Military Power Projection in the Indian Context

Walter Ladwig

When considering the range of foreign policy tools employed by India, military power projection may not be one that comes readily to mind. In recent years, a host of external observers have written about the Indian military's growing power projection capabilities.[1] Yet in discussions with senior civil servants and members of the political class, it appears that power projection is not necessarily a concept that gains ready acceptance. Some reject it altogether, conflating it with aggression or hegemony—two concepts that "are not in the Indian psyche."[2] Since India is a status quo power, it has little need to develop the capacity to project military force far beyond its borders. As one former joint secretary in the Ministry of Defence bluntly remarked, "India does not believe in power projection."[3] Similarly, a former Cabinet minister discounted the notion that India would ever militarily intervene in a neighbour's internal affairs with the remark that "India would never do a Grenada."[4]

Other foreign policy thinkers do not reject the concept of power projection outright, but argue instead that India seeks only to project "soft power"— the attractive qualities of its culture and society—abroad to gain it influence without resort to military power. In that vein, several recent academic studies of Indian "power projection" have tended to focus largely, or even exclusively on the non-military aspects of India's efforts to influence neighbouring regions.[5]

The view that India can discount the ability to project power militarily is understandable to an extent, given India's traditional discomfort with hard power.[6] Nevertheless, these views appear to be based on an incorrect understanding of both the concept of power projection, the fungibility of military tools for the projection of both hard and soft power as well as India's needs in a changing geo-

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political environment. Moreover, the belief that power projection is alien to India overlooks the fact that New Delhi has not hesitated to "sort out" its neighbours when it felt that its interests were threatened. This article seeks to bring analytical clarity to the discussion of military power projection by first examining the concept in detail (including examples of power projection by India) and then exploring the Indian military's power projection capabilities. Given the previously noted focus on Indian soft power projection by other scholars, this article focusses solely on the use of military tools to shape political events abroad.

Examining Power Projection

Conversations with Indian foreign policy thinkers suggest that power projection is commonly viewed as being about imposing regime change on a state far from home for strategic gain.[7] In this view, the prototypical power projection operation would be the 2003 US' invasion of Iraq.[8] In contrast, the US Department of Defence defines power projection much more broadly as:

> The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power — political, economic, informational, or military — to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in, and from, multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.[9]

Based on the political goals being sought and the level of force employed, it is possible to disaggregate military power projection into nine different aspects, four of which relate to the employment of 'soft' military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian response, and peacekeeping) and five of which are primarily concerned with 'hard' military power (showing the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, intervention and conquest.)

Soft Power Projection

- **Securing Sea Lanes of Communication:** As the navy's maritime doctrine notes, trade is increasingly critical to the Indian economy, which makes the protection of the sea lanes transiting the Indian Ocean a significant priority.[10] Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Indian Navy played a high-profile role in escorting US shipping through the Strait of Malacca. More recently, Indian naval vessels have been deployed to the Gulf of Aden where they have thwarted several attempted hijackings by pirates.

- **Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations:** The evacuation of Indian or friendly third country civilians from a foreign country when they are endangered by war or civil unrest. During Operation Sukoon, the navy evacuated 2,280 Indian, Sri Lankan, and Nepalese civilians from Lebanon ahead of the 2006 ar.
- **Humanitarian Response**: The use of military forces abroad to assist in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Following the 2004 tsunami, the Indian Navy mobilised 32 ships and over 20,000 naval personnel to evacuate casualties, as well as provide emergency sources of power and water to the peoples of Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.[11]
- **Peacekeeping:** Military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement to an on-going dispute. India has been one of the most significant contributors to UN peacekeeping missions—as of 2009: the army had roughly 8,000 personnel deployed in the Congo, Lebanon, East Timor, the Ivory Coast and the Golan Heights.[12]

Hard Power Projection

- **Showing the Flag:** The symbolic deployment of military forces to a region for the purposes of demonstrating political interest, resolve, or willingness to take more forceful military action. Operation Poomali, the forced air-drop of relief supplies during the siege of Jaffna in June 1987, sent a clear message to the Sri Lankan government about Delhi's desire to see a negotiated end to the conflict and helped lead to the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.[13] More recently, the Indian Navy has undertaken several of high-profile deployments to the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf, which have been interpreted as important signals of Indian interest in these regions.[14]
- **Compellence/Deterrence:** The use of the threat of military force against another state to either induce it into, or dissuade it from, pursuing a given policy. In this form, power projection acts as a diplomatic tool, attempting to influence the decision-making process of foreign actors. The aforementioned Operation Poomali could be considered an episode of weak compellence as it was part of the Indian government's attempts to signal to Sri Lanka that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option on the table if diplomatic solutions to the conflict failed. Although not expeditionary, the 2001-02 mobilisation of the Indian Army in Operation Parakram has also been described as an exercise in coercive diplomacy.[15]
- **Punishment:** The punitive use of force against another state in response

to its pursuit of a given policy. On occasion, India has undertaken limited punitive strikes on Pakistani posts across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir in response to militant activity, but has refrained from the larger-scale use of punishment strategies.[16]

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- **Intervention:** The movement of military forces into another nation's territory for the purposes of influencing the internal affairs of the target country short of outright conquest. Historical examples of such operations in India's immediate neighbourhood range in size from the 1988 deployment of a parachute battalion to the Maldives (Operation Cactus) to put down a coup against the government of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom to the 1971 intervention in East Pakistan by three corps of the Indian Army to assist the Mukti Bahini.
- **Conquest:** The offensive use of military assets to forcibly occupy non-contiguous territory controlled or claimed by another state. Although critics may charge that the use of military forces in "police actions" in Hyderabad in 1948 and Goa in 1961, as part of the post-independence consolidation of the Union, qualify as examples, conquest has not been an aspect of power projection pursued by independent India.

This brief examination of the concept of power projection suggests that contrary to the opinions expressed above, in the six decades since independence, India has employed at least seven of these aspects of power projection to assert influence beyond its immediate borders. Moreover, as the dominant regional power in South Asia and an aspirant to a seat at the head of the global high table of the UN Security Council, India is likely to be called on in the future to take an increased role in ensuring international peace and security, either under UN auspices or in a coalition of the willing. In this vein, scholars of international relations argue that as a state's wealth and material power increase, it will have an increased interest in favourably shaping its strategic environment.[17] Sustained economic growth, India's top priority, depends in part on relative peace in India's fragile periphery. Furthermore, a succession of India's political leadership has identified "the arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of interest…for the first quarter of the 21st century."[18] In this zone, concerns

about energy access mesh with those of the safety of shipping transiting the entire Indian Ocean littoral. Merely asserting interest across a wide geographic scope is a meaningless exercise without the means to achieve or protect it. Although many of the challenges plaguing the immediate and extended neighbourhoods are political and economic in nature, India does require the kind of ability to shape events in these countries that power projection provides, should the need arise. Therefore, going forward, it is reasonable to assume that India will have at least, the same level of need for power projection missions as it has in the past and more likely will make increased use of such tools in the future.

Recognising that India will likely have an increased need for power projection in the future is not the same as arguing it will intervene willy-nilly around the globe. Such operations will still have to be in response to a threat to a vital national interest and have the support of the population if not, ideally, of the international community. Having provided an overview of the concept of power projection and examples of its historical use as a foreign policy tool by India, the next section examines India's present and future power projection capability.

Conventional Military and Power Projection

The three varieties of conventional military power, land power, air power and sea power all contribute to power projection missions in different ways. As Table 1 indicates, sea power has a high degree of fungibility across the various power projection missions –particularly in South Asia where India's "extended neighbourhood" of the Indian Ocean region is primarily a maritime domain. In contrast, air and land power play more limited, but nonetheless important, roles.

Table 1: The Utility of Power Projection Tools

	SLOC	NEO	Humanitarian	Peace Ops	Show the Flag	Intervention	Compel/ Deter	Punish	Conquest
Land		●	●	●		●	○	●	●
Air		○			○	●	●	●	
Sea	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●

● Major tool of power projection ○ Minor tool of power projection

Sea Power

At its core, maritime power projection is about the ability to influence events on land from the sea.[19] The key power projection platforms in this regard are aircraft

carriers, surface ships and submarines equipped with land-attack cruise missiles, and amphibious landing ships—the latter of which are discussed in the section on land power below. Aside from the submarine, which can rely on stealth to approach an enemy coastline, task forces of cruise missile armed surface platforms, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers require the assistance of attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and modern destroyers and frigates to protect them from hostile submarines, aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. If operating a significant distance from friendly ports, maritime forces can require tankers and supply ships to sustain them with food, fuel and ammunition when underway.

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Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta foresees that the navy of 2020 will be "capable of influencing the outcome of land battles and performing a constabulary role in the Indian Ocean region."[20] However, this will require significant upgrades from its present capabilities. Naval planners envision a three-carrier fleet as the cornerstone of India's future blue water navy: the 44,500-ton Russian-built INS *Vikramaditya* and two indigenously constructed aircraft carriers of the *Vikrant* class weighing in at 40,000 and 64,000 tons respectively. However, the *Vikramaditya* and the lead vessel of the *Vikrant* class only carry 16 fighters each. Assuming that the larger *Vikrant* class carrier will accommodate a larger complement of aircraft (in the range of 50-60), operating in tandem with either of the two 40,000-ton carriers would only produce "as much striking power as a single US *Nimitz* class carrier. Even armed with precision-guided munitions, a contingent of this size could sustain only a modest land bombardment, and only for a modest time."[21]

The Indian Navy's surface-strike capability centres on the 290-km range supersonic BraMos cruise missile. While highly effective in an anti-shipping role, it is less useful as a land-attack weapon since it possesses only a tenth of the range of the US Tomahawk. This relatively short range would render surface-launched cruise missile strikes against a state that possesses even a modest anti-access capability [attack submarines, anti-ship missiles and supporting command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems) a risky proposition.

Finally, the Indian Navy's ability to project hard maritime power in the Indian Ocean and beyond is further harmed by the fact that it is currently decommissioning surface ships faster than it is adding them.[22] At present, large portions of India's fleet of 57 surface combatants, including five of its eight destroyers and seven of its eleven frigates are approaching the end of their service life. The navy requires these kinds of platforms, equipped with advanced anti-aircraft and anti-submarine systems to operate in hostile littorals. Moreover, to achieve a real power-projection capability across the Indian Ocean littoral and beyond, the navy will require several additional fleet replenishment tankers and modern replacements for its cadre of Soviet-era minesweepers.

Air Power

Air power projection primarily comes in two forms: strikes against ground-based targets and the transport of ground troops. Since this latter role is primarily a supporting one, it is taken up in the discussion of land power below. As a power projection tool, the use or threat of air power is primarily a tool of compellence/deterrence or a means to punish another state should these efforts fail to bring about the desired policy change. Affecting targets at a range beyond a few hundred miles requires advanced strike aircraft capable of penetrating enemy air defences (typically operating in conjunction with tankers), longer-range cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.

The Chief of the Air Staff has argued that Indian air power needs "a strategic reach to safeguard our national interests" which requires "long-range presence, persistence and 'forward-basing arrangements.'"[23] In this vein, the Indian Air Force's (IAF's) revised war doctrine is structured around "both preemptive action and swift retaliation," across a region stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca.[24]

However, the air force has long suffered from the piecemeal acquisition of platforms and much of its fleet is facing obsolescence—raising questions about future combat power.[25] Nonetheless, the IAF has pushed for an independent strategic role in future conflict, arguing that air power can influence the battlespace through deep strike missions.[26] The air force "aims to achieve this objective by operating advanced, long-range platforms with air-to-air refueling capability."[27]

Most notable in this regard are efforts to induct long-range strike platforms—particularly 230 Fourth Generation Sukhoi Su-30s. The combination of SU-30s with stand-off precision-guided munitions, such as the AS-13, would produce a significant ability to strike targets across the immediate neighbourhood. Capable

though these aircraft are, their ability to operate at a significant distance depends on the air force's in-flight refuelling capability. Although the IAF does have 6 IL-78MKI "Midas" tanker aircraft (which doubles the Sukhoi's range to 6,000km), this only amounts to "baby steps towards acquiring the capability of projecting combat power in the region. At this point in time, the capability is limited to a token force and cannot be described as significant."[28] In this regard, the IAF's hope to acquire an additional six new Airbus Military A330 multi-role tanker transports is a positive step. [29] However, to support an expeditionary strike package of just 60 aircraft, which would only provide a modest land-bombardment capability, at least 15 IL-78/A330 tankers would be required, notwithstanding the need for reserves or simultaneous capability in other areas.[30] If the entire fleet of Sukohis were to be so equipped, the IAF would require nearly 60 tanker aircraft.

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Strike aircraft are not the only way that offensive air power can contribute to *deterrence* or *punishment* type power projection missions. Given the simultaneously increasing lethality of air defence systems and cost of combat aircraft, India may instead increasingly rely on surface-to-surface missiles for "deep strike against heavily defended targets in depth, such as airfields."[31] This could presage an increased role for India's ballistic missile forces, which just saw the 3,000-km range Agni-III approved for induction into the army. The follow-on 5,000-km range Agni-IV is likely to be tested in 2010.[32] While these missiles are commonly associated with India's strategic nuclear programme, they could be employed in a conventional role if necessary. Much to the dismay of Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated that test launches of ballistic missiles can have real coercive effects.

Land Power

The employment of expeditionary land power requires the facilitation of airlift or sealift capabilities. Projecting land power abroad requires specially trained forces (such as airborne troops or marines), long-range command and control capabilities and a significant logistical ability to support and sustain troops once an initial landing

has been made. The chief of the Indian Army Staff has argued that "in keeping with our growing regional aspirations," the army needs to develop the capability to deploy ground forces for an out of area operation and at the recent infantry commander's conference, the army's senior leadership explored how it can transform into an "expeditionary force."[33] There is some evidence that senior army leaders have been pressing for an increased overseas presence, "even outside the UN banner."[34]

"Given its emerging regional power status," one former flag officer contends, "India may be called upon to project power in the region, which may involve airlift of large military forces to areas of interest…outside of our borders and [the capability] to provide sustained logistic support."[35] This would, in turn, require a substantial expansion of the country's strategic airlift capability which some argue is virtually non-existent today—with the transports that India does have largely unable to operate in a hostile air environment.[36]

For future power projection, it has been suggested that India requires an air assault brigade in place by early 2012.[37] While the Agra-based 50th (Independent) Parachute Brigade might form the core of an air assault capability, such a unit would require extensive organic fire support in the form of Lancer and Hind attack helicopters to compensate for the lack of artillery possessed by such highly mobile troops. Moreover, the ability to move such a force in a rapid reaction scenario would require a significant increase of airlift capability. The Indian Air Force is rumoured to be interested in buying 10 Boeing C-17s for heavy lift, but moving a single battalion 2,000 km in one day to respond to a crisis in the immediate neighbourhood would necessitate a lift capacity of 19 C-17 equivalents, while the ability to do so with an entire brigade would require 55 C-17 equivalents. Although the former is notionally within the capacity of present airlift assets, persistent questions about the actual state of these aircraft raises questions.[38]

This strategic reach also has utility in non-combatant evacuation operations as well as humanitarian response missions. In 1991, the IAF, along with civil air assets, played a key role in evacuating 100,000 Indian nationals from the Persian Gulf ahead of the Gulf War.[39] More recently, India's airlift capabilities have reached across the extended neighbourhood to ferry supplies and humanitarian aid to crises from Lebanon to China.[40]

In terms of amphibious lift, the navy's present ability to move 3,000 troops plus vehicles and equipment is centred on the INS *Jalashva*, a 16,900-ton landing platform dock (LPD) that can transport nearly 1,000 soldiers and six medium helicopters. Sealift capacity should be increasing as the fleet's present complement of Magar-class landing ship tanks (LST), which can transport 500 men or 15 armoured vehicles, is expected to be supplemented by four new amphibious assault ships.[41] In line with

these developments, the Integrated Defence Staff developed a joint doctrine for amphibious warfare and earlier this year, the army formally raised a dedicated amphibious brigade based at Thiruvananthapuram, which is expected to form the core of a larger amphibious force in the future.[42]

The *Jalashva,* operating together with one of the new carriers and a pair of LST, provides roughly the same sized amphibious force—in terms of deployable troops, armoured vehicles, fighter aircraft and helicopters—as a typical US Marine Expeditionary Group. With proper logistical support, this force could provide India with the ability to respond to contingency or crisis situations of limited scope or duration in its "extended neighbourhood" —provided the intervention was not contested. As with the carrier battle groups discussed above, the ability to operate close to hostile shores requires assistance from surface vessels that can provide advanced anti-submarine and anti-aircraft capabilities. Should the Indian military reach its target amphibious lift capacity of 10,000 personnel, which would require both new amphibious platforms and an expansion of the number of amphibious ready troops, New Delhi would notionally have the ability to mount an operation on the size of the 1983 US intervention in Grenada, or respond to a major humanitarian crisis or NEO mission, all of which would go a long way towards Admiral Mehta's stated goal of playing a constabulary role in the Indian Ocean littoral region.[43]

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Strategic thinkers both inside and outside the Services have identified ambitious power-projection goals for all three branches of the Indian armed forces. In the near-term, these objectives appear to be much more aspirational than achievable. In the next decade, the ability to project sea power ashore will remain confined to attacking soft targets or providing limited air support to amphibious operations. The induction of advanced fighter aircraft makes precision strikes across South Asia a viable prospect, but a lack of significant tanker capacity would limit the projection of air power in the extended neighbourhood to symbolic rather than substantive operations. Finally, limited

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Conclusion

This article sought to provide some analytical clarity to the concept of military power projection in the Indian context by demonstrating both that the concept's scope goes beyond that often considered by Indian foreign policy thinkers as well as the fact that, since independence, India's armed forces have undertaken a range of power-projection missions when demanded by Indian national interest. While India may not have revisionist territorial aims, it does not necessarily follow that power projection is not part of the Indian psyche.

In this new century, it is likely that economic strength, rather than military prowess will be the real measure of state power. In an increasingly integrated world, the use of military force does not necessarily secure economic gain and, quite frequently, could undermine it. India may not yet have the global reach or global interests of a superpower, yet as it rises, India will need sufficient expeditionary military capability to retain foreign policy autonomy, control disorder in its immediate neighbourhood, and prevent the emergence of a power vacuum in key points of its extended neighbourhood that could be exploited by a less than friendly extra-regional power. In the near term, it is right for India to develop the capacity to play a more responsible role in the region, in line with its present capabilities. However, as the more ambitious power projection goals advanced by the armed forces indicate, there may come a time, in the words of Rahul Gandhi, when "we stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world."[44]

Notes

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2. Author's interviews with former military officers, Foreign Service personnel and scholars at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Institute for National Security Studies, New Delhi, July 2009.
3. Author's interview with senior member of the Indian Administrative Service, New Delhi, July 2009.
4. Author's interview with BJP parliamentarian, New Delhi, July 2009.
5. See, for example, Prithvi Ram Mudiam, "Indian Power Projection in the Greater Middle East:Tools and Objectives," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology,* Vol. 6, 2007, pp. 417-439 and David Scott, "India's 'Extended Neighborhood' Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power," *India Review,* Vol. 8, No. 2 April, 2009, pp. 107-143.
6. K Shankar Bajpai, "Engaging With the World," in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta, (eds), *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), p. 79.
7. Although the exact formulation did vary across the fifty interviews and meetings conducted by the author in New Delhi in July 2009 with politicians, former ambassadors, active duty and retired military personnel, senior members of the Indian Administrative Service, journalists and local defence analysts, the definition above captures the core elements reported to the author.
8. Frequently cited to author by interlocutors.
9. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2009), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
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12. Deepak Kapoor, "Changing Global Security Environment," in RK Jasbir Singh (ed), *Indian Defense Yearbook 2009* (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 2009), pp. 60-62.
13. Steven R Wiseman, "India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels," *New York Times,* 05 June, 1987.
14. Scott, n. 5,pp. 107-143 and Walter C. Ladwig III, "Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, 'Look East,' and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific," *Asian Security*

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15. Šumit Ganguly and Michael R Kraig, "The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," *Security Studies,* Vol. 14, No. 2, April-June 2005.
16. For example, following the 2001 attack on the state legislature in Srinagar, the Indian Army shelled Pakistani installations across the LoC, smashing "11 Pakistani posts" and inflicting "widespread damage and destruction." Celia W Dugger, "India Shells Kashmir Area, Imperiling Delicate Balance," *New York Times,* 16 October 2001.
17. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 23; and Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 2-3.
18. The quote is taken from *Indian Maritime Doctrine* (2004), p. 56. The Ministry of Defence identifies the same region as "India's security environment." *Annual Report 2006-2007* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2007), p. 2.
    For similar language from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, see "Prime Minister's Address," speech presented at the Combined Commanders Conference, New Delhi 26 October, 2004, http://pmindia.nic.in/lspeech.asp?id=37. Brajesh Mishra, then national security advisor to BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee also identified a similar zone of interest in "Global Security: An Indian Perspective," speech presented at the National Defence Institute, Lisbon, 13 April 2000, http://meaindia.nic.in/disarmament/dm13apr00.htm.
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20. Cited in Bedi, n. 1.
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22. Singh, n. 1,*2009*, p. 260.
23. Fali Homi Major, "India's Air Force in the 21st Century," in Singh, n. 1, pp. 72-73.
24. Bedi, n. 1; "India: Air Force," *Jane's World Air Forces* June 1, 2009.
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26. Bhashyam Kasturi, "Force Structures and Doctrines of the IAF," *Air Power Journal,* Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 2008, p. 10.
27. Bedi, n. 1.
28. Pandey, n. 25.
29. "India—Air Force."
30. Sixty aircraft would provide three times the force size of an Osirak type-raid on a single target, but only half the number of US and British aircraft employed in the multi-day

punitive strikes of Operation Desert Fox. Statistics from Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force confirm that one medium tanker is needed per four fighters for conventional strike missions. This ratio falls to 1:2.5 if aircraft are expected to loiter on station to provide persistent strike against mobile targets as in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Carlo Kopp, "RAAF Aerial Refuelling: Where To Next?" *Australian Aviation,* March 2004, pp. 1-2.

31. Pandey, n. 25.
32. Hackett, n. 1, p. 336.
33. Kapoor, n. 12, pp. 60-62.
34. Sujan Dutta, "Army for Larger Overseas Role," *The Telegraph* (Calcutta), 18 April 2007; Singh, n. 1, p. 68.
35. Pandey, n. 1.
36. Ibid., and "Armed Forces," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—South Asia,* 16 June 2009. Although only able to operate in permissive environments, some observers believe that India possesses the civil capability to move and sustain up to a brigade of troops—provided it has access to secure airfields. Stephen P Cohen, "The Bad, the Ugly and the Good: South Asian Security and the United States," *Testimony Before the House Committee on Armed Services*, 26 September 2005, p. 8.
37. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Get Behind Enemy Lines," *Strategic Affairs,* August 2008, pp. 22-23.
38. Pandey, n. 25.
39. Sanjeev Bedi, "Strategic Role of Air Power," *Air Power Journal,* Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 2008, p. 42.
40. "IAF Aircraft to Carry Relief Supplies to Lebanon," *Indian Express*, 12 August 2006; "IAF's Largest Ever Across the Border Relief Missions to Myranmar, China," *Asian News International*, 27 May 2008; "IAF Flies Medical Team, Aid to Sri Lanka," *Indo-Asian News Service*, 22 May 2009.
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42. Sujan Dutta, "US Marines Model for Amphibious Force," *The Telegraph* (Calcutta) 29 January 2009.
43. Singh, n. 1, p. 267.
44. Giridharadas, n. 1.