Pakistan: A Geo-Political Analysis

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Introduction

Geo-politics is the integrated study of the interaction between a state's domestic factors (ethnicity, religion, population, etc.), external factors (bilateral and multilateral relations), its geography and the government's policies. It explains a country's behaviour, as no country exists in a geographic or political vacuum.[1] In this context, a geo-political analysis of Pakistan could be used to determine its behaviour over time, with a greater focus on the strategic angle, particularly given the importance of many of the issues now besieging us.

The birth of Pakistan was a traumatic event in 1947. It became the first state in the world to be formed solely on the basis of religion. The decision to partition India was an emotive one. It was not based on a cold analysis of geo-political implications or far-sighted strategic inferences. The pangs of partition caused the Pakistani nation to evolve based on its perspective of wrongdoing, injustices and feeling of victimisation.

The new state was born in a sensitive geo-political arena with powerful civilisations on three sides—China, India, and Iran. Within this domain, Pakistan had to carve out its own distinct identity, based on religion. This led to the belief that they are the descendants of the Muslim rulers of the subcontinent who created an empire, which was lost and had to be regained. Pakistan's consequent foci in dealing with its security threats—both external and internal—have made it less secure, impacting its civil society as well as the military.

Pakistanis believe that India has never accepted the concept of Pakistan,

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at least not completely, and seeks proactively to undermine Pakistan's security. The wrench of partition, the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, and the debate over distribution of assets pitched Pakistan and India onto a track of hostility and wars. Afghanistan's claims over Pakistani territory exacerbated Pakistan's security concerns. Pakistan's experiences of alliances with the United States (US) and with China have also not adequately redressed its security psyche. Pakistan's defence strategy in the last 60 years has thus been built on confrontation with India and a search for influential patrons.

Pakistan split open in 1971, because it showed insensitivity to civilisational and cultural continuities in the subcontinent. Relationships and bonds between the two wings of Pakistan were predicated upon a subcontinental identity. Had these continuities not existed in pre-partition days, there would have been no possibility of a country being formed with two geographically unconnected wings. If Pakistan shows incomprehension of this reality, it may split again, under the burden of its military expenditure.

Pakistan needs to realise that it is a country that is part of the subcontinent and whose destiny is linked with the Indus-Gangetic area and it would never be accepted as part of the West Asian Islamic states. Its geo-strategic importance arises out of its proximity to the two largest nations in Asia—China and India. It is the only country in South Asia that has been discussed internationally as a possible failed state because the terrorism unleashed by its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has boomeranged on it. Its future lies in reinforcing its links with South Asia. It also has to take into account threats connected with the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

A Pakistani scholar has defined strategic culture as "a collectivity of beliefs, norms, values and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security issues and environment, and shapes their responses to these."[2] This group is dominated by the military in Pakistan, with the support of professional bureaucrats, particularly those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are the keepers of Pakistan's strategic culture. Like most bureaucracies, they are slow to admit mistakes, resistant to alternative views, and tend to lean on organisational preferences when faced with new situations that require change.

Geography as a Factor

Pakistan's boundaries encompass a large tract of land stretching from the peaks of the Himalayas to the Arabian Sea. However, today, the writ of the Pakistani

state stops short of the country's mountainous northwestern frontier. The strip of arable land that hugs the Indus river and the land to the east is the province of Punjab, where the bulk of the country's population, industry and resources are concentrated. This region is the core or heartland of the Pakistani state, which has to be protected by control over its peripheries, mainly in the north and west, where the terrain is more conducive to fragmenting the population than defending the country. For Pakistan to survive as a modern nation-state, it must protect its core at all costs. But even in the best of circumstances, defending this core and maintaining the integrity of the state are extraordinarily difficult tasks, mainly because of geography.

Even if direct violence is avoided, the inability to resolve river resource issues will undoubtedly limit the ability of Pakistan to manage and utilise water resources in an efficient manner.

The headwaters of the Indus river system are not in Pakistan. It is a lower riparian state. India is moving steadily closer to a danger zone in terms of water supply. Pakistan is nearing the "water stress" limit of 1,000 cubic metres per person per year, below which serious economic and social consequences are likely. Rivalry over river resources has been a chronic source of severe inter-state tension between India and Pakistan. With water issues intensifying, the possibility for conflict will likely increase. Even if direct violence is avoided, the inability to resolve river resource issues will undoubtedly limit the ability of Pakistan to manage and utilise water resources in an efficient manner. Inadequate management of water resources will exacerbate domestic problems in Pakistan, which could lead to further political extremism and terrorism. The disputes over water also have broader implications for the overall character of future India-Pakistan relations.[3]

While Kashmir has been the focus of Indo-Pakistani conflict, the area where Pakistan faces its most severe security challenge is the region comprising its heartland. This region is hemmed between its volatile northwest frontier and India. Geography dictates that Pakistan either be absorbed into India or fight a losing battle against Indian influence. In the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), Northern Areas, and its occupied portion of Jammu and Kashmir, the terrain, though mountainous, does not create a firm enough barrier to block invasion. To the southwest, the Balochistan plateau parallels the Arabian Sea coast and crosses the Iranian-Pakistani border.

To control these outlying regions, Pakistan has to accommodate ethnicities that do not conform to the norms of its core. Pakistan's broken and mountainous border areas reinforce ethnic divisions among the regions' inhabitants—Sindhis in the Indus Valley, Balochis to the west and Pashtuns to the north—which are far larger than the population that comprises the core or heartland.

A problem with maps is that one tends to believe that boundaries are real barriers. While Pakistan has relatively defined boundaries, it lacks the ethnic and social cohesion of a strong nation-state. All major Pakistani ethnic groups — Punjabis, Pashtuns, Balochis and Sindhis — are not entirely in Pakistan but spill over to neighbouring countries; 42 percent of Afghanistan is Pashtun, and Iran has a sizable Baloch minority; Kashmir has a significant irredentist problem. Thus, Pakistan faces an internal problem whereby, in its efforts to secure buffers, it has to include groups that, because of mountainous terrain, are impossible to assimilate. Consequently, Islamabad cannot assert its writ in its outer regions, particularly in the Pashtun areas. Also, the fact that Pakistan ceded part of its occupied territory in Kashmir to China, in 1963, is ample manifestation of the scant regard its politico-military elite has for its ethnic-minority regions.

Pakistan's exact size is in dispute. Estimates of the United Nations could be taken into consideration for the purpose of analysis. Accordingly, examination of the population of Pakistan vis-à-vis the area of its administrative territories is shown in Table 1.[4]

Table 1

Region	Population		Area	
	(Millions)	(Percentage)	(Square Kilometres)	(Percentage)
NWFP	20.22	11.7	74,521	8.4
Balochistan	10.25	5.9	347,190	39.4
Punjab	81.85	47.7	205,344	23.3
Sindh	46.38	27.0	140,914	15.9
FATA	6.5	3.7	27,220	3.1
Occupied Kashmir	4.5	2.6	13,297	1.5
Northern Areas	1.8	0.1	72,496	8.2

The Punjabi heartland that comprises less than 50 percent of the population covers less than 25 percent of the total area of Pakistan. Thus, though the Indus core is geographically, economically and culturally cohesive, Pakistan cannot democratically rule from this core and remain a stable nation-state.

The minorities in the outer regions make up more than 50 percent of Pakistan's population and occupy more territory. It is no wonder that the parliamentary system Pakistan inherited broke down within four years of independence.

Pakistani politics has never highlighted this aspect of population vis-à-vis territory but it is evident that the country's military leadership implicitly understands the dilemma of holding onto the outer regions. Thus, the ethno-nationalist tendencies of the minority provinces have been countered by promotion of an Islamic identity, particularly in the Pashtun belt. This was taken to a higher level during the war in Afghanistan (1978-89) when Pakistan's army began using radical Islamism as an instrument of foreign policy. Islamist militant groups, trained and aided by the government (ISI), were formed to push Islamabad's influence into Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, the strategy of promoting an Islamic identity to maintain domestic cohesion while using radical Islamism as an arm of foreign policy has done more harm than good.

Pakistan's major ethnic groups including Punjabis, Balochis and Sindhis are not just concentrated within, but do spill over into neighbouring countries. Thus, Pakistan faces an internal problem whereby, in its efforts to secure buffers, it has to include groups that, because of mountainous terrain, are impossible to assimilate.

A nation needs an identity and a history that defines its members as a single people sharing a past. Pakistan has never been able to convince its diverse ethnic regions as to why it is a nation. It is certainly not the Muslim nation Jinnah had thought of as one of the two nations inhabiting British India. Of that Muslim nation, only a third is in Pakistan. It was never homogenous with its eastern partner. The Muslim League was an Uttar Pradesh and Bihar party, with little influence in Sindh or the NWFP. Pakistan, therefore, has had to uphold Kashmir as a unifying element in its national narrative since there is none other. Pakistan will always have to suffer a volatile relationship between its core (heartland) and areas located at its periphery. This makes it difficult to be a democracy, or last as a dictatorship either, which is a particularly vulnerable condition for any nation-state to be in. The human element will always be at the forefront of its actions.

The Durand Line demarcating Pakistan and Afghanistan was established by the British, with great difficulty, after four wars that ended with Afghanistan becoming an independent kingdom and not a princely state under British paramountcy. However, the boundary between the NWFP and Afghanistan was always a matter of guesswork. No one has really ruled over these territories in the sense in which we understand the word today. No one's writ runs except of the tribal leaders. The FATA is also a false description since no one administers much around there. There is no sentience where Pakistan begins and Afghanistan ends. Geographical barriers like mountain ranges create discontinuities when they do not easily yield sustenance for human habitation.

The India Factor

A structured hegemony in the subcontinent, with India as the hegemon, is what Pakistan resents the most. Accordingly, Pakistan is willing to see itself as an extension of the Middle East, with a view to drawing upon pan-Islamic sentiment and support, to deal with India on equal terms. Pakistan befriended the US and China for the same goal. During the Cold War, this approach worked up to a point. But now a search must begin to create a new political architecture for the subcontinent in which all its nations are truly equal for certain stated purposes, and in common interests. This is difficult to come by as over sixty years have been spent by India and Pakistan in confrontation.

From the time of its establishment, Pakistan's worldview has been dominated by the perception that it faces an existential threat from India. This perception pervades all aspects of Pakistan government policy, and the fear of India "undoing" the 1947 partition of British India has meant that successive Pakistani governments have viewed national security almost exclusively through a distorted military lens—to the detriment of economic, political, judicial, and social considerations.[5] Emphasis on military security has contributed to the overwhelming influence of the army in policy and governance through most of Pakistan's history.[6] The military's narrow institutional interests have assumed an awkward prominence that is often manifested in Pakistan's international behaviour.

The natural geographic area for Pakistan and India to come to blows in a full-scale war is in the northern Indian plain and the desert terrain along its western border, where Pakistan would be able to concentrate its forces. Geographically speaking, India's vast territory offers considerable strategic depth from which to conduct a war, and its large population allows it to field an army that far outnumbers that of Pakistan. Though the lack of terrain obstacles along the

Indian-Pakistani border is an issue for both sides, Pakistan's core in the Punjab deprives Islamabad of strategic depth. This is why Pakistan concentrates six of its nine corps formations in Punjab, including both its offensive "strike" corps. Compounding its underlying geographic weaknesses are the qualitative challenges Pakistan faces in its military competition with India. Pakistan's game of catch-up in the nuclear arms race is ongoing, and the gap is enormous.

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Pakistan's Geo-Strategic Options

Pakistan's grand strategy has four principal elements:

- First, it seeks to maintain sufficient conventional and nuclear strength to deter an Indian attack or, if deterrence fails, to prevent a catastrophic defeat long enough for the international community to intervene and halt the conflict.[7]
- Second, it relies on external support, seeking to translate its geo-strategic position into a claim on the resources and attentions of outside actors – especially the US and China. Islamabad, however, has been unable to secure specific security guarantees against India.
- Third, Pakistan seeks to weaken India militarily by enmeshing Indian security forces in domestic unrest while at the same time limiting New Delhi's access to foreign sources of diplomatic assistance, moral support, and weapons transfers.
- In the 1990s, Pakistan added a fourth element: seeking "strategic depth" against India by establishing a sphere of influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is not clear what real benefit has accrued to Pakistan from this notion, which has foundered on the rocks of reality. Pakistan, however, remains vitally concerned with gaining strategic depth to its west, as instability on its western border can have dangerous repercussions inside Pakistan.

Pakistan's armed forces are the foundation of its grand strategy. Its military must provide adequate conventional strength and competence to persuade India that a rapid attack has little chance of substantial gains without triggering a nuclear response. Pakistani strategic forces, in turn, must be sufficiently numerous and reliable to make the nuclear deterrent credible. At the same

time, the Pakistan Army aims to retain an offensive capability sufficient to tie down Indian forces, conduct counter-attacks, and seize key bits of Indian terrain. This has led it to support *jihadi* insurgents in Kashmir and elsewhere as a low-cost means of occupying Indian security forces and reducing the likelihood of a major cross-border attack by India.[8] The *jihadis*, however, have come to threaten Pakistan itself, sowing instability and violence, frightening investors, and nearly provoking full-scale war with India. Since 2001, according to Pakistani accounts, Islamabad has been seeking to reduce the danger these non-state groups pose, while retaining them as a "strategic asset" to force New Delhi into negotiations on the status of Kashmir.[9] The problem still remains that, in Pakistan, sponsors of terrorism are "a state within a state".The military will be crucial to Pakistan's grand strategy for the foreseeable future, though Gen Musharraf did try to alter the fundamental strategic paradigm by highlighting Pakistan's economic strength as a key aspect of national security equivalent, at least in theory, to military power.[10] In part due to domestic policies and in part to copious international assistance, the economy did rebound and see a growth rate of more than 8 percent.[11] Musharraf also began stressing "enlightened moderation" and dilution of extremism, in part due to the damage extremism inflicted on the investment climate, but also because of the danger radical and violent political groups pose to both government and society.[12] This new attitude led to substantial army operations against foreign fighters and other extremists in select areas along the Afghan border, and resulted in the capture of several high profile terrorists during 2004-05. Despite emphasis on economic progress and domestic threats, military considerations will remain paramount in Pakistani security thinking for the near term, and defence will continue to absorb to 5 percent of the nation's annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Pakistan's leaders believe that their planning "benefits from a degree of ambiguity" regarding the country's nuclear doctrine.[13] Nuclear warheads are seen as weapons of war, not just tools of deterrence; a stance that implies the option of "first use" in a conflict. There are no stated criteria for when Pakistan might resort to nuclear weapons. Pakistani officials and commentators emphasise that the threshold is low, a "one rung nuclear escalation ladder", and express concerns that Indian modernisation will drive the threshold still lower.[14] The four "red lines"– significant loss of territory, significant damage to military forces, threat of economic strangulation, and threat to internal stability – are deliberately vague.[15] The Cold War nuclear stand-off between the USA and USSR devolved

around a 20 minute warning in case of a nuclear strike. In the Indo-Pak scenario, the warning time is 2 minutes (barely time to get to the telephone). It is in Islamabad's interest to create doubts in the minds of decision-makers in New Delhi about how quickly and easily they could launch a nuclear strike. Of relevance to Indian thinking is the statement by the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations, "If India reserves the right to use conventional weapons, how can Pakistan – a nuclear power – be expected to rule out all means of deterrence?"[16]

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The triad of Pakistani geo-politics, therefore, relies on protection of its core or heartland, controlling its buffers, and supporting militant proxies. The cement to bind them is Islamism. The offshoot of these forces — Pakistan's raging *jihadist* insurgency, the devolution of the ISI and terrorist attacks in both Pakistan and India — highlight the extent to which Pakistan has lost control over its Islamist militant proxy project. More importantly, Pakistan has more or less admitted that its ISI has lost control of these groups, leaving India and the US with the alarming thought that rogue operations are being conducted by elements of the Pakistani security apparatus that no longer answer to the state. Moreover, Indian influence in Afghanistan, a country Pakistan considers a key buffer state for extending its strategic depth, will always keep Islamabad on edge.

The Economic Limits of Geography

Pakistan's economy suffers from a host of problems — insufficient infrastructure and technical personnel, high levels of corruption, shallow local capital markets, currency risk and overdependence on commodities, besides other issues. Pakistan historically has been an economically weak, mismanaged and corrupt state. Its military elite, deeply entrenched in the economy, holds much of the country's wealth as well as a number of key assets in the corporate and real estate sectors. The agricultural industry remains the country's economic backbone, employing some 44 percent of the population, yet accounting for only 21 percent of Pakistan's GDP. The remainder of the GDP comes from services (53 percent) and industry (27 percent).

Pakistan's most fundamental economic problem is that it has very few natural resources. To add to this, security issues in the country's northwest have constrained even basic exploration in much of the country, going back to times that predate the British colonial experience. In order to industrialise, therefore, Pakistan is forced to import whatever materials it needs without first being able to establish a source of income. The unavoidable results are high debt and a sustained, massive trade deficit. As of 2008, the country's national debt was more than 60 percent of the GDP, and the trade deficit about 9.3 percent of the GDP.

Even agriculture poses problems. The Indus River Valley is productive and has made Pakistan the 11th largest producer of wheat, but the country remains a net importer of foodstuffs largely due to the burgeoning population of 168 million. Though Pakistan is the 5th largest exporter of rice and 14th largest exporter of cotton, floods and pests have hit rice and cotton production, with the growth rate of agriculture (for fiscal year 2008) being 1.5 percent. In fact, the only true growth industry in Pakistan is its near-monopoly on fuel supply to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in Afghanistan. Aside from refining, nearly all of Pakistan's economic sectors face massive challenges teetering towards collapse.

The need for new sources of capital is now greater than ever. In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed a collapse of its infrastructure, with power outages of up to six hours a day across the country. The 2008 spikes in energy and food prices almost bankrupted the state. Pakistan's food bill has jumped by 46 percent over 2007 figures, and its oil bill by 56 percent. The deteriorating security environment has deterred foreign and even domestic investors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita in Pakistan has plunged to US$32 per year. (By comparison, sub-Saharan Africa's per capita FDI is US$50 per year.)

Pakistan is holding on by spending money that it does not have to spare. Social stability can largely be credited to food and energy subsidies, which have contributed to an annual inflation rate of more than 25 percent. The costs of subsidies, along with ongoing military deployments, have put the budget in deficit to the tune of 7.4 percent of the GDP, among the world's highest. Recent spending has reduced Pakistan's foreign currency reserves by 75 percent in the past year to US$3.45 billion. This is only enough to cover one month of imports, bringing the country dangerously close to defaulting on its debts. Though some respite has come in the form of sharply declining oil prices, Pakistan's ability to finance the debt through bond issues has effectively ended.

What sets Pakistan apart in terms of economic performance is geography that greatly curtails its economic opportunities. Of its cities, only Karachi remains

globally competitive. It is the country's only real port with easy access to major sea trade lanes. Moving north, the Indus Valley is hemmed in by marshes and desert to the east and arid highlands to the west. Thus, Karachi functions as a city-state unto itself.

The upper Indus is where Pakistan's best infrastructure is located and where any integrated development can take place. But such development is impossible for three reasons. First, the region's high population requires extensive irrigation, which has reduced the Indus' water level, making it unnavigable by any but the smallest of ships. The region is, in effect, cut off from Karachi except by far more expensive rail or road transport. Second, the upper Indus' natural market and trading partner is India, but Indo-Pak hostility denies the region the chance for progress. Finally, what water the Indus does have is not under Pakistan's control; the headwaters of nearly all of its major tributaries lie in India, which is damming up those rivers, both to generate electricity and to further tilt the balance of power away from Pakistan.

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The remainder of Pakistan's population is confined into the mountainous region of NWFP and FATA, which are too remote to justify developing under normal circumstances. Thus, with the exception of Karachi, economic development in Pakistan is virtually impossible without the country somehow getting past its conflict with India.

Islamabad's success in leveraging its geography means that the country has not had to succeed economically on its merits for decades. It has leveraged its geo-political position not only to push for softer security policies from the US or India, but also to pay the bills. It is reported that the US Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus personally intervened with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that Pakistan received a US$7.6 billion loan in November 2008, a loan for which it certainly did not qualify. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided US$2 billion in credit, while China contributed US$500 million and the Asian Development Bank provided another US$300 million.

While these funds certainly will delay Pakistan's day of reckoning, they

are unlikely to prevent it. Pakistan's economy is flirting with becoming non-functional, and it cannot operate in the black any more. To do so will require slashing military and subsidy expenditures, an impossible move for a socially seething country operating on a war footing (and, incidentally, a move the IMF loan supposedly will require).

The real danger is that the world is shifting away from Pakistan, and with that, Pakistan's ability to leverage its geography attenuates. The US views Pakistan as much part of the problem of the Afghan insurgency as it is part of the solution. Oil prices have dropped by US$100 a barrel in less than five months, drastically limiting the Gulf Arabs' ability to dole out cash. China also has concerns about fighting Islamist extremism that has spilled over into its own western provinces. It is something Beijing has to weigh against its commitment to Pakistan. The result might not prove to be a total cut-off of funds, but a slackening of support certainly seems to be in the offing. And without such outside support, Pakistan will have to make it or break it on its own — something it has never proved capable of doing.

Conclusion

Pakistan as a country has always lacked strategic depth and often it has harboured ambitions to overcome this lack of strategic depth by using Afghanistan as a hinterland or buffer state. The Pakistani establishment considers control over Afghanistan critical for the survival of Pakistan as a state.

The Baloch separatist insurgency in Pakistan differs in certain important respects from that of its 1970s predecessor. Most fundamental of these differences are those stemming from energy resource development. Pakistan's mounting energy insecurity – a product of rapid increase in demand coupled with rising scarcity and the region's intensified energy rivalry – has magnified the economic and strategic importance of Balochistan, while, at the same time, complicating Pakistan's efforts to cope with the province's resurgent tribal separatism. It lifts Balochistan and Baloch nationalism to a position much higher on the scale of central government priorities, thus, seeming to warrant, as the government sees the problem, zero tolerance and ruthless crushing of the insurgency. Second, it arms the Baloch insurgents with both greater incentives to reclaim control of Balochistan concomitant with the capacity to drive the economic and political costs to the government of continuing insurgent activity far higher than ever in the past.[17]

Ethnically, religiously and territorially divided, Pakistan began as a nation in crisis. It was not until the military intervened in the early days of parliamentary democracy and established itself as the guarantor of the state's stability that

Pakistan was able to stand on its own feet. Given the current state of the military and the mounting stresses on the institution, Pakistan is showing serious signs of becoming a failed state.

How is Pakistan able to survive? Economic development has been nearly impossible since partition from India. What Pakistan has succeeded in doing is leveraging the political and security aspects of its geography in order to keep its system going. Just as geography has been Pakistan's curse, to a great degree it also has become its lifeline. Pakistan sits at the intersection of many regions, countries and cultures, including Iran, India, Afghanistan, Shiite Islam, Sunni Islam and Hinduism. This mix makes ruling Pakistan a major headache at the best of times, but it also means that powers beyond Pakistan's immediate frontiers have a vested interest in seeing Pakistan not fail.

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Pakistan's reputation focusses on four categories of its strategic behaviour: Islamic extremism and terrorism, democratic restoration and reform, nuclear proliferation, and Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations. The international community demands fundamental change in all of them. However, Pakistan's radical strategic transformation is not likely to happen because it would sacrifice Pakistan's vital national interests. Pakistan's behaviour is predictable in many ways. It will not seek parity with India but will do its utmost to balance and retain initiative; it will seek external alliances with outside powers (the US or China), but will not sacrifice its regional objectives. However, geo-politics is not static and unchanging but extremely dynamic. Time could change the scenario in the foreseeable future as the equations of its relationships alter.

Notes

1. This definition has been given by Claude Rakisits of Webster University (Geneva). See http://www.geopolitiek.nl/Interview_Rakisits_Claude_Geopolitical_Passport.html Accessed on 8 October 2008.
2. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture," Chapter 12 in *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002), p. 307.

3. See Robert G Wirsing, Christopher Jasparro, "Spotlight on Indus River Diplomacy: India, Pakistan, and the Baglihar Dam Dispute", Asia-Pacific Centre For Security Studies, Honolulu, May 2006.
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5. Teresita C Schaffer, "Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options", *South Asian Journal*, No. 3, January-March, 2004.
6. See Ayesha Siddiqi Agha, "Pakistan's Security: Problems of Linearity", *South Asian Journal* No. 3, January-March 2004.
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11. Asian Development Bank, "Pakistan Economic Update," 21 April 2005, http://www.adb.org. For a dose of skepticism, see Shahid Kardar, "Maintaining High Growth Rates," *Dawn,* 18 April 2005.
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13. Mahmud Ali Durrani, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons," Cooperative Monitoring Centre, Occasional Paper, No. 37, July 2004, pp. 28, 31.
14. Shireen Mazari, "Nature of Future Pakistan-India Wars", *Strategic Studies,* No. 22, Summer 2002: and Rodney W Jones, "Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia," South Asia Strategic Stability Unit Research Report, University of Bradford, No.1, March 2005.
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16. <http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/May/30war2.htm>
17. Robert G Wirsing, "Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan", Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 2008.