakistan is a security seeking state. So in other words it's inherently an insecure state, which by the way I agree with. I agree it is an inherently insecure state but the American approach to managing Pakistan is that there is something in our toolbox that can make Pakistan a secure place. And that once it is a secure state it will be less reliant on Jihadist and it will be less compelled to pursue strategic depth in Afghanistan. It will be at peace with its neighbours and then itself.

This gives rise to this perennial, every new administration re-fixation upon Kashmir. You saw it with the Obama Administration – they wanted to appoint a special representative to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. This idea was followed by the appointments of Richard Holbrooke and Grossmann as special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. They talked about the ‘grand bargain’ whereby the United States should persuade India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue and that is how you solve Afghanistan. I object to this very strenuously:

- (a) This argument implies that Pakistan has defensible stakes in Kashmir and I don’t think they do. If you look at the history, I don’t know why we are entertaining this?
- (b) I don’t believe that it would actually fix anything. Because as I argue in the book, Pakistan’s issues in India are not about Kashmir. It’s about resisting India’s rise and it’s about resisting what it sees as Indian hegemony. Interestingly enough, the Pakistanis talk about Indian hegemony much before any Indian strategist ever thought of India as a hegemony. Pakistani’s started talking about this as early as 1971.

The problem with viewing Pakistan as a security seeking state is that it motivates the US to engage in policies of appeasement - whether it is political appeasement or military appeasement by providing large weapon systems like the F16s and so forth. Instead I argue that Pakistan is an ideological state. And this is drawn from the work of Charlie Glaser, who may not have thought of Pakistan in these terms, but he describes an ideological greedy state as one that is - fundamentally dissatisfied by the status quo, desiring additional territory even when it is not required for security. Purely greedy states pursue revisionism to increase prestige, spread ideology and propagate their religious world view. Greedy states use completion as the only and primary means to achieve these non security goals. When I finished this study it became very difficult for me to see Pakistan in any other way other than this. This seemed to describe its behaviour.

In Pakistan military journals, when they speak about Kashmir they don’t talk about it in terms of security; they could have made it about issues of water security or the terrain being more defensible on certain divisions of the territory... yet they did not. The only exception to this was when Kiani came a few years ago to Washington and he was really carrying back what people in Washington were saying about the importance of the Indus water and water as a future source of conflict. This did not come out indigenously from Pakistan; he was basically carrying back what people in Washington were saying.

The implications of this are important because as Charlie Glaser argues, if you treat ideological state like a security seeking state with policy appeasement you actually incentivise that state to continue this behaviour. That conclusion will sound very familiar to you in India when thinking about Pakistan.

Some of the key findings: The Pakistan army arrogates to itself to not only the logical task of protecting Pakistan’s army but also what it calls Pakistan’s ideology. What probably may surprise you is that while many people think it was Zia who did this but in fact it was Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan in 1954 wrote a piece in foreign affairs called the *Ideology of Pakistan* and right on the top he writes about the two nation theory. In his auto biography he has an entire chapter dedicated to the ideology of Pakistan.

Ayub Khan also set up a commission that was responsible for aligning Pakistan's curriculum with the ideology of Pakistan. So all that we hear about Pakistan's history beginning in the 7th century with the arrival of Islam to Asia, that did not begin with Zia but with Ayub Khan. This is important because when the army takes over the country directly they put army officers in charge of ministries such as education. Making sure that their ideology and strategic culture diffuses to the rest of Pakistan such that in the event when a civilian government came into power their view of seeing the world would not be that different from the way in which the army sees the world. Thus I don't think civilian government is the panacea that we are all looking for. It is a necessary and sufficient condition but the real necessary condition is Pakistan's forgoing the two nation theory.

The two nation theory is nothing but disaster and more disaster for Pakistanis themselves. This is playing out through the sectarian violence that we are seeing. Today it's not just enough to be Muslim you have to be a specific kind of Muslim. And right now the Deobandi's are really winning that as they are the ones that have the guns and the suicide vests.

The army literature makes a very clear case about the terms for peace with India is: India has to accept Pakistan as an equal and they have to accept the two nation theory. So this is obviously a very hard set of pills to swallow because the two nation theory makes no sense rationally and certainly doesn't make sense with India's own history.

The other reason why they claim to this so ferociously is that it legitimises their claim to Kashmir. There is nothing else that legitimises their claim to Kashmir. If they say the accession to India is illegitimate then they have to also accept that Baluchistan is also illegitimate. Every argument that they use to say the accession of Kashmir has enormous implications for them domestically. If they let go of the two nation theory they are essentially letting go of Kashmir and vice-versa. So their demand for Kashmir and their pursuit for the two nation theory are mutually reinforcing.

The other thing that I thought was really interesting is that they don't define defeat in terms of loss of territory, loss of life or the value of the territory lost... their definition of defeat is acquiescing completely. This was explained to me by a former Army chief when I was in Pakistan in 2000 talking to them about – why in the world would you want the Kargil operation? Even a fourteen year old who plays dungeons and dragons could have gained out Kargil and the consequences that would eventually evolve from it. The army chief said – *“if we do nothing that is to acquiesce to Indian hegemony. Therefore we always have to do something. We would rather take a calculated risk than do nothing. Because to do nothing is to genuinely be defeated”*. After hearing this out, it occurred to me that Pakistan is more like an international insurgent – it fights its conventional conflicts unconventionally. Yet it fights its unconventional conflicts conventionally. Using F16s in Waziristan and using non states actors against India.

This means that for Pakistan it doesn't have to decisively defeat India. It sees itself constantly being able to frustrate India's ability to exert its will when and where it wants which it believes is India's intention. Even during the 71 war, when everyone would agree they lost Pakistani's frame it very differently. They say – yes we lost in a sense but we were defeated by a much bigger army. And we haven't been truly defeated because we are the only country in the region that can

challenge India. We are not a Bangladesh, we are not a Sri Lanka, and we are the only country that can frustrate India's rise.

I gave the title "*Fighting to the End*" because Pakistan will fight to the end and because it doesn't see defeat as most of us see defeat. I am not saying they are irrational, in fact I say they are quite rational but from their point of view the power differential will continue to rise. So they are not saying they have to deliver decisive military defeat but what they are saying is whenever you want to do something for them to not be defeated is to simply frustrate you - whether that is in Bangladesh, Afghanistan or trying to fully integrate Kashmir.

What are some of the policy implications of this? I am going to speak what I tell my American friends, and you can see why they think I am a lunatic. But I think they are very clear indications, and I think for India too. Their nuclear weapons are coercive instruments, but they are also politically coercive instruments. When there is a conflict, they use their nuclear weapons to coerce the Americans to sit on the Indians. You saw this in 2008, you saw this in 2001 after the parliament attack. They use their nuclear weapons, obviously whether they have them or not is a different issue, but when they talk about nuclear weapons they are a way to coerce us to intervene into the conflict cycle. They also coerce us from never leaving the country.

When I talk about Pakistan being a state that sponsors terrorism and being declared as such the implications are really frightening for us because it means that we have to stop supporting them. Americans will say that we cannot do that because we will have no influence and we have no visibility.

We have to take ourselves out of this coercion group. And we can do that principally in two ways: one we say you are a responsible nuclear power (we know their signatures from Iraq, Libya, Iran) so we are going to treat you as responsible. If you use your weapons, we will respond as per our doctrine. In other words make a very clear declaratory policy that removes United States from their coercion cycle. Obviously as implications for India, it means that when America is no longer there to provide crisis management, India will have to deal with them very directly and India will have to think about how it will take itself out of their coercion circle.

I am also a fan of cutting off the IMF, I don't understand why the Americans continue to support the IMF and why is it important? The army is completely insulated from the economic consequences of its behaviour as long as there is an IMF program. They can take the pie and eat all of it. Because they know that the IMF and other donors will come in to keep Pakistan on life support. By constantly doing this we preclude the demand among people for different set of policies and a different set of priorities. Because they themselves never have to bear the full consequences of the army's decision making.

On the political (front), I think it's very important that the Americans stop indulging Pakistan's position on Kashmir. I wrote a piece last summer making a very clear argument that we should recognise the LOC as the international border. This has two advantages:-

- (a) It deprives Pakistan of any legitimacy
- (b) It reduces India's conflict in J&K to a completely internal problem.

I think India would be more comfortable dealing with boundary issue if it wasn't constantly a subject of international discussion.

In conclusion, I will say we have to be very specifically punitive. We have evidence of ISI complicity and terror attacks. We should be using treasury designations, we should be using Interpol and when appropriate selective targeting. Even though, it is very difficult for us to operate in that environment. Given our equities in Afghanistan, much of LeT's infrastructure is not in Pakistan, I think there is much more that we could be doing coercively.

I am going to finish here. Thank you!

Discussant 1: Lt Gen S A Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM*, VSM (Retd), former Military Secretary

Through my career, I have always been taught by my superiors that one must study the mindset of the Pakistani army. This particular book by Christine has done human service to the Indian Army. It has summarized from 1947 to 2013-14 the cyclic mindset of the Pakistani army making our job that much easier.

This book defines strategic culture in a very appropriate way and considers many sub factors which gives us insight and gives us a cue on how we should examine our own strategic culture and possibly how Pakistan is examining our strategic culture.

It surprising that so much literature from the Pakistani army is available, much of which as mentioned was picked up from archives in the United States, and we are not aware of it. This is an eye-opener for us. While Christine has looked at it with a strategic angle, we need to look into how we can make use of this literature and use it with an operational and tactical angle.

The chapter on Pakistan's strategic culture explains Pakistan army's persistent revisionism with the aspect of *victory in status quo*. We have been aware of this and have been studying this aspect of insecurity being driven by ideological ambitions from time to time. Pakistan desires to be seen as a part of the grand Islamic uma and part of the Arab world rather than being a part of South Asia. In fact this particular linkage to the Arab world and more deeply to Saudi Arabia drives the ideology of a Pakistani. A deep study on the concept of *victory in status quo* is required.

The book talks about the theory of the martial races. In many ways the Pakistani army has tried to bring out our theory of martial races and turned the tables on us. Our theory of the martial races was put to an end after our engagement with the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The Pakistan army looks at this whole theory and imagines that every Pakistani Army soldier is superior to an Indian Army soldier. This is a good revelation but I don't know how true it is today's world?

The book doesn't however explain as to how on a single day in the middle of August in 1947 the British Indian Army's culture suddenly breaks apart into two? It appears almost as if right from the day the Pakistani army got formed that this culture of religion and faith was embedded. We are

aware that the officer cadre of the British Indian army was not into this kind of thinking. How did this emerge overnight? And how in a matter of a couple years did this seep deep into the psyche of the Pakistani army is something that needs explanation.

The statement '*the world should be ready for an even more dangerous Pakistan*' is almost like a conclusion and should be the last part of the book. It is a prediction that implies that we have not seen the worst of it and we are going to see much more of this. That is a fact and anyone who is looking at Pakistan in any rational way is probably coming to that conclusion.

I would also like to bring out that when you meet Pakistani officers, you find no regret and no remorse for having created negative narratives for Pakistan. In fact this whole concept of 'jihadization' does not appeal to their mind at all. This was very appropriately brought out by Christine: revisionist systems around the world are actually suicidal be it Japan, North Korea and Pakistan.

How does the Pakistan army view India? Very correctly brought out – a hegemony and Hindu. They always refer to India as 'hindu' and never as secular or a heterogeneous India and how it becomes homogenous. This lesson of homogeneity of India is almost never spoken about anywhere in the literature of Pakistan with the exception of modern day columnist.

The book does not explain why the Kashmiri's today are so anti Pakistan? Kashmiri's are anti-India there is no doubt -but they are more anti Pakistan.

Lastly the chapter, '*Jihad and the Nuclear Bomb*', it explains perhaps from an operational and tactical angle, Pakistan's obsession with infiltration. Right from 1947, the lessons of the 1947-48 wars they realised that it is irregulars that make a difference. If you notice, right from 1947-48, in every war in every campaign, in every effort irregulars have always been used and continue to be used. It dwells into their tactical and operational mindset and brings out why 111 infantry brigade, one of the most important formations of the Pakistani army, is a highly trained brigade for infiltration.

A fair amount is written about the concept of infiltration in this book and needs examination. Christine has referenced a fantastic essay that I was never aware of – General Nyazi as a brigadier in 1964 wrote an essay on the concept of infiltration. Most of us are not aware that Pravez Musharraf's dissertation was on water wars. It is important for us to have our eyes open and have a proper surveillance on all kinds of literature that is coming out of the Pakistani army.

There is not too much on the response to the cold start strategy. We say there is no proactive strategy but the Pakistan army still believes there is a thing called the cold start doctrine. How did the Pakistan army react to this and how does it continue to react to this? What is the new concept of war fighting? How has it really emerged?

Discussant 2: Capt (IN) Alok Bansal (Retd), Executive Director, South Asian Institute for Strategic Affairs (SAISA)

Indian army's understanding of the Pakistani army is lacking. There is an overwhelming belief that we know Pakistan army because we have come from the common stock and thus understand how the Pakistani army will behave. People extrapolate their behaviour on the Pakistani army. Regrettably 67 years of having taken a different path have made them different. Christine's book states that the process started with the partition in 1947 itself. Ayub Khan's autobiography justifies partition and birth of Pakistan. He talks of the anguish of the Muslim while remaining a component of the secular British army. More significantly the Kashmir issue, no one in the Indian army discusses how Gilgit and Baltistan went to Pakistan? We all blame Major Brown. The truth of the matter is that your Jammu and Kashmir Rifle was actually responsible for giving Gilgit and Baltistan to Pakistan. If you read Major Hassan Khan's autobiography you read about how he went and met Jinnah in Bombay before 1947. The fact is that the officer corps of the British Indian army was already getting radicalised and getting influenced by the Pakistan movement. To that extent this is very important because many in India believe that Jinnah was very secular. But one must realise that Jinnah said different things at different times, to suit his convenience. There are enough indications to show that this premise may suit certain secular persons in India and Pakistan to propagate but it is not the truth.

The book tells you what the Pakistani army believes about the Indian army. Many in India believe that if General Zia Ul Haq had not come to power, Pakistan would have been as secular as the United States. The truth of the matter is that the radicalization is inherent in the two nation theory. When you create a nation state premised on the belief that the Muslims of the subcontinent are a separate nation religion is bound to assume primacy. Regrettably there are many who do not believe this.

To my mind the person who actually transformed the Pakistani army was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The single event that transformed the army was the banning of liquor in the officers mess. It transformed the social structure of the officer's mess. Once there were no bars the discussions started drifting towards different topics. The radicalization which started in 1947 actually picked up pace post Bhutto. Thus Bhutto a secular person contributed far more in the radicalization of Pakistan than anyone else. He was the first to use taqfil to push Ahmadi's out of the fold of Islam.

The 1973 constitution made questioning Pakistan's ideology treasonable.

The book very rightly says as to how the Pakistani army has always been trying to project the Indian army as a 'Hindu' Army. It suits their purpose. Pakistan has a Pakistan Studies Program that justifies the creation of Pakistan. Because they know the inherent weakness of their ideological baggage, they must justify it and reinforce it. As a result right from the beginning a child is taught why Pakistan was created. Why Pakistan was created can only be justified on the premise that Indian secularism is a sham. As a result it is essential that the Indian army is projected as a Hindu army. These facts must be understood. One part is that they project the Indian army as a Hindu army and as a result they commit atrocities in Kashmir against the Muslim population. The second is the martial race concept where they say India is a hollow balloon incapable of fighting. One Muslim soldier is equal to 12- 15 Hindu soldiers... these are some of the issues that have been covered in this book.

I don't agree with Christophe Jaffrelot when he says that Jinnah till 1946 wanted a unified India. Cabinet mission was accepted by Jinnah not with intent to avoid partition. In fact if you see the way Liaqat Ali was appointed as finance minister to sabotage the cabinet mission. It was actually a clear cut enunciation that much before that Jinnah had been converted to Pakistan.

The second is the Gilgit Baltistan Issue. You say that Gilgit Baltistan was overwhelmingly inhabited by Ismaili Shias. Only Hunza valley was dominated by Ismaili Shias. Baltistan is Ithna-Ashari. Even the Gilgit bulk of it, Nagir are Ithna Ishari, it was actually Shia dominated region with certain pockets where Ismailis where in domination.

Contrary to what Pakistanis and most people in the West believe - that if LoC becomes the international border, it will be a big favour done to India - I think such position is untenable in current political scenario. This is so because the discourse has changed and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) is non- negotiable. The Indian populace understands the whole geo-strategic significance of Jammu and Kashmir stems from Gilgit Baltistan. Kashmir anyway is not as geo-strategically significant as Gilgit Baltistan. This is the part that connects China with Pakistan. Its relevance has been understood. Today no Indian government especially after the passing of the parliamentary resolutions can legally cede territory.

Interaction

Please explain how you arrived at central theme of your book.

I arrived at it from how they (Pakistan) describe their position vis-a-vie India. In the book I provide numerous quotes from their literature over a very long period of time where they persistently say that if we are unable to challenge India and accept India's will then we have been defeated. They consistently define victory for themselves in a very different way. The theme of the book was derived from their own writings.

Every India Prime Minister right from 1947 to the present Prime Minister wants to make history by making peace with Pakistan. Similarity from 1947 every Pakistani Army Chief wants to create history by taking away Kashmir from India. Have you reconciled this thought process in your book?

The only way the Pakistani army gets to run the country is by having perennial civilization conflicts with India. If you look at Pakistan's curriculum, India started every war. And in its literature understanding its perception of this is really important. As it then describes its reaction as a defensive jihad. What the Pakistan army has done with its strategic culture is basically it set up a civilization conflict between India and Pakistan. And the terms in which it describes this conflict are ideological and these ideologies are mutually non-resoluble. I call this, jokingly, a self looking ice cream cone for the Pakistan army. Because if there were to be any sort of resolution between India and Pakistan. Their claim to be the premiere defender of Pakistan's ideology and territory ceases. The army itself will be biggest spoiler for any peace between the two countries. I don't care what Nawaz Sharif says, he doesn't control these policies. I don't get excited when your Prime Ministers meet, because they are meetings about meetings. When in fact the Pakistani Prime Minister can deliver on nothing!

Pakistan army is hell-bent on destroying the Indian army, is it only by military methods or are they thinking of other methods of destroying India- economically, environmentally?

I actually don't agree if the Pakistan army wants to destroy the Indian Army. That does not come across in their writings. In fact they know they can't. That's why they have set for themselves a very different conflict. They can't defeat you conventionally but you are suggesting is that they want to. I don't see any evidence in their writings that they want to defeat the Indian army eventually. That is not what they are trying to do. They depict themselves as is an insurgent that India wants to impose its will on and how they survive. They say everyone else in the region is habituated to India except Pakistan.

On the second point you made, when you read the green books for example, they talk about India's civilization conversation with Pakistan. The 2010 green book they talk of SAFMA being a RAW concept. They talk about Bollywood being a tool of R&AW and they evidence frustration that their children know Hindi words and the pantheon of Hindu gods yet they are otherwise lousy Muslims; they don't pray or behave the way Muslims should. What you get a sense while reading all this is that they think Pakistan is constantly under siege culturally, politically and diplomatically. And that's why I call them international insurgents. Just by resisting India, they are succeeding in their own definition of success.

Is Saudi Arabia using Pakistan as proxy against India (a string of Wahabi pearls?)

The Saudi world view and the Pakistani world view meshes in a very terrible way. The way the Pakistani's are worried about Indian involvement in Afghanistan the Saudi's see nothing but Iranian Involvement. And of course any discussion on Indian- Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan is the super glue that holds Pakistan and Saudi Arabia together. Their reasons are different but both the Saudi's and Pakistanis believe that the Haqqani group, LeT and the Taliban are the only meaningful way of containing this joint threat of the Indians and the Iranians. Hearing the Saudi's talk about Iran in such similarly neurotic terms as the Pakistani's do about the Indians was really eye opening for me.

Going to your question- do the Saudi's control the Pakistan army? I don't think it does. And I am glad you raised this, there is some tension because the Pakistanis in their literature – they want to be the legitimate Islamic fauj. In their literature they cast themselves as the spearhead of Islamic generalship. This obviously stands in contrast with how Saudi Arabia would itself to be projected. The Pakistani's see themselves as the protectors of the Islamic tradition. Of course the Saudi' are the ones who are doing the actual defending. There is a real tension between how the Pakistan army wants to see itself as a citadel of Islamic warriorship and Saudi Arabia which has very similar plans.

The way in which the Pakistani army uses Islam is very dangerous for itself. You will never see them talk about muslcs (in Pakistan there are five – Jamat Islami, Deobandi, Baerlvi, Ahl al-Hadith and Shia). There are Ahmedias in the army, there are Shai's in the army and non- Muslims in the army. When you see Pakistan's literature describing it as an Islamic military force. You have to ask yourself how do non-Muslims participate in this process? (And in there lies the seeds of the loss of East Pakistan.) How do Ahmedia's and Shia's fit into this scheme? Because the Pakistani's are working with militant groups that very clearly associate with these sectarian traditions this is very dangerous.

When they talk about Islam and the Pakistani army, they are talking about an Islam for all. But when you talk to the individual members of those Muslims – the Islam for all is there particular Muslim. This is a very difficult equilibrium for them to sustain. And you see they are not entirely succeeding in this because of the emergence of the TTP which is an exclusively Deobandi organization targeting the state. This is why I come back to this idea that the only way Pakistan can save itself is ironically to get rid of the two nation theory.

The problem is not Saudi Arabia but it's more deep and imbedded in the DNA of the Pakistan army. Saudi Arabia provides the seed capitals for the lunacy but all of the recurring elements are coming from the Pakistani army.