India's Grand Strategy for the 1971 War

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Emerging Crisis in Pakistan

1970 Elections and Aftermath

The crisis that erupted in Pakistan towards the end of 1970 was not a political or ideological one. Its roots lay in Pakistan's inability or unwillingness, or both, to substantially address the issue of its pronounced ethnic fault lines. Back then, the Bengali population, which comprised 60 percent of Pakistan, and had suffered as second-class citizens since Pakistan's inception, saw a rare opportunity in the 1970 elections., Sheikh Mujib's Awami League obtained a clear and convincing majority in these elections to stake his claims to premiership. But, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's obsessive ambition to become the undisputed Pakistani leader; if not, then, at least of West Pakistan, no matter at what cost, triggered Pakistan's severest crisis since its creation.

As TN Kaul avers, "The military leadership of Pakistan fell into Bhutto's trap and started an unprecedented campaign of atrocities, suppression of Bengalis, oppression of intellectuals and minorities with such ruthlessness and cruelty as had not been seen since Hitler's days".[1] This, indeed, was the second trigger for the commencement of the war of liberation in Bangladesh in which India got forcibly sucked in, the first unquestionably being the denial of democratic rights to the people of East Bengal following the 1970 elections. The incompetence of the administrative response to the devastating flood and cyclone disasters at the last stages of the election campaign served to further deepen alienation against the rule from Islamabad.

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An important development was Pakistan's mischief in the middle of its preoccupations relating to the election results. An Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship was hijacked to Lahore and destroyed by Pakistani agents and militants from Jammu and Kashmir on January 30, 1971. India played a strategic master stroke by suspending over-flights of all Pakistani aircraft, civil and military. This key decision was to impose severe constraints on the ability of Pakistan later, at the height of the crisis in October-November 1971, to build up its forces in East Bengal. Because ten months after the Indian ban on Pakistani over-flights, US Secretary of State Rogers in a meeting with President Nixon on November 24,1971, told him, "It is a 2,500 mile flight to resupply the troops in East Pakistan…the logistics, you know are impossible….my own judgment is that probably it will get worse".[2]

Impact of Refugee Influx

The gravest threat to India's security, stability and well-being arose from the massive and unending influx of millions of refugees driven out of their homes by the holocaust against them by the Pakistan Army from March 25, 1971, onwards. This security compulsion clearly necessitated formulation of an overarching strategy for a conflict that could ensue. The number of refugees swelled from a quarter of a million on April 21 to 1.48 million by May 6, mostly into the states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi justifiably described them as "victims of war who sought refuge from military terror across our frontier".

The threat perception arising from the refugee influx acquired grave proportions when the number progressively increased to reach 6 million in July to eventually peak at 9 million by November. Pakistan had successfully pushed out 8-10 percent of East Bengal's population into India. Articulating Pakistan's export of its internal security threat to India as constituting a grave national security challenge, Indira Gandhi in a speech on May 24 rightly commented, "What was claimed as an internal problem of Pakistan has also become an internal problem of India". There were unbearable pressures on the fledgling Indian infrastructure to assist the refugees. As PN Dhar, a key political aide to Indira Gandhi was to

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confess, "During her visit to the camps in May, she was so overwhelmed by the scale of human misery that she could hardly speak…she made up her mind on the Indian response to the crisis."

The presence and continued influx of refugees doubtless generated multi-dimensional security apprehensions. First, the Pakistan Army's hot pursuit of Bangladesh rebels created insecurities along and around the border. A large number of Pakistani intelligence agents, posing as refugees, had entered India and tried to cause communal strife and indulge in sabotage. By the end of August 1971, "at least four hundred trained Pakistani agents had been rounded up in Assam and Meghalaya". Second, the negative impact on socio-economic development, specifically of the relatively more poverty-stricken West-East Bengal border region was evident. Third, the concentration of refugees in a small area of West Bengal had the potential to generate tensions in a state where conditions were already unsettled. On the other hand, dispersal to other parts of the country would have only tempted Pakistan to push out even more Bengali people. Fourth, large numbers of refugees were concentrated on the border, and with continued inflow, especially of Hindu minorities, there were apprehensions of major communal violence in West Bengal and Assam, the states most affected. In hindsight, it is a tribute to the people of India that they demonstrated an innate commitment to the cherished core value of secularism throughout the refugee influx. But would it have been wise to bet on this scenario should the crisis have prolonged?[3]

India's Overarching Strategy

The Indian armed forces and intelligence services were watching the development of the constitutional crisis in Pakistan and the grave problem of refugee influx with close attention. But as a foreign chronicler stated, "Their advice to the Cabinet at the end of March'71 appears to have been that India was not ready for immediate intervention in East Bengal and that any military action to help the Bengalis would have to wait."[4] In that sense, the Pakistan Army's increasingly hardening stand on non-acceptance of the legitimate political demands of the Awami League and persistent crackdown were perhaps encouraged by its realisation in early summer that India was unlikely to react militarily.

Unsurprisingly, in her speech at Ranikhet as well as in Parliament in the first week of June, Indira Gandhi ominously warned that if the international community did not act early, India would be compelled to consider "other solutions to this problem". To be sure, international concern for the plight of the refugees led, in almost every country, including the US and Europe, to the build-up of sympathy of the general public, civil society and the media towards India and hostility towards Pakistan. The question is: how did India plug-in this sympathy factor into its grand strategy? As JN Dixit avers, "The Government of India decided on a two-track approach to resolve the East Bengal crisis. Firstly, to support the liberation struggle to exert pressure on the Pakistan Government to respect the electoral verdict of 1971. Secondly, mobilise international public opinion through bilateral contacts and the UN. While India successfully followed the first track, the second track was beset with several hurdles, particularly because of US support to the Pakistani regime."[5] Moreover, China's espousal of the Pakistani position, and equally significantly, the China-US collusion exacerbated India's concerns.

Indira Gandhi, during her six-nation tour in November, made it clear at various places that India only desired the early return of the refugees under conditions acceptable to them. She emphasised a settlement between the people of East Bengal and the Pakistan government. Even at that late stage, "she did not stipulate whether such a settlement could be within the framework of a 'United' Pakistan or outside it".[6] India's options to secure her national interests and strategy were, thus, fast running out. Fortuitously, the long monsoons provided time and space, just as public opinion in favour of effective action was building up.

Due to the gravity of the problems faced and the likelihood of their highly adverse consequences, opinion clearly veered towards a commitment to the creation of an independent Bangladesh. The die appeared to have been cast, but which strategy would bring about this outcome? The resolution in the Indian Parliament, resolutions in a number of state legislative assemblies, military and intelligence assistance to the Mukti Bahini, setting up of a provisional Bangladesh government, sanctuary given to a large number of members of the Pakistan National Assembly and support to a high number of diplomats, who had defected, constituted a few strands of the Indian strategy.

India was confronted by a binary choice: either support Pakistan to firmly put down the massive East Bengal rebellion against the West Pakistani military junta, which was out to crush it or support Bangladesh, in whichever way possible, to emerge as an independent nation. When it was evident by about May-June

that the government was unlikely to take military action, powerful pressures got generated for India to accord diplomatic recognition to Tajuddin's émigré' Bangladesh provisional government that was also pressing for recognition. But Indira Gandhi was firm: "Unless Bangladeshis established effective control in some areas and proved to the world through their own struggle that the people were with them, recognition by India would only create the impression that India was trying to divide Pakistan by setting up a puppet regime in Bangladesh", further adding "when the time comes, we will do it."[7] Here was one clear-headed move on the strategic chessboard.

There were sharp variations in the perceptions of the Indian elites. A strong lobby projected the thought in the media that the break-up of Pakistan was not in India's national interest. Another perspective was that actions to snatch away East Bengal from Pakistan would only strengthen the latter, by taking away "its economic and military liability." A powerful consideration "influencing Indian public opinion was the conviction that India must necessarily be on the side of a people struggling to be free."[8] In the first phase of the crisis, as stated earlier, it was perceived that national interest would be best served by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on Pakistan through the influence of international opinion. Propositions were also put forth on whether it would not be more prudent to absorb the pressure of refugees, obtain international aid for this purpose and reconcile to the domination of the West Pakistani military over East Bengal than to react militarily. This view is said to have got traction among some in the Union Cabinet itself, to be expectedly ruled out as an option by Indira Gandhi. But as K Subrahmanyam perceptively argued, "One must be clear when diplomacy of persuasion must end and diplomacy of threat of force and force itself should be considered".[9]

A close look at the Indian response from March 25 to December 3, 1971, reveals that diplomatic efforts and military preparations were undertaken simultaneously and in tandem. Having run out of all diplomatic options, Indira Gandhi and her key advisers assessed that India was faced with security compulsions when it would be unable to protect its national interests without resorting to a possible war. In the public domain, K Subrahmanyam convincingly projected the argument, subsequently to resonate in important world capitals, that it would be more economical to fight a war to solve the problem of Bangladesh than to feed millions of refugees indefinitely. This calculation was not based purely on economic considerations but took into account the political, social and international relations cost-benefits for India. He provided numerous instances

in contemporary history of threat of use of military force or its application by countries to safeguard their national interests.

Around early-October 1971, Yahya Khan stepped up his activities to increase the probability of war through war preparations. Troops were concentrated along the border and the civilian population along the western border towns and villages was evacuated. Yahya's famous declaration of November 25, 1971, "I may not be here in Rawalpindi during the next ten days, I may be fighting a war" need hardly be recalled to underscore Pakistan's strategy of bringing the crisis to a stage where the military option became a Hobson's choice for India. Significantly, the determination of the leadership to pursue the military option was made in the face of daunting odds: war would have a serious impact on India's economy and the likelihood of intervention by the United States or China would skew the cost-benefits against military retaliation. Nonetheless, Indira Gandhi took the courageous decision she believed would best serve India's strategy. The objective was to militarily liberate East Bengal to eventually create the geo-political space for an independent state of Bangladesh.

It is important to recall that there was no Indian intention to garner territory for permanent occupation either in East Bengal or West Pakistan. As TN Kaul later noted, "India has never gone to war against another country for the acquisition of that country's territory. India does not believe in acquiring territory through war and keeping it as a fruit of victory…India has always advocated peaceful solution of international problems and denounced the use of force or threat of force for their settlement. It was in this spirit and against this background that India's Prime Minister had declared before, during and after the 1971 war with Pakistan that India had no design on the territory of Pakistan or Bangladesh".[10]

External Strategy: Leveraging Great Powers

Engaging the Soviet Union

In the run-up to the Tashkent Agreement (1966) and after it, the Soviets befriended Pakistan and provided it military supplies right until 1971. From 1968 onwards, the Soviets adopted a position which would, in their view, provide them leverage with both India and Pakistan. Because countries friendly to it in the subcontinent, even when not allies, were important to check US designs that could point a dagger at its soft underbelly, India became a preferred choice due to its dominating position. In addition, a friendly India could help the USSR in checking Chinese designs against it. India also had become worried due to the

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threatening activities of Pakistan and China. Hence, to protect their mutual interests the Soviet Union and India began to move closer.[11]

A defining highpoint of India's grand strategy was taking the initiative of getting the Soviet promises plugged into the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 9, 1971, tentative variants of which had been under consideration for over a year. The treaty, described by some as the "most momentous decision in 24 years of independence", was acclaimed countrywide in view of the grave threat to the nation's security and the hostile attitude of the US, although contrarians also described it as "a second Tashkent imposed", and a "departure from non-alignment". The Americans perceived India's strategy as serving a counter to the Sino-US pincer against India, and to create a strategic stand-off between China and the US supporting Pakistan and the Soviet Union being on the side of India. This strategy unquestionably deterred the Chinese and the Americans from intervening militarily.

In the critical stages leading to the treaty, there was no typing of documents; only hand written letters and notes were exchanged. To allay last-minute Soviet misgivings, DP Dhar had to rush to Moscow for a secret meeting with Kosygin to provide insights on the gravity of the security challenges facing India and the Soviet Union in the subcontinent, and the critical need for the latter's obligations to be spelt out in "black and white."[12] The Soviet build up of force from 3-4 divisions to 44 divisions at the Sino-Soviet border on the Amur river also helped dissuade the Chinese from any intervention.

It is the credit of the Soviets that during the war they remained resolute in their support for India in the face of multiple American diplomatic pressures, threats of cross-sector retaliation and direct warnings. They had possibly assessed that the Americans were overplaying the limited cards they had, a perspective the Indian leadership shared. For, on December 10, 1971, Kissinger told Nixon that if the US pressure on China to put its forces on the Indian border worked, the danger of a corresponding move by the Soviet Union to support India would be real. Kissinger said, "I must warn you, Mr. President, if our bluff is

called, we'll be in trouble."[13] One key dimension on which the Soviets seemingly 'yielded' was to caution India against annexing West Pakistan or at least retake Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—an option that in any case was not a component of the Indian strategy.

Checkmating the United States

In the run-up to the Indo-Pak War, the Cold War dynamics tended to generate even stronger negative impulses in Indo-US relations. Given the US-Soviet enmity with China, both had a *modus vivendi* in South Asia to contract its influence in the region. This was reflected in the US support for Soviet mediation post-1965 War at Tashkent. But 1971 witnessed a discontinuous strategic change in that the US, under Nixon and Kissinger, opted to 'tilt' towards China in an attempt to curb Soviet ambitions in different parts of the world. The main concern of the White House was that the political turbulence within East Bengal should not result in a war that could threaten the balance of power. And during a period when Nixon's 'path-breaking' initiative towards China was being made, a regional war was perceived as jeopardising such a strategic leap of self-interest.

India also witnessed how during the height of the crisis, the Nixon Administration completely overlooked the reports and assessments of their consuls general in Dhaka and Kolkata, particularly the former, Archer K Blood. The State Department's South Asia specialists were also in Nixon's view pro-Indian. The Indian leadership exploited fully these divisions within the US establishment and was aware of US limitations to seek to influence India. In fact, William Rogers told Kissinger on November 24, "The leverage we have is very minimal…any action against them would be symbolic rather than substantial."[14]

As the first set of politico-military options for a coordinated interventionist approach, Kissinger's idea of backing up the warnings with a show of force was moving a carrier force into the Bay of Bengal, the other arrow in the quiver being pressure on the Chinese to move troops to the border, with the Soviets, in Nixon's words, "being told to get the hell out of West Pakistan."With the Chinese not walking the talk on their moving troops until the end, that caused utmost frustration to Nixon and Kissinger, the Indian leadership was hardly deterred by the attempted US coercion. As PN Dhar, then secretary to the prime minister noted, "Indira Gandhi and her advisers were convinced it was a symbolic gesture meant for consumption by Pakistan, China and the Muslim states of the Middle East. In any case, Dhaka was expected to fall before the fleet could do anything about it."[15] The American decision to send

a nuclear aircraft carrier task force to the Bay of Bengal did, however, have an impact on Indian policy-makers. It led to an acceleration of the Indian nuclear programme and eventually to the testing of a nuclear device two and a half years later, in May 1974.[16]

Holding the Chinese

The first official response to the Pakistani military oppression in East Bengal was Chou En-Lai's bombastic letter to Yahya of April 13, "Should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will fully support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence."[17] This was of a piece with similar propagandist statements made by the Chinese leadership during the Indo-Pak War of 1965. But in 1971, the flow of Chinese military and economic assistance to Pakistan continued after their April statement.

Was there a fear of the possibility of Chinese intervention and an assessment of the effect of the same on India's national interests? The Indian strategy was perhaps shaped by three aspects. First, the mistaken belief of the Pakistani leadership that they would win the war in East Bengal with Chinese help, "which Bhutto claimed had been promised when he had visited that country in early November."[18] On July 28, at his meeting with Nixon and Kissinger, US Ambassador in Pakistan, Joseph Farland, also "anticipated that conflict between India and Pakistan would draw in China as well."[19] In actual fact, unknown to the US and Pakistan, the Chinese position appeared to have shifted from that in April to the Bhutto visit in November, when the promise turned to providing "resolute support". Because, in the Chinese assessment, the determination of the East Bengalis to cast off the West Pakistani yoke and that of the Indian leadership to find a permanent solution to the refugee influx, made an independent Bangladesh inevitable. The question of 'resolute support' (read military intervention) would only have arisen if the very existence of Pakistan—in the West—was at stake.

The second aspect was India's extremely friendly relations with the Himalayan Kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, of which the last had not acceded to India then. This meant a strategic buffer was in place should China have opened a military front to deflect Indian military pressure against Pakistan. The third dimension was a purely military consideration: weather-terrain-closure of the Himalayan passes precluding any Chinese effective military actions. Interestingly, such was the ignorance of the terrain factor in American thinking that when Kissinger alluded to it in his meeting with Nixon on December 6, the

latter rejoined "that it had not prevented the Chinese army from crossing the Yalu River in the dead of winter during the Korean War."[20]

The Indian government's Inter-departmental Group, assessing Chinese intentions, seems to have also drawn the aforementioned conclusions, based on "little or no increased military along the northern borders and a less negative public stance toward India than during the 1965 War."[21] The Indian strategy was rightly anchored in the assessment that the Chinese support to Pakistan, even in its challenging moments, would be confined to verbal and moral encouragement. This was quite unlike Nixon and Kissinger, who reached the opposite conclusion. They incorrectly expected the Chinese to intervene militarily, based on a misinterpretation of Chinese perspectives and communications, and their pronounced anti-India obsession.

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Military Campaign

India's grand strategy for management of the serious Pakistan-created crisis in 1971 and the war that followed depended critically on an early and successful conclusion of the military campaign. Here was that rare moment in India's history when it took the military initiative and achieved success. The credit is due, most of all, to Indira Gandhi, a master strategist and resolute leader, who reposed utmost faith in the armed forces leadership and gave them a free hand to deal with the military situation as it developed. Unambiguous political goal setting for the armed forces, high quality of joint planning—at the strategic, operational and tactical levels—and excellent tri-Service coordination were the hallmarks of the military campaign.

The lightning tri-Service campaign, in which the Bangladeshi liberation force Mukti Bahini made a pivotal contribution, has been considered the fastest land forces advance since the North Africa campaign in World War II. The focus remained on fighting a defensive war in the West while simultaneously seeking a successful end-game in the East through a creative and innovative offensive strategy. An early clincher was the Indian Air Force achieving air dominance through mastery of the skies over East Pakistan in just two days. This effectively

created the much-desired operational space for the five-division strong land force to advance from three directions, bypassing Pakistani fortifications, heading for ferries, crossings and bridges in the rear to secure choke points, unhindered by the Pakistan Air Force.

In the East, innovative and creative armed forces actions in different sectors contributed to the overall military triumph. Air dominance ensured enforcement of a naval blockade and a successful amphibious assault at Cox's Bazaar. Para-dropping the battalion-group at Tangail effectively altered the military arithmetic on the ground. In an incredible feat, 12 small Mi4 helicopters of the air force ferried a brigade-strong force across the 2-km-wide Meghna river inflicting 'shock and awe' on the Pakistani defenders. Sylhet was captured through a heliborne operation. The resolute local support of the Mukti Bahini was invaluable. A highly-accurate rocket attack on the Governor's House in Dhaka compelled him to resign and hasten the surrender of the 93,000-strong garrison at Dhaka.

With all energies focussed on the Eastern front, both sides played a waiting game in the West. Indian successes in Punjab, Shakargarh, Akhnoor and the thrust toward Naya Chor were substantial even as there were territorial losses at Chhamb and Fazilka. The missile boat attack on Karachi harbour was a bold master-stroke as was the IAF's role in blunting the Pakistani armour offensive at Longewala. Key outposts in the Kargil sector and large areas in Partapur and Turtuk were also captured and retained. Decades after the war, the view that India did not drive a hard bargain at Shimla to compel Pakistan to at least agree to the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue is perhaps justifiable. Perhaps a more objective and rigorous analysis of the narratives at Shimla may bring out the strategic factors that underpinned the outcome.

National Crisis Management and Decision-Making

For the political leadership, the strategic challenge of safeguarding India's vital national interests during a security crisis of serious proportions—with no international help, barring the Soviet Union—was an enormous one. It is to the credit of Indira Gandhi that she so effectively led her country in the crisis with statesmanship, sagacity and resolute determination. It was said of her that "she is at her best in a crisis. In normal times, she is apt to be hesitant and indecisive, vacillating and wavering. In a crisis, she seems suddenly to take courage, and strike at the right moment and place."[22]

Articulating the decision-making trend lines of that period, PN Haksar, principal secretary to the prime minister, wrote, "It was in the year 1971 to 1973

that we once again became possessed of a promise of restoration of national will for a brief period. The periods of successfully coping with the problems of foreign (security) policy in the Nehru period and in the period of Mrs Indira Gandhi's prime ministership, are, thus, relatable to one dominating factor, namely the existence of a widespread belief in national purpose, national will and credibility."[23]

It was the unparalleled synergy among the political, military and diplomatic dimensions of national crisis management and decision-making that enabled India to take the initiative for a military campaign, in centuries of its history, to achieve the desired politico-strategic outcome.

Clearly, during the 1971 crisis, there was a deep consciousness of national interests and objectives, and the ability and commitment to choose long-term interests over narrow short-term parochial considerations. Unquestionably, Indira Gandhi demonstrated the single-minded courage and disposition to see the military option decision through. Having tested the diplomatic waters and evaluated public opinion, the key political trio, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, are said to have weighed the likely consequences of different and complex courses of action and adopted a strategy which not only minimised the adverse impact of the East Bengal crisis on India's national interests, but leveraged that challenge to militarily split Pakistan and create an independent Bangladesh.

The prime minister was ably assisted by the three Service Chiefs, Gen 'Sam' Manekshaw, Air Chief Mshl Pratap Lal and Adm SM Nanda, Defence Secretary KB Lall, Foreign Secretary TN Kaul, External Intelligence Chief RN Kao, Director Intelligence Bureau RN Banerjee and, the most important of all, Chairman Policy Planning Committee DP Dhar and Principal Secretary PN Haksar. DP Dhar was doubtless the strategic mastermind, ably assisted by PN Haksar. Both were trusted confidants of the prime minister who helped her transform a crisis into a strategic leap.

Reviewing the national crisis management and adoption of a strategy for it with the benefit of a four-decade-long hindsight, some aspects stand out. First, a courageous political leadership that was willing to take risks to safeguard long-term national interests in the face of highly daunting odds. Second, build-up of

a national consensus to the extent pragmatism dictated. Third, orchestration of a diplomatic campaign to seek legitimacy for a war considered inevitable. And lastly, provision of the fullest support and freedom to the armed forces to plan the timing, military objectives, as also the actual conduct of operations. It was the unparalleled synergy among the political, military and diplomatic dimensions of the national crisis management and decision-making that enabled India to take the initiative for a military campaign, in centuries of its history, to achieve the desired politico-strategic outcome in that war.

Notes

1. TN Kaul, *Diplomacy in Peace and War: Recollections and Reflections* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p.179.
2. US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976,* South Asia Crisis, Vol. 11, 1971.
3. Writing for a syndicated column published in various newspapers, K Subrahmanyam analytically put forth the strategic implications of developments arising from the refugee influx; also see, *Bangladesh and India's Security* (Dehradun: Palit and Dutt Publishers, 1972), p. 99.
4. Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), p. 37.
5. JN Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Sangam Books Ltd, 1998), p. 105.
6. *History of Indo-Pak War 1971, Part II* (History Division of the Ministry of Defence, New Delhi,1992), p. 275.
7. For more details, see Kaul, n. 1, p. 181.
8. For more details, see Jackson, n. 4, p 37.
9. For more details, see Subrahmanyam, n. 3, p. 72.
10. TN Kaul, *Ambassadors Need Not Lie: Some Aspects of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Lancers International, 1988), p. 107.
11. For more details see, n. 6, p. 268.
12. Notes on discussions between Chairman AN Kosygin and Prime Minister AA Gromyko with DP Dhar, special representative of India's prime minister, at Moscow on August 5, 1971; PN Haksar Papers, (Top Secret, Declassified), Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.
13. For more details see, n. 2, Document 266, (Declassified).
14. Ibid., Document 199, (Declassified).
15. PN Dhar, *Indira Gandhi: The Emergency and Indian Democracy* (New Delhi: Oxford

University Press, 2000), p. 183.

16. Ibid., p. 184.
17. For more details, see Jackson, n. 4, p. 42.
18. For more details, see Dhar, n. 15, p. 179.
19. For more details, see n. 2, Document 109, (Declassified).
20. Ibid., Document 239, (Declassified).
21. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991* (US: National Defence University Press, 1993), p. 303.
22. For more details, see Kaul, n. 1, p. 172.
23. PN Haksar, *India's Foreign Policy and its Problems* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1989), p. 158.