

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES

SECURING INDIA-2014

16 January 2014

Seminar Report

Inaugural Session

The Director welcomed all present and briefly spoke on the need to have both conflict prevention measures as well as conflict resolution measures in place, if India was to achieve her rightful place in the comity of nations. While the Indian Army is capable of dealing with conflict situations, steps must be taken to improve justice delivery mechanisms, social and economic equity norms as conflict prevention measures. He also briefly touched upon the need to improve defence preparedness through improved decision-making processes and indigenisation in the defence industry. Thereafter, the Director read out the address by the Honourable Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lt Gen AK Singh, as the Lt Governor could not attend due to a sudden bereavement in his family.

Address of Lt Gen AK Singh, Lt Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands (As read out by the Director)

Ex Chiefs, Director CLAWS, members of the strategic community, academia, industry and media, ladies and gentlemen.

It is indeed a privilege to have been invited to deliver the keynote address this morning on "Securing India". The seminar has been nicely structured into two sessions, which should take us through the entire gamut of issues for empowering people, reforming institutions, resolving conflict and strengthening our country for a better tomorrow. I find that the panellists selected for various sessions are pre-eminent personae who would take this debate to strategic heights and produce holistic recommendations for dissemination to decision makers.

Concept of India: India's culture is marked by a high degree of cultural pluralism, being a centre of numerous cultural and religious traditions. Notwithstanding its ancient civilisation and inherited wisdom, India remains somewhat tentative and insecure about the use of power. In this process, our efforts to define and shape a coherent strategic identity have also been adhoc and arbitrary and sometimes not in our best interests. The Preamble to the Indian Constitution spells out the basic philosophy underlying the Indian nation State; the key aspects are: Sovereignty; A Democratic Republic that is socialist and secular and one that provides its citizens JUSTICE; social, economic and political, LIBERTY, of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity and to promote among all its citizens- FRATERNITY, assuring the dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of the nation.

Achievements in the last 6/7 decades: To start with, let us do a status check and talk of the "State of our Nation". Given the challenges that faced India at birth, not many had given her a chance to succeed, in the manner we have. The story of

emerging India is therefore catching the imagination of the world. And whether we want it or not, India will be a player on the world scene. India is today a major “Stake Holder” power, using this power to reconfigure relations with the major powers of the world. For example:-

- With the US, a people & trade driven relationship into strategic partnership;
- With France, a defence relationship, moving towards wider trade and security stakes and so also with major powers (the only exception being China! Where we are still struggling to find our course).
- Shedding its non-alignment and wanting to retain strategic autonomy, India is leveraging its stakes into positions of influence - thus giving credence to Policy of Omni Alignment.

There are many positives in the Emerging India's story. India has an emerging economy, a vibrant middle class that has raised consumption levels significantly, thereby creating a huge internal market and a vigilant and powerful media which works as the perfect watchdog. I think, however, the most important leap of faith taken by emerging India is a change in our attitude from “*Let me not lose*” to “*I can win, I will win*”.

Notwithstanding this huge leap, ‘Going Forward’ would mean enormous challenges in the areas of rural development, urban sustainability, national infrastructure, and human capital. The priority now must be only on growth, but on the triple canons of growth, inclusion and environmental sustainability. As one of the world's most crowded country, India faces this challenge more urgently than others do.

Challenges

Despite great economic and political progress, India remains a fragile state and society with regional and religious fault lines and economic polarisation. Obscene wealth and abysmal poverty living side by side is an unpalatable truth of 21st Century India. Hunger still stalks large numbers; food grains are overflowing but the distribution is warped. Corruption seems to be widespread, which has generated the current backlash. There is also the demographic factor. Growing population from 1.04 billion in 2000 to 1.21 billion in 2010 to 1.6 billion by 2050. The demographic dividend comes as a package. The good news is that the world is scared of India's young entrepreneurial power because they are the game changers of a competitive India. However, this youth bulge can also be a ticking time bomb if we are unable to create the right opportunities and the hope of progress. A million graduates every year sounds good - but are they “employable”? Dangers related to “under employment” are lurking at our doors.

Security issues

External Environment: India has the disadvantage of being situated in close proximity to what is being described as the ‘epicentre of global terrorism’. Tribal region near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is constantly drawing attention of America's Global War on Terror since 2001. India's increasing relevance to the US strategic canvas, troubled relationship with Pakistan since independence, deteriorating/unpredictable relationship with China and unstable political climate in neighbouring countries (Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) have rendered any fair estimation of Indian preparedness to deal with these security challenges an onerous task. Pakistan will continue to remain the principal national security threat in the

short term and in all the military dimensions - sub conventional/ conventional and nuclear. The Pakistan army remains fixated to implacable hostility towards India as a strategy fundamental, despite India extending its hand of friendship on numerous occasions. Moreover, irrationality of response from Pakistan cannot be excluded from our calculus, more so on account of its internal contradictions. We must have a measured response to Pakistani provocation, on the lines of an 'iron fist in a velvet glove' and call its bluff.

With China, there are issues of convergence and issues of divergence. Despite the positive progress in India-China relations in the past three decades, unresolved border issues and mutual distrust remains; added to the often-repeated unpredictable behaviour of various organs, especially PLA. We also cannot ignore the massive development of infrastructure in TAR and related rapid development capability of PLA and the PLAAF. China therefore remains the major long-term challenge for our national security. We need to engage China on multiple levels to include trade and commerce, but from a position of strength.

Internal Environment

While there are large positives in our growth story, there are significant challenges also. These can be categorised under two heads: insurgency and extremism including the LWE. There has to be a consensus on several things if India is to avoid continued and serious internal conflict. First, we need to build a credible state that makes citizens feel secure. Second, we need to further develop models of inclusive governance that can address the sense of disempowerment in certain sections of the population. Third, we need a political culture that is attuned to defusing conflict rather than exacerbating it. Fourth, fair and transparent law enforcement and quick, efficient judicial apparatus are required to stem the tide of religious extremism in the country. Fifth, good governance, delivery of services and socio-economic justice commensurate to the ideals enshrined in the Constitution become imperative.

It is indeed a complex task to determine which of the two threats (external or internal) will be greater for India. In fact, in a highly dynamic external security situation and rapidly evolving internal socio-economic developments, the relative strengths of these challenges cannot be determined with certainty. Continued insurgency can provide a fillip to external aggression from our adversaries, sensing internal weakness. Thus both threats need to be tackled comprehensively if India is to emerge strong.

Do we have a Policy for Internal Security? In practice, the following parameters emerge:-

- Patience- Exhaust into submission.
- Inclusive Growth- Bring into mainstream without compromising in National Sovereignty.
- Use of Military Power- Win Hearts and Minds-Iron Fist in velvet glove.

What Choices do we have in developing our military power? Common sense says we prepare for the "most likely", but can we afford to ignore the "most dangerous". Each nation has to make a choice based on the security environment it faces. For the US & NATO, there is a more direct land threat: They prepare for the most likely and are ready to adapt to "most dangerous". In India's case, we have disputed

borders with two inimical neighbours. We cannot ignore the “most dangerous” and would have to adapt to the “most likely”.

Strategy

Indian grand strategy de-emphasises the use of force and consequently, the military receives little strategic guidance from the political leaders. Indian defence needs reform; we need to start at the beginning with a clear vision of the role of the military and use of force in the country's rise as great power. This vision must balance domestic and external threats to security including non-military challenges. An example of this fuzziness is reflected in the way we conduct defence cooperation, where military exchanges have become an end in themselves. The counterparts often ask - “what now?”. We have no clarity. But there have been exceptions: Food security through “Green Revolution” enabled our finest hour, as also the the 1971 War which led to the creation of Bangladesh. We are beginning to realise the importance of strategy but still disinclined to articulate it openly and clearly. In the 21st Century, we need to move from “Power of Argument to Argument of Power”: A combination of Soft and Hard Power.

SESSION I: INTERNAL CONFLICT: PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

Political and Legal Interventions: Mr. Shakti Sinha, Chairman, South Asian Institute for Strategic Affairs (SAISA)

Service delivery mechanisms at present are suffering from decision making paralysis. This is because institutional changes are not in consonance with socio-economic reforms. Though emergency situations have seen remarkable progress in policy implementation, political leadership is hesitant to improve governance structures. For example, cyclones in Orissa were dealt with in an efficient manner, however the long term rehabilitation measures for the displaced population have failed. The public administration mind set which prevailed in the 50s or 60s persists where the citizens are viewed as passive recipients, only expressing their opinions once in five years during elections. Korean government website could prove to be a good model of interactive and participatory governance.

Lack of understanding prevails in the domain of public policy. It has to be more flexible for local adaptation. Accountability, outlook and processes are three integral pillars of policy. Pertaining to the food security bill, its impact on hunger, malnourishment and fiscal consequences have not been effectively evaluated. Policy making should follow a step by step rational approach. Same members are becoming a part of the committee formed to suggest remedial measures, which obviously leads to fault lines in the service delivery mechanisms. Monitoring and evaluation for any programme needs to be strengthened. While implementation can be done at various levels, it must be ensured that it establishes clarity and accountability. Multiple bodies assigned to look over the same tasks create a fuzzy situation. Public policy and governance thereby have to be more participatory in their approach and engage citizens in every aspect that directly affects their life. Failure to deliver justice would only lead to more challenges in securing India.

Social and Economic Interventions: Ms Madhu Kishwar, Director Indic Studies Project, CSDS

Serious government failures have occurred in the recent times. India is going through a great deal of ferment but we also need to look at places where things are improving. There is a need to reflect why certain state governments are getting elected and have restored stability. Role of political representatives and bureaucracy must be studied. As an example, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, changed the mood in Kashmir during his tenure by being a more responsive and accessible leader who exhibited consistency in his message, strengthened delivery mechanisms and ensured better coordination with the army.

NGOs have filled the vacuum for delivery mechanisms, but some of these are turning out to be sinister forces that are destabilising India. India has had a long history of very vibrant social work and reforms that is now completely marginalised. Now the fatter grant they receive from international donor agencies, the more media space they tend to occupy. In fact, current events have showed a blending of political and academic space because their funding sources are pretty much similar. NGOs which are into advocacy, political change and legal reforms are all aimed at conflict promotion. They look for fault lines and have vested interests in keeping the issues unresolved. American and European foundations handpick leftist, lunatic NGO types which tend to extend the logic of irreconcilable differences and keep men-women, tribals-non tribals, Hindus-Muslims, perpetually at war. They represent the foreign agencies and work towards subverting the functioning of government in the name of social justice.

Transparent institutional frameworks must be ensured for the smooth functioning of government. The development projects which have displaced a large part of the population resulting in a number of economic refugees must follow a democratic process. The NGOs which preside over various committees, their source of funding must be looked into to ensure more transparency.

Use of Force: Combating Violence: Dr. Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal and Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review

There is a great deal of debate which delegitimises State usage of forces while legitimising the use of force by anti state forces which leads to constant apologetics in the security discourse. The use of force is integral without which the State will have no rationale for its existence. The degree to which State and the powerful monopolise force and undermine the rule of law and democracy needs attention. Resources and efficiency are core concerns that must be addressed if service and justice delivery mechanisms were to improve. For example, the discourse around calling the army to handle the Naxal problem has not dealt with issues concerning the resources and the personnel required in a realistic manner. The army has been overextended for decades in internal security operation at the expense of its core capabilities.

Lack of expertise in the ministerial institutions has shown disastrous results. The over exaggeration of the area held by the Maoists as liberated area has generated a sense of panic when in reality the Maoists have claimed that the movement is going

through a crisis. It is very important to look at data and numbers to ensure good governance and accountability at all levels.

No system which is under resourced can be held to account in times of crisis. High levels of development work can only follow only when the security issues are adequately addressed. Past incidents have established that the insurgents have been defeated but never out developed by the State. Winning hearts and minds can be used as a strategic and tactical intervention by the army to establish a link between the local populations. In the middle of an ongoing war, winning hearts and minds in its absolute terms is mere self-deception. Failure to make a correct assessment of the use of force is a failure in tactical command. Currently, issues of internal security are decided on short-term considerations and partisan politics framework and institutions which ensure security are collapsing.

Remarks by the Chairperson: Dr. Surjit Bhalla, Managing Director Oxus Research & Investment

The relation between internal security and economy needs immediate attention. The Maoists have managed to garner support from the disaffected tribal population. Terrorism and violence against women are other facets of security, which need to be reflected upon. The Indian society is undergoing a social change; women have been progressing in various spheres. Whether violence unleashed against women is a result of the brimming frustration amongst men who perceive them as threat is a lurking question. People have tilted towards free and fair elections in the tribal areas which disproves Maoist claims of enjoying support of the vast tribal population in waging an anti state war.

Checks and balances for policy implementation have not been duly addressed. The Food security bill does not have the adequate framework to tackle the malnourishment issue in India, which is worse compared to Sub Saharan Africa. Health and sanitation services must be improved to address the malnourishment menace. Solutions to policy problems are more money driven which also explains the massive corruption in these institutions. NGOs and academic activists have become money laundering organisations working in the name of poor.

Discussion

Role of politicians and bureaucracy and how they influence internal security matters needs to be scrutinised.

Centrality of police reforms in conflict resolution is imperative. Excessive force lies at the heart of injustice across India. They should be accountable to the law.

Quality of teachers is poor in government schools and rural areas. Teachers should be employed by the schools owing to lack of accountability when they are transferred to other communities.

Policy making decisions are vote bank based.

Institutional reforms are needed to introduce accountability at all levels of governance.

Army does not have surplus capacity to tackle the naxalites

Distinguishing between distribution and use of force is important to understand the security aspect of India

SESSION II: STRENGTHENING THE NATION: DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY

Unifying the Narrative: Higher Defence Management – Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), former Director CLAWS

With the experience gained over the last six decades, there are several steps that the government can take to improve the functioning of higher defence organisations and better manage national security. The first and foremost item on the government's defence and national security agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review. Such a review must take the public into confidence and not be conducted behind closed doors. Like in most other democracies, the NSS should be signed by the Prime Minister, who is the head of government and must be placed on the table of Parliament and released as a public document. Only then will various stakeholders take ownership of the strategy and work unitedly to achieve its aims and objectives.

The armed forces are now in the second year of the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17) and it has not yet been formally approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with full financial backing. The government has also not formally approved the Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP 2007-22) formulated by HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Without these essential approvals, defence procurement is being undertaken through *ad hoc* annual procurement plans, rather than being based on duly prioritised long-term plans that are designed to systematically enhance India's combat potential. These are serious lacunae as effective defence planning cannot be undertaken in a policy void. The government must commit itself to supporting long-term defence plans or else defence modernisation will continue to lag and the growing military capabilities gap with China's People's Liberation Army will assume ominous proportions. This can be done only by reviving the dormant National Security Council (NSC) as defence planning is in the domain of the NSC and not the CCS, which deals with current and near-term threats and challenges and reacts to emergent situations.

The inability to speedily conclude major defence contracts to enhance national security preparedness in the face of growing threats and challenges, exemplifies the government's helplessness to grapple with systemic flaws in the procurement procedures and processes. Despite having formulated the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPD) and the Defence Production Policy (DPrP), the government has been unable to reduce bureaucratic red tape and defence modernisation continues to stagnate. It is difficult to understand why the budgetary allocations earmarked on the capital account for the modernisation of the armed forces should continue to be surrendered year after year with complete lack of accountability. The year FY 2010-11 had brought some encouraging news as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) managed to fully utilise all the funds that were allocated on the capital account. This should become the norm rather than the exception.

While internal security challenges are gradually gaining prominence, preparations for conventional conflict must not be neglected. Major defence procurement decisions must be made quickly. The army is still without towed and self-propelled 155 mm howitzers for the plains and the mountains and urgently needs new utility helicopters,

anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and weapons and equipment for counter-insurgency operations. The navy waited for long for INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier, which has been refurbished in a Russian shipyard at exorbitant cost and with operationally unacceptable time overruns. Construction of the indigenous air defence ship has also been delayed. The plan of the air force to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft in order to maintain its edge over the regional air forces is stuck in the procurement quagmire, even as the indigenous LCA project continues to lag inordinately behind schedule. All three Services need a large number of light and medium lift helicopters. India's nuclear forces require the Agni-III missile and nuclear-powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles to acquire genuine deterrent capability. The armed forces do not have a truly integrated C4I2SR system for network-centric warfare, which will allow them to synergise their combat capabilities and defend against cyber-attacks. The approach followed is still a platform-centric one despite the demonstrated advantages of switching to a network-centric approach.

All of these high-priority acquisitions will require extensive budgetary support. With the defence budget languishing at less than 2.0 per cent of India's GDP compared with China's 3.5 per cent and Pakistan's 4.5 per cent plus US military aid – it will not be possible for the armed forces to undertake any meaningful modernisation. The funds available on the capital account at present are inadequate to suffice even for the replacement of obsolete weapons systems and obsolescent equipment that are still in service well beyond their useful life cycles. The central police and para-military forces (CPMFs) also need to be modernised and better trained as they are facing increasingly greater threats while continuing to be equipped with sub-standard weapons.

The government must immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide single-point advice to the CCS on military matters and to synergise operational plans. Any further dithering on this key structural reform in higher defence management on the grounds of the lack of political consensus and the inability of the armed forces to agree on the issue will be extremely detrimental to India's interests in the light of the dangerous developments taking place in India's neighbourhood. The logical next step would be to constitute tri-Service integrated theatre commands to synergise the capabilities of individual Services. International experience shows that such reform has to be imposed from the top down and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up.

Building Defence Capability: Lt Gen JP Singh PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Chief Consultant, DRDO

For India to maintain a regional strategic capability advantage to deter war and prevail in this conflict if the deterrent fails and to minimise the casualties building of the military capabilities land, maritime, air and information is vital. In defence context, capability is capacity or the ability to achieve operational effect. It can be defined in terms of nature of effect and of how when where and how long it is to be produced. One of the core components of capability is systems and platforms which can find high rate of survivability and these systems and platforms must meet three essential capabilities or elements. Firstly, there has to adequate quantity, serviceability and a

short supply of expendable and essential to sustain the capability. Secondly, there have to be periodical upgrades to ensure what is held is current and it matches with the adversaries and lastly, the continuous modernisation of the force by gradual induction of latest equipment. The focus of my talk will be building defence capability through capital acquisition, where we have missed two acquisition cycles. More worryingly, we have missed on two technology cycles and especially in key technologies. We have not been successful in seventy percent of imports leading to obsolescence. The management of this obsolescence by itself has become a problem because of the sham TOT that took place. The transfer of technology is in shambles by itself. There was non-alignment of research and development in the short term and long term needs. We have confined our defence production largely to DPSU' and ordinance factories. This largely happens through capital procurement, which is regulated by the DPP manual. Over the last decade in spite of the reforms in defence procurement and production and opening up to Indian defence industry, we are still importing 70 percent of defence equipment. We cannot exercise strategic autonomy on such high import content. The solution lies in systemic changes in our planning, aligning it with the budget to prioritise, simplify the acquisition system to meet timelines, strengthen the R&D base and create a robust defence industrial base. The first structural change to address the 'need and requirement' is the structural change in the IDS. When you are looking at the capabilities, the most important thing is the budget. There is no thing as capability based budget system. There is a mad race to finish the budget without relating it to what capability has got generated. The 'timeline' is the first block. The time sensitivity is extremely vital to contain the contemporary capabilities. Today the technology cycle is getting compressed in the field of electronics in particular. In addition, there is no central agency to monitor. The focus is on procedural versus effectiveness. There exist a lack of domain knowledge as far as the services, bureaucracy and indecision making is concerned. There is lack of data and data mining. The framework is not responsive to the urgencies of military needs. Self-reliance should be backed by technology audit. A strong research and development base is first requirement of self-reliance. The ground realities today are that our requirements far exceed national capacities.

Strength through Diplomacy: Dr. Arvind Gupta, Director General, IDSA

There are many intersection points between defence and diplomacy. Defence diplomacy is one component of a country's overall diplomacy. The close connection between the two arises because of link between foreign policy and security policy. In some situations, as in the time of wars and conflicts, foreign and security pose overlap substantially. Defence and diplomacy are important both in peace and war. During peace, the task of the diplomats is to prevent war. During war, the task of the diplomats is to prevent war while that of soldiers is to be ready for the next war. In India's history, defence-diplomacy interface has been intense and continues to remain so. Some examples can be cited. In 1947, the war in Kashmir immediately brought to fore the role of diplomacy. The then government of India decided to take the question of Kashmir to the UN. The results of those ill fateful decisions are still with us. The national debacle in 1962 was the result of many factors one of which was the lack of defence preparedness, problems in higher defence management system and the inability of India to read Chinese intentions. A better interface between defence and diplomatic establishments would have served the nation

better. In 1965, we did better on military front but lost the war on diplomatic front. In 1971, brilliant diplomatic effort before the Bangladesh war and the mobilisation of the international opinion helped Indian army to carry out its operations in a timely and effective fashion. The country was able to withstand the combined pressure of US, China and Pakistan. But the diplomatic negotiations at Simla proved disastrous as India could not clinch the final solution of Kashmir problem despite holding nearly 90,000 Pakistani's POWs. In all these years, the nuclear factor had been playing out at international level. India's decision not to test the nuclear weapon after Chinese test in 1954 and India's so called peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 kept it out of the emerging nuclear order and also made it an international untouchable due to sanctions. This had a major impact on our security. India had to deal with a nuclear China and clandestinely nuclear Pakistan for decades on the basis of conventional military strength until 1998. Again diplomacy and defence nexus was evident. After India's nuclear tests of 1998, the situation has changed dramatically. Indian diplomacy has been successful to the point that India is back in the international mainstream without being a member of NPT regime. But, a new factor has risen - the ability of Pakistan to wage sub conventional war against India under a nuclear overhang. Today India is trying to engage with nuclear non-proliferation regime in innovative fashion and the Indian military is left with the task of fashioning new doctrines for war fighting incorporating, nuclear deterrence, asymmetric warfare, cyber warfare and so on. Defence and diplomacy have become even more closely tied with each other.

The changing regional and global security environment has created new challenges and diplomats alike. They need to work in tandem and more closely with each other. A few examples are:

- International Terrorism: At the diplomatic level, India has to emerge with various conventions and agreements. New counter terrorism partnerships are being forged. We need to craft new counter terrorism doctrines. International cooperation has become a must for counter terrorism efforts.
- Maritime Security: Major maritime challenges have arisen including maritime territorial disputes, sea piracy, terrorism, pollution, natural disasters, implementation of the law of sea, safety of the sea lanes of communication, etc. These challenges are multidimensional and require combined diplomatic effort and maritime operations. The Indian navy has played an important role in fighting sea piracy in the gulf of Aden, provided relief in tsunami disaster in the Indian ocean. India is also cooperating with regional structures such as ADMM plus. Indian ships pay friendly visits to the other countries.
- Defence cooperation: Defence cooperation has emerged as a major component of Indian diplomacy. India has signed numerous strategic partnerships in which security cooperation is an important part. Defence cooperation involves joint exercises, military dialogues, training, HADR, etc. This has helped India raise its regional and global profile.
- Defence procurements and exports: Defence procurements are vital components of India's military preparedness. At the same time the efforts to indigenise defence production is also vital. In all these areas, diplomacy comes into play. When India develops the capabilities to export defence items, Indian diplomacy will get new task of promoting defence exports.
- Power projection: India has substantial political, diplomatic, economic and national interests abroad. These need to be safeguard through a combination

of defence and diplomacy. The evacuation of large number of Indian from conflict zones, the India operations in East Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are some examples of out of area contingencies undertaken by Indian forces. If India is to emerge as a net security provider, it must synergise defence and diplomacy.

- UN Peacekeeping: India has been a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations around the world. This has helped raise Indian profile and given Indian diplomacy a strong impetus. But, there are many problems in this area, the most fundamental being that India does not have role in decision making. This may change if India becomes a permanent member of the UNSC. But this is not happening right now. India will have to find ways to deal with the situation.

Problems in achieving synergies are: -

- NSS: There are several problems in achieving these synergies. One of the major issues is the absence of national security strategy. This means there is often a lack of clarity in India's national security objectives. India actions are often episodic and ad-hoc. They are taken without adequate preparation and thought. This is a serious lacuna.
- Coordination: Indian bureaucratic structures are too rigid and do not allow for efficient coordination. This delays implementation of the decisions taken. Large bureaucratic do not yield quick results.
- Lack of resources: As a rising power, India has to modernise its defence and diplomacy. This requires resources. The existing resources have to be spent more efficiently. With economic slow down hitting the country, India will for the next few years will face resources crunch. This will hamper diplomatic as well as defence efforts.
- Human Resources: Indian diplomats are not trained to think like soldiers and nor are Indian soldiers trained to think like diplomats. There could be some exceptions. But we need to build in our training systems sufficient resilience so that defence and diplomacy are taught to budding diplomats and soldiers.

Defence and diplomacy are Siamese twins. In today's changing geo-political environment, when India's interests lies overseas and domestic situation is affected by developments abroad, diplomacy and defence situation is affected by developments abroad, diplomacy and defence must be synergised and given higher priority in India's foreign policy. India has been a security provider. This role is likely to grow. There should be a politico-military approach on some issues of security. Our decisions making structures should be overhauled to promote synergy between defence and diplomacy. Higher Defence management needs fine tuning and MoD, NSC, MEA, MHA need to work together. A National Security cadre should be built and cross postings and mixed training should be adopted. Interaction between policy makers and think tanks should be strengthened for better understanding of issues involved.

Discussion

- We have special strengths in Indian Industry, which are not being exploited by defence. We have been very successful in Information Technology. Somehow, we have not harnessed this. In the DPP we can have small changes. Firstly, we need to have a separate chapter for IT. Secondly, the

make procedure has so many barriers that only companies in the country can participate in the make procedure.

- The PPL model is being used but not in a big way like infrastructure projects. PPP model implies that who puts in the money. Private sector is interested in design and development in projects subject to the fact that we are also given the production part of the project. We need a level playing field for successfully incorporating PPP model.
- Self-Reliance should not be seen in absolute terms. We must develop technology jointly with our strategic partners as far as platforms and equipment are concerned. Low-level technologies should be outsourced to private sector completely.
- We need to work towards a technologically savvy human resource so that that they can drive the DRDO or at least understand nuances of the problem.

Remarks by the Chairperson: Gen NC Vij PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd), Former COAS and former Chairman, NDMA

One of the reasons why India lacks strategic culture is because we do not have an institutional method for long term planning and evolving a national strategy by a balanced group of experts. The changing nature of war has direct effect on defence management. The warfare has changed progressively over the last fifteen years. A time has come when there is requirement by military leaders even at lower level to have a good understanding of the political dimensions.