

National Seminar

PAKISTAN DEEP STATE: FOUNTAINHEAD OF TERROR AND CONFLICT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The seminar on *Pakistan Deep State: Fountainhead of Terror and Conflict* highlighted the role of the Military in the functioning of the state outside the Charter of the Military. The Seminar covered five themes that are as follows:

The Pakistan State: Multiple Power Centres and Policy Determinants

Pakistan political class has little say in foreign and security policy, vis-à-vis, India; it is determined by the Military (paras 1 to 5). Pakistan has fault lines which are used by the Military to their advantage. There are societal fault lines like Sunni-Shia, Mohajir, and non-Mohajir divide, the rich and poor divide, Punjabi and non-Punjabi divide, the feudal and labour classes, fundamentalist/moderate divide in Sunnis, etc. The Military uses these strategies for exploitation, rather than address them for elimination, and to enhance its political power and interference. Although the Military has established deep roots into businesses, however, currently they shifted their focus to media and real estate due to complexities in other economic sectors, and on the contrary the Army has reduced their focus on business ventures.

Talks between India and Pakistan need to have substance and clarity of agenda as the political class lacking the authority as one of the speakers suggested that it will be a good idea to involve the Pakistan Army in negotiations. Talks flounder because the Pakistan Army scuttles them by their rejection of policy agreed and terror actions (Para 8) to force India to discontinue dialogue.

Tracing Progress in Military Action on Terror Groups Inside Pakistan

Pakistan Military establishment have been undertaking selective and specific anti-terrorism operations (paras 10 to 16). These are not entirely cosmetic measures—they may have helped Pakistan to gain some diplomatic mileage. There is, however, no effort to curb hate

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speech, terrorist financing, registration of seminaries, dealing with banned organizations, and the use of social media.

Pakistan Army continues to use their ‘proxy war’ assets. Only their activities are carefully calibrated—disciplining some but not all Islamic militant groups. Despite some civil society introspection, no evidence so far, of effort to change narrative of convoluted concept of ‘jehadi’ Islam, which continues to hold minds and hearts of the conservative masses (this mindset has to be tackled before things can change). The ISI have adequate data about madrasas in the tribal agencies and their funding, but these data is not made public or cracked down. They are merely managed and controlled.

Assessment of the Role of Pakistan in Afghan War on Taliban in the Future

The Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan are deeply involved in creating instability in Afghanistan. Pakistan feels that it is strategically important to control Afghanistan and the best option is to keep fundamentalist like Taliban in power. Pakistan is still supporting Taliban inside Afghanistan (paras 13 to 19).

Pakistan is very sensitive about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. On the contrary, India says there is no encirclement of Pakistan. Given the scenario it is important for the countries like China, India, Russia, the United States, and Pakistan to work collectively to resolve the terrorism issues in Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Military: Deep State Agenda—Linkages Between the Conventional Strategy, Modernization, Nuclear Strategy and Methods to Negate the Strategy

Pakistan has successfully embedded the linkage of nuclear escalation and its proxy terror war (paras 20 to 25). This has been reinforced due to the fact that the Indian establishment has believed their nuclear brinkmanship. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is India centric and has developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) to counter the Cold Start Doctrine. Whether Pakistan has a TNW is a conjecture, some experts believe that they don’t have the technology for miniaturization but China might be helping them.

The Indian nuclear doctrine is to prevent nuclear weapons use against her. India qualifies it with no-first use with massive retaliation resulting in unacceptable damage; hence, Pakistan must understand that TNWs will invite massive retaliation. India must reinforce the credibility of its doctrine to prevent use of TNWs at any stage.

Pakistani Proxy War of Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir: Challenges and Solutions

Pakistan's Actions

Pakistan is resorting to information war which is an Achilles heel of the Indian Army. The balance for Deep State between Kashmir front, internal security of Pakistan, and Afghanistan has again shifted to Kashmir due to Burhan Wani's death (paras 26 and 27). Pakistan wishes to revive militancy, enhance alienation, use of non-military methods like financial conduits, drugs in Jammu and Kashmir, and radicalization. There are ISI modules in Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal for terror operations in the Indian border states. Pakistani policymakers know that parting with Kashmir will not happen without conflict with India.

Local Issues

In Kashmir, pro-secessionist groups have been infiltrated and their integrity is questioned by all sides. The police are now being targeted (Para 28). The Jamaat-e-Islami influence in education is substantial to be ignored. Ideologically, radicalized people have infiltrated public offices, judiciary, civil society, clerics, banks, etc. The network of instigators has financial security. There is a generational shift in protestors with no visible leaders without junking the label of Hurriyat entirely.

Solutions

Indian response will be different due to enhanced socio, political, military, economic, and diplomatic stature. The international community is more amenable to India on Kashmir issue. India

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vanquished militancy and thought that problem is now of the past but instigation, infiltration, and indoctrination is still going on.

The Government needs to give Kashmir two good winters of good public services and governance, and *azaadi* will be diluted (Para 32). The state government needs a PR strategy of *Gul, Gulshan, Gulfaam—Flower, Garden, Gardener* (paras 30 to 34) to resume and improve political communication with the polity.

The Government should be a facilitator of solutions (paras 35 and 36) and economic development. There needs to be a caution that India does not have a *carte blanche* to do whatever Kashmir.' The age of communication makes it necessary to be more transparent and accountable. India needs more people trained in Urdu, Islamic imagery, and Kashmiri language. India needs to regulate the internet use to counter radicalization. Solutions suggested can be classified as 'short-term' for normalcy to be resumed in 3-6 months; 'medium-term' for policies of governance and socio-economic policies, and skill building; and the 'long-term' for a 20-25 years project to reform education, affect a political solution, and execute a de-radicalization problem.

DETAIL REPORT

The seminar on *Pakistan Deep State: Fountainhead of Terror and Conflict* focussed on the core Military domain inside Pakistan and its multiple facets. The Seminar brought into rigorous discussion the form, policies, and implications of the Pakistani Deep State for India including Jammu and Kashmir.

Introduction

The politics and politicians of Pakistan failed themselves in the formative years and handed over the power to the Military. Democracy does not have strong roots in Pakistan. Political parties are dominated by specific families. There is a competitive populism in anti-India rhetoric. There is a powerful domination of Punjabis in Pakistani polity in all institutions perpetuated by elites in power. The Pakistan Army has been dictating the foreign policy, vis-à-vis, India. The Deep State consists of the Army and the ISI. Its taboo to talk about the Pakistan Army in the legislature. Civilian-military relations have been further damaged by the Panama papers expose' of the Sharif family and their money laundering abroad. The Army has created military courts outside the judicial system post-Peshawar incident.

There are societal fault lines in Pakistan like Sunni-Shia, Mohajir, non-Mohajir divide, the rich and poor divide, Punjabi and non-Punjabi divide, the feudal and labour classes, fundamentalist/moderate divide in Sunnis. The Deep State uses these for exploitation rather than management or redressal. Pakistan is a breeding ground for terrorism and the state has become a sponsor of terrorism. Breaking up of Pakistan will not happen because it has mastered the art of survival. It is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons which forces international community to sustain Pakistan in light of a global threat.

The political solution in Kashmir has remained difficult. Indo-Pak relations have followed a meandering curve. The lows outnumber the highs. There is a serious lack of trust and Pakistan has proved

time and again that it cannot be trusted due to broken promises in the form of Mumbai and Pathankot attacks and various summit declarations. Pakistan is a revisionist state.

Pakistan uses brinkmanship, proxy war, terror strikes despite economic problems. Break up of Pakistan is not in India's interest because it will lead to instability in the sub-continent, further spread of terrorism, spurt in communalism and lawlessness. Chaos in the Middle East and Europe shows the kind of turbulence India can feel should a break up happen.

The basic problem remains as to who to talk to in Pakistan—civilian, Deep State, or both? It is pertinent to continue people-to-people contact so that India makes a better impression on Pakistani public. The Track 2 is a constructive initiative and serves a useful purpose of coming up good ideas on both sides.

The Pakistan State: Multiple Power Centres and Policy Determinants

Pakistani politicians handed over power to the Military in the 1950s. Since then the Army has dominated the governance of the country. The corps commanders don't decide everything but the role of Army is much more pervasive. It's in the nature of a constituency. It has embedded interests in society and polity, and therefore has influence. The Army has to do much more heavy lifting inside Pakistan as compared to what it had to do 15-20 years ago due to internal change. The nature of Army's interest is changing. From corporate interests that they set up, they are coming to a realization that the economy is far too complex for direct intervention. They are now focusing on specific areas like the media and real estate. The Military has to have its say in media coverage inside Pakistan, and are setting up media institutions.

The relationships between different institutions inside Pakistan, indicates that there is a general decay as shown by socio-economic indicators. There was a public health crisis in terms of polio 2-3 years ago. One sign of decay is that hope has been externalized since the 1950s in terms of CENTO, SEATO but now it's towards CPEC

and relations with China. It is seen as transformative step inside Pakistan. There needs to be skepticism because foreign capital cannot transform any country or its economy. It depends on how one puts his own house in order. The United States has already transferred US\$ 25 billion and there has been no positive transformation during 2002–14. There is a long-term downward trend on the contrary.

Talks between India and Pakistan need to have substance and clarity of agenda, who to talk to and how to go about it. The dilemma is the authority with which meaningful talks can be conducted. The environment of entire South Asia will determine how to combat de-radicalization. There is a need for multi-pronged coherent strategy instead of ad-hoc strategy. Dismemberment of Pakistan is not in the strategic interests of India in terms of turmoil and domestic blowback. Till parallel power centres exist in Pakistan, it is pragmatic to involve the Pakistan Army in negotiations. This will invite their commitment and involvement. The approach needs to be principle based, in written form, and not personality based when it comes to dealing with Pakistan. India needs to keep evolving the understanding of Pakistan in light of social change.

Tracing Progress in Military Action on Terror Groups Inside Pakistan

For an Army that prides itself on the notion of imam, taqva and jihad, there have been some traumatic shocks that the Pakistani state and Army have experienced which have forced to make certain course corrections. General Kayani and General Raheel Sharif have said that the internal threat is far more than external threat, enemy no. 1 India

After many terrorist attacks, the Army has taken on the mantle to dispense justice. The twenty-first Amendment was passed in January 2015 with a 2-year sunset clause which was due to finish in December 2016. There were 11 military courts established—3 in Khyber Pakhtunwa, 3 in Punjab, 2 in Sindh, 1 in Balochistan; the courts have tried 105 accused, convicted terrorists in 81 cases, sentenced 77 persons to death, life sentences were awarded in 4 cases, 24 people were found not guilty. Out of the 81 convicted so

far, 77 have received death sentences. Of these, 43 belonged to the TTP, 6 were from Tauheed Wal Jihad, 7 from Sipah-e-Sahaba, 8 from al Qaeda, 4 from Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami (HuJI), 1 each were from Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), al Qaeda, and TTP-Swat; 7 affiliations were not made public.

The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and HM have not been touched, but there is some hope as Sufiyan Zafar, major funding source of the 26/11 Karachi-based funder and procurer, and Hammad Amin Sadiq were arrested, recently.

The deployment of Pakistan Rangers in Karachi has also given rise to issues impinging on Civil-Military relations. The curbing of MQM (A) has achieved limited success. 22 August saw major disturbances leading to a weakening Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) political hold in Sindh. The Rangers, on their part, have been breaking criminal mafias and extortion rackets but striking selectively at terror safe havens of TTP and Afghan Taliban.

After the Pathankot terror attack, the Counter Terrorism Department of the Punjab Police raided JeM seminary in Sialkot. JeM supporters (14) were arrested in Mundeke Goraya village; there were raids on the Jamia Masjid and Madrasa-al-Noor near Daska; 8 persons were arrested from Raza Abad, Faisalabad and shifted to an undisclosed location for questioning; Rana Sanaullah and Sartaj Aziz issued statements on apprehension of Masoud Azhar and his brother.

There is selectivity in Pakistani Army's policy between the 'good' and 'bad' terrorists. Pakistan Military establishment is undertaking selective and specific anti-terrorism operations. These steps have had a deterrent effect and have blunted the capacity of militant outfits and sectarian fanatics to hit at prominent security agencies. These measures are not entirely cosmetic and may have helped Pakistan to gain some diplomatic mileage. There is no effort to curb hate speech, terrorist financing, registration of seminaries, dealing with banned organizations, and the use of social media. An event like the bombing of Quetta hospital still happens, and is a reminder that terrorism refuses to fade away.

There is no doubt that the Pakistan Army has not yet decided to roll up its use of their tried and tested asymmetric ‘proxy war’ assets against India. Only their activities could be carefully calibrated—disciplining some but not all Islamic militant groups. Questions remain unanswered about the intent, timing, and scale of its actions.

Despite some civil society introspection, there is no evidence of an effort to change narrative of convoluted concept of ‘jehadi’ Islam, which continues to hold minds and hearts of the conservative masses. This mind set has to be tackled before things can change. Madrasa reform has remained slow as the main source of funding continues from Saudi Arabia. Funds to JuD by the Punjab Government and to Jul (S)—Sami ul Haq’s Akora Khattak Mosque and Funds to Nowshera by the PTI government in KP have continued. None of the Ulema allowed inquiring into their funding; ISI have adequate data about madrasas and their funding but these data is not made public or cracked down. They are merely managed and controlled for strategic objectives of the Deep State.

Assessment of the Role of Pakistan in Afghan War on Taliban in the Future

Why does Pakistan persist with policies of fostering militancy which haven’t worked for the last 20-25 years, vis-à-vis, India and Afghanistan? Pakistan accepted 5 million Afghan refugees during the peak of Soviet invasion and there is 3 million left which is a heavy burden on the Pakistani economy. Afghan elite have multiple interests in Pakistan, for e.g. children’s’ schools, real estate, health care, etc., and this continues to keep the situation extremely complex.

The Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan were deeply involved in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s second strategic interest is in avoiding Pashtunistan and keeping a friendly government in Afghanistan. Pan-Islamism was sought to overshadow the traditional tribal loyalties of Afghanistan which might have resulted in a new Pashtun Islamism. Durand line is a serious issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is very sensitive about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. On the contrary, India says there is no encirclement of Pakistan.

There is a change in Afghan strategy towards Pakistan. The relations have soured after Torkham. The Afghan government wants more security co-operation with its neighbours. Mahmood Ali Durrani, the former NSA said that 90 per cent of Afghans think their problems are created by Pakistan. Issues related to Afghanistan have to be resolved by China, India, Russia, the United States, and Pakistan. JuD affiliates, JeM have conducted attacks on Indian targets inside Afghanistan. There are also narco-trade routes in South Asia enjoying patronage by ISI. Resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan does not bode well for India.

There are people who take a broader view in Pakistan who believe that Pakistan's policies have not worked, and there have been huge reputational costs in the world. There is more sympathy for India in the international community for having a neighbour like Pakistan.

The Pakistan Military: Deep State Agenda—Linkages Between the Conventional Strategy, Modernization, and Nuclear Strategy of Pakistan and Methods to Negate the Strategy

Two statements were highlighted at the Session. The first one was by the former Prime Minister ZA Bhutto stated that, 'We'd rather eat grass, stay hungry but make the bomb.' The second statement was made by Zia-ul-Haq, the former President of Pakistan. He stated that, 'We will bleed India by a thousand cuts. This is an era of low intensity conflict, proxy war and limited war.' Three other statements that are discussed when it comes to negation of conventional war in contemporary times are as follows: 'War is not an option', 'The next war will be short, intense and fought on the backdrop of nuclear weapons', and 'It will be limited due to nuclear factor.' In 1977, Zia-ul-Haq started with a diabolical 'Zia plan'. The retribution for 1971 will be achieved by two things—Pakistan has to go nuclear to remove the asymmetry, and it can only be done sub-conventionally. Pakistan's nuclear policy is India centric. For Pakistan, a nuclear weapon is to deter a conventional war.

One of the panelists highlighted that in one of the Pakistani's papers it was stated that: The Indian intent is to create space for

a short swift intense war, keeping it below the perceived nuclear threshold. The tempo of war will be regulated to keep in mind the nuclear threshold of Pakistan.

That India has not reacted to 2001 and 2008, is cited as restraint due to nuclear weapons with Pakistan. Despite the lack of modernization and shortages, India is in a position to prosecute a conventional war and achieve the politico-military objectives as laid down due to good generalship, training, experience, and heritage of the Indian Army. At the point of decision, India has the capability to achieve a decisive victory even in the nuclear backdrop. In a short war, the duration of the war should be decided according to the time the military planners need to achieve the politico-military objectives in spite of the nuclear backdrop. Pakistan's nuclear blackmail is not the correct way of thinking.

What is the Pakistani nuclear threshold? Even during the Kargil war, there was talk that Pakistan wanted to go to nuclear. This sabre rattling should be left to SFC to deal with because of the simple reason that Pakistan is a sensible professional army. India has continuously said that the onus of escalating the conflict will rest with Pakistan.

To use a strategic nuclear weapon is devastating so Pakistan started talking about the TNW. Pakistan factored that such a TNW will be used on its own soil, the destruction caused would be limited, and the world opinion and decision dilemma for the Indian decision-makers to retaliate will afford them the window to stop the operations where they wanted them to stop.

For India, nuclear weapons help to prevent an aggressor from using nuclear weapons against her. India qualifies herself with no-first use with massive retaliation resulting in unacceptable damage, with political control. India does not differentiate between the yield of nuclear weapon and it is not meant for sabre rattling. Nowhere does it say that a nuclear weapon should be above a KT. Cold war definition was that TNW is a weapon which will have an effect on the tactical battlefield. Whether Pakistan has a TNW is conjecture. Some experts believe they don't have miniaturization. But the critical factor is Chinese role in all aspects of Pakistani nuclear programme in the

past, present, and future. China is helping Pakistan in conventional and nuclear field and China can afford it.

Pakistani Proxy War of Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir: Challenges and Solutions

Pakistan Strategy

Pakistan is resorting to information war which is an Achilles heel of the Indian Army. The balance for the Deep State of Pakistan between the Kashmir front, internal security of Pakistan, and Afghanistan has again shifted to Kashmir due to the trigger of Burhan Wani's death. In Kashmir, pro-secessionist groups have been infiltrated and their integrity is questioned on all sides. India has to focus on the alienated youth on her side. There needs to be rational, concerted, and sober thinking on this problem.

There have been four distinct phases in Kashmir. These are as follows:

1. During 1989-90, Kashmiris' felt independence is imminent.
2. During 1999-2002, the Pakistan SSG entered into the Valley and brazenly commanded the operations of the LeT and JeM with Fidayeen attacks. India strengthened systems, fenced the LoC, raised 27 more RR battalions, and defeated Pakistan.
3. In 2008, the street-intifada 1 and intifada 2 based on Geelani's reading of Gene Sharpe with a chapter providing 198 ways of non-violent revolutions. and
4. The year 2016 provides the present phase of generational shift.

Pakistan wishes to revive militancy, enhance alienation through use of non-military methods like financial conduits, drugs in Jammu and Kashmir, and radicalization. The essential aspects of Strategy are social media, print media, masjid, and Friday prayers. All these 26 years the Jammu and Kashmir police, intelligence, and SoG were not targeted but the separatists have finally gotten to it. India has to rebuild Jammu and Kashmir police. The Strategy now will be one of civil insurrections, mass protest, and demonstrations.

The Indian Response

Pakistan knows parting with Kashmir will not happen without conflict with India. The present strategy will continue to be proxy terror war.

From 2005 to 2013, violence levels fell but that wasn't the whole story. India vanquished militancy and thought that problem is now of the past but instigation, infiltration, and indoctrination was still going on. The Jamaat-e-Islami influence on education cannot be ignored. Ideological people have infiltrated public offices, judiciary, civil society, clerics, banks, etc. The network of instigators has financial security. There is a generational shift in protestors with no visible leaders without junking the label of Hurriyat entirely.

The 1995 elections don't mean restoration of democracy unless the political space at the grassroots level is created right down to panchayat. Money and goodwill needs to reach the grassroots. The excitement of 2011 was due to conduct of 34 meetings by the Army in parts of Kashmir where no one had ever entered.

The current Chief Minister needs to give Kashmir two good winters of good public services and governance and 'azaadi' will be diluted. This will cut the pillars on which the plank of azaadi stands. The state government needs a PR strategy of *Gul, Gulshan, Gulfaam Flower, Garden, Gardener* to resume and improve political communication with the polity. The Government should be a facilitator of economic development. Radicalization can only be beaten at a mental level. There needs to be a caution that India do not have a *carte blanche* to do whatever in Kashmir. The age of communication makes it necessary to be more transparent and accountable. India needs more people trained in Urdu, Islamic imagery, and Kashmiri language. India needs to regulate the internet use to counter radicalization. The Shopian and Pampore roads need to be controlled in south Kashmir. India has not lost Kashmir and its control, but it needs to rework by not underestimating separatists and their human resources, intelligence, and forms of communication.

Solutions suggested can be classified as 'short-term' such as opening schools, businesses, contact programmes for normalcy to be

resumed in 3-6 months; 'medium-term' for policies of governance, socio-economic policies, and skill building; and the 'long-term' for 20-25 years project to reform education, affect a political solution, and execute a de-radicalization problem.

The time frame for the challenge is 25 years because India has a 3-month policy cycle according to next state or general election. Pakistan wants to play the long game in Kashmir. India allows the gains of previous success to drift away. By some accounts there are qualitative and quantitative shift from 2013. The use of calendars is an important tool.

India needs to resist swinging between paranoia and hubris. Global and regional events have significant bearing on Kashmir. The militancy might become more intense due to the current generational shift. The Indian response will be different due to enhanced socio, political, military, economic, and diplomatic stature. The international community is more amenable to India on the Kashmir issue.

There needs to be more political clarity rather than political doublespeak. India needs to marginalize religious elements on all sides. Political solutions and negotiations have to satisfy Kashmiris and the rest of India. Economic development is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for political solution. The Indian Army does not have the capability to counter Pakistan's use of religion inside Kashmir. There is a need for multi-pronged coherent strategy instead of ad-hoc strategy. The legal position is that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. Even Jammu and Kashmir assembly has passed a resolution endorsing the same.