REPORT ON

RISE OF TERRORISM, POST WAR ON TERROR:

EMERGING CAUSES AND STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THREAT

Gulmohur Hall, India Habitat Center

23 April 2015



Centre for Land Warfare Studies New Delhi

Vij Books India Pvt Ltd New Delhi Seminar Coordinator Rapporteurs Ms Shweta Desai Pavneet Chadha Sameer Mallya Shreyas Deshmukh

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Centre for Land Warfare Studies

RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi-110010 Phone: 011-25691308; Fax: 011-25692347 email: landwarfare@gmail.com ; website: www.claws.in

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an autonomous think tank dealing with contemporary issues of national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach.

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Printed in India by

Vij Books India Pvt Ltd

(Publishers, Distributors & Importers) 2/19, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi - 110002 Phones: 91-11-43596460, 91-11- 47340674, Fax: 91-11-47340674 e-mail : vijbooks@rediffmail.com; web: www.vijbooks.com

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Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Seminar

Rise of Terrorism, Post War on Terror: Emerging Causes and Strategies to Counter Threat Gulmohur Hall, India Habitat Center 23 April 2015

With a view to determine the emerging causes for rise of terrorism, post war on terror and discuss strategies to counter the emerging threats, a seminar was conducted by Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) on 23 April 2015. The panel for the seminar comprised of:-

- Prof Dr Rohan Gunaratna, Head International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore.
- Dr Adil Rasheed, Senior Fellow, The United Service Institution of India (USI).
- Mr Sanjay Kapoor, Journalist and Editor, HardNews.
- Mr Sushant Singh, Associate Editor, The Indian Express.
- Captain (IN) Alok Bansal, Director, India Foundation.
- Ms Shweta Desai, Associate Fellow, CLAWS.
- Dr Nivedita Ray, Senior Fellow, ICWA.
- Col Vivek Chadha (Retd), Research Fellow, IDSA.
- Lt Gen PC Katoch, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd), Former DG IS.
- Dr Thomas Marks, Professor, Department of War and Conflict Studies, College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU), USA.
- Sudhir Aggarwal, Senior Director, Oracle.

SEMINAR REPORT

The War on Terror (WOT) launched by the US President George W Bush to 'find, stop and defeat every terrorist group of global reach' divided countries into allies and enemies. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were led by an idealistic notion as wars of liberation to usher in a change of democracy, human rights and justice for the people who had suffered long under the brutal regimes. The US withdrew from Iraq in 2011 and the US drawdown in Afghanistan is nearing completion. However, the situation in Iraq has worsened since 2011 and Afghanistan continues to be embroiled in conflict between Government forces and Taliban, which is supported by Pakistan.

In the last decade, the political and security situation in some parts of the world has fast deteriorated. Public uprisings have manifested as a regionwide Arab Spring, political turmoil leading to civil wars and insurgencies in Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Ukraine, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic. There have also been many incidents of bombings, kidnappings, beheadings and barbaric attacks by new militant groups like ISIS. The level of atrocities committed by them has reached new levels to include chemical attacks, large scale killings of civilians, destruction of ancient heritage sites as well as new cities. The frequency of all these violent events increased alarmingly particularly after the Arab Spring protests a decade after the 9/11 terror attacks.

If the strategy was to eliminate the existing terror groups and deter the formation of new terror groups, the expansion of Al Qaeda, emergence of armed militant organisations like Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Boko Haram and many other smaller factions have proved the strategy to be a failure. The emergence of new groups and their ambition to establish governance using brutal savagery has changed the dynamics of modern terror This importantly warrants an examination of the current status of the war on terror and resulting violence, and the means by which terrorism can be defeated.

Special Address- Dr Rohan Gunaratna

The contemporary wave of international terrorism originated with its epicentre in West Asia in 1968 and lasting till 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the foundation of many different Muslim terrorist organizations in South Asia. These organizations from Asia, Middle East and Africa shifted to Pakistan and created a global network of terror thereby signalling the shift in the epicentre of terrorism to India's immediate neighbourhood. The emergence of more than 30 different groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan has posed a real threat to the region.

Just before the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden along with Abdullah Azzam and others formed Al-Qaeda (AQ) in 1989. The group emerged from *Mukhtab al-Khidmat* (Service Centers) which were earlier formed by Azzam. Azzam was the ideological mentor and the man responsible for coordination of the Arab efforts in the fight against the Soviet Union. AQ, which largely consisted of Saudis and Yeminis, collaborated with the Egyptian group El Gama Islamiyya and the Egypt Islamic Jihad which at that time was led by Ayman al Zawahiri (the current leader of AQ). Hence the genesis of international terrorism at its peak can be traced back to the anti-soviet, multinational, Afghan Mujahidin campaign.

AQ's greatest strength was calling other terrorist groups from the region to join global Jihad. Responding to this call around 30 terrorist groups came to join AQ's fight in Afghanistan. The group provided them training, infrastructure and the most importantly an ideology or a belief system that ultimately lead to the creation of the first global terrorist organization. The Taliban or the Student's Movement that as well emerged in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion supported AQ. Today the terror caused by the new group called the ISIS can be traced back to this coalition of terrorist groups in Afghanistan.

Genesis of ISIS. Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian from the town of Zarqawas, was one amongst the scores of mujahedeen in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviet invasion. Zarqawi returned back to his native town but soon relocated to Afghanistan where he formed Jama'at al-Tawhidwal-Jihad group and ran a military training camp for AQ fighters. After the 9/11 attack and the subsequent US led invasion in Afghanistan in October 2001, Zarqawi moved back from Afghanistan to Iraq. On the way, he was briefly detained

by Iranian intelligence and security agencies that remained unaware of his importance. He was later released by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards at northern borders of Iran. Zarqawi later joined hands with AQ and renamed his group Tawhidwal Jihad to form Al Qaeda in Iraq. Around two hundred Arabs from the Levant joined the group which later evolved into the ISIS or the Islamic State. After Zarqawi's death in 2006, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and later Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeded as leaders of ISIS.

At present there is no single epicentre of international terrorism but the developments in Levant continue to pose much bigger threats in view of the numerical strength involved. Initially, AQ had 2,000-3,000 fighters including four hundred hard core fighters, whereas ISIS has about 30,000 fighters including 20,000 foreign fighters in the core area of Levant. The ISIS leadership is located in Iraq and Syria and it is difficult to dismantle this infrastructure merely by using airpower. Although the use of air power has certainly degraded this group very significantly and prevented its expansion, there is certainly a need to expand on current capabilities to dismantle this group.

ISIS has announced territorial claims in 26 wilayats (provinces) to establish an Islamic emirate including Tripoli (Libya), Sinai (Egypt), Dagestan (Caucasus), Khorasan (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and Yemen. The threat groups in these provinces are now replicating ISIS's behaviour through the same style of graphic executions, training of combatants, significant assistance in terms of finance and other capabilities. About 60 terror groups have currently pledged allegiance to ISIS. These groups are much bigger than AQ affiliated groups such as Abu Sayyaf in Philippines and other groups in South Asia, South East Asia and Central Asia including Islamic Jihad. ISIS ideology of a Caliphate promises to implement Sharia law by controlling and governing territories which greatly appeals to Islamist fundamentalists and conservatives. In South East Asia, 21 identified groups and political organizations are actively supporting ISIS. Some of these groups are operating in the immediate neighbourhood of India and have the capability to influence Indian youth to join ISIS or contribute to its propaganda. An estimated 30,000 foreign fighters which include 20,000 Sunni and about 10,000-15,000 Shia fighters have volunteered to participate with pro-government forces in Iraq and Syria. Some of these foreign fighters have returned to their home country and conducted attacks. The attack in Brussels on a Jewish museum was the first such terrorist attack to be mounted by a foreign fighter. After fighting alongside radical Jihadists for a year in Syria, 29 year old French national, Mehdi Nemuchi, left for Turkey in mid 2014 and travelled to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Germany and then to Belgium. Nemuchi bombed the Jewish museum, killing four nationals, and was arrested on his return back to Marseilles, France.

The Boom in Terrorism: Drivers for the Emergence of Transnational Armed Non State Actors

In the last decade, the world has witnessed growth of new terror groups, networks and a worsening increase in the scale of terrorist activity and violence. The regime changes in West Asia and North Africa have created fundamental forces who aim to establish their own power structure through means of religious ideologue. The failure of governance, large scale unemployment, poverty, corruption and lack of political freedom on the other hand has spurred a dangerous trend causing large number of civilians to take up arms. The emerging global political, military, social and economic challenges are pivotal for the growth of armed non state actors and transnational terror. The doctrine of War on Terror designed to defeat terrorism has in fact, had an opposite effect.

The Failure of Governance, Social and Economic Grievances. The civilian resistance movements in the Arab world in 2011 brought youth and unarmed protesters out in the streets to protest against unemployment, collapsing economy, poor quality of governance and absence of democracy. Tunisia is perhaps the only example where Arab Spring ushered in multiparty democracy. Unlike the countries of Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, Libya had a robust economy mainly due to the proceeds from oil besides a high quality of governance. After the NATO led invasion, Libya has been reduced to a playground of warlords without an effective government.

External Intervention. In Syria negligence towards agriculture, rampant corruption and discrimination of majority Sunni community by minority Alawite caused resentment against the regime of President Bashar-al-Assad. Taking advantage of political instability in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey inserted mercenaries to overthrow Assad and help the rebels. External players support in encouraging a revolt violently disturbs the status quo. In a country like Bahrain, where majority Shias had stepped out to protest

against the discriminatory attitude of the monarchy, the revolt was brutally crushed. Saudis sent in their troops to save the royalty in Manama. Pakistan army's help was also sought. As US and UK supported the Saudi intervention, the western media too did not go hysterical with the brutalities heaped on angry protestors in Manama. The help to Bahrain was seen as an operation for protection of a strategic asset.

The rise of Religious Extremist Terror Groups. The first generation of the modern jihadist, who fought in Afghanistan in the 80s, were anti-communist Islamic insurgents who had ideological issues with their Middle East rulers. This was followed by the Bosnian and Chechen brand of jihadists in the 90's, which along with Saudi jihadists came out with the pan Islamic global agenda. After the 9/11 attack, AQ became unpopular in the Muslim world. In 2012 the group released its religious justification for conducting acts of terror which included:-

• The norm of reciprocity.

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- The inability to distinguish civilians from combatants.
- The role of civilians in aiding the enemy.
- Transformation of enemy 'strongholds'.
- The use of modern weaponry.
- The acceptability of killing women and children.
- Enemy's violation of agreements or treaties.

Religious Discourse. Some of the new Muslim ideologues from AQ added the seminal work in this discourse post 9/11. In 2004, Abu Musab al-Suri published a book "Global Call to Islamic Resistance". In the book Al Suri coined the concept of *Nizam la Tanzim* or a system without organization. A complete form of anarchic jihadist warfare in which disaffiliated terrorist groups are enable to carry out lone wolf operations based on detailed online training. "Management of Savagery" written by Abu Bakr Naji is another book that charts down a roadmap on methods of initiating sectarian violence and lists out details on ways to carry out savagery barbarian attacks against civilian population in order to subjugate them and ensure their cooperation

which seemingly has influenced the ISIS strategy. Naji's book introduced the concept of manoeuvre warfare of the Mongols and speaks about the engaging powerful western enemies in the long war of attrition in order to overstretch their resources in remote and inhospitable regions.

The third and most important book is written by Fouad Hussein, who was in the jail with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2006, he wrote about the seven phase master plan to initiate a global war and establish a caliphate by 2020.

- According to book the first phase of this master plan is **awakening phase**. The aim of this phase is to provoke US into declaring war on the Islamic world.
- The second phase or the **eye opening phase** from 2003-06 is the one where the people would be made aware of the western conspiracy against the Muslim world.
- The third phase from 2007-10 is described as a **rising and standing phase**. During this phase focus was on the uprising in the Syrian regime and increased attacks on Israel.
- The fourth phase from 2010-13 covers the stage when the insurgent would seek to **bring down most hatred Arab regimes**. Al Qaeda believes that the power vacuum created by the uprising would strengthen the hands of the insurgents and not the democrats.
- The fifth phase from 2013-16 is when the **Islamic caliphate will be declared**. According to Hussein, Western fist in the Arab region would have relaxed and the international balance will change. It also says that Europe would fall into disunity and it would have economic problems at this time.
- The sixth phase starting from 2016 onwards will be of **total confrontation** characterised by the formation of the Islamic army which will instigate the fight between believers and non believers.
- In the seventh phase, proposed to start by 2020, **definitive victory** would be achieved leading to the success of the caliphate.

Availability of such kind of jihadist literature in open domains, particularly on internet, has become an easy tool for radicalization of young minds to join terror groups or carry out lone wolf attacks. The same jihadist literature also holds the key to developing a coherent liberal counter narrative against Jihad, which policy makers need to understand and develop.

Islamic Prophetic Concepts: However in the last decade, a new generation of Iraqi and Syrian jihadists (ISIS) have brought fresh political and military concepts to the jihadist discourse. Some of the most important ideas these new extremist terror groups propound are-

- The concept of *Takfir* (i.e. declaring people apostate and hence fit for killing) which can be then linked to present large scale ethnic and sectarian cleansing.
- Struggle against the nation-state system in order to establish transnational if not a global caliphate.
- Apocalyptic seduction: The Inclusion of End-Time Prophecies in *Hadeeth* literature to make the idea of *jihadist* destiny more appealing.

During and following the war in Iraq, ISIS terrorists did not feel obliged to defend the indefensible and attacked the civilian population killing women and children. The violence, being based on the concept of *Takfir*, gained currency as a legitimate action against the people of rival religion, sect, ethnic community or political orientation. The centrality of *Tawhid* (Oneness of God), *Takfir* (Declaring Apostasy), opposition to *Taqlid* (Belief in Orthodox Jurisprudence) and *Tawassul* (Prayer through Intermediary) as a form of Aggressive Jihad has become inviolable in the *Salafi Jihadist* discourse. Many *Jihadist* ideologues like Abu Katada questioned whether Taliban, which belongs to the *Hanafi Deobandi* school of Islam and follows the concept *Taqlid* can dent the legitimate Islamic movement. The centrality of *Tawhid* has become an attractive strategy for the *Salafi jihadists* undermining the voices of majority quietist *Wahabi Salafi Jihadist* community who condemn the violence and barbarism followed in the name of religion.

Many Sunni Islamic leaders like Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas, Muhammad

Morsi of Egypt and Islamic scholar like Yusuf al-Qaradawi have been branded *Murtada* or apostate for holding contradictory views to the concept of *Tawhid* and hence fit the criteria for being executed by ISIS and other terrorist organisations. ISIS and its affiliates have upstaged AQ in terms of sheer barbarity, landscape of ideological inspiration and divisiveness.

Establishment of Caliphate. Converse to Al Qaeda, which follows the anarchist anti Western approach to jihad, ISIS has popularised the idea of territorially expansionist jihadi model. Such an idea promises the fulfilment of quest of political power and territorial control. By taking lead in establishing an Islamic caliphate, ISIS apparently wants to dominate all jihadist groups. Many Islamist organizations particularly Hizbut-Tahrir aspired to achieve the goal of global Caliphate, but failed in their attempt to establish an Islamic State. Since the dismantling of Caliphate as an institution in 1924 by the Turkish Ottoman, no Muslim organisation dared to establish an Islamic State like the ISIS, which has self appointed a Caliph and demanded the entire Muslim community around the world to swear allegiance and follow him. The declaration of a caliphate arguably may have been a strategic miscalculation by ISIS. Nevertheless, counter terrorism strategists will find it hard to curtail the idea of an Islamic State ruled by a religiously sanctioned caliph even after ISIS as a group is defeated and eliminated.

ISIS has popularised the Islamic prophecy by capturing the small and apparently inconsequential village of Dabiq in Syria which it claims is the prophesized spot for the 'last great war of the world' called the *Malhama Al Kubra*. According to the group, an army of Westerners will arrive in Dabiq and engage militarily with the Muslim legion. The ISIS terror tactics of beheading American and other journalists from the west is to dare the US to start the war against ISIS. ISIS believes that such an action will attract even more Muslim support. Such apocalyptic references have snapped the minds of young and impressionable Muslims as well as the newly converted Muslims in US and Europe, who have been migrating to the ISIS territories in the belief that the so called Islamic State is destined to play a major role in the history.

In addition to the concepts of Jihad, new forms of warfare as a strategy have emerged. These forms include -

- Fourth Generation Warfare (wherein transnational armed non-state actors are fighting conventional military power of the state).
- Cyber Jihad.
- Lone-Wolf Operations.
- Economic Warfare (gold based economy).
- Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Strategies Used by Armed Non State Actors to Achieve Their Objectives

Controlling Territory and Governing Population. Capturing of territory by armed non-state actors to rule and sustain their legitimacy in power, represents a new wave in modern terrorism. ISIS's declaration of an independent country called Islamic State or Caliphate has given power to the jihadist group to control territory and govern. To enable its rule over the captured territory, ISIS is using the combines of terror, fear and governance to intimidate the population and follow the rules and practices of the Caliphate.

Case Study I: Strategies Used by ISIS to Run its Caliphate.

Religion: ISIS cleverly uses religion as a strategy to further its political and military goals. Its grand plan of controlling the masses, establishing rule and governing the territory will work only if it is legitimised in the name of God. Without a Caliphate, ISIS would remain like any another terrorist group or organised criminal gang. By creating a Caliphate, Muslims, in theory, are obliged to follow the Caliph and immigrate to the land of Islamic laws. This also makes ISIS the only dominant power to which other rebel groups in Iraq and Syria must pledge their allegiance or face death.

Fear and Subjugation. ISIS publicised its brutality in order to convey its authority over its controlled areas, show its strength to attract recruits, and threaten any entity that challenges its ideology. It has undertaken a policy of imposing discriminatory sanctions such as taxes or forced conversions on the basis of ethnic or religious identity, destroying religious sites and systematically expelling minority communities. ISIS employs the practice of *takfir* (declaring someone to be a heretic) in order to justify attacks on any group it perceives to be a challenge to its dominance. It carries out amputations and lashings in public spaces in its areas of control. Under ISIS jurisdiction, women have to cover themselves with a full-face *niqab* in public, entertainment is banned, consumption of western products is forbidden and all citizens must pray five times a day.

Leadership: The group has established a command and control system under

Caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who holds absolute power. The Islamic State requires territory to remain legitimate and a top-down structure to rule it. Its bureaucracy is divided into civil and military arms, and its territory into provinces. ISIS also depends on a network of regional and local emirs and military commanders to enforce tight discipline among its ranks and ensure full control of its territory.

Propaganda: World Wide Web has proved to be the most important weapon for ISIS to cash in for spreading its propaganda. No other group in the history of modern terrorism has ever used Information Technology as a tool for terror the way ISIS has been able to. There are more than 47,000 ISIS supporters on Twitter including a popular one run by an Indian national, now under arrest. Besides this, ISIS has 10,000 Face book accounts and links to 9800 websites. The group attracts followers yearning for not only religious righteousness but also adventure, personal power, and a sense of belonging to community. Its brutal violence attracts attention, demonstrates dominance and draws people. ISIS not only employs social media to spread its messages and recruit followers, but also to empower its supporters to take part in that process.

Case Study II: The Terror Campaign of Boko Haram

Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it *haram* or forbidden for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. Nigeria has almost equal share of Christian population (estimated around 49.3 percent) and Muslims (48.8 percent). Boko Haram attempts to exploit the sectarian divide by targeting Christians as nonbelievers and regards the state represented by President Jonathan Goodluck (now replaced by Muhammadu Buhar) as anti-Islamic. It has extended its military campaign to attack people voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education as well as by targeting neighbouring states of Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

Anti-Western Ideology: Boko Haram was formed in 2002 as an Islamic resistance to Western education. The group's founder cleric, Mohammed Yusuf set up a religious complex, which included a mosque and an Islamic school. Many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries, enrolled their children at the school. The group having been motivated by localised socio-economic and politico-religious

grievances, poverty, unemployment, corruption and political discrimination in Nigeria's northern states was thus able to manipulate an already radicalised population and cultivate their own ideology to recruit and transform a socio-religious group into a violent militant sect.

Guerrilla Warfare: The group uses urban guerrilla tactics by carrying out bombings and attacks and targeted assassinations against the Nigerian military, police, teachers, educational facilities, banks, markets, Christian preachers and churches. Its other major methodologies include suicide attacks and drive-by shootings. It has mainly engaged in attacks against government and security establishments in the North as well as Christians in order to foment sectarian violence. By 2012, the group became more sophisticated in its capability to coordinate multiple strikes. It no longer remains a local problem but a threat to Nigeria's national security as well as regional security. Presently it has a fighting force of thousands of men and cells that specialize in bombings. By carrying out raids on military bases and banks, it has gained control of large amounts of weaponry and money.

External Linkages: The group is receiving growing foreign support from ISIS and AQ groups including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabaab, which have influenced the militant group with both tactical knowledge and ideological affinity.

How terror groups get funding

General. The two key elements for any terrorist movement to function effectively are ideology and financing. Other than the physical part of the attack that requires ammunition, weapons and logistics, there is a need of a constant and consistent flow of funds for the attack to take place. While organizing a single terrorist attack may be relatively inexpensive, managing a terrorist organization capable of conducting an attack remains costly, complex, and bureaucratic.

Substantial funds are required to finance each component of the terrorist life cycle namely recruitment, weapons acquisition, training, communications, logistics, salaries, travel, safe havens, bribes, payments to the families of the deceased fighters, and support to other groups. Their sizable operating budgets and global supply chains create vulnerabilities for even the most nimble and methodical terrorist group.

Legal Channels: Most funding which tends to finance terrorism is actually legal. If money donated to a charity ends up with a terrorist group, the reality is that the source of funding is legal but its utilisation is illegal. There have been cases, like the 9/11 attack in US and 1993 Mumbai blasts, wherein the money was directed through legal channels. Hence, it is a misconception to say only illegal money flows into terrorism. The sources funding terrorism are multiple and diverse. Even with legal sources, terrorists can utilise and abuse the financial system to fund their activities through banking channels, credit cards, PayPal and money transfer services. Narcotics, counterfeit currency, illicit trade, and crime are some of the illegal sources.

State Sponsored Terrorism: Iran remains the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism by planning terrorist attacks, abetting of terrorist groups, and delivering hundreds of millions of dollars annually to support extremist groups. Hezbollah, for example, has received significant monetary payments from Iran to fund its activities during the past. Qatar has for many years openly financed Hamas, a group that continues to undermine regional stability. In the Indian context, counterfeit currency coming from Pakistan is funding terrorist movements in India.

Donor networks and charities: Traditional means of funding terrorist groups, such as deep-pocket donors and charitable organizations, have experienced resurgence of late. Since early 2012, senior AQ leaders in Pakistan have raised millions of dollars from deep pocket donors. They receive the majority of their funds from Gulf-based sympathisers and supporters based in Pakistan and Turkey. Charitable fundraising networks in the Gulf have collected hundreds of millions of dollars through regular fundraising events held at homes or mosques and through social media pleas. These networks then use couriers, wire transfers, *hawala*, and exchange houses to move these funds to Syrian extremists. The recipients of these funds are often terrorist groups, including AQ affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusrah Front (JaN) and ISIS.

The Irregular Channels Over the past decade, powerful financial sanctions at the national and international levels, coupled with close cooperation among governments and the private sector, have helped combat these traditional methods of terrorist financing. Turned away by banks and other reputable financial institutions, terrorist groups have increasingly turned to

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less regulated channels like *hawala*, exchange houses, and cash couriers to transfer funds. These channels are decidedly less effective than transacting through the global financial system. Using these alternative transfer mechanisms carries greater transaction costs, higher risk of loss, theft and logistical complications as cash is bulky and carrying it across borders has its own legal risk. These mechanisms also require terrorist groups to rely on more people and larger networks, thus making the organisation more vulnerable.

Self Funding. Numerous armed affiliates recruit their own jihadists, organize their own operations, and raise their own funds. Many of these groups generate capital locally, often in areas subject to little governmental control. These groups also increasingly have turned away from the traditional 'donor' model of fundraising and rely more on criminal activity for their financial support, a phenomena which has been called 'gangster jihadism'.

From Hezbollah's cigarette smuggling and Taliban's drug trafficking to the Haqqani network's mafia-like extortion schemes, terrorist groups have long turned to crime in their quest for funding. The magnitude and scale of this crime-terror nexus has reached new heights with the spread of kidnapping-for-ransom as a fundraising strategy. Apart from state sponsorship, kidnapping as a source of terror funding is the most challenging threat. Groups such as AQAP, AQIM, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab continue to collect tens of millions of dollars from ransoms. Terrorist groups that control territory have employed yet another self-generated revenue source by taxing local population. This form of pseudo-sovereignty-based fundraising has spread to other under-governed territories around the world. New groups are also translating territorial control into revenue. ISIS generates a portion of its extortion-derived proceeds from Iraqi and Syrian oil resources, while JaN has also exploited local natural resources to raise funds.

Fund Raising Through Internet. Innovations in traditional modes of terrorist fundraising, particularly through the use of social media are a new challenge. Private fundraising networks in Qatar increasingly rely upon social media to solicit donations for terrorists and also to communicate with both donors and recipient extremist rebel groups in Syria.

Dark Web. Terror groups, violent non state actors use Dark Web, a parallel virtual world. This includes many servers at their disposal and approximately

4.5-4.7 lakh sites and transmissions which are difficult to track. The advances in media technology have allowed transmission of real time data at great speeds. This poses a security challenge as was evident in Mumbai terrorist attack from the intercepts of the handlers received from Pakistan. This is an example of what is known as intelligence led terrorism.

Bit coin. It is the crypto currency which is now a preferred means to finance terror activities. This has given rise to new entities called jugglers. The primary task of a juggler is to transfer money from person A to B in different currencies. This helps evade the tracking radar of the security forces as small packets of money of different currencies do not generate heavy data. In order to check the threats emanating out of this virtual dark world, the current security setup requires dark web explorers and ethical hackers.

There is no sequential progression when it comes to the terror financing tactics that are being resorted to by various terrorist organisations. There is a very flexible and adaptive mechanism to alternate between the external and internal sources that continue to fund the terrorist organisations. The strategic and clan based interests of various countries drive some of the funding patterns and this is a major reason why money continues to flow in these areas. The ungoverned space (like ISIS) has the ability to generate and raise money on its own, which is outside the formal economy and hence it is very difficult to counter it.

Counter Terror Strategy at the Global Level

Tech based Counter Terrorism Strategies

Recent evolutions of anti-terror measures have been in the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Geographical Intelligence (Geo-intelligence), and Cyber Security. These fields of 'Actionable Intelligence' need to be developed further in order to synchronise various sources of data/ information and agencies to work in integrated manner.

- Among the key strategies, 'Change Management' of entire Border and Internal security forces is most critical. Change of mindset along with continuous re-orientation is a necessity else deployment of even the best of the technologies and strategies may not yield desired results.
- Building a national centralized/ decentralized database, but connected with the details of entities, persons, events, groups and intelligence input. This will help continuous developing of database and entities with relations.
- Use of national infrastructure by different agencies working in integrated manner is among critical success factors.
- Cross-Ministry-Department-Agency level coordination across centre & state government.

Military Operations Ground and Air: The US Case Study

The US has broadly adopted two strategic approaches post 9/11 to deal with the emerging threats:

- Small Foot Print Approach involving predominantly Special Operations Forces.
- Developing Partners Approach.

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The US operations in Afghanistan post 9/11 were a textbook example of what the US Special Operations Forces were trained to do ever since World War 2. Operations in Afghanistan unfolded with a small footprint approach. Regular forces supported the Special Operations. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan led to the Main forces gradually taking the lead over the Special Forces. Despite that the 'Small foot print approach' and 'developing partners approach' continued to exist in tandem.

In Iraq, the issue of WMD's had great tractions and hence was floated widely. The actual issue however was the Iraqi regimes support for terrorist organisations. This resulted in major operations against the terrorists under the umbrella of Global War on Terror. After initial successes on ground in Iraq the pacification phase failed and took the form of an insurgency being waged across Iraq against an occupying power. The latter emerged as a preferred US approach for dealing with overseas missions after lessons learnt in Iraq.

Countering Terror Finance. The goal of counterterrorism must include a strategy to dismantle the infrastructure that the terrorist organizations utilise to fund their activities The US has undertaken an unprecedented effort on detecting, disrupting, and dismantling the financial infrastructure of terrorist organisations, which has particularly put a strain on AQ's external donors. Saudi Arabia has made great progress in stamping out AQ funding sources within its borders. Its new terrorism law passed in 2013 and a series of related royal decrees have created a legal framework to tackle these issues.

The Threat of Global Terrorism to India

Terror challenge in India primarily comes from the immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh. More than 40 individuals have fled the touristic haven of beautiful islands in Maldives to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. There is an increasing radicalization of Maldivian society and the quasi-Islamic government is not acting against the threats. The radicalisation of the society in Bangladesh along with resurgence of political and extremist elements having extraterritorial ambitions of establishing an Islamic State have the ability to make the adjoining North-eastern border states of India their first target. In Pakistan, amidst the vast factions of terror groups and extremist elements, the entry of ISIS has provided an alternate attraction. Reportedly many Islamist groups including the fragmented leadership of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is joining ISIS Khorasan.

The Muslim community in India is integrated and adheres to moderate set of Islamic beliefs. However, the rising spread of Wahhabism in the subcontinent, social and political alienation at home, may spur Indian Muslims on the path of radicalisation and extremism. Jihad is a political concept and it is imperative for India to approach this problem through the political process.

Strategy at the Policy Level: Case of India

India has a host of security challenges like terrorist organisations, Left Wing Extremism, proxy war waged by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, drug trafficking to Virtual terrorism. In order to tackle the threats posed, a comprehensive strategy should include the following measures:-

- At a strategic level, a doctrine is required to attack radicalisation and recruitment despite it being a tall order.
- Treating the Community as the Centre of gravity by denying support of locals and making it difficult for the threats to operate.
- Planned policy including a continuous de-radicalization and rehabilitation programme.
- Use of force against hardcore terrorists and elements which cannot be de-radicalised.
- Establishing an efficient intelligence system with continuous inputs from surveillance and monitoring channels followed by periodic re-evaluations.
- Choke state support to non state actors.
- Delinking financial support from radicalisation and sponsoring of terrorism.
- Linking regional and national counter terrorism centres in order to prevent loopholes in the security structure.

Strategic partnerships at bilateral and multilateral levels should be optimised for capacity building. Technology must be harnessed for better data management, intelligence gathering and action.

Responses Needed by India to Fight Global Terrorism

To fight transnational terror, the response to it as well needs to be of multidimensional. There is a need for a multi agency, multinational and multi jurisdictional level of co-operation on a global scale.

Engaging the Muslim Community and Building Social Harmony. The Muslim community in India has been very resistant and resilient against terrorism. This is largely to the credit of Islamic thought in India and the traditional ethos which talks about the reconciliation and not revenge. That era of reconciliation is slowly coming to an end with the emergence of global trans-national form of terrorism. When AQ was at its peak, there was only one known case of an Indian joining the group. Now there are at least 12-15 suspected cases of individuals joining ISIS. The extensive use of social media by terrorists and non-state actors has widened the scope for radicalisation of young minds at home. There is need to engage the Muslim community to build crucial partnerships and for that as a country we need to create harmony centres in schools, villages, towns and cities to engage and interact with Muslim community. The government should not allow the grievances of large minorities to go unattended, which could encourage alienation from the state and radicalization.

Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Policies: The biggest threat that India faces from ISIS is through online radicalisation. Well educated Indian youth have access to social media hence they can be radicalised through this medium. It is assessed that 12-15 Indian nationals have travelled to the Levant to join ISIS.

UN Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism defines deradicalization as `programs directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence. Policy makers should closely work with Muslim community leaders and religious figures to develop a de-radicalization policy to dissuade the indoctrinated individuals from violence.

EMERGING CAUSES AND STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THREAT 21

India has responded to the cyber threat well and shut down dangerous propaganda or websites hosting Jihadist material. It should now lead the way and include the large group of moderate and main stream Muslims including *ulema* who can play very important role in fight against the terrorism in the cyber space.

Rehabilitation of Terrorists: There is larger need to rehabilitate those suspects accused of terrorism and later released from judicial custody. If they are not rehabilitated then there are three probabilities upon their release-

- Go back to their community and resume normal life
- Pose a threat by conducting terrorist attacks
- Deemed as heroes and recruited by terrorist groups

India must build a robust rehabilitation capability that delivers educational, vocational, agricultural, recreational and psychological rehabilitation.

Special Forces. To a large extent in order to neutralize ISIS global expansion, it is imperative to build the capabilities of Indian Special Forces. India has built very good special operations capability, but has not demonstrated those capabilities in practise. India needs to go beyond tactical capabilities to understand full spectrum response and deploy Special Forces to fight both international and domestic terrorism. Indian Special forces are numerically almost at par with USSF, but have not been deployed and employed for creating deterrence to proxy war. Absence of a unified structure and dedicated support, coupled with lack of policy for employment at national level greatly hampers the functioning of these elite units. To tackle this issue certain structural changes which need to be carried out are listed below:-.

- Ministry of Defence should be replaced by Department of Defence manned by defence professionals.
- A Combined Defence Staff (CDS) with full operational powers should be appointed.
- A Unified Operational Command for tackling the Naxal belt should be established and should be manned by career professionals.

- Establishment of National Intelligence Grid or NATGRID, National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and State Counter Terrorism Centre (SCTC)
- Public-Private partnership monitoring cyberspace like US Counter Extremist Project (CEP) that augments US NSA.
- Integrated Commando Command under CDS.
- Special Forces Command should rest under highest political authority.

Indo-Pak Co-operation. There is a fear that large number of youth from South East Asia may join ISIS, specifically to realise its aim to build a Caliphate in Khorasan. ISIS affiliated groups in the Af-Pak region are already operating in tribal areas of South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Urozgan and many other provinces. This phenomenon is likely to have a blowback and the impact of terrorism will be so extreme that it will be imperative for Pakistan to consider cooperating with India. This scenario is not improbable to imagine as in the past as Pakistan has worked with the US to dismantle AQ's infrastructure operating within its territory. 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was arrested in Rawalpindi, Abu Zubaydah was killed in Faisalabad and more than 600 AQ operatives have been killed or captured by ISI and other agencies. The emergence of new threats in the Af-Pak region is something that Pakistan cannot deal single handed. Both India and Pakistan need to co-operate to fight trans-national terrorism and contain the threat by denying safe havens. Failure on behalf of both India and Pakistan to join hands and work together will ultimately affect the South Asian region as a whole.