

## **Seminar Report**

# **MAPPING OF PERCEPTIONS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR : THE WAY AHEAD**

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The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an independent think tank dealing with contemporary issues of national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach.

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## CONTENTS

Concept Note	1
Seminar Programme	5
Executive Summary	7
Seminar Report	21
Inaugural Session	21
Session I: System and Behavioural Analysis of Jammu and Kashmir	25
Session II: Mapping of Perceptions	60
Closing Remark	81



## CONCEPT NOTE

### Overview

The invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan had its genesis in the partition of India into India and Pakistan with initial ambiguity in the status of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) till its accession to India, fuelling a bitter relation lasting over seven decades. Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir has resulted in three major wars and the proxy war through terror continuing till date. The rise of militancy in the late 1980s with Pakistan's support has further fortified India's resolve to settle the matter as an internal issue with the Kashmiri people. India's position is that the accession of Kashmir to India is final and complete, and hence Kashmir is an integral part of India as defined in the Constitution. However, the state continues to be in turmoil due to Pakistan's cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand, insists that Kashmir is a disputed territory and that it is merely providing moral and diplomatic support for an indigenous freedom struggle in Kashmir.

While the issue of Kashmir appears to be rather simple on the face of it, the multi-dimensional nature of the problem and a sheer number of actors—be it the state or the non-state actors have ensured that this problem takes on the character of the proverbial “Gordian Knot”. In fact, so convoluted is the matter that identifying the problem has itself become a source of angst and hand-wringing amongst the disparate populace that makes up the kaleidoscope of Kashmir. It is increasingly being understood that merely “eliminating” poster boys and dreaded terrorists will not take the situation to a logical and favourable conclusion and therefore much more needs to be done on the psychological, economic-social, and other factors.

### Present State versus Desired End State (Peace and Prosperity)

#### *Present State*

The present state of security in the state can be, at best, narrated as one of unease and mistrust, that is to say, that there is a sense of

## 2 MAPPING OF PERCEPTIONS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

functionality where the security situation in the state is bordering on the line between militancy and a law and order situation. There is an increasing demand by the *Awaam* to allow them more breathing space. The security forces, however, understand the sacrifices that have resulted in this present functional environment and do not want to loosen the grip, which may cost more lives and sacrifices. Radicalisation through Wahhabi Islam is a big challenge in the Valley. Increasingly, traditional Sufi Islam is being pushed out by a radical brand of Islam in Kashmir. On top of all this, stone-pelters are being indoctrinated in schools, madrasas, and jails where they come in contact with extremist literature and hard-core militants and Over Ground Workers (OGW). A new mindset in Kashmir is underway especially in the younger generation due to the fact, that Kashmiris have been made to sever their relationship with their past through a structured doctrinal narrative created by Pakistan through radicalisation, and this break is being exploited as a reinforcing loop by inimical agencies. To say the least, there seems to be a deadlock and all are looking forward to a phased yet definite set of coherent strategies to reach the desired end state.

### *Desired End State*

The desired end state of the J&K situation may be envisioned as “Peace and Prosperity” in the state which can only be achieved if the Centre of Gravity, i.e the *Awaam* perceives that all their basic needs, as well as higher needs of esteem and self-actualisation are met; only then the support for national integration shall perhaps begin.

### **Perception is the Key to Success**

From the desired end state, it is evident that the *Awaam* becomes the centre of all activity and their perception also becomes the key to the resolution of this conflict. There is a need to holistically study J&K. Perceptions are made in the mind. It is important to study what is actually affecting the mind of the *Awaam* today in J&K. Understanding of the comprehensive situation will lead to the derivation of strategies for ensuring lasting peace and progress.

**Objective of the Seminar**

The objective of the Seminar was to analyse the current situation in J&K by focussing on the varied perceptions, ideas, and thought processes of the people and devise pragmatic strategies for resolution of the conflict.

**Conduct**

The Seminar was conducted over a day in two sessions covering Systems and Behavioural Analysis of J&K and Mapping of Perceptions and the Way Forward.





## SEMINAR PROGRAMME

09:00-09:30h	Tea and Registration
09:30-09:35h	<b>Opening Remarks</b> by Lieutenant General (Dr) VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd), Director CLAWS
09:35-09:55h	<b>Keynote Address</b> by General Bipin Rawat, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC, Chief of Army Staff
09:55-11:35h	<b>Session I: System and Behavioural Analysis of J&amp;K</b>
09:55-10:05h	<b>Opening Remarks</b> by Chairperson Lieutenant General Satish Dua, PVSM, UYSM, SM, VSM, CISC
10:05-10:25h	<b>System Analysis</b> by Brigadier Anupam Bhagi, YSM, SM, Head of Faculty, CDM
10:25-10:45h	<b>Behavioural Analysis</b> by Professor Sujata Sriram, Professor Human Ecology, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai
10:45-11:05h	<b>Solutions on Psychological Aspects</b> by Colonel AS Chonker, VSM, Senior Fellow CLAWS
11:05-11:35h	Questions and Answers
11:35-11:55h	High Tea
11:55-13:55h	<b>Session II: Mapping of Perceptions</b>
11:55-12:05h	<b>Opening Remarks</b> by Chairperson Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM**, VSM** (Retd)
12:05-12:45h	<b>Psychological, Politico-Social and Economic Aspirations</b> by Professor Navnita Behera, Delhi University and Dr David Devadas, Journalist and Author
12:45-13:25h	<b>The Way Ahead</b> by Mohammed Ummer Ashraf (Voice of the Youth of Kashmir) and Lieutenant General DS Hooda, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM** (Retd)
13:25-13:55h	Questions and Answers
13:55-14:00h	<b>Closing Remarks</b> by Lieutenant General (Dr) VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (Retd), Director CLAWS
14:00h	Lunch and Dispersal



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) conducted the National Seminar on “Mapping of Perceptions in J&K: The Way Ahead” on August 18, 2018. The Seminar ensured an in-depth analysis of the factors which are affecting the perceptions of people in the state with special reference to Kashmir and the current situation there. It also provided practical solutions which could break the cycle in case done coherently.

The summary of deliberations is enumerated next:

### Inaugural Session

- The key points that emerged from this session are as under:
  - *Humlevar hoshiyar, hum Kashmiri-Hindu, Muslim, Sikh—sabhi taiyyar* [Beware, invaders, we Kashmiris—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs- are fully prepared]. This was the slogan and perception being voiced by the people of J&K in October 1947 against the Pakistani intruders. A warm welcome to our troops was an expression of “Kashmiriyat”, i.e. peace, amity, brotherhood, respect for each other’s religion, social harmony, as also patriotism and solidarity with India.
  - We need to identify whether the drivers for the current situation in J&K are ideological, political, purely based on religious fundamentalism, radicalisation, governance-related, socio-economic, psychological, result of non-engagement of the youth, unemployment of the youth or whether the drivers are the covert and overt support of Pakistan which is trying to bring in the same uprising which it tried in 1947 as Operation Gulmarg and in 1965 as Operation Gibraltar.
  - Local youth are taking up arms and losing their lives in a very short time frame. What are the reasons which induce the youth to take such a decision? Radicalisation and perceived isolation of the youth could be some of these.

## 8 MAPPING OF PERCEPTIONS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

- False propaganda is exacerbating radicalisation and this issue needs to be addressed right from the grass-roots to the top. In fact, it requires a top-down approach more than a bottom-up approach.
- Unemployment of the youth and lack of opportunity and industry is furthering the sense of isolation in the youth. This vicious cycle is leading to the situation on the ground and needs to be addressed.
- The Indian Armed Forces and other security forces are operating in Kashmir not to kill terrorists, but to protect the people of Kashmir from the violence that is perpetrated by these terrorists. This can be achieved by either asking the terrorist to shun the gun and surrender or by neutralising him. That is the only way to bring down the levels of violence that are presently prevailing in the Valley.
- We have to look at over the horizon strategies.

### Session 1

- The important issues that emerged in the Session are given in the succeeding sub-paragraphs:
  - The violence in the Valley has the following salient features:
    - It is a repetitive cycle.
    - This cycle is governed by the time of the year—infiltration is less during winters, harvest cycles like the apple growing season, and events like the Amarnath Yatra, Ramzan, Darbar move, etc.
  - **Change in the Profile of Terrorists.** The youth who are joining militancy are fairly educated, some even well-educated. They haven't studied in madrasas and hail from well-to-do families.
  - **The Mind-Space of the People.** Extremism is filling up the cognitive domain through victimhood, trauma, recalling of events, and memories. The mind of the youth has been occupied by the “other” side—the Deep State, ISI, separatists,

etc. The Kashmiri youth is getting indoctrinated to be irrational.

- The separatists have perfected this game of perception by infiltrating educational institutions. Schools are shut down at the slightest pretext. When schools are shut, the state narrative cannot be propagated, and more children and youth are available for criminal activities like stone-pelting. They have created a false notion that there is militancy, stone-pelting, and anger on the streets because the population is unhappy.
- Our engagement in the information domain and countering of religious radicalism, especially Wahhabism, need a relook. The security forces have made some efforts, but the approach has to be comprehensive, led by the government. Attempts which are made using only Armed Forces will fail and create more alienation.
- **Systems World.** There are two factors which govern the support of the people for national integration–terrorism, and the alienation and resentment in the minds of the people. If the support for national integration were to increase, the alienation and resentment would increase. Should terrorism bear heavily on the people’ support for national integration, both alienation and terrorism would increase. If the people’s support for terrorists’ cause were to increase, it would have a balancing effect on the whole system.
- **Deriving Leverage Points.** Both terrorism and alienation are leverage points [key issues which need to be worked upon]. When terrorism is in decline, we must leverage that point to our advantage by simultaneously working towards reducing the level of alienation. Youth is the major part of the local population and can’t be ignored. They are not interested in history, but what is happening currently on the ground.
- Values and perceptions: If Kashmiriyat were predominant today, it would bear down on the alienation and

resentment, therefore the revival of Kashmiriyat becomes important.

- The politico-administrative-security combine should do something about pan-Islamic influence and radicalisation being initiated across the border. The same has been covered by the speaker providing solutions to psychological aspects later in Session I.
- Economic development drives prosperity and development of the community. Central support, infrastructure, and investment must lead to the industry. It is indisputably a major driver in any such complex situation and has to be timely and visible.
- If the security force operations could contain terrorism, the local support for national integration would go up and the state's capacity for governance would increase. Consequently, support of the Awaam for integration would continue to get reinforced.
- If security operations are too harsh, imposing curbs on local people, it could be counter-productive. The operations should be restrained and the instruments of governance should step in. If they don't step in, the security forces would have to up the ante—this is a fix that is bound to fail.
- When terrorism incidents have gone down and reasonable stability is achieved, the burden has to shift to instruments of governance.
- Barring military, all energies—social, industrial, economic, political—should be spent on the local people.
- Soft system methodology, when applied on Kashmir, highlights the need for perception modulation from Sadhbhavna to Vichardhaara.
- **Survey Pointers.** The salient aspects of the response of survey are as follows:
  - **Being Kashmiri.** Whereas more than 75 percent respondents stated that they were proud of being a

Kashmiri, around 25 percent saw no solution in sight or felt oppressed or second-class citizen.

- **Return of Pandits.** Around 50 percent favoured the return of Kashmiri Pandits, whereas 30 percent were against their return and 20 percent preferred not to express their view. Those favouring return comprised 57 percent of the girl and 63 percent of boy “Yes” respondents.
- **Religious Places and Political Meetings.** There was 84 percent who said that they visited religious institutions in spare time with 40 percent doing so frequently. However, only 28 percent participated in political meetings (4 percent often).
- **Social Media and Radicalisation.** More than 80 percent youth of Kashmir region use Social Media (SM). Around 75 percent said the contents were “Not Very Truthful” (28 percent) or “Sometimes Truthful” (34 percent). Around 32 percent affirmed getting influenced by SM and 28 percent had heard people getting radicalised through SM. Therefore, SM becomes a very important leverage point to address.
- **Trust Factor with Establishment.** While 15 percent expressed a great deal of trust and 39 percent had some trust in the state government, the corresponding figures for Central Government were 11 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Compared to around 42 percent respondents, who had a great deal of trust (12 percent) or some trust (30 percent) on the army and local administration, only (7 percent + 31 percent = 38 percent) trusted the police. The figures for PMFs were even lower (4 percent + 21 percent = 25 percent). Trust on religious institutions and leaders appeared to be far more as around 65 percent respondents expressed a great deal of trust (21 percent) or some trust (44 percent). Only 25 percent had no trust at all for them.
- Youth also reposed more faith in teachers as 84 percent of respondents trusted them.

- **Youth Aspirations.** An overwhelming 61 percent of youth wanted to take up Central Government jobs, whereas 12 percent showed a preference for state government jobs and only five percent wanted to join the Armed Forces.
- **Nationality.** The most important and direct question asked in the questionnaire was “Do you consider yourself to be an Indian?” Around 35.6 percent said “Yes”, 35.8 percent said “No”, and 27.6 percent preferred not to take a position. A majority of respondents from Kupwara (71 percent), Shopian (66 percent) and Pulwama (51 percent) districts opted for “No”, whereas those from Kulgam (71 percent), Budgam (63 percent), Gandarbal (53.7 percent), Anantnag (49 percent) and Srinagar (40 percent) districts chose “Yes”. Compared to males, a larger percentage of female respondents said “Yes”.
- **Satisfaction with Present Situation.** Around 34 percent of respondents felt that they or their family members were discriminated against for which 30 percent ascribed the reasons to being Kashmiri, 3.6 percent cited religion, and 62 percent assigned other reasons.
- **Changes in Current Situation.** Approximately 50 percent of respondents were happy with their present state of life, 30 percent were dissatisfied, and 20 percent said “Can’t Say/Don’t Know”. There was 34 percent who wanted a change of government, 21 percent were in favour of withdrawal of Army, and around 45 percent clamoured for better jobs and education opportunities. Only two percent wanted better anti-drug abuse policy in the state.
- **Systematic Entrapment in Kashmir**
  - 7-13 years of age. At this age, the children are used for stone-pelting. He’s booked under PSA and gets more radicalised staying with fundamentalists in jail.
  - 3-17 years of age. At this age, he becomes an OGW, logistically supporting the terrorists.
  - 18-32 years of age. At this age, he’s a resilient, motivated



youth indulging in grenade-throwing and snatching of weapons. This is the lot joining mainstream terrorism.

- **Leverage point.** According to the Survey, 50 percent of people are proud to be Kashmiris. This identity needs to be leveraged. *Kashmiriyat*—the culture of Kashmir—should be promoted by capitalising on Moderate Islam. The Suhrawardi, Kubrawi, Naqshbandi, and Qadiri form of Sufi Islam has been a part of Kashmiri culture. The likes of Bulle Shah, Shah Hamdani, and Zain al Abedin brought it to Kashmir in the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. This culture based on the *rishi*—order has to be used to counter the imported culture being sent as part of the proxy war.
- **Ideology behind the conflict.**
  - It's a mix of ethno-religious separatism and Islamic extremism. Ethno-religious because of the ethnic population of the erstwhile princely state of J&K with only a part of the Muslim population of the Valley supporting the separatism. The colour of Islamic extremism is being brought out by terrorist leaders like Zakir Musa who openly declare their allegiance to the proposed Caliphate of Islam.
  - Islamic imperatives have not superseded the essential nationalistic dimension of the conflict, but are gaining ground.
  - There are definite indicators of the conflict being converted into a religious struggle.
- **Indicators of religious extremism.** The huge influx of madrasas and mosques belonging to Tablighi Jamaat, Ahl-e-Hadees. Religion propagated through Tablaghi Jamaat which asks Muslims to improve their “Deen”, acts as a pull and a crutch in the absence of any other sort of entertainment. Ahl-e-Hadees mosques have four grades: Jamaat-ul-ahl-e-Hadith, Difai, Guraba, and lastly, Sout-ul\_Haq which is represented by the IS, for which “wajib-e- qatl”, i.e. murder for religion is authorised. Tablighi Jamaat focuses on doing the work of *da'wah*.

- **Rise of Wahhabi/Salafi groups.** Wahhabis and Salafis consider praying at shrines *shirk* and are pushing people away from Sufism. Indicators are as follows:
  - Fiery speeches by terrorist leaders calling for jihad.
  - Change in the dress code.
  - Massive protests after the Friday congregations.
- According to the Survey conducted, 84 percent of the people believe and do go to religious places in their free time.
- **International environment.** Though the Islamic State (IS) has been defeated in Syria and Iraq, recruitment and radicalisation are still going on. The returnees and the recidivists are getting back to Europe, USA, Afghanistan, South East Asia and creating trouble by not only transporting the ideology to these areas but also planning and executing fresh recruitment and targeted attacks in these countries.
- **PRIME ANTENNA** solution is an acronym for a coherent whole of the government approach. The explanation for this acronym is as under:
  - **P: Promote the Basic Culture of Kashmiriyat**
  - **R: Respond Full-Spectrum**
    - *Kinetic Response:* Disrupt, apprehend, and neutralise the terrorists.
    - *Institutional Framework:* Strengthen regional frameworks fighting terrorism. If there's a block by Pakistan in SARRC, we could go to South East Asia and the CARs through regional frameworks like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and SCO.
    - *Reintegration Strategies:* Reintegrate the stone-pelters into society and assist in the reintegration of terrorist detainees.
    - Community Engagement, especially engage mothers.
  - **I: Integrate the Power of Technology**
    - AI monitoring by drones, cameras.

- Social media applications as well as governance applications which will make the youth feels empowered. We could generate our own intelligence and data and not rely on foreign servers.
  - Data modelling.
  - Positive news should flow especially in Urdu news channels and Urdu newspapers published by major publishing houses on the same day in Jammu as well as in Kashmir.
  - There should be more FM channels to provide the opportunity to entertain themselves; thus, shielding them from the danger of getting radicalised.
- **M: Manage Perceptions Internationally**
- Capitalise on the zero-tolerance wave against extreme ideology/radicalism.
  - Pakistan is using propaganda. We should also impart the world our side of the story.
  - Enhance the diplomatic effort for perception management.
- **E: Engage.** Only 50 percent of the Survey population wants Kashmiri Pandits back, as against 84 percent in 2007. The Banihal divide needs to be eradicated. There's a need to engage not only with those advocating peace, but also with the slain militants' families, their mothers, and the youth. Actions or initiatives taken by the government are perceived as agenda of the government, therefore there is a need to involve corporate houses as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and youth groups to support the cause.
- **A: Autonomy Within the Realms of the Constitution.**
- **N: Networks to Defeat Networks.** It takes a network to defeat a network. We should create clubs like Kulgam Kings, Kupwara Tigers, etc. These networks could be given a social standing and supported by applications.

- **T: Trend-identification Through Constant Analysis.** Trends need to be identified through deep study and an ear to the ground to remain ahead in the curve. For this, we can have a core group expert panel support from think-tanks and veterans giving weekly updates to the NSC so that things can be tweaked in a timely manner.
- **E: Empowering People Socially, Democratically, Through Good Governance.**
- **N: Name and Shame Pakistan and OGWs.**
- **N: Negate New Tradecraft.** This can be done using the Singapore model discussed earlier.
- **A: Address Cognitive Domain.** There is a need for regular assessment and counselling and psychological rehabilitation. They need to be taught to cope with stressors and reduce their vulnerability to negative group pressures.

## Session II

- A summary of important issues that emerged in the Session is given in the succeeding sub-paragraphs:
  - Stone-thrower leaders were 11-12 years old. Is mapping of their perceptions required? When they grow up, they'll create problems for us.
  - Arm-chair philosophers have a great role because those serving on-ground tend to over-emphasise on the reality.
  - There is a complete "civilianisation" of the war that is to be fought on the SM. The army can't fight this war, but can only supervise it. Thousands of SM warriors who are 18-30 years old are required.
    - The perceptual problem lies in Shopian, Kulgam, and other areas of South Kashmir. The headquarters of the Jammat-e-Islami lies in Kulgam. The ideological core of Kashmir is South Kashmir.
    - *Sadhbhavna* was the institutionalisation of the military-

civic action. It was not strategic communication as there was physicality to it. *Sadhbhavna* should now morph into *Vichaardhaaraa*.

- Managing the perception of the soldier, the veteran, and that of the environment of India is as important.
- Pakistan cannot create trouble if the Kashmiri population stands with us.
- As a policymaker, how do you see such events coming? Do we have a people's policy? The people were always ahead of state and social scientists. We've not had our ears to the ground.
- There is a difference between print media and electronic media, English media and vernacular media, local media and national media, and within SM too, it is being modified and utilised to the advantage of the handlers. A more nuanced study of how SM is being operated is required to be carried out.
- Big data is lacking. Though we have been fighting this war for more than 30 years, there has not been even a single study aimed at understanding the political economy of the conflict. We have only conjectures and no empirical data on which social and political class the youth is coming from.
- Dialogue has become the biggest casualty of the violence in the last 10 years. We need to not only have dialogue but also make the dialogue work.
- Security has been a very significant part of governance in Kashmir for the past 30 years.
- The cultural terrain is constantly in flux. A decade back, the forces were supporting Tablighi Jamaat despite being warned that it was from these sorts of madrasas in Pakistan that the Taliban emerged. We don't seem to learn lessons.
- The patronage system of governance is dominant in Kashmir; with the result that people who don't have

access to the network of power and influence tend to get frustrated.

- Corruption organically feeds into the narratives that are available on SM. A gullible individual would believe that a Sharia and the Caliphate-based system would be just. An example of how corruption and mis-governance dovetail with the messages available on SM is the IS.

○ **Factors for Radicalisation:**

- External Factors:
  - Salafi/Hanbali version of Islam.
  - Foreign-funding/petro-dollars.
  - Influence of IS and al-Qaeda.
  - Increased access to Wahhabi literature.
  - Declining influence of Hanafi Islam.
  - International media propaganda.
- Internal Factors:
  - Polarising statements of politicians.
  - Emergence of Hindutva.
  - Unemployment and socio-economic condition of Muslims.
  - Declining influence of Sufism.
  - Distorted version of Quranic teachings.
- Kashmir-specific Factors:
  - Role of Jamaat-e-Islami [it has infiltrated the schools in Kashmir. Most of the teachers are from the Jamaat and the next generation is being groomed by people of this separatist mindset].
  - Growing unemployment.
  - Cases of atrocities by security forces.
  - Glorification of militants.
  - Hurriyat.
  - Lack of youth-engagement.
  - Identity crisis.
  - Negative role of media.

- Mental health issues/drug addiction.
  - Lack of counselling centres.
  - Sense of alienation and insecurity, vis-à-vis, India.
- Other reasons
  - Cozy lifestyle.
  - Low intelligence and academic failure.
  - Hyperactivity and impulsivity.
  - Engagement in social networking sites.
  - Lack of direction.
  - Quantity but not quality education.
  - Communication gap.
  - Unhealthy competition.
  - Family conflict.
- **Action Plan for Reducing Radicalisation.**
  - Youth engagement.
  - Involvement of religious leaders.
  - Increasing efficiency and accountability of civil administration [the failure of civil administration is seen as the failure of India].
  - Controlling the narratives being peddled by the media.
  - Community policing [police reforms needed].
  - Restructuring of the education system.
  - Involvement of senior citizens, NGOs, and civil society.
- **The Religious Engagement Model.** The Model involves identification of maulvis to be sent for training focusing on the core teaching of peace in Islam and using these maulvis for counter-radicalisation.
- What are the factors behind ethnically driven conflicts? A primary factor is the fear of the future. This does play out in Kashmir to a large extent. Violent protest to issues such as migrant colonies and Sainik colonies, Article 370 is a manifestation of that. There's a fear that their identities would get lost. The Hurriyat and other such people exploit this fear.

- The same is happening in Jammu where the people are feeling left out and hence, there are debates over where institutions such as AIIMS, IITs, etc., should come up. This divide is growing because of the fear of the future.
- We need to change this climate of fear into a climate of hope. We should look at bringing people who answered “Can’t Say” on the question of whether they identified as Indians, to the positive side.
- The Government needs to look at strengthening our strategic communication. This requires formalised policies and structures to be put in place. A narrative from Delhi probably won’t find resonance in Kashmir.
- Intra-state dialogue needs to get strengthened as the division between the three regions is only growing. Politics has further divided these regions.
- We should take a long-term view not subject to the effects of changing political dispensations.

### Closing Remarks

- The Director reiterated that all the three regions—Jammu, Ladakh, and the Valley—are equally important. He, however, said that the aim of the Seminar was to give greater focus on Kashmir.
- Varying perceptions have been expressed regarding the “Centre of Gravity”. Some say the “idea of *azadi*” is the centre of gravity, others say it is the “psyche and culture”, some say it is “building relationships” and maximum have said that it is the *Awaam*. At the end of it all, the applications so suggested pertain to the *Awaam*, who have to be won over.
- There are multiple stakeholders in the conflict. It stood out clearly that people have great pride in being a Kashmiri, and that they have been significantly affected by the SM, particularly the youth. The youth trusts their families, friends, teachers, and religious teachers, in that order, which must be kept in mind in our future strategy.



## SEMINAR REPORT

*The aspects enumerated as part of this Report are exclusively based on the deliberations by panellists and interaction with the delegates. These do not necessarily conform to the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) or that of the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence, Government of India.*



THE COAS BEING ACCOMPANIED BY DIRECTOR CLAWS  
ON HIS ARRIVAL FOR THE SEMINAR

### INAUGURAL SESSION

During the Inaugural Session, General Bipin Rawat, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC, COAS and Lieutenant General VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM\*\* (Retd), Director CLAWS addressed the delegates.

### Opening Remarks by Director CLAWS

Delivering the Opening Remarks, Lieutenant General V K Ahluwalia, Director (CLAWS), said that there were many dynamic factors that



**General Bipin Rawat, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC, COAS, Delivering the Keynote Address**



**Lieutenant General VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM\*\*, YSM, VSM (Retd), Director CLAWS, Delivering the Opening Remarks**

influenced perception and hence, perception itself was dynamic. He highlighted the following aspects:

- On October 27, 1947, the Indian Army was moved by air at a very short notice into Kashmir Valley where they were given a very warm welcome by the local people. Since they were moved by Dakotas, the Indian Army didn't have their own vehicles. The local people gave them their passenger buses, transport carriers, personal jeeps, etc., so that they could move forward and fight the Pakistani tribal raiders who, by then, had already reached Baramulla. In fact, they had reached Baramulla on October 24, 1947. The Indian Army had the complete support of the local population. As they moved forward to fight, they were greeted by the locals in the Valley with the slogan: *Humlevarhoshiyar, hum Kashmiri—Hindu, Muslim, Sikh—sabhitaiyyar* [Beware, invaders, we Kashmiris—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs—are fully prepared].
- This was the perception in 1947 which bolstered the morale of our troops and gave great hope to the politicians that they had taken the right decision. Above all this, there was an expression of the sentiment of Kashmiriyat—the traditional culture of the Valley. It was an expression of peace, amity, brotherhood, social harmony, respect for each other's religion, solidarity with the country, confidence in India, its people, its leaders, and its Armed Forces.
- With the elections in Kashmir in 1987, followed by 1989, the narrative changes very rapidly.
- We need to identify whether the drivers for the current situation in J&K are ideological, political, purely based on religious fundamentalism, radicalisation, governance-related, socio-economic, psychological, result of non-engagement of the youth, unemployment of the youth or whether the drivers are the covert and overt support of Pakistan which is trying to bring in the same uprising which it tried in 1947 as Operation Gulmarg and in 1965 as Operation Gibraltar.

- Given that 65 percent of the population of J&K is younger than 35 years, the youth is the centre of gravity. Therefore, it is very important to understand the aspirations and perceptions of the youth and also the women. Women have a great control over the family and play a very important role.

**Keynote Address by COAS General Bipin Rawat, UYSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, ADC**

- The COAS addressed the gathering and highlighted the following issues in his Keynote address:
  - Setting the tone for the deliberations to follow, General Bipin Rawat, COAS, stated that India was looking at ways to move forward on the issue of Pakistan-supported insurgency and terrorism in J&K. When the support comes from a nation, there will always be changing contours to the manner in which the nation would want the proxies to conduct the proxy war. Therefore, India's strategy has to be proactive and not reactionary. We need to look at how we intend dealing with the situation in the coming times, over the horizon at the end state we desire and not just the current year.
  - Local youth are taking-up arms and lose their lives in a very short time frame. What are the reasons which induce the youth to take such a decision? Radicalisation and perceived isolation of the youth could be some of these.
  - False propaganda is exacerbating radicalisation and this issue needs to be addressed right from the grassroots to the top. In fact, it requires a top-down approach more than a bottom-up approach.
  - The narrative that the problem in Kashmir is due to lack of development is not true as the Valley is more developed than many other parts of India. Nobody has ever died of hunger or cold in the state, which might be true in other states of India with a lesser extreme winter. The roads are congested with traffic and people of the state are building big villas. All this points towards the development of the state.

- Unemployment of the youth and lack of opportunity and industry is furthering the sense of isolation in the youth. This vicious cycle is leading to the situation on the ground and needs to be addressed.
- The people of the state and Kashmir, in particular, have to move out and see the progress that is taking place in the country, in order to de-isolate themselves.
- The Indian Armed Forces and other security forces are operating in Kashmir not to kill terrorists, but to protect the people of Kashmir from the violence that is perpetrated by these terrorists. This can be achieved by either asking the terrorist to shun the gun and surrender, or by neutralising him. That is the only way to bring down the levels of violence that are presently prevailing in the Valley.
- The Armed Forces and the security forces need an umbrella to operate under. The police forces are provided protection by the Criminal Procedure Code and for the Armed Forces, there are some special provisions to operate. Within these provisions that exist, there are stringent rules of engagement which have been framed and every member of the Armed Forces is expected to operate under those rules of engagement. They are very much operating under those rules, never hesitating to take the first bullet before gunning down a terrorist.

### **SESSION I: System and Behavioural Analysis of Jammu and Kashmir**

- The Session was chaired by Lieutenant General Satish Dua, PVSM, UYSM, SM, VSM, CISC, and the discourse covered the following topics:
  - System analysis by Brigadier Anupam Bhagi, YSM, SM, Head of Faculty, CDM.
  - Behavioural Analysis by Professor Sujata Sriram, Professor of the School of Human Ecology Department, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai.



## 26 MAPPING OF PERCEPTIONS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

- Solutions on Psychological Aspects by Colonel AS Chonker, VSM, Senior Fellow CLAWS.



Delegates Attending Session I



Lieutenant General Dua's Opening Remarks

Lieutenant General Dua highlighted the following issues:

- The situation has not got better in the last 30 years. Even though the number of terrorists is less, the alienation is more. If terrorist-initiated incidents are less, the violence, including stone-pelting, is more.
- The violence in the Valley has the following salient features:
  - It is a repetitive cycle.
  - This cycle is governed by the time of the year—infiltration is less during winters, harvest cycles like the apple growing season, and events like the Amarnath Yatra, Ramzan, Darbar move, etc.
- **Change in the Profile of Terrorists.** The youth who are joining militancy are fairly educated, some even well-educated. They haven't studied in madrasas and hail from well-to-do families.
- The percentage of local terrorists is increasing.
- **Influence of Social Media.** SM is a game-changer. It builds perceptions and spreads propaganda. Burhan Wani was a creation of SM.
- **Fuelling of Unrest.** Though it's true that an entire generation has grown up in the shadow of the gun, unrest is being very intelligently fuelled by the "other" side. It is being done scientifically through religious, political, and social layers, of which the religious layer is the most important part.
- Stone-pelting is augmenting terrorism.
- **Role of National Media.** The national media is exacerbating the situation by creating a social sanctity for aggressive rhetoric. It does not bring out any good stories; instead, it focuses on sensational stories, editing them to suit its needs.
- **Role of the Political Class.** The political class has ceded space totally. They use different narratives at different times to suit their needs.

- **The Mind-Space of the People.** Extremism is filling-up the cognitive domain through victimhood, trauma, recalling of events, and memories. The mind of the youth has been occupied by the “other” side—the Deep State, ISI, separatists, etc. The Kashmiri youth is getting indoctrinated to be irrational.
- Windows of opportunity were available during the period from 2003/08 to 2012/15 when the violence was brought down, but very little effort was made by the government, both local and central, to move towards ameliorating the situation and removing the alienation. The state is guilty of fully outsourcing the work to the military. This is the wrong approach as it addresses the symptom—the violence and the security situation—and not the problem.
- We are not talking to the right quarters. We are only engaging not with the common man, but with separatists, terrorist tanzems, and other fringe groups which have a nuisance value. There is a need to change the discourse in favour of the people.
- The separatists have perfected this game of perception by infiltrating educational institutions. Schools are shut down at the slightest pretext. When schools are shut, the state narrative cannot be propagated, and more children and youth are available for criminal activities like stone-pelting. They have created a false notion that there is militancy, stone-pelting, and anger on the streets because the population is unhappy.
- Our engagement in the information domain and countering of religious radicalism, especially Wahhabism, need a relook. The security forces have made some efforts, but the approach has to be comprehensive, led by the government. Attempts which are made using only Armed Forces will fail and create more alienation.





**System Analysis by Brigadier Anupam Bhagi, YSM, SM,  
Head of Faculty, CDM**

- The Brigadier Anupam Bhagi brought a flavour of decision science into intuitive decision-making. He gave a statistical overview of J&K and explained why Kashmir was a complex system. He related the soft system methodology to Kashmir and highlighted the need for perception modulation from *Sadhbhavna* to *Vichardhaara*.
- According to 2011 census, the Valley accounts for 56 percent of the total population of J&K, Jammu 41 percent, and Ladakh three percent.
- There are 22 districts in J&K and separatist tendencies are pronounced in seven of them—all in the heartland. Religious factor influences perception on either side of the Pir Panjal. The cusp districts of Ramban (70 percent Muslims), Doda (55 percent Muslims), and Kishtwar (60 percent Muslims) should be focused on as they are connected with the heartland but don't show any separatist tendencies. The districts of Reasi, Rajouri, Poonch, Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Samba, and Ladakh show no secessionist tendencies at all.

- The migratory tribal population is not supportive of the terrorism either, but they aren't able to influence perceptions across the Pir Panjal.
- He highlighted the following aspects of J&K as a system:
  - Literacy in J&K is 67.1 percent which is almost at par with India.
  - Just five percent of the population is below the poverty line.
  - J&K has been under the governor's rule for seven years and two months excluding the present spell. The form of governance is immaterial. It is what the form does that matters. The indicators of development on the ground lead to perception.
  - **Industry and Businesses.** J&K features in the bottom five in terms of setting-up businesses, infrastructure, allotment of land, utilities, etc.
  - **Social Development Index.** As of 2016, J&K featured in the middle range in this dimension, at par with Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Madhya Pradesh.
  - **Corruption.** J&K does figure in the most corrupt states, but so do Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu.
  - **Health Index.** According to NITI Aayog's health report of 2018, J&K has climbed to Rank Seven from the earlier ranking of 11.
  - **Unemployment Rate.** The 2016 figure for J&K was 12.3 percent against a national figure of 4.3 percent. It's pertinent to note that the number for Kerala is 9.6 percent.
  - **Per capita Income.** The per capita income of J&K saw a jump of 44 percent to Rs 74,580. The economic growth from 1990 to 2016 saw a 16 percent increase.
  - **Socio-economic Indices.** Other socio-economic indicators like sex-ratio, birth-rate, death-rate, infant-mortality rate, life expectancy, are all down.

- **Youth-bulge.** According to 2011 census figures, the majority of J&K's population is in the age group of 10 to 24. This is higher than the rest of India. It is an important factor when it comes to perceptions.
- **Social Mobility Indicators.**

- Access to banking: more than rest of India.

- Ownership of TV: more than rest of India.

Ownership of computers with the internet: almost at par with the rest of India.

- Ownership of mobiles: at par with that of India.

- Ownership of two-wheelers: less than the rest of India, but that can be attributed to the terrain, weather, etc.

- Ownership of four-wheelers: more than rest of India.

- Access to drinking water: more than rest of India.

- Access to electricity: more than rest of India.

- Literacy rate: at par with the rest of India.

- Regular workers in work-force: less than rest of India.

Therefore, it follows that J&K is not a systemic failure.

- **Contradictions in the System.**
  - J&K has a young and literate population. The health index is good. Cultivable land is available. There's also unemployment, corruption, security situation, the Pir Panjal divide, and alienation—all under the terror overhang.
  - A mapping of terrorist incidents from 1989 to 2014 shows that a window of opportunity was available from 2007 to 2013. From 2016 to 2017, terrorist attacks on civilians, security forces, etc., show a spike. The civil unrest spiked after the death of Burhan Wani.
  - Such incidents result in the closure of the Valley for one to four months at a stretch or in staggered periods. Such long non-productive periods spark unrest. The intensity

distribution of unrest in South Kashmir shows that it contributes 3-6 percent of the unrest incidents that have so far occurred.

- **Soft System Methodology.** The soft system methodology can be used to solve complex problems like Kashmir where often people do not come to a consensus on what the problem is. This methodology opposes a linear, hard-system approach and presents evolving approaches, and not solutions, over a period of time. It involves the following steps:
  - **A Problem Situation Which is Unstructured.** Kashmir is an unstructured problem as:
    - Some people ask for pre-1953 autonomy, some for secession, and some for complete integration with India.
    - Alienation has increased in the past 10 years.
    - Though the stakeholders condemn violence, the interpretation of the cause, its effect, and who's responsible for it is diametrically and irrevocably opposite.
    - Third-party mediation is unacceptable.
  - **The Problem Situation Expressed as a Rich Picture Depicting the Stakeholders and the Divergent Players.**
    - There is a multiplicity of stakeholders and other factors in Kashmir—the geographic and historical burden, youth, Shia-Sunni divide, secessionists, army, the LC fence, lack of political leadership, poverty, external abetment, unemployment, strong central government and weak local governance, narco-terrorists-hawala nexus, human rights violations, migration, displacement of Pandits, Article 370 and recently 35A, AFSPA, madrasa, etc.
    - The central cog is the people. Their perception is the next bigger cog. Then come terrorism, SM, government administration, security force operations, youth, culture of the people, and the force of

radicalisation. Outside the system boundaries, there are two players—India and Pakistan.

- **System World.** There are two factors which govern the support of the people for national integration—terrorism, and the alienation and resentment in the minds of the people. If the support for national integration were to increase, the alienation and resentment would increase. Should terrorism bear heavily on the people's support for national integration, both alienation and terrorism would increase. If the people's support for terrorists' cause were to increase, it would have a balancing effect on the whole system.
- **Deriving Leverage Points.**
  - Both terrorism and alienation are leverage points [key issues which need to be worked upon]. When terrorism is in decline, we must leverage that point to our advantage by simultaneously working towards reducing the level of alienation. Youth is the major part of the local population and can't be ignored. They are not interested in history, but what is happening currently on the ground.
  - Values and perceptions: If Kashmiriyat were predominant today, it would bear down on the alienation and resentment.
  - The politico-administrative-security combine should do something about pan-Islamic influence and radicalisation being initiated across the border.
  - Economic development drives prosperity and development. Central support, infrastructure, and investment must lead to industry. It is indisputably a major driver in any such complex situation and has to be timely and visible.
  - If the security force operations could contain terrorism, the local support for national integration would go up and the state's capacity for governance

would increase. Consequently, support of the Awaam for integration would continue to get reinforced.

- If security operations are too harsh, imposing curbs on local people, it could be counter-productive. The operations should be restrained and the instruments of governance should step in. If they don't step in, the security forces would have to up the ante—this is a fix that is bound to fail.
  - When terrorism incidents have gone down and reasonable stability is achieved, the burden has to shift to instruments of governance.
  - Barring military, all energies—social, industrial, economic, political—should be spent on the local people.
- **Formulation of Strategy.** The strategy must be to address the cause—the state's capacity for governance rather than symptoms.
- **An Assessment of Stone-pelting.** The following factors seem to drive the stone-pelters in Kashmir:
- A David versus Goliath syndrome which appeals to the grassroots.
  - The ability of the act to grab eyeballs.
  - Accessibility of SM: From 23 percent in 2010, it has risen to 74 percent in 2016. An analysis of 1,26,000 SM responses showed that 45 percent came from unknown locations, 40 percent from Indian locations, and eight percent from Pakistan.
  - In August 2015, Burhan Wani called for Khilafat on Facebook. In June 2016, the ambit was widened to include the Sainik colonies and the Kashmiri Pandit enclaves.
- **The Way Forward.** Highlighting the way forward the speaker said, winning hearts and minds and concurrently countering inimical propaganda is a difficult task. It requires a strategic and not a tactical response. Professional agencies with freedom of intervention will have to do it. Youth, women, elderly

people, and secessionists—everyone needs to be engaged. Bhand Pather should be promoted. Though they poke fun at the government, administration and security forces, they convey nationalistic and secular messages. There's a need for mainstreaming of livelihood approaches. The Education, Empowerment, Employment, Employability, Efficiency (E5) approach can be implemented.

There has to be a unity of approach, effort, and implementation.

Existing narratives need to be contested. Nuanced reporting is required and both the vernacular and national media have to realise it. Socio-economic security is of prime importance. We have to look at the possibility of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in J&K. If nothing else, information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing (BPO) industries can well come up. Identification of specific goals and long-term commitment is the need of the hour.



**Behavioural Analysis by Sujata Sriram, Professor Human Ecology,  
Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai**

Sujata Sriram talked about the results of a Survey that was carried out on the Kashmiri youth—324 young men and 179 young women—in the age group of 18 to 30 years. Although it's a work in progress, the

Survey has been tabulated as under (Tables 1 through 42 and figures 1 and 2):

**Table 1: Age of Participants**

<i>Age (Years)</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
18-20	19.48
21-25	70.57
26-29	8.34
30+	1.59

**Table 2: Home-town of the Participants**

<i>Home-town</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Baramulla	28.42
Pulwama	15.10
Anantnag	10.93
Ganderbal	10.73
Shopian	10.53
Kupwara	6.16
Budgam	5.96
Srinagar	5.96
Kulgam	5.56
Banihal	0.59

**Table 3: Course Pursued**

<i>Course</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
High School	0.79
Diploma	0.79
Graduation	89.86
Professional Course	1.39
Post-graduation	5.56
MPhil/PhD	0.59
None	0.99

Most students were undergoing a general graduation course [BA, BSc, BCom]. Very few were doing professional courses like BEd, BTech, etc. It's very significant to note that a general graduation doesn't help very much in directly getting a job after the course (Table 3).



**Table 4: Place of Study**

<i>Place</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Bandipora	0.19
Bijbehara	0.19
Delhi	0.19
Islamic College	0.19
Jammu Medical College	0.19
Kargil	0.19
Nagpur	0.19
SKIMS	0.19
Hazratbal	0.39
Government Degree College	0.59
Women's College	0.59
Handwara	1.78
Kupwara	2.18
Pattan	2.78
Tangmarg	2.78
-	3.18
Uri	3.97
Budgam	4.77
University of Kashmir	4.97
Kulgam	5.16
Anantnag	7.15
Srinagar	7.15
Sopore	8.15
Baramulla	8.94
Shopian	8.94
Ganderbal	9.74
Pulwama	15.10

**Table 5: Reasons for Joining the Course**

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Parents' advice	52.28
It is the only course I got admission into	24.85
My friends are joining the same course/college	17.89
Other reasons	4.97

The influence of parents is very marked. Parents seem to be a very important motivating factor.

**Table 6: Occupation**

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Artisan	2.78
Business	17.29
Doctor	4.37
Employee	3.37
Employer	4.57
Engineer	0.59
Farmer	26.83
Fruit Trader	4.17
Government Employee	12.72
Labour	1.59
Lawyer	1.39
Lecturer/Professor	0.59
Shopkeeper	4.97
Teacher	11.92
Transporter	1.98
No Response	0.79

**Table 7: Mother's Occupation**

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
No Response	10.13
Artisan	0.19
Employee	0.39
Employer	3.57
Government Employee	4.97
Home-maker	66.60
Healthcare Worker	1.39
Teacher	12.72

Mothers being home-makers is very normal in an area like Kashmir.

**Table 8: Satisfaction With the Course**

<i>Option</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Somewhat Satisfied	47.51
Somewhat Dissatisfied	24.45
Very Satisfied	17.89
Very Dissatisfied	6.75
Prefer Not to Say	3.37

The level of satisfaction is, surprisingly, not bad.

**Table 9: Reasons for Dissatisfaction**

<i>Option</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Infrequent classes due to strikes and <i>bandhs</i>	59.24
Bad infrastructure	22.46
Uncertainty about examinations	10.53
Poorly trained faculty	4.57
Not enough books and reference material	3.18

“Infrequent classes” is the significant reason for dissatisfaction. Extension of classes and inability to graduate are factors. Infrastructure issues are not significant.

**Table 10: What Will You Do After Completing the Course?**

<i>Option</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Look for a job	58.64
Prepare for entrance examinations for higher studies	23.45
Don't know as yet	17.89

**Table 11: Optimism About the Future**

<i>Option</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
I can only hope for the best	43.53
Things are bad, jobs are difficult to get	31.01
Yes, I am very optimistic	25.44

Most are very optimistic about the future. The cautious optimism in terms of “I can only hope for the best” is useful to look at.

**Table 12:** Things to Consider While Looking for a Job

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
A job which provides security and stability	26.85	28.49
Good salary	24.38	25.69
Job satisfaction	23.14	19.55
Can't say	15.12	15.08
A job which allows me to be close to family	10.49	11.17

Security and stability is a useful thing to look at. Both men and women show this preference.

**Table 13:** Where Would You Like to Work?

<i>Option</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Central Government Job	61.03
Don't Know as Yet	18.68
State Government Job	11.92
Armed Forces	4.77
Private Sector	3.37
Others	0.19

Nobody wants to go into farming as a profession despite coming from that background. Most prefer a Central Government job, not even a state government job. It links well with their preference for security and stability in the job.

**Table 14:** Will You Look for a Job in Kashmir

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Yes	60.80	54.18
Can't Say	30.55	38.54
No	8.64	7.26

A Central Government job in Kashmir would make them the happiest. They want to stay in Kashmir and the feeling of being Kashmiri is very strong.

**Table 15:** Diversity in Friendships

Friends From Other Parts of India

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Yes	55.55	37.98
No	44.44	62.01

## Friends From Other Religions

Option	Male (%)	Female (%)
Yes	68.51	68.15
No	31.48	31.84

## Friends of Opposite Gender

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Yes	63.88	49.72
No	36.11	50.27

Males have more exposure in terms of friends from other parts, religion, and gender.

This suggests that families tend to keep daughters more protected.

**Table 16:** How Important is the Identity of Being Kashmiri?

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Very Important to a Great Extent	62.03	61.45
Important to Some Extent	24.69	25.69
Can't Say	12.65	10.05
Not Important At All	0.61	2.79

## Meaning of Being Kashmiri

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Source of Pride	75.30	76.53
Oppressed People	11.72	8.93
Second Class Human Beings	6.79	7.26
No Solution in Sight	6.17	7.26

Though the people are very proud to be Kashmiris, the way they define being Kashmiri is problematic, even though the number of such people is less (Table 17).

**Table 17:** The Return of Kashmiri Pandits

<i>Option</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
They should be encouraged to come back	50.30	49.16
No, they chose to leave, and should not be allowed to come back	32.09	28.49
I don't know	17.59	22.34

The people who give "I don't know" as the answer are the

problematic ones as they aren't saying anything clearly right now, but given a chance, may not welcome the Pandits back.

**Table 18: What Do You do in Your Spare Time?**

	<i>Often</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Can't Say</i>
Go Out With Friends (%)	25.84	68.19	4.37	1.59
Spend Time With Family (%)	83.49	14.71	0.39	1.39
Read Books and Magazines (%)	29.22	57.05	9.74	3.97
Play Outdoor Games/Sports (%)	16.10	63.02	17.49	3.37
Watch Movies/TV (%)	18.48	66.60	9.94	4.97
Go to a Religious Institution (%)	39.76	44.33	12.52	3.37
Go for Political Meetings (%)	3.97	23.65	52.28	20.07
Pursue a Hobby (%)	25.84	38.36	20.07	15.70

Family is very important and they spend a lot of time with their families; so is going to religious institutions (Table 18). Sports is not that important. The importance of religion cannot be overlooked. It's a crutch that they use and we have to look at how religion can be used in terms of developing *Vichaardhaaraa*. As for going to political institutions, it shows disenchantment with the government.

**Table 19: Use of the Internet**

	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Yes	81.17	84.91
Sometimes When the Internet Works	13.27	10.05
No	5.55	5.02

**Table 20: Reasons for Use of the Internet**

Social Media (%)	~41.74
Information Related to Jobs (%)	~33.79
Information on Kashmir	~10.93
Games	~8.94
Others	~4.57

**Table 21: Use of Social Media**

	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Yes	81.48	79.88
No	18.51	20.11

**Table 22: Reasons for Use of Social Media**

	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
To Connect With Friends	64.81	58.10
To Express Opinion on an Issue	25	28.49
To Follow a Celebrity	2.46	4.46
To Join Groups	4.32	7.82
Others	3.39	5.02

**Table 23: Radicalisation by Social Media**

<i>Response</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Yes	28
No	29
Can't Say	43

The “can’t say” group is important to look at because of this “can’t say” group, 63 percent are male. They are a group who prefer not say anything right then, but they have their own ideas and the ideas are probably not something which we would like to hear.

**Table 24: Ease of Influence by Social Media**

	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Yes	34.56	27.93
No	20.67	16.75
Can't Say	44.75	55.30

**Table 25: How Truthful is Information on Social Media**

<i>Response</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Very Truthful	5.16
Sometimes Truthful	34.19
Not Very Truthful	28.42
Can't Say	32.20

Combing the “very truthful” and “sometimes truthful” would constitute a significant number. It’s important to look at if one is looking to use SM to modify perceptions.

**Table 26: Are You a Part of Any Youth Organisation**

<i>Response</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Yes	3
No	97

The Speaker thinks the response could be different if the question were framed differently.

Of the three percent, nine respondents were part of a religious organisation and seven were part of a cultural organisation.

**Table 27: Do You Read Newspapers?**

<i>Response</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Yes	32.40
No	24.05
Sometimes	43.53

Of the total number of respondents who read the newspaper daily or often, 89.36 percent are male.

**Table 28: Which Newspapers Do You Read?**

<i>Response</i>	<i>Participants (%)</i>
Local Newspaper	41.88
National Daily	33.50
Whatever I Can Get	24.60

**Table 29: Can Newspapers Report Accurately on Kashmir?**

<i>Options</i>	<i>Response (%)</i>
A newspaper in Urdu that is published in Kashmir	40.35
No newspaper can report accurately about what is happening in Kashmir	31.21
An English or Hindi newspaper that has its headquarters in Delhi	15.70
A newspaper that is published in Pakistan	12.72



Urdu newspaper published in Kashmir is the most trusted. People have very little trust in newspapers published in Pakistan.

**Table 30:** Which Are the Most Watched Television Channels in Kashmir?

<i>Options</i>	<i>Response (%)</i>
International Channels	28.23
Private Hindi News Channels	22.86
Private English News Channels	21.86
Doordarshan	15.30
Local Channels	9.14
Pakistan TV	2.58

Perhaps they think that the reporting is much more nuanced in international channels.

**Table 31:** Whose Interests Does the Government Take Care of?

<i>Options</i>	<i>Response (%)</i>
It doesn't take care of anybody's interests	42.74
It takes care of the interests of people from outside Kashmir	20.47
It takes care of the interests of Kashmiris	20.87
It takes care of mine and my family's interests	15.90

This statistic shows their alienation. They feel no one except their family cares. They don't know whom to rely on in times of trouble. The government does not care. They're left with their family and religion.

**Table 32:** Awareness About the UNHCR Report

	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Aware	50	37.43
Not Aware	50	62.56

**Table 33:** Accuracy of the UNHCR Report

<i>Options</i>	<i>Response (%)</i>
Accurate	67.24
Not Accurate	24.89
Can't Say	7.86

**Table 34:** Discrimination Faced


<i>Options</i>	<i>Response (%)</i>
Yes	33.99
No	33.20
Can't Say	32.80

**Table 35:** Reasons for Discrimination

Options	Response (%)
The State You Belong to	83.04
Religion	5.26
Social Class	5.26
Others	4.09
Caste	1.16
Gender	1.16

**Table 36:** Life Satisfaction


<i>Satisfaction Level</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Very Satisfied	13.88	15.08
Fairly Satisfied	35.18	32.96
Can't Say	31.17	37.98
Not Satisfied	17.28	12.29
Not At All Satisfied	1.85	2.79



**Figure 1:** Life Satisfaction and Gender

**Table 37: Satisfaction of Friends**

<i>Satisfaction Level</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Very Satisfied	12.34	12.84
Fairly Satisfied	29.01	24.02
Don't Know/Can't Say	26.23	30.72
Not Satisfied	29.01	30.72
Not At All Satisfied	3.39	1.76

**Figure 2: Satisfaction of Self and Friends**

<i>Satisfaction Level</i>	<i>Self (%)</i>	<i>Friends (%)</i>
Very Satisfied	14.31	12.52
Fairly Satisfied	34.39	27.23
Can't Say	33.59	27.83
Not Satisfied	15.50	29.62
Not At All Satisfied	2.18	2.78

The levels of satisfaction are okay, not bad. But the important part is that they rate the dissatisfaction level of their friends higher. This is important because it is very easy to attribute things to others than to oneself. So the actual levels of dissatisfaction for self are likely to be much higher, closer to the one given for friends.

**Table 38: Reasons for Dissatisfaction**

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
No Jobs	40.74	28.49
Uncertainty About Future	18.20	19.55
Being Forced to Live Under the Rule of the Indian Government	21.60	24.02
Life Disrupted Due to Curfews and <i>Bandhs</i>	6.48	12.29
Others	10.49	13.96
No Dissatisfaction	2.46	1.67

**Table 39: Important Things in Life**

	<i>Very Important</i>	<i>Somewhat Important</i>	<i>Somewhat Unimportant</i>	<i>Not Important At All</i>
Getting Higher Education (%)	58.05	8.94	1.39	31.61
Getting a Job (%)	56.85	7.95	1.59	33.59
Having a Peaceful Life Without Disruption (%)	56.26	6.16	3.57	33.99
Being Assured Human Rights (%)	42.54	12.32	10.93	34.19
Being Provided Basic Amenities (%)	40.55	19.28	5.96	34.19
Getting Married (%)	40.35	16.30	8.54	34.79
Having a Stable Government (%)	38.96	13.12	11.33	36.58

Almost as many say it's important as the ones saying it's not important for "having a stable government" and "being assured human rights". This is reflective of a strong sense of alienation.

**Table 20: Trust in Social Institutions**

	<i>Great Degree of Trust</i>	<i>Some Trust</i>	<i>No Trust At All</i>	<i>Can't Say</i>
Family-Members (%)	90.05	7.55	0.39	1.98
Friends (%)	55.26	36.58	2.98	5.16

Teachers (%)	41.15	50.29	4.37	4.17
Religious Institution (%)	21.27	43.93	25.04	9.74
Local State Government (%)	15.10	38.76	39.56	6.56
NGOs (%)	12.92	0	73.16	13.91
Army (%)	11.72	30.41	48.70	9.14
Central Government (%)	10.93	30.01	45.12	13.91
Local Administration (%)	10.53	31.21	40.15	18.09
Court (%)	9.14	53.28	25.84	11.72
Local Police (%)	7.15	30.41	51.49	10.93
Central Police (%)	4.17	20.67	54.87	20.27

Family, friends, teachers, and religious institutions are very important. They trust the judiciary, but not entirely.

**Table 41:** Feeling of Being Indian

Yes	33.99
No	32.80
Can't Say	33.20

The “can’t say” group is again worrying.

**Table 42:** One Thing That Can Bring About a Change

	<i>Male (%)</i>	<i>Female (%)</i>
Change of Government	32.71	36.31
Better Education/Employment	25	23.46
Withdrawal of Army	20.06	21.22
Better Life	20.06	18.43
Improvement of Drug Policy	2.16	0.55



### Solutions to Psychological Aspects by Colonel AS Chonker, VSM, Senior Fellow CLAWS

Colonel AS Chonker highlighted the fact that the centre of gravity is the psyche and culture of the people. It is influenced by many factors including, but not limited to the baggage of history, pan-Islamic movement, moderate Islam, adaptability in the *Awaam*, sense of alienation, different streaks of militancy, level of inclusivity in society, etc.

- **The Kashmiri psyche.** Analysing the Kashmiri psyche, the speaker brought out the following salient points:
  - The Kashmiri does not know whom to trust. Should he/she trust the state government, the central government, the Army, the police, or the academic institutions ?
  - The Kashmiri does not know what he wants. Does he/she want Azadi, does he/she want to remain with India or join Pakistan?
  - **The Dual-personality of the Kashmiri.** The Kashmiri in a mob is different from the Kashmiri as an individual.

- **The Feeling of Oppression.** The Kashmiri feels that he's being oppressed and ruled by others.
- **Adaptability.** The Kashmiri feels forced to survive under constantly changing the environment and hence, adapts to the same.
- **Low Trigger-threshold.** Very small triggers, such as a failed love-life, are making the Kashmiri join militancy.
- **Lack of Alternatives in Leisure-time.** The Kashmiri has no source of entertainment in his leisure time, so he/she visits religious institutions, gets into such discussions that result in hardening of stance. According to the Survey, 84 percent of people visit religious institutions.
- **Traits of a Rebel.** The Kashmiri youth is a victim of violence and as such, has developed traits of a rebel. It is presently manifesting itself in aggressiveness.
- **Political Awareness.** The Kashmiri is very politically aware. He/she may boycott the bye-elections, but not the assembly elections as it gives the voice of expression.
- **Systematic Entrapment in Kashmir**
  - **7-13 Years of Age.** At this age, the children are used for stone-pelting. He's booked under PSA and gets more radicalised staying with fundamentalists in jail.
  - **3-17 Years of Age.** At this age, he becomes an OGW, logistically supporting the terrorists.
  - **18-32 Years of Age.** At this age, he's a resilient, motivated youth indulging in grenade-throwing and snatching of weapons. This is the lot joining mainstream terrorism.
- **Leverage Point.** According to the Survey, 50 percent of people are proud to be Kashmiris. This identity needs to be leveraged. Kashmiriyat—the culture of Kashmir—should be promoted by capitalising on Moderate Islam. The Suhrawardi, Kubrawi, Naqshbandi, Qadiri form of Sufi Islam has been a part of

Kashmiri culture. The likes of Bulle Shah, Shah Hamdani, and Zain al Abedin brought it to Kashmir in the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. This culture based on the rishi-order has to be used to counter the imported culture being sent as part of the proxy war.

- **Ideology Behind the Conflict.**
  - It's a mix of ethno-religious separatism and Islamic extremism. Ethno-religious because of the ethnic population of the erstwhile princely state of J&K with only a part of the Muslim population of the Valley supporting the separatism. The colour of Islamic extremism is being brought out by terrorist leaders like Zakir Musa who openly declare their allegiance to the proposed Caliphate of Islam.
  - Islamic imperatives have not superseded the essential nationalistic dimension of the conflict, but are gaining ground.
  - There are definite indicators of the conflict being converted into a religious struggle.
- **Indicators of Religious Extremism.** The huge influx of madrasas and mosques belong to Tablighi Jamaat, Ahl-e-Hadees. Religion propagated through Tablaghi Jamaat which asks Muslims to improve their "Deen", acts as a pull and a crutch in the absence of any other sort of entertainment. Ahl-e-Hadees mosques have four grades: Jamait-ul-ahl-e-Hadith, Difai, Guraba, and lastly, Sout-ul\_Haq which is represented by the IS, for which "wajib-e-qatl", i.e. murder for religion is authorised. Tablighi Jamaat focuses on doing the work of da'wah.
- **Rise of Wahhabi/Salafi Groups.** Wahhabis and Salafis consider praying at shrines shirk and are pushing people away from Sufism. Indicators are as follows:
  - Fiery speeches by terrorist leaders calling for jihad.
  - Change in the dress code.
  - Massive protests after the Friday congregations.



- According to the Survey, 84 percent of the people believe and do go to religious places in their free time.
- **International Environment.** Though IS has been defeated in Syria and Iraq, recruitment and radicalisation are still going on. The returnees and the recidivists are getting back to Europe, USA, Afghanistan, South-East Asia and creating trouble by not only transporting the ideology to these areas but also planning and executing fresh recruitment and targeted attacks in these countries.
- **France.** The French built Banlieues [suburbs for people to stay from where they could come and work] in the 1960s. By the 1980s, there was ghettoisation and a sense of “otherness”. This social marginalisation and a sense of “otherisation”, a feeling of “us against them”, has led to the breeding of recruits for ISIS.
- **Britain.** The three-fold response of the UK government to the recent spate of terror-related incidents in their country has yielded rich dividends. First, the SM companies were given an ultimatum to eradicate/filter radicalising offensive literature and videos from their platforms in the UK. This resulted in a 98 percent decrease in such online literature which could lead to radicalisation and recruitment. Second, they have upgraded their artificial intelligence (AI) monitoring system to identify probable recruiters, OGWs, and radicalised elements. Third, they have taken the assistance of NGOs like the “London Tigers” to spread the message of peace and well-being through their community development programmes to prevent people from undertaking violent extremist acts as also reach out to suspected affected cases.
- **Indonesia.** They utilised the concept of Network-Based Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWERS). It is a concept which illustrates various activities for conflict prevention. The assumption in CEWERS concept is usually referred to the analogy that conflict is a cycle, which includes conflict prevention steps, intervention to stop violence [peacekeeping], negotiation to create peace [peace-making] and also the effort to develop positive peace

to establish long-term resilience. He also explained the efforts of “Bela Negara”, the community empowerment strategy from Indonesia which has been instrumental in not only countering violent extremism but also has successfully built social resilience against radicalisation through synergetic cooperation between the government and the communities through smart power. Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) is the Indonesian agency that works to prevent terrorism. It could not achieve as much through the hard power that interactions with local Ulema and community groups that generated the adequate soft power could do.

- **Singapore.** The TRIDENT concept operationalised by Singapore incorporates/addresses the Transforming power of technology, Recruitment and radicalisation, Innovativeness, Dense pollination of ideas, Evolving trends, New tradecrafts, and last but not the least Trusted networks which can be utilised for this fight. The concept envisages the use of transformative power of technology to prevent recruitment and radicalisation thereby be ahead in the field of innovation by understanding the vectors in a way that could save lives and prevent families from getting destroyed. There is a need to be ahead of the terrorists and their masters in innovation and the learning curve. This could be done through intelligence breakthroughs. A recent case was that of weaponising the family unit as a tool for jihad. Addressing the cognitive domain through a dense pollination of ideas is the universal approach that the handlers and OGWs are exploiting for leading unknowing youth into the trap of fighting for an unrighteous jihad. Radical Islam may not be the only guiding light for the disenchanted. Evolving trends [a sequence of critical events of consequence] give us an insight into the things to follow. Hence, trend analysis is of utmost importance in the business of countering violent extremism. New tradecraft being employed by the extremists like Inghimasi attacks or lone wolf attacks and its psychoanalysis will help us in getting into the minds of the extremists. An ear to the ground in this regard will pay rich dividends. Lastly, trusted networks like security agencies, educational institutions, grass

root organisations, and community groups are important to counter the extremist networks.

- **The Indian context in J&K.** About the possible approaches and solutions in the Indian case, the speaker suggested something he calls the “PRIME ANTENNA” solution which is an acronym for a coherent whole of the government approach, the explanation for which is as under:
  - **P: Promote the Basic Culture of Kashmiriyat.** The Survey and Behavioural Science suggest that the core culture of Kashmiriyat is still alive and will be the last to melt as it is at the bottom of the iceberg. Hence, the Home Ministry could organise a Sufi festival for people for 10 days. It could be played on the FM and TV channels for a month or more.
  - **R: Respond Full-Spectrum.**
    - Kinetic Response  
Disrupt, apprehend, and neutralise the terrorists.
    - Institutional Framework
    - Strengthen regional frameworks fighting terrorism. If there’s a block in SARRC due to differences in India and Pakistan, we could go to South-East Asia and the CARs through regional frameworks like BIMSTEC and SCO.
    - Reintegration Strategies—Reintegrate the stone-pelters into society and assist in the reintegration of terrorist detainees.
    - Community Engagement—especially with mothers.  
We need to support national/regional security and social cohesion initiatives. While carrying out the full spectrum response, the radical ideology needs to be understood. The vulnerable individuals are going to the net, the religious institutions, and teachers. Some are at a risk of being misguided. According to the Survey conducted, 80 percent people are using SM and 25 percent of those have friends who got radicalised by SM. Hence, SM becomes a lynch-pin in all our strategies to counter the effect of radicalisation.

- **I: Integrate the Power of Technology.**
  - AI monitoring by drones and cameras.
  - Applications like governance applications which will make the youth feels empowered. We could generate our own intelligence and data and not rely on foreign servers.
  - Data Modelling
  - Positive news should flow especially in Urdu news channels as well as Urdu newspapers published by major media houses of mainland India in Jammu as well as Kashmir itself so that the newspapers reach the masses on the same day.
  - There should be more FM channels for the opportunity to entertain themselves, thus shielding them from the danger of getting radicalised.
- **M: Manage Perceptions Internationally.**
  - Capitalise on the zero-tolerance wave against extreme ideology/radicalism.
  - Pakistan is using propaganda. We should also impart the world our side of the story.
  - Enhance the diplomatic effort for perception management.
- **E: Engage.** Only 50 percent of the Survey population wants Kashmiri Pandits back, as against 84 percent in 2007. The Banihal divide needs to be eradicated. There's a need to engage not only with those advocating peace, but also with the slain militants' families, and the youth. There is a divide and "otherisation" because of the debates on news channels. Positive news needs to be aired. Reach out to the religious fraternity—the *ulema*. Empower the *waaz of the maulvis* to contribute and become a part of the governance process. They should be psychologically integrated. There needs to be a strategy beyond physical security. This can be done in partnership with an expert panel of religious teachers and scholars—a religious rehabilitation group. Religious counselling needs to be given to counter radical ideas. They

should have access to proper teachings and interpretations of religion. Actions or initiatives taken by the government are perceived as the agenda of the government, therefore there is a need to involve corporates as well as NGOs and youth groups to support the cause.

- **A: Autonomy Within the Realms of the Constitution.** We can have debates within the constitutional confines and without affecting the idea of India.
- **N: Networks to Defeat Networks.** It takes a network to defeat a network. We have clubs like Kulgam Kings, Kupwara Tigers, etc. These networks could be given a social standing and supported by applications.
- **T: Trend-identification Through Constant Analysis.** According to the Survey 71 percent people in Kupwara don't identify themselves as Indian and indeed, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is moving its HQ from South Kashmir to Kupwara. Such trends need to be identified to remain ahead in the curve. For this, we can have an expert core group panel support from think-tanks and veterans giving weekly updates to the NSC so that things can be tweaked in a timely manner.
- **E: Empowering People.** The lack of dignity, freedom, and social justice were the reasons for the Arab Spring. When these three things couldn't be guaranteed to the population, the empty spaces were filled by the ISIS ideology. Hence, we need to empower the people politically, socially, economically, technologically, and psychologically. We can empower them by introducing democracy in schools and colleges [elections of class representatives], provide dignity through jobs and opportunities, and social justice through governance applications and even playfields. There are 2,800 playfields required in J&K today as against the 56 that are available. Mental health support is of prime importance. We need to make mothers of slain militants grieve for their loss. This can only be done with the help of professional psychological support. A word of caution is that all the three regions in the

state need to be empowered equally otherwise there will be a negative sentiment which will fuel the divide.

- **N: Name and Shame Pakistan and OGWs.** Although we have started naming and shaming Pakistan in international fora, this trend needs to continue. Also, we need to sting and shame the OGWs through credible intelligence. The people have to be shown how they are destroying the future of their children. Approximately 5,000 OGWs are running 300 terrorists and recruiting more. This needs to be stopped.
- **N: Negate New Tradecraft.** This can be done using the Singapore model discussed earlier.
- **A: Address Cognitive Domain.** There is a need for regular assessment and counselling and psychological rehabilitation. They need to be taught to cope with stressors and reduce their vulnerability to negative group pressures. There is a need to use counter-narratives to fight radicalisation. Some examples are as follows:

— **The CAPS Method**

“C”orrect distortion of Islamic teachings

“A”ssist in detainees’ reintegration

“P”revent the ideology by taking roots in the community

“S”upport the national security and social cohesion initiatives

— **The SPEAR Method**

*“S”trengthening Solidarity*

Take non-violent and constructive action to demonstrate solidarity with other. Source information from reputable sources. Harness the spirit of volunteerism. Come up with new and creative approaches to common/global problems.

*“P”reserving Harmony*

Discover others to foster mutual understanding.

Understand others and their history, traditions, and

values. Manage conflicts in an intelligent and peaceful way. Have shared purposes to work together towards common goals.

*“E”mbracing Diversity*

Weigh and understand contrasting points of view.

Nurture empathy and compassion. Forge meaningful bonds between people. Sieve collective solutions for societal well-being and sustainability.

*“A”dvocating Engagement*

Provide ideas and creative solutions. Develop a sense of identity, camaraderie, and belonging with the community. Involve in decision-making processes.

Promote advocacy and leadership skills to facilitate engagement.

*“R”eciprocating Respect*

Respect each other’s right to freedom of opinion, expression, and belief. Promote a culture of non-violence and non-discrimination.

- **Conclusion.** We need to follow a new doctrine–“Heads to Hearts to Hands”. When you address the heads, hearts will soften and action will begin.



The Panel of Session I Taking Questions From the Audience

## SESSION II: Mapping of Perceptions

- The Session was chaired by Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM\*\*, VSM\*\* (Retd) and the discourse covered the following topics:
  - **Psychological, Politico-Social, and Economic Aspirations**  
Professor Navnita Behera, Delhi University  
Professor David Devadas, Journalist and Author
  - **The Way Ahead**  
Mohammed Ummer Ashraf (Voice of the Youth of Kashmir)  
Lieutenant General DS Hooda, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM\*\* (Retd)



**Opening Remarks by Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM\*\*, VSM\*\* (Retd)**

This Session was chaired by Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain who deliberated upon following issues and points:

- Talking on Kashmir outside the ambit of normal military operations he explained that many of the people involved in



stone-throwing were younger than 18 years of age. Stone-thrower leaders were 11-12 years old. Is mapping of their perceptions required? When they grow up, they'll create problems for us.

- Arm-chair philosophers have a great role because those serving on-ground tend to over-emphasise on the reality. There are many other aspects which need to be weighed along with realities. The academic content is very important for it. Conflict theory states that conflict is dynamic, and at a particular time, hard power has to start getting displaced by soft power. Perception is nothing but soft operations. Words such as “propaganda”, “psychological warfare” are passé. Even “perception management” is getting out-of-fashion. The new terminology is “strategic communication” and India is struggling with soft power. Hence, ideating over it is very necessary. Ideas were brought forward in the first session, but how to get the act together.
- There is a complete “civilianisation” of the war that is to be fought on the SM. The Army can't fight this war, but can only supervise it. Thousands of SM warriors who are 18-30 years old are required. This has been done by Pakistan. The US has 75,000 SM warriors. We haven't even started. It's an all-of-government approach and can't be left only to the Army.
- The perception element from Pakistan is already huge. The Generals in Pakistan strongly feel they are winning the conflict in Kashmir. The Bajwa doctrine essentially talks about peace at a cost and that cost is reducing India's effectiveness in Kashmir and making sure Pakistan's influence in Kashmir continues to enhance. We should keep in mind that Pakistan will try to sabotage India's perception management efforts in Kashmir.
- It is not true that separatist tendencies exist only in five districts and seventeen districts are free of it. The separatist tendency is almost equal everywhere, except that is decidedly much more in South Kashmir.
- The perceptual problem lies in Shopian, Kulgam, and other areas of South Kashmir. The HQ of the Jammat-e-Islami lies in Kulgam. The ideological core of Kashmir is South Kashmir.

- The physical terrain is important in such warfare, but much more important is mapping the cultural terrain. Understanding the cultural terrain in a proxy war situation is something that we have not achieved fully.
- On the issue of radicalisation, we should desist from over-analysis. Simplification of the understanding of Islam is the key to countering radicalisation.
- There is a huge connect with Pakistan on the aspect of religion. Anecdote—When the Kaman Aman Setu bridge was being laid, a huge placard came up on the “other” side which read: *Pakistan se rishta kya? La ilaha illallah* [Pakistan and Kashmir are linked by Islam]. India’s counter to it was: *Mazhab nahi sikhata aapas mein bair rakhna* [Religion does not teach us to harbour ill-will] which was rather weak. All that is happening in South Kashmir has the stamp of Pakistan on it. All the ideological battles on SM are coming from there. The Muslim clergy should be involved in the effort to counter radical Islam in South Kashmir. We are afraid of countering religion as we feel it is too sensitive an issue for the Army to get into. If the Army cannot get into it, others should.
- *Sadhbhavna* was the institutionalisation of the military-civic action. It was not strategic communication as there was physicality to it. *Sadhbhavna* should now morph into *Vichaardhaaraa*.
- Managing the perception of the soldier, the veteran, and that of the environment of India is as important.



### Psychological, Politico-Social, and Economic Aspirations by Professor Navnita Behera, Delhi University

The earlier mentioned facts and points of deliberations was further elaborated and discussed by Professor Navnita Behera. These are given as under:

- Try to understand how Kashmiris look at the world. The focus will be more on the Valley. One question that people from outside J&K are asked is whether they are from India. There is a perception of Kashmir being different and separate. From 1947 when the common Kashmiri supported the Indian state to the present state of affairs is something to reflect on.
- In Sheikh Abdullah's first speech to the J&K constituent assembly, he said that he envisaged Pakistan to turn into a feudal state and Kashmiris' interests would be better protected in a federal, secular, democratic India.
- While Maharaja's accession to India fulfilled a constitutional requirement, Sheikh Abdullah's speech shows that it was a voluntary political choice of joining the Indian state. They believed that Kashmiris' political interests would be better served in the Indian state.

- When the militancy began in the late 1980s, Kashmiris had a much-romanticised vision of Pakistan. People would change the time on their watches to that of Pakistan as they identified much more with the Pakistani state. From that time hence, there has been extreme disillusionment with Pakistan which sustains till date. When Kashmiris talk about *Azadi*, they talk about independence. Only a minuscule minority talks about acceding to Pakistan. The stage when they looked to Pakistan for succour is over.
- **Intra-state Equation (Jammu, Ladakh, and Valley):** There has been a shift from the time of Sheikh Abdullah when on the question of self-determination, he included all Kashmiris—Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Muslims, to a time within his time-period when he said that Jammu and Ladakh can go with India, while the Valley would look for independence. Why the insurgency failed in the early 1990s. Of course, India used the Army to crush militancy, but it was political defeat more than a military defeat as, though they asked for self-determination for all Kashmiris, they did not take Ladakh, Jammu, or the Kashmiri Pandits along with them. This equation hasn't changed till date. Separatists haven't looked to build bridges between Ladakh, Jammu, or the Kashmiri Pandits.
- Article 370 recognises an alternative model of state-making within the Indian Constitution. It is an important element which has helped build the resilience of the Indian Constitution because of which it has stood the test of time. It accommodated different political aspirations of different parts of the country within the Indian Constitution. Article 35 A is prevalent in other parts of the country as a pure domicile status. Contentious issues of this Article like those of women's rights and other derogatory issues could be debated and removed.
- The Kashmir conflict has acquired clearly cyclical nature. There are bigger cycles within which there are smaller cycles. Looking at the bigger cycle, from the 1940s to 1950s, there is bonhomie between the political leadership of Kashmir and INC. From 1960

to 1970s is a decade of contestation with Sheikh Abdullah wanting to look out of the central leadership lead by Nehru because of which he was imprisoned. From the 1970s to the 1980s, we've had a very good, cooperative relationship and the 1990s was the breakout time. The elections were not completely free and fair. The windows of opportunity were lost. From 2010 onwards we are back in a decade of contestations and unfortunately, we're in a curve going south. Without corrective measures, the turmoil would continue, if not get worse.

- Pakistan cannot create trouble if the Kashmiri population stands with you.
- Smaller Cycles: Ballot-box wasn't working so gun became the answer. Next phase—gun is not the answer; a political dialogue is the way out. From 2008 when the Amarnath land row emerged in the summer of 2010, stone-pelting became a civilian mode of protest, it became a way of doing politics. Now, of course, the gun is coming back.
- As a policymaker, how do you see such events coming? Do we have a people's policy? The people were always ahead of state and social scientists. We've not had our ears to the ground. Much before Rubaiya Sayeed was kidnapped, and Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) let loose the mass mobilisations, any mention of India would get blackened. The "Bharat" in Bharat Petroleum was blackened, in the State Bank of India, "India" was blackened. Same was the case for Air India, Bharat Gas, etc. These were indicators for what was to come.
- Particular kind and size of shoes were being stolen from all stores in the late 1980s. Money was not stolen, but only shoes were stolen. Later it was discovered that the shoes were being stolen because the youth were beginning to cross the border through the passes. Snow-boots were being stolen. The signs were all there, but it wasn't picked up. A recent trend is graffiti. "Free Kashmir" is written on the walls. The security forces write "from stone-pelters" in front of it. The separatists then strike off "stone-pelters" from it.

- Much of what is going on today was predicted by me and my team in a study conducted by us in 2011/13. They found that the youth were listening to radical speeches on DVDs and YouTube. Such windows of opportunity have been lost.
- There is a difference between print media and electronic media, English media and vernacular media, local media and national media, and within SM too, it is being modified and utilised to the advantage of the handlers. A more nuanced study of how SM is being operated is required to be carried out.
- Big data is lacking. Though we have been fighting this war for more than 30 years, there has not been even a single study aimed at understanding the political economy of the conflict. We have only conjectures and no empirical data on which social and political class the youth is coming from.
- When violence gets social legitimacy and sanctity, it is the first sign policymakers need to pick up. Dialogue has become the biggest casualty of the violence in the last 10 years. We need to not only have dialogue but also make the dialogue work.
- Youth have to lock up their younger siblings in the age group of 9 to 12 years so that they don't go to pelt stones. So, schools are the places where we need to begin our battles and the biggest hurdle to this is the burning and closing down of schools.



### **Psychological, Politico-Social, and Economic Aspirations by Professor David Devadas, Journalist and Author**

Professor David Devadas was mandated to speak on the aspects of governance which are affecting perceptions amongst the people and he deliberated on the following issues:

- Governance is defined in multiple ways. The World Bank defines it as “Efforts to create an enabling environment and to build capacities.”
- Security has been a very significant part of governance in Kashmir for the past 30 years.
- The security apparatus and the government are oriented to fire-fighting. If militancy were to die down, discussions and dialogue would not take place. The Speaker wrote an article in 2012 about weapons being snatched. In 2013, he wrote that a full-blown new militancy was upon us. Burhan Wani went underground in 2010. But no proactive actions were taken.
- The cultural terrain is constantly in flux. A decade back, the forces were supporting Tablighi Jamaat despite being warned that

it was from these sorts of madrasas in Pakistan that the Taliban emerged. We don't seem to learn lessons.

- Eight-year-olds are manning barricades that were laid across the Valley. They called themselves “bosses” of the barricade. Today, radicalisation has gone down to infants. We need to focus urgently on these infants who haven't even joined schools.
- There are two different paradigms in governance in the civil sphere. These are:
  - Interface of officials, ministers, and other functionaries of the state with the people.
  - Structural: The ways in which those in authority shape the economic, social, and cultural life of the place, the institutions they build, and the channels through which they provide services to the people.
- To some extent, the personal interface is essential, but if it becomes the main method of governance then the systems suffer. In Bandipora, for example, a particular government did not repair roads because that constituency had elected a person from the other party.
- For long-term economic stability and security, it is essential to establish systems that enable citizens to smoothly access services.
- The patronage system of governance is dominant in Kashmir; with the result that people who don't have access to the network of power and influence tend to get frustrated.
- Until recently, power shortage was an endemic problem in Kashmir, particularly in the winters. As soon as the Durbar moved to Jammu, the power-supply would be down to at times half-an-hour a day! Basics such as waste-disposal, drainage, scavenging, town-planning, etc., barely exist. The data of the 2011 Census reveals that manual scavenging is huge in Srinagar because drainage barely exists. Most houses have a sump under the foundation of their houses. Even the most well-to-do localities have such tiny lanes that two cars can't pass each other.



- The town planning authority in Kashmir is built on wetland and grassland. The Dal is dead and Wular is reduced to almost a pond. The Jhelum at times looks like a drain. We have to start saving the Nigeen.
- The 2002 Industrial Policy was a dream document. All kinds of incentives and subsidies were offered for a number of industries, but it never took off largely because of the corruption and nepotism involved.
- The way that people experience access to things is rarely understood.
- The frustration of people regarding this sort of lacuna in structured governance and the dominance of the Durbar-type of governance is partly obscured by the fact that there is so much wealth in Kashmir. Kashmir is a huge cash economy, some of which comes from the “other” side and other countries.
- The fog of war has allowed this cash economy to thrive and it has given an incentive to those in authority to keep the place unstable as that would help in protecting them against an investigation by making the place inaccessible.
- A man who contested the 2014 Lok Sabha elections against Mehbooba Mufti said that the system has been so corrupted that people “go to a market to buy vegetables. They go to a government office to buy a service.” They have no idea that it is their right.
- **Employment is a huge conundrum in Kashmir.** The patronage system has become such a mammoth network that everybody wants a government job. That explains why they want a Central Government job and remain in Kashmir because that job has maximum authority and leverage there. It is like an oligarchy of the employed and the elected. If Kupwara today has become the centre of the Hizb, the structural governance reasons behind it are to be looked at.
- **Anecdote:** The state of J&K employs almost five percent of the population and the majority of them are from the Valley.

- In a 2011 Survey conducted by the speaker on 6,000 to 7,000 school and college students in the Valley, it was found that the children from the most economically backward sections seemed to be least alienated. The ones whose parents were in influential positions seemed to be the most radical in their language. That may have changed now as the change in the geographical and socio-economic pattern was noticed of stone-pelting from 2010 to 2016.
- The idea that someone in the Central Government job was more committed to the idea of India is false. An orchard owner has an incentive because he very little to do during summer. Similarly, a government employee also has an incentive not to go to work and have a *hartal*. It's the daily wage-earner, the one who earns when markets are open, who has an incentive not to have a *hartal*.
- Corruption organically feeds into the narratives that are available on SM. A gullible individual would believe that a sharia and caliphate-based system would be just. An example of how corruption and mi-governance dovetail with the messages available on SM is the IS. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gave his address as the Caliph, there was chant in the background of the video which stated that the IS was established on Islam, they wage jihad, and they also give governance, justice, and responsiveness to the people. We often miss this aspect of what attracts people.



### **The Way Ahead by Mohammed Ummer Ashraf (Voice of the Youth of Kashmir)**

Mir Md Ummer Ashraf has a B.Tech in Electronics and Communication Engineering. He is a celebrated speaker of the Kashmir Valley and the media calls the likes of him, a “child of conflict”. He deliberated on the following issues while constructing a roadmap for the way ahead:

- Calling Kashmir a “strategic” issue hurts the Kashmiris. Anthropology is the key, not systems-analysis.
- Events organised by Kashmiris see maximum participation by the locals. In other events, participation is usually by the families of bureaucrats.
- The Nobel Prize for Physics this year was given to the same theory which was discussed with Shah Faisal by a Kashmiri kid a few months back.
- Focus areas in Perception Management are as follows:
  - Unearthing sources of Islamic radicalisation.
  - Weaponry used.
  - Target groups and damage caused.

- Counter-action plan.
- Creation of groups in sync with the ideology of national integration.
- Saudi Arabia is home to the most fundamentalist and intolerant schools of Islam like the Hanbali School. The Indian sub-continent is home to the most tolerant school which is the Hanafi School. The Maliki School is found in Africa, while East Africa and Indonesia have the Shafi'i School.
- **Factors for radicalisation:**
  - External Factors:
    - Salafi/Hanbali version of Islam.
    - Foreign-funding/petro-dollars.
    - Influence of IS and al-Qaeda.
    - Increased access to Wahhabi literature.
    - Declining influence of Hanafi Islam.
    - International media propaganda.
  - Internal Factors:
    - Polarising statements of politicians.
    - Emergence of Hindutva.
    - Unemployment and socio-economic condition of Muslims.
    - Declining influence of Sufism.
    - Distorted version of Quranic teachings.
  - Kashmir-specific Factors:
    - Role of Jamaat-e-Islami [it has infiltrated the schools in Kashmir. Most of the teachers are from the Jamaat and the next generation is being groomed by people of this separatist mindset].
    - Growing unemployment.
    - Cases of atrocities by security forces.

- Glorification of militants. On SM as well as in death during funeral processions, there is a concentrated effort by inimical agencies to glorify militants so that fresh recruits are attracted to the idea.
- Hurriyat and its separatist agenda.
- Lack of youth-engagement.
- Identity crisis caused due to the youth moving away from the core culture of Kashmiriyat as a result of religious overtones to the conflict.
- Negative role of media which creates a sense of rest of India against the Kashmiris.
- Mental health issues/drug addiction.
- Lack of counselling centres.
- Sense of alienation and insecurity, vis-à-vis, India
- Other Reasons
  - Cozy lifestyle.
  - Low intelligence and academic failure.
  - Hyperactivity and impulsivity.
  - Engagement in social networking sites.
  - Lack of direction.
  - Quantity but not quality education.
  - Communication gap.
  - Unhealthy competition.
  - Family conflict as the youth is at loggerheads with the patriarchs of the family.
- How can students do well if, instead of six working days, they have two [due to “hartals”].
- **Kashmiri Perception of India.** To the Kashmiris, the police, the army, the governor, and the media are the face of India. What the person in the lowest ladder does on the ground makes a lot of difference to the Kashmiri. A small act like a selfie with a kid on the street can go viral in the Valley and bring goodwill.

- **Action Plan for Reducing Radicalisation.**
  - Youth engagement.
  - Involvement of religious leaders.
  - Increasing efficiency and accountability of civil administration [the failure of civil administration is seen as the failure of India].
  - Controlling the narratives being peddled by the media.
  - Community policing [police reforms needed].
  - Restructuring of the education system.
  - Involvement of senior citizens, NGOs, and civil society.
- **Youth-connect Model.** The youth don't have a place to vent out their anger. There is no student politics. KUSU is banned. A "youth-connect model" was presented. It consists of a youth leader office liaising with different sections working on community policing, justice revenue system, money flow through RDD, job-placement and de-addiction centres, and recreational clubs. It will also serve the strategic purpose of collecting intelligence which can be sent to the Centre Radicalisation Analysis (CRA). The Model is presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Youth-connect Model

- **Restructuring Education System.**
  - At the primary level, useless, irrelevant stories should be replaced with moral lessons in the local/regional context.
  - At the secondary level, the focus should be on holistic development, skill development [tourism-specific subject], civic sense and lessons on consequences of various wars and violent uprisings in the world.
  - There should be an identification of like-minded people and at least 10 percent controlled recruitment of teachers.
  - The syllabus should emphasise on moral education, tolerance in Islam, Muslim heroes of India, Kashmir and Kashmiriyat, IT, and more importantly, “Rajatarangini”.
- **Role of Media.** The polarizing narratives being played by the media are contributing to the feeling of alienation in the Kashmiri population.
- **The Religious Engagement Model.** The Model involves identification of maulvis to be sent for training focusing on the core teaching of peace in Islam and using these maulvis for counter-radicalisation.
- On the issue of unemployment, the Speaker talked about a holistic approach including all job-related schemes like Skill India, Himayat, Corporate Social Responsibility Funds, Rural Self Employment Training Institutes, Jammu Kashmir Women Development Council, Self Help Groups for engineers, etc. The government should ensure youth-oriented expenditure.
- **Juvenile Justice.** The young stone-pelters who are arrested are sent to juvenile justice homes and they came out more radicalised from these juvenile justice homes. The problem is that there are no psychologists/trainers/counsellors in these homes.



**The Way Ahead by Lieutenant General DS Hooda, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM\*\* (Retd)**

Lieutenant General DS Hooda highlighted the following issues:

- We tend to look at the situation primarily from violence parameters, i.e. the number of deaths of security forces/civilians/terrorists.
- The following trends have emerged in the Valley:
  - There seems to be a greater acceptance of violence in society.
  - There's a muting of civil society protests and voices, particularly after the killing of Shujaat Bukhari. There's a climate of fear.
  - There is complete absence of politics, particularly after the dismissal of the government. Even before that, there was hardly any political activity going on and the spaces getting filled by separatists and radicals. Now that the state government has got dismissed, elections in Anantnag have not been held.
- When did this all start? The indicators about the rise of violence



were there from 2013 onwards, much before the 2016 killing of Burhan Wani. The beheadings around September-October 2013 onwards, the spate of attacks across the International Boundary in Hiranagar, Janglot, Samba, Arnea, increase in local recruitment from 2014, crowds coming out and interfering with operations in 2014/15, etc. Burhan Wani's killing was just a trigger. But for him, there would've been some other trigger.

- There was also a fair amount of anger in people because of the lack of rehabilitation after the floods of 2014 and doubts about the political dispensation which the BJP-PDP combined had formed.
- What are the factors behind ethnically driven conflicts? A primary factor is the fear of the future. This does play out in Kashmir to a large extent. Violent protest to issues such as migrant colonies and Sainik colonies, Article 370 is a manifestation of that. There's a fear that their identities would get lost. The Hurriyat and other such people exploit this fear.
- The same is happening in Jammu where the people of Jammu are feeling left out and hence, there are debates over where institutions such as AIIMS, IITs, etc. should come up. This divide is growing because of the fear of the future.
- We need to change this climate of fear into a climate of hope. We should look at bringing people who answered "can't say" on the question of whether they identified as Indians, to the positive side.
- What is the narrative that we want to build in Kashmir? The dominant narrative is that the government is at war with a section of the people. They feel that the government does not care about their aspirations, the weapons which they use like the pellet guns are not used anywhere else in the country. We need to counter this narrative but just the opposite is happening because a section of the mainstream media just reinforces the narrative that Kashmiris are pro-Pakistan. Hence, instead of two narratives cancelling out each other, the narratives are actually reinforcing each other.

- The government needs to look at strengthening our strategic communication. This requires formalised policies and structures to be put in place. A narrative from Delhi probably won't find resonance in Kashmir. Even at the state level, the theme and narratives that you would like to propagate towards Jammu would be different from the one you would like to propagate in Kashmir. Within Kashmir, Uri and Shopian would require different handling.
- All sorts of extremist content need to be tackled, not just Islamic ones. The other right-wing hate content is also as much a recruiter.
- Hard-power and concrete action on the ground are required. SM is powerful, but we can't depend on it for everything.
- We don't have counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation programmes. Some very efforts have been made by the police, which is just not enough.
- Germany has a programme called NICHT for their Neo-Nazis. When the Neo-Nazis held a rally, the government distributed shirts with skull and bones and the word "hard-core" written on them. When the shirt was washed, the skull and bones and the message got washed away and a new message appeared which reads—"If your T-shirt can change, so can you." Small steps can be taken.
- Intra-state dialogue needs to get strengthened as the division between the three regions is only growing. Politics has further divided these regions.
- **Utility of force.** We have a large force in J&K, but what is its utility and how is it to be utilised? Force is required to be used, but we tend to equate success with the number of terrorists killed. We tend to not look at intangible parameters like alienation as a measure of success. By killing more local terrorists have we encouraged more local recruitment? By carrying out large cordon-and-search operations, are we adding to the alienation of the general population? Is the use of terms like "Op All-Out" ultimately counter-productive? What is the message that you're

conveying? We should start relooking at some of our practices, the measures that we take, and how we measure success.

- We should take a long-term view not subject to the effects of changing political dispensations.



**The Panel of Session II Taking Questions From the Audience**



## CLOSING REMARK



Closing Remarks by the Director, CLAWS

Lieutenant General Ahluwalia, Director CLAWS delivered the closing remarks as under:

- The Seminar was indeed an enriching experience with valuable insight from army officers, social/political scientists, journalists and the *Awaam* from J&K.
- When Lieutenant General SK Sinha took over as the Governor of J&K, he said he would base his governance on three pillars, his key result areas (KRAs)—controlling the violence, suggesting to first bring in a semblance of secure environment, development and governance, and more importantly, the psychological initiatives to revive Kashmiriyat and Sufi culture. In fact, he held an International Sufi Festival, with Junoon Sufi band orchestra from Pakistan, for well over seven days. He did not talk about SM in those days, which has become an important factor today. The takeaway from his experiences is that psychological initiatives and Kashmiriyat remain very important and relevant even today.
- The Director mentioned that, according to the Survey, the SM usage has gone up from 23 percent in 2010 to 76 percent in 2016.
- On the question of Kashmiri Pandits, it is good to see that more than 50 percent people in the Survey have said that they would like them to return.
- The Director reiterated that all the three regions, namely, Jammu, Ladakh, and the Valley are equally important. He, however, said that the aim of the Seminar was to give greater focus on Kashmir.
- Those who have joined militancy are from affluent families and are well-educated. Unemployment is a major factor in Kashmir, well over the national average.
- The family and religious teachers have a great role. Even in Afghanistan when the US could not find any solution and the Taliban were not accepting any negotiations, they have used clerics and religious teachers from Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, etc., to educate the maulvis and masses. This exercise has been going on for the over six months. We may like to keep such developments also in mind when dealing with extraordinary situations.

- Varying perceptions have been expressed regarding the “Centre of Gravity”. Some say the “idea of azadi” is the centre of gravity, others say it is the “psyche and culture”, some say it is “building relationships” and maximum have said that it is the *Awaam*. At the end of it all, the applications so suggested pertain to the *Awaam*, who have to be won over.
- There’s a need to bring in a climate of hope, especially for the youth. A man can live without food for seven days, without water for three days, but he cannot live without “Hope”. Those in the age group of 7-17 years, throwing stones and grenades, have to be engaged and brought to the right stream.
- Pakistan has always gone wrong in its planning and assumptions—whether it was Operation Gulmarg in 1947 or Operation Gibraltar in 1965. They continued to believe that there would be an uprising by the *Awaam* in the Valley. According to the survey on their concept of Azadi, the youth did not care about Pakistan. Only one percent wanted to accede to Pakistan.
- Radicalisation having gone down to the infants is an issue that needs to be taken note of seriously.
- Dialogue is important and more important is that it should work. The bane of our country is that we don’t implement things on the ground. Just talking won’t help.
- One disturbing thing in the result of the Survey is that the youth do not have trust in anyone; they don’t know whom to trust.
- There are multiple stakeholders in the conflict. It stood out clearly that people have great pride in being a Kashmiri, and that they have been significantly affected by the SM, particularly the youth. The youth trusts their families, friends, teachers, and religious teachers, in that order, which must be kept in mind in our future strategy.

