Creating a Successful Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Matrix:
Lessons from 26/11

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Room 1W01 was a window-less room, four stories underground in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) new Headquarters building. Designated as "Alec Station", it was a sub-division of the CIA's counter-terrorism efforts to "find, track, capture or kill Osama Bin Laden".[1]

By late December 1999, the National Security Agency (NSA) had picked up intercepts that indicated that Al Qaeda was meeting in Malaysia and involved 11 people who were planning a possible attack on the United States of America.[2] The report pointing out that one of the terrorists had a multi-entry visa to enter the US landed up on the desk of Doug Miller, one of the three Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials who were on loan to Alec Station. Ideally, Miller's report should have travelled to his parent cadre, the FBI, but it didn't. The FBI was in a position to ensure that an alert was issued to all immigration authorities. They could have also issued a country-wide alert to all concerned agencies that could track the movements of any possible terrorist threat emerging within the country, and connected to the information already available to Alec Station.

But the report never went to the FBI. It stayed within Alec Station and was soon forgotten in the mass of data that would stream into the station on

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an hourly basis. On hindsight, as the 9/11 Commission began to delve into the details of the intelligence available to the various security agencies before 9/11, they discovered that enough had been available to prevent the attack. But key procedural failures prevented key officials from connecting the proverbial dots. As the airplanes crashed into the World Trade Centre on 9/11, the face of terrorism and its potency changed forever.

Seminal moments in the history of the intelligence community are few and far between. Failures, when they occur, are usually spectacular. If the American intelligence community and its associated security agencies failed to connect the dots, a similar occurrence in India has occurred at least twice in the last decade or so. In 1999, the war in Kargil has been accepted as a "systemic failure" of an occurrence that could have been prevented. Similarly, the attack on Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) terrorists on November 26, 2008 (26/11) was another occurrence that needs a great deal of attention to learn key lessons in the continuous process of shaping an effective counter-terrorist and security architecture in India.

Reforms in India's Intelligence Structure

It is important to note that in India, three major exercises have been undertaken to bring about significant restructuring in India's intelligence community. The first was the L P Singh Committee, after the Emergency in 1977 to look into the affairs of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI).[3] The second exercise took place in 1998 which introduced the concept of the National Security Council (NSC), armed with a full-fledged Secretariat[4], and merged it with the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC, as envisaged by the committee, would now look at various inputs from across a cross-section of security agencies and produce actionable reports and assessments.

In the aftermath of the Kargil War, following the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, a Group of Ministers (GoM) looked into the specific recommendations of four task forces. A special task force on intelligence under former Secretary-R, Girish Saxena went through possible reforms of India's intelligence structure. Their report pointed out several major flaws:

- Glaring absence of a body at the highest level that could provide direction to the agencies on what intelligence they have to gather and evaluate their work;

- Complete lack of coordination, cooperation and sharing of intelligence between different agencies;
- Pervasive unhappiness among those whom the agencies serve. The recipients of intelligence information also do not tell their requirements to the agencies;
- Ability to gather intelligence from people has degraded;
- Absence of a process that would ensure the agencies are working in the interest of the nation, but doesn't make any specific proposal in this regard;
- It urged a proper process to brief the political leadership;
- It suggested streamlining and rationalising the sharing of built-up assets for cutting down costs;
- Advised ironing out of glitches in sharing technical intelligence outputs;
- Provided the texts of formal charters for the Research and Intelligence Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the newly set-up Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The charters, a token genuflection to accountability, attempt to strike a balance between the role of the organisation and the operational latitude necessary for their activities;
- Frowned upon the lack of any quality control at the entry level in the profession; it recommended a better working environment and a policy of rewarding the deserving; and
- Wanted RAW's Science and Technology (S&T) division to be strengthened, both in terms of technology and manpower.[5]

To address some of these flaws, several structures were set up by the government in keeping with the recommendations of the GoM. The GoM, set up after the Kargil War did make an effort to institutionalise this process. They set up a Strategic Policy Group (SPG), an Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG), a Technical Coordination Group (TCG), a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and a Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) to ensure that information could be sought and shared by the consumers and the producers of intelligence.[6] These structures were meant to operate at the highest levels of government and institutionalise the interaction between the intelligence producers and consumers and enable the government to periodically review the efficacy of these arrangements. However, their functioning and efficacy has left major room for improvement.[7]

But, it is important to note the institutional changes and additions that have taken place since 1998. Changes began with the setting up of the National

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Security Council (NSC) at the end of 1998. It had been formed out of a study group, set up under the chairmanship of the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, K C Pant, and had Jaswant Singh and Air Commodore Jasjit Singh as two of its members. The idea of the NSC had been brought up for the first time during the V P Singh government.[8] Unlike the US, from which the NSC's idea had been borrowed, a new system had to be adapted to a Parliamentary system of democracy. The prime minister, unlike the president of the US, is only first among equals, where he is responsible to the Cabinet and the Parliament. Therefore, it is important to note that the system would be subject to political considerations.[9]

The NSC was created primarily to deal with the "dissatisfaction" with the JIC.[10] While the existing mechanisms were only "geared for crisis management" the new system was to focus on a more holistic approach to national security and concentrate on preemption.[11] The NSC would now be at the apex level, having been merged with the JIC, and would have the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The NSC would be chaired by the prime minister and would have the home, defence, external affairs and finance ministers and the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission as its members,[12] [the deputy chairman was later excluded from the NSC by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government].

Interestingly, the appointment of the NSA was mandated by a Cabinet Secretariat resolution that the NSA would "function as a channel for servicing the National Security Council". Meanwhile, the NSCS was created by a resolution of April 16, 1999, to "prepare (or cause to be prepared) papers for consideration of the NSC and the SPG".[13] The NSCS was also tasked to perform the all-important role of coordinating between the consumers and producers of intelligence. An effective system of grading the intelligence generated was also prepared to ensure that the consumers and the producers of intelligence had a viable dialogue.[14]

By 2003, the IB had also been asked to set-up a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and a Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI). The MAC

was created for "intelligence sharing and formulated response", while the JTFI would "synergise the state intelligence branches and bring about operational convergence between them and the central agencies."[15] However, a major flaw in this system was that none of the major nodal agencies received any feedback down the line.[16] While the structures were in place, none of the officers, even up to the joint secretary/joint director levels, was ever in the loop. As a result, the agencies and their key officials continued to work in isolation and failed to achieve any significant symbiosis of intelligence and analysis.

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Ironically, while India was taking notes from the US intelligence community between 1998 and 2000, they were also going through the throes of change. The failure to predict or detect the May 1998 nuclear tests by India led to a lot of soul searching within the US intelligence community. But, post-9/11 saw the biggest rethink in the history of the US intelligence community after the findings of the investigations and reforms conducted in the wake of the Senator Church and Senator Pike Committee.[17] The US began to refine its intelligence community by creating a separate department for homeland security. Specifically, it also created the office of the director of national intelligence to play a role that was traditionally reserved for the director, CIA.[18]

Post-26/11 Attack Analysis

The absence of a commission of inquiry or a special task force to look at the 26/11 attack on Mumbai has led to a serious deficit in creating an institutional memory of such episodes. Inquiries, brought into the public domain, help create a record that helps future generations to improve their response to similar events. It is now clear that there were several lapses. While there was a plethora of information from various security and intelligence agencies, the inability to connect the dots proved to be a fatal flaw.[19] (See Fig. 1)

Fig. 1



By mid-September 2008, several indications were available to the Indian intelligence community of an impending 'attack'. While the contours of the attack were not clear, there was definite intelligence that it was coming. Several warnings from the CIA, based on intercepts that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan had picked up during routine sweeps in and around Jalalabad, were passed on to India's security agencies. By September 24, Indian security agencies were aware of at least three major issues:

- An LeT module was being trained in a camp around Karachi for launching attacks from the sea for at least three months;
- Yahya @ Muzammil, of the LeT was in contact with an LeT operative stationed in Bangladesh who was being asked to procure international SIM cards for an operation that had been planned;
- Information was also available that the team had been trained by Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, also known as *Chacha*. He was considered to be the chief military commander and the chief of operations of the LeT and had designed and conducted several training modules for the impending attack;

In addition, by November 13, more indications came in that the Taj and Trident Hotels in Mumbai would be the main targets of such an attack. On November 18,

2008, India's external intelligence community sent a specific input to the coast guard and the Indian Naval Headquarters stating that "an LeT ship/boat" had taken off from Karachi and would be headed towards the Indian coast. The coast guard, which has been designated as the "leading intelligence agency" by the GoM, set up after the Kargil War, immediately began a series of actions to detect and neutralise the LeT ship/boat[20].

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The first intelligence inputs were received in mid-September by the liaison branch of RAW. This input was not passed on to the analysis branch of the agency and was instead shared directly with other agencies without due processing or embellishment.[21] Had this intelligence been analysed and processed by the production branch of the agency, perhaps greater focus and emphasis could have been added to the advisory that was sent out.[22] This flawed procedure was repeated when the second input arrived on November 13. Even then, there was a systemic failure to process the information by the concerned branch. Once again, a raw input, without context and analysis, was immediately rushed to the other agencies. Perhaps, this was the key reason why the input did not get the attention that it deserved.

A key figure to emerge after the 26/11 attack by the LeT terrorists on Mumbai was an American of Pakistani origin, David Coleman Headley, aka Dawood Gilani. Headley visited India on at least seven occasions and conducted detailed reconnaissance for the LeT, which enabled them to plan a meticulous attack on Mumbai. In fact, the interrogation report of David Coleman Headley, prepared by India's National Investigation Agency (NIA), throws up several interesting details. Some of them are being examined in this paper's context of an episodic inquiry into India's intelligence and counter-terrorism capabilities.

Headley is a member of the LeT who spoke at length to India's NIA officials in Chicago. His interrogation report also reveals several areas which, on hindsight, could have helped India's vast security architecture to crack the impending 26/11 Mumbai attack.[23] Headley's interrogation report clearly indicated at least seven trips to India for reconnaissance purposes. While there was a clear history of several simultaneous trips to Pakistan, this failed to attract the attention of the security agencies.

Headley also gave the Indian security agencies a tremendous insight into the planning of the 26/11 attack and the key leaders of the LeT (See Fig. 2). There is also

a wealth of intelligence available on how Headley managed to successfully get visas for seven visits to India despite having travelled to Pakistan. Perhaps, these repeated visa requests could have been used to do a due diligence on Headley by the Indian authorities. They could have also chanced upon a key fact that Headley had changed his name and was the son of a prominent Pakistani politician. From here on, joining the dots for the Indian security agencies could have been relatively easier.

Fig 2



A Post-Reform Assessment

How much has India's intelligence structure improved following these reforms? While there is an absence of any open source data to quantify the progress as envisaged by the various committees, a set of episodic reviews can help us arrive at some key pointers. We shall use the 26/11 attack on Mumbai by the LeT terrorists in November 2008 to make an empirical assessment of the impact of the intelligence reforms as mentioned earlier.

From the available data, on the intelligence available regarding the 26/11 attack on Mumbai, we can raise several relevant issues:

- When the first intelligence reports came in September and November 2008, did the relevant agencies discuss the possible scenarios of such an attack? Key elements of such a scenario-building exercise could have looked at:
  - The possibility of such an attack and its scale.

- The response of the Indian security agencies to such an attack.
- The key elements that need to be in place to respond to such an attack.

- Was a special task force set up with key officials drawn from all relevant agencies to monitor any fresh development and/or develop the intelligence inputs of such an impending attack on a real-time basis?
- Were the agencies identified to deal with such exigencies—the Indian Army's Special Forces units, the National Security Guards (NSG), the Marine Commando Force (MARCOS) of the Indian Navy or the Special Group under SFF/Cabinet Secretariat—informed of these inputs and asked to prepare detailed response scenarios?[24]
  - The NSG is the premier counter-terrorist agency to respond to national exigencies such as the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. It is also a repository of counter-terrorism expertise, having studied and participated in a host of events since its creation. Had the NSG been roped in as a part of the special task force created, it could have either given key inputs of its own or sought relevant information to respond to such an attack.
  - The NSG could have also used data on the intended targets such as building plans, etc and used the relevant material to build up several response scenarios. Such an exercise could involve building up transport details, troop build-ups, stock-taking of available equipment, and improve on the response time.
  - It could have created greater inter-operability between the NSG and all other security agencies as well as relevant civilian agencies such as the Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation, the Mumbai Fire Brigade and other relevant civil authorities.

Intelligence for a New World

With new challenges come new opportunities. Intelligence structures across the world are going through a process of tremendous reform brought in by various factors. In fact, many countries are now getting into areas that were considered sacrosanct to the intelligence community. For instance, the Obama Administration in the US is now looking at aligning the covert activities of their intelligence community with their overt policies.[25] In fact, in their recently published National Military Strategy, released by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US has pointed out that they will be looking at improving their human intelligence capabilities. "To do so, we must change our mindset from simply increasing the density of Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities *to*

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evaluating our methodologies and increasing ISR assets." They also state that "Joint Force processes must efficiently employ and allocate all ISR assets from across the services and strengthen the linkage between ISR and cyber space operations where they leverage each other or operate in the same space."[26] It is time for policy-makers in India also to build more cohesive bridges with the intelligence community and move away from the episodic interactions that dominate the current security architecture landscape. The argument that "…all too often, intelligence professionals never interact with policy-makers (and vice-versa) until some crisis thrusts them together in an unsteady and uncertain discourse"[27] holds true for India.

This thesis is also true for intra-relations within the security architecture. While attempts are being made to ensure greater connectivity, the systemic fault-lines continue to exist. Information needs to be shared by the security agencies on a real-time basis and must be done so in a horizontal manner rather than vertical. The "top-down" or the "bottom-up" approach can prove to be a major impediment in sharing, processing, analysing and acting upon intelligence in any form.

Intelligence, by its very nature, is "primarily detected at anticipating happenings".[28] Vice President Hamid Ansari has pointed out that "intelligence is often inconclusive because the methods of acquisition are at times surreptitious. On the other hand, the probabilities of reality that can be established by intelligence information are necessary and sufficient to enable national decision-makers to make reasonable judgments about courses of action. While intelligence information is at times incomplete, good intelligence often has made the difference between victory and defeat, life and death. By the same token, faulty intelligence leads to failures of varying degrees. Over time, reasons for failure are analysed and classified. These range from overestimation to underestimation, lack of communication, unavailability of information, received opinion, mirror-imaging, overconfidence, complacency, failure to connect dots and subordination of intelligence to policy."

The Indian intelligence community is also a victim of "groupthink"[29] that adversely affects our analytical capabilities. This is a phenomenon that is

prevalent in most intelligence communities across the world. In fact, an ethnographic study of the US intelligence community by Rob Johnston for the CIA, points out that "groupthink might contribute to confirmatory behaviour in intelligence analysis." Johnston's analysis suggested that groupthink ushers in a "corporate judgement" that is a "pervasive and often unstated norm in the intelligence community" and it prevents any fresh or alternate thinking or analysis.[30] A task force on intelligence reforms set up by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) regarding "decision points" has been earmarked by:[31]

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- Whether line departments having security-related functions – Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), etc – should have their own intelligence wings or appoint intelligence liaison officers?
- Whether analysis and operations should be completely separated or a joint analysis centre (based on the UK model) be established?
- Whether strategic military intelligence should be taken out of the charter of external intelligence and handed over to the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)?

Perhaps, it is also time to work on the constitutional efficacy and role of the India's intelligence community to begin with[32]. Once that is done, the intelligence agencies can be empowered through an Act of Parliament with a charter that works and strengthens the security of a vibrant democracy such as ours.

But, it must be noted that India lives in a tough neighbourhood, surrounded by failed totalitarian states. These throw up several new challenges on a daily basis and require considerable synergy between the various security agencies. For instance, India's policies, doctrines and tasking for special forces continues to lag behind considerably, especially when viewed from the prism of the rapid developments

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made by the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) *kuaisu* forces and Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG).[33] Clearly, "synergy" is the key word for a successful intelligence and counter-terrorism matrix in India.

Recommendations

From Kargil 1999 to Mumbai 26/11 has been a long journey for the Indian intelligence community. The internal, external and economic security challenges have become far more complex and difficult and have outpaced the available resources. A few recommendations are as follows:

- **Legislate Specific Acts of Parliament for our Intelligence Agencies:** Serial No. 8 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution states that a Central Intelligence Bureau shall be created by an Act of Parliament. An Act of Parliament will help give both agencies a constitutional identity and mandate.[34]
- **Create a Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Board:** A Parliamentary Oversight Board to be chosen by the prime minister on the lines of a similar Intelligence and Security Committee of the British Parliament.
- **Codify the Role of the National Security Advisor and the National Security Council (NSC), Special Protection Group (SPG), Indian Coast Guard (ICG), TCG, JTFI and MAC:** This will help strengthen and empower the current role played by the NSC in relation to the intelligence community.
- **Institutionalise Information/ Intelligence Sharing Mechanisms:** Information sharing needs to be codified through legal statutes to ensure clear demarcation of responsibilities and aid their smooth functioning. There is a need for better mechanisms for intelligence officials to sustain a dialogue at various levels for a seamless sharing and simultaneous analysis of information and inputs.
- **Create Scenario Building Mechanisms Along with Security Agencies:** Expertise must be made seamless and accessible. Such mechanisms help in bringing sharper focus to intelligence inputs and create a realistic and viable

dialogue between the consumer and the producer of intelligence

- **Emphasis on Intelligence Analysis:** Intelligence analysis is *not* a tradecraft but *part of* a greater scientific process. By grading and spreading the intelligence inputs, more minds and talent get to work and improve an intelligence input. Johnston has noted that "the idea that intelligence analysis is a collection of scientific methods encounters some resistance in the intelligence community."[35]
- **Police Modernisation and Reforms:** The intelligence community cannot evolve in isolation. India's security architecture crumbles due to the lack of police reforms and modernisation. The proposal to set up NATGRID and CCTNS might help but these structures need to be thought through.
- **Better Personnel Management:** Critical to intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination is better personnel recruitment and career management. Incentives need to be built-up into the system.
- **Resurrect the National Information Board (NIB):** Information as an entity and its strategic and tactical applications are neither understood nor deployed. The GoM had recommended the establishment of an NIB to look into these aspects and implement policies.
- **Efficacy must Override Secrecy:** Intelligence communities must establish a perfect balance between secrecy and openness to ensure "greater access to information and sources that may be necessary for accurate or predictive analysis."[36] Greater openness leads to better time-management, analysis, dissemination and efficacy.
- **Creation of Institutional Memory:** Create centres for excellence in intelligence studies to constantly innovate and improve the practice of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination and build an institutional memory.

It is a well recognised axiom that the level of violence is always indirectly proportional to the quality of intelligence. The better the quality of intelligence gets, the lesser the occurrence of violence. This is true from both perspectives — *intelligence gathering* as well as *intelligence operations*. Therefore, this has to be a continuous and dynamic process if the Indian intelligence community seeks to evolve and prepare itself for new challenges and exigencies.

Notes

1. James Bamford, *The Shadow Factory: The NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America* (NY: Anchor Books, 2009), p. 18.

2. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
3. See K S Subramaniam, IPS. His excellent papers on the L P Singh Committee, available at http://www.indiatogether.org/2007/oct/rvw-rawraman.htm.
   His other works, such as *Political Violence & The Police In India*, published by Sage also have extensive reference to the L P Singh Committee and its findings and recommendations.
4. Interview with Air Commodore Jasjit Singh; also see Saikat Datta, "There are no Secrets", published in *Outlook*, November 13, 2006; and *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, published by Sage, para 6.22, p. 116.
5. V Sudarshan, "What's Wrong with Our Intelligence?" *Outlook*, July 01, 2002.
6. Saikat Datta, "Low on the I.Q." *Outlook,* July 04, 2005.
7. Ibid.
8. Brajesh Mishra, "Political Management of National Security," *AGNI*, Vol. 9, No. 4, October-December 2007, p. 40.
9. Ibid.
10. Satish Chandra, "The National Security Set-Up," *AGNI*, Vol. 9, No. 4, October-December 2007, p. 6.
11. Ibid., p. 7.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 8.
14. Interview with a senior intelligence official.
15. Chandra, n. 10.
16. Interview with a senior intelligence official.
17. After a series of reports by Seymour Hersh in *The New York Times* revealed that the US intelligence community was spying on American citizens, the US Senate initiated two investigations by Senator Frank Church and Senator Pike. Their recommendations led to several institutional reforms, changes and oversight mechanisms. The post-26/11 reforms are the biggest after the changes initiated in the 1970s.
18. William Branigin, "Bush Backs Creation of Intelligence Czar," *The Washington Post*, August 02, 2004.
19. Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, "The Armies of the Night," *Outlook*, December 15, 2008.
20. Saikat Datta, "The Gateway of India," *Outlook,* November 29, 2008.
21. Interview with a senior Indian intelligence official.
22. Ibid.
23. Saikat Datta, "The Union Republic of Terror," *Outlook*, October 11, 2010; The magazine accessed the NIA's interrogation report of David Coleman Headley.

24. Any of the agencies mentioned here could have been involved for a counter-terrorism response to the 26/11 attack by terrorists on Mumbai. However, for the purposes of this paper, the reference shall denote the NSG since that was the agency involved in neutralising the 26/11 terrorists.
25. Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 370.
26. The *National Military Strategy of the United States, 2011"* released on February 08, 2011, p. 19.
27. Shlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision Maker," in Loch K Johnson and James J Wirtz, eds., *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World, An Anthology* (CA: Roxbury Publishing House, 2004), p. 127.
28. See the transcript of the Fourth R. N. Kao Memorial Lecture, delivered by Vice President Hamid Ansari, available at: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?263861.
29. Wikipedia defines '*groupthink*' as: a type of thought within a deeply cohesive in-group whose members try to minimise conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analysing and evaluating ideas. It is a second potential negative consequence of group cohesion. '*Groupthink*' was the title of an article in *Fortune* magazine, in March 1952, by William H Whyte Jr. who described it as rationalised conformity.
30. For a fuller discussion on the effects of '*groupthink*' on intelligence analysis, see "Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community – An Ethnographic Study" by Rob Johnston for the CIA's Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 2005, p. 23.
31. Draft Report of the IDSA Task Force, p. 8 (for limited circulation only).
32. For more details on legally empowering India's intelligence agencies, see Manish Tiwari (MP, Lok Sabha), "Legally Empowering the Sentinels of the Nation," *ORF Issue Brief*, August 2009.
33. For a longer discussion on India's, China's and Pakistan's special forces, see Saikat Datta, "The Bear Trapper and the Dragon's Fist: A Short History of the Special Forces of Pakistan and China," in Vijay Oberoi, ed., *Special Forces: Doctrine, Structures & Employment Across the Spectrum* (New Delhi: Knowledge World).
34. In the UK, the security service (earlier known as MI-5) (comparable to India's IB) was mandated through an Act of Parliament passed in 1989. Two similar Acts were passed – the Intelligence Services Act 1994, to create and govern the secret intelligence services (earlier known as MI-6) and GHQ. The British Parliament also passed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
35. For a fuller discussion on intelligence analysis, see n. 30. p. 19.
36. Ibid., p. 11.