Counter-Terrorism Approaches Post-9/11:
Challenges and Responses

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Most studies on terrorism and political violence by experts and researchers have focussed on the causation factors of terrorism over the years. A majority of the scholarly works has mostly focussed on the historical, ideological, and etiological aspects of terrorism and insurgency. Scholars, researchers and investigators have attempted to epitomise and define terrorism as a phenomenon, and have admitted to the problems in finding a universally acceptable definition. They have primarily focussed on bringing out an acceptable definition of terrorism in all its manifestations and forms, and in the process, have analysed the roots, origins and growth of terrorism.

Compared to the enormous literature on the growth and incline of terrorism the world over, studies or scholarly works on the decline of terrorism or insurgency are not as vast and are limited in number.[1] A few experts like Martha Crenshaw and Audrey Cronin have dealt with this aspect in detail.[2] However, these attempts comprise only a fragment of the total terrorism literature in place.

A clear understanding of the reasons for the decline of terrorism and insurgencies has to be the basic framework to study the various approaches

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Most government responses to end insurgency and terrorism have been coercive, but have proved to be insufficient on their own. Lack of progress, militarily, creates a need to complement coercive military actions with other forms of approaches to end terrorism.

used by governments to orchestrate this decline. The idea of studying the reasons for the decline has to be more pertinent to the counter-terrorism experts, complemented with existing knowledge on the genesis of terrorism and insurgency, if one has to formulate an effective counter-terrorism strategy. The primary reason being that across the world, counter-terrorism policies formulated by governments invariably function under the broad premise that use of force alone contributes to decline in terrorism and insurgency. On the contrary, causal studies have brought out other factors which have a bearing on how an insurgency or terrorism ends. Hence, the counter-terrorism approach of a nation-state has to necessarily aim at precipitating and expediting such declines. Each of these approaches has different outcomes, which requires a clear and detailed understanding before implementation.

Past experiences have proved that military intervention alone does not precipitate a decline in terrorism. The US led war on terrorism has been continuing for the past 12 years. Has it been successful? Has the international community been able to achieve what it set out to accomplish? The answer has to be a resounding "No". Al Qaeda is still active; more groups are getting integrated as Al Qaeda affiliates. But, it is true that some groups have been defeated militarily. However, this list ends even before it begins. According to the RAND study named *How Terrorists Group Ends*, only 7 per cent of the groups have ended their campaign through direct military intervention between 1968 and 2006.[3] Hence, little or no success by military intervention on a stand-alone basis places an imperative to study the other approaches to end

terrorism or insurgency. In this context, the statement by then Defence Secretary Robert Gates in 2008, half way through the war on terror, is a stark reminder that a lot still needs to be done.

> In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit[4]

Most government responses to end insurgency and terrorism have been coercive, but have proved to be insufficient on their own. Lack of progress militarily creates a need to complement coercive military actions with other forms of approaches to end terrorism. Experts like Martha Crenshaw have indicated tools that a government employs, or could employ, to end terrorism like deterrence, criminal justice, enhanced defence and negotiations.[5] However, these tools are employable only after thoroughly understanding their use. They need to be customised in terms of their objectives to facilitate and orchestrate precipitation in the causal factors that bring about a decline in terrorism and insurgency.

Causal Factors of Decline and State Responses

Studies on the decline of terrorism and insurgencies have produced various core theories and related arguments which overlap each other. However, for the sake of easy understanding, the causal factors can be broadly classified into four main categories. They are: integration into mainstream politics; organisational breakdown due to splintering; loss of mass support; and policing and military intervention.[6] However, other factors like the death or arrest of the leader or leaders, competition among

terror groups in the same space leading to internecine conflicts , changed objectives like degeneration into criminality, or achievement of objectives by groups have to be a sub-set of either one or a combination of more than one of the above broad premises.[7] [8]

Another school of thought stresses that the factors that are involved in ending terrorism strongly resemble those which aided its growth.[9] Martha Crenshaw argues that strategic mistakes by terrorist groups also contribute to their downfall, at the same time, highlighting tactical changes like transition from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare as also one of the reasons.[10] Each of these factors responsible for the decline is brought about by individual government response. Hence, the primary government approaches to deal with the causal factor will be the logical way to study this concept. These are: integration approach; disintegration approach; constructive approach; and military interventionist approach. Based on an analysis of scholarly works and other open source data, the various approaches are explained briefly below.

Integration into Mainstream Politics

It has been observed that insurgent and terror groups across the spectrum have ended their violent campaigns and been integrated into the political mainstream. According to the RAND study titled *How Terrorists Group Ends*, out of the total 268 groups which were surveyed, 43 per cent ended their campaign due to political integration since 1968-2006.[11] Political integration is necessarily born of continuous negotiations between the warring parties caused due to either weakening of the terror groups and policy changes of the government or a combination of both. For instance, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) [CPN(M)] and the Government of Nepal concluded a comprehensive peace agreement in 2006 after a prolonged negotiation. This resulted in the Maoists laying down arms while, at the same time, integrating into the political mainstream. This resulted in confinement of Maoist combatants to temporary cantonments

till they were integrated into the Nepalese Army.[12] However, political integration is not an overnight affair but is also interlinked to a series of other factors such as splintering, loss of support, etc. The success of the talks primarily hinges on the sincerity of government efforts for political integration as perceived by the terror or insurgent groups. A sound rehabilitation package is one of the key ingredients of a political integration process.

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Integration Approach as the Government Response: The basis of this integration approach is negotiations. However, for negotiations to fructify, the nation-states and the terror groups have to constantly and continuously engage in them. Both the parties attempt to negotiate with each other from a position of their respective strengths. However, negotiations mostly occur with terrorists groups when they perceive themselves as weak.[13] Notwithstanding the high percentage of terror groups that have ended violence through political integration, this approach could be fraught with danger for the governments involved. There is always a possibility that the talks could break down and could also be used by terrorists to consolidate and regroup. Audrey Cronin has aptly stated, "Negotiations with terrorist groups are best approached as long-term, managed processes demanding patience, resilience, extensive intelligence, and steady determination, rather than the kinds of intensive meetings and well-publicized signing ceremonies that follow civil war ceasefires or the endings of conventional wars".[14] Also, there is always a possibility that negotiations may not end the violence nor always lead to the political integration of the terrorists or insurgents.

For instance, two of the most publicised such negotiations took place in the later part of the 20th century between the governments and

terror groups. One was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The IRA announced cessation of hostilities on August 31, 1994, followed by talks with the concerned stakeholders. However, it withdrew from the ceasefire offer which resulted in bomb blasts in 1995 and 1996.[15] Later, the government and IRA entered into peace talks after Tony Blair assumed office in 1997, which ended the bloody campaign in 1998. Though these talks were shadowed by issues like arms decommissioning by the IRA, the warring parties had the resolve to come to an agreement in the interest of all the parties concerned which resulted in the political integration of the IRA. On the other hand, peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE which started in 2002, broke down in 2006, resulting in resumption of hostilities. Some believe that this hiatus was used by the LTTE to clandestinely rearm itself.[16] Another important feature of these talks was that it facilitated a split in the LTTE ranks. Colonel Karuna who was the Commander of the LTTE's eastern flank and a member of the peace team, broke ranks with the LTTE leadership and joined the political mainstream.

Terror groups have seldom succeeded in achieving all their objectives either through negotiations or military victory. Only 10 per cent of the total terror and insurgent groups have ended their campaign due to this factor.[17] However, achieving objectives may not necessarily mean achieving all the objectives comprehensively and through military means. Sometimes, negotiated settlements of integration into the political mainstream could be an objective which the terror group could have claimed to have achieved. However, insurgencies with diverse objectives are less likely to end through this means compared to the objectives of small ethnic groups whose objectives could be narrow and acceptable to the state. For example, the primary objective of the Communist Party of India-Maoists [CPI-(M)] is "*Installation of a voluntary federation of nationalities with the right to secede*", according to its General Secretary

Ganapathy, which is less likely to be accepted by the government.[18] On the other hand, a group known as the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) laid down arms in 2003 after the creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The BLT's main objective was creation of a separate state for the Bodos, a tribal community in Assam. However, during the negotiated settlement, they compromised on their demand for a separate state of Bodoland and settled for governing an autonomous council within Assam in Kokrajhar. It is the best possible illustration of terror groups narrowing their main objectives in order to facilitate integration into the mainstream. The process of negotiated settlements is always fraught with danger. Negotiations and talks often create differences within terror groups which could face splits and conflicts.

Splintering

Splintering is one of the important factors which impede the growth of terror organisations. Fissures due to ideological differences, differences in choosing the path of struggle, egoistic clashes, and opposition to negotiated settlement also lead to breakdown in groups. Negotiations driven splits, in turn, could either be pro-talks or anti-talks. Divisions may not necessarily result from negotiations alone. Splintered groups may not always abjure violence—they may continue to perpetrate violence. Splintered groups are considerably weak compared to their original form which could either result in a military defeat or bring them to the negotiating table. For instance, the Maoist movement in India witnessed several splits and internecine conflicts from 1969. Most of these splits occurred due to internal differences. The first known split in a Maoist organisation named the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) occurred due the ideological differences in the path leading to armed revolution. The Kanhai Chatterjee led group broke away from the Charu Majumdar group to form the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), named *Dakshin Desh* (at the time of its inception

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in 1969),owing to ideological differences. Chatterjee believed that mass struggle should precede annihilation of class enemies whereas the Charu Majumdar group which formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), [CPI (ML)] was against the same. A weakened CPI (ML) was decimated militarily as most of its cadres were either arrested or killed which occurred concomitantly with the death of its leader Charu Majumdar. Another offshoot of this group, known as the CPI (ML) Liberation took the path of political integration in the early 1980s. Throughout the history of the Maoist movement till the late 1990s, similar splits and conflicts have been witnessed, leading to weakening of the movement.

Negotiation-driven splits create two broad ideas. The first one is *negotiations leading to splits* and, the second, *splits leading to negotiations*. Both are true to a certain extent. For instance, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) split into pro-talks and anti-talks factions. The pro-talks faction led by its Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa initiated peace talks with the Government of India after his arrest and subsequent release which was opposed by its military chief, Paresh Barua. The anti-talks factions have pledged to continue the armed struggle. This is a classic case of *negotiation leading to splits*.

On the other hand, the LTTE in Sri Lanka split into two factions in 2004. The splintered group led by Colonel Karuna broke away from the LTTE when it was actually in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. However, when peace talks with the LTTE Chief Prabhakaran failed in 2006, the Karuna faction integrated itself politically, using a concomitant channel of negotiations. In this case, the split occurred due to internal differences instead of negotiations. However, the splintered faction entered into negotiations with the Sri Lankan government successfully

which could be an ideal example of *splits leading to negotiations.*

Disintegration Approach as Government Response: The basis of splintering could be triggered by factors which are both endogenous as well as exogenous to a terror organisation. However, both these factors occur due to measures taken by the government directed at the terror groups directly or indirectly. The crux of the disintegration approach is to bring about disintegration from

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within the organisation. This approach attempts to use the weaknesses in the terror organisation and orchestrate further disintegration. The disintegration could take the shape of splits, leading to conflicts or voluntary surrenders. Orchestrating a split in a terror group has been attempted before by offering special amnesty and rehabilitation schemes for terrorist combatants which could increase the surrender percentage; psychological warfare measures like calibrated propaganda against terrorists; and last, but most important, through a well defined decapitation strategy. The decapitation strategy aims to disintegrate a group by killing or capturing its key leaders and decision-makers.

The LTTE's armed struggle came to an end after Prabhakaran's death. However, most of his trusted lieutenants were also killed along with him. Moreover, a tyrannical leadership like the one in the LTTE renders it leaderless (secondary level leaders) as second rung decision-makers are either executed by the leadership for their deviant behaviour or they defect.[19] However, the decapitation strategy may not be successful every time. Terror and insurgent groups are structurally arranged as hierarchical or networked, the latter being a recent phenomenon. Removal of leaders would have a higher impact on groups which are arranged hierarchically

compared to networked groups .However, recent variations and evolutions in terror and insurgent groups have relegated this decapitation theory behind. For instance, in August this year, 19 embassies of the United States were shut down temporarily across the Middle East, Africa and South Asia due to credible threats emanating from Al Qaeda and its affiliate organisations. This advisory which comes two years after the Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was eliminated, is ample testimony to the fact that removal of leaders or important operatives does not necessarily have a greater impact.

Researchers like Stern and Modi who have studied the organisational dynamics of terror groups state that a networked structure is less susceptible to splintering compared to a hierarchical one.[20] However, an entirely contrarian concept has emerged from studies related to Al Qaeda. Gunaratna and Oreg state that the hierarchically arranged Al Qaeda consistently has been able to replace leaders who were either killed or captured. They state that Al Qaeda has lost four chiefs of staff, four chiefs of the special forces unit, and at least half a dozen senior regional field commanders from 2003-12.[21] This is as a result of an evolving terror organisation having a hierarchical set-up at its super structure level and networked set-up at its lower modules. This hybrid organisational structure of terror groups would pose a serious threat to the success of the decapitation theory. Removal of leaders may not be successful in organisations which have a larger membership base. The decapitation theory is bound to succeed only on fringe groups or groups which are in their infancy stage of growth. Apart from the decapitation theory, psychological measures like government propaganda on the negative aspects of terror groups and insurgents aims to achieve withdrawal of mass support for the groups.

Loss of Public Support

Mass support determines the growth and longevity of a terror organisation. Losing public support could be a death knell for terror organisations.

For instance, the LTTE which used to enjoy wide support among the Tamil speaking population in Southern India, lost popularity and was banned in India after it assassinated India's former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. People stopped romanticising this organisation forthwith. A group in Italy called the Red Brigades lost public support, which eventually led to its decline, when it kidnapped and murdered Italy's former Prime Minster

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Aldo Moro.[22] However, in both cases, loss of support was due to the actions of the groups themselves. Violent negative actions like these, perpetrated by the groups themselves and positive constructive actions by the government, could cause reduction in the terrorist's support base. On the other hand, theorists have argued that action or inaction by the government leads to decrease or increase in the popular support base to terror groups. Government initiated negotiations with a clear and sincere intent are received well by the people which could veer away popular support that a terror group might enjoy. The Oslo peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians which was widely supported by the majority of the population on both the sides could be an ideal example for this.[23]

Constructive Approach as a Government Response: Scholars and theorists have argued that terrorism is bound to thrive in democracies rather than in countries ruled by dictators. Proponents of the constructive approach or economic approach have stated that there is a direct relation between economics and growth of terrorism. Experts like Thomas Gries, Tim Kriegery, Daniel Meierrieksz who advocate the economic theory as a causal factor for terrorism states, *"Solid growth in some countries may raise the opportunity costs of terror, thus, discouraging violent behavior, for instance, as individuals find more economic opportunities."*[24] Another

theorist named Piazza argues that pluralistic and diverse societies with a multi-party system are more vulnerable to terrorism than nation-states with a single party or two party systems. Piazza states, "*More diverse societies, in terms of ethnic and religious demography, and political systems with large, complex, multiparty systems were more likely to experience terrorism than were more homogeneous states with few or no parties at the national level.*"[25] The government approach to reduce socio-economic inequality in pluralistic societies will certainly be a factor in reducing the popular support.

Developmental actions by the government also play an important role in the constructive process. For example, decline of Sikh terrorism in India has been directly linked to the introduction of financial stability packages to farmers and more employment opportunities in the secondary and tertiary sectors in Punjab.[26] Similarly, the Government of India initiated various developmental actions in India's northeast which has brought down insurgency to a manageable level.[27] On the other hand, lack of economic development and absence of social rights has led to growth of Naxalite insurgency in some parts of India.[28] Hence, the birth and growth of violent movements are directly proportional to the level of development. Though, government action here relates to constructive actions, it can also be on the other end of the spectrum, using military intervention to bring about a decline.

Policing and Military Intervention

Scholars have attempted to differentiate military actions from policing actions. Technically, they are distinct. While policing relates to enforcement through preemption supported by a robust intelligence mechanism and strong legislations, direct military intervention comes at a later stage which uses force aimed at suppression. However, for the sake of simplicity both have been grouped under one category in this study. According to the RAND study quoted earlier, only 7 per

cent of the insurgencies have declined due to military intervention, whereas around 40 per cent of groups have ended their campaign due to effective policing.[29] However, both put together come to around 47 per cent which is higher than the percentage of decline contributed by any other means. For example, the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 after a prolonged civil war lasting over 30 years could be cited as an ideal example.

Interventionist Approach as Government Response*: Visible policing, enhanced surveillance and strong legislations were some of the primary reasons for the decline of a terror organisation known as the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada.[30] To illustrate the effectiveness of qualitative change in policing and military intervention, the actions against the Maoists in India could be an ideal example. Government actions against the Maoists took place at three different stages: 1985, 1991 and post 2000. Mr. Ganapathy, the General Secretary of the Maoists, is of the considered opinion that there was a considerable change in type of the forces used against them in 1991 compared to 1985. The Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBF) and Border Security Force (BSF) were used in 1991 which inflicted severe casualties on the Maoists. Similarly, there was a qualitative change in the military strategy during 2000-04 using communication systems, modern weapons, and better roads for connectivity.[31] However, this approach has not been able to make much headway. The Maoists currently are the single biggest insurgent group in India and pose the gravest threat to India's internal security.

Equivalent illustrations similar to the Indian scenario wherein interventionist strategies have failed could also be cited internationally. According to Bruce Hoffman, the US' war on terror has not been as successful as it was in its initial stages.[32] Thus, fragmented results for each of these approaches have compelled the policy-makers to implement a collective or blended approach.

Blended Approach

It is not very difficult to decipher that no single approach can orchestrate a decline on a stand-alone basis .The earlier mentioned clearly illustrate that causal factors of decline in terror and insurgent groups are linked to different government approaches. These approaches have to work in tandem and also have to be in a combination of two or more approaches to bring about any change.[33] For example, the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 was also due to the defection of Colonel Karuna on its eastern flank. Some have touted Colonel Karuna as being propped up by the Sri Lankan government which is a sub-set of the disintegration approach of divisive politics. Another classic example of the collective approach theory is the defeat of Sikh terrorism in India. Though, it was orchestrated by the military intervention approach, it was ably supported by the constructive approach by the Government of India. The success of these approaches lies in their interdependence among each other.

- A viable military action needs a robust intelligence mechanism and public support.
- A negotiated settlement under the integration approach needs military victories and enforcement mechanisms to weaken and pressure the terrorists to come to the table.
- A disintegration approach, on the other hand, needs negotiations to splinter the groups.
- A constructive approach needs to be supported by strong policing to protect its investments in development and infrastructure .All these approaches tend to work on the weaknesses of the terror and insurgent groups.

Though these approaches have been successful in the past, they have not been effective in stopping the recent manifestations of terror groups. The threat of terror groups has been haunting the international community for the past five decades. This is because it is an evolving

or changing threat. The terror groups have thwarted these attempts by evolving continuously and becoming more hybrid. This evolution or hybridisation is the key to their survival which has increased the life span of the terror groups. [34] This extension of their life needs to be contained.

A recent phenomenon in terrorism which is branded as "new terrorism" by experts, characterised by a decentralised structure ,virtual networks and self-sufficient resources complemented with indigenous membership, comprises a force to be reckoned with[35]. These terror offsprings which are born out of evolutions have been more pronounced since 9/11. These evolutions within terror groups have proved to be an enigma for counter-terrorism experts. [36] Thus, it is imperative that counter-terrorism strategies should include measures to restrict or contain these evolutions in addition to the existing ones discussed above. Counter-arguments could arise, questioning the need for such a response when other approaches seem to have yielded results in the past. However, this approach is advocated as a complementary one rather than an independent theoretical approach. It would be prudent and sensible to have this approach work in tandem with other measures and not on a stand-alone basis.

Containing the Change – Need for a Counter-Transition Approach: Transition or evolution or change is the only aspect which iterates itself in one form or another within a terror group. Organisations could undergo structural transitions, ideological transitions, resource transitions, territorial transitions, military and tactical transitions and total organisational transitions. These could happen individually or concomitantly throughout the life of a terror organisation.

These transitions within terror groups are an opportunity for the governments to bring about a decline. Though this approach of targeting transitions is a sub-set of the disintegration approach, the main distinction is that the directions in this approach will be focussed only against weaknesses during transitions alone and not against weaknesses in

a non-transition phase. Another key feature is that this approach should attempt to target the transitions in the perceived objectives or targets of other individual approaches, as outlined above.

The rationale behind such an approach is that government machinery can conserve its energy and resources for an appropriate moment. It could also minimise the impact of collateral damage from disproportionate or excessive use of a military interventionist strategy. Negotiated settlements could be much faster and favourable to the governments if timed at the right moment. Waiting for an appropriate moment would give the government the necessary breathing space to undertake a constructive approach. A "counter-transition approach" as it counters transition or evolution, may not have been used as a separate approach by governments earlier. However, there are instances where groups have collapsed due to government measures when they have been in transition. This is a direct outcome of actions of the terror groups themselves and not as a result of deliberate and scientific government actions to tap weaknesses during transitions.

For example, left wing extremism in Italy declined rapidly due to the amnesty scheme offered by the government. The success of this measure was more pronounced as it was announced at a time when the Italian Red Brigade was in total disarray and in a transitory stage.[37] The transitory phase pressurises groups to make mistakes. Terror groups, like normal entities, are bound to make errors. These errors are more pronounced and visible to the outside world during an evolution or in a transition phase in terror groups. The Red Brigade's kidnapping and killing of former Prime Minster Aldo Moro was their undoing. The Italian government wasted no time using suppressive military force with very strong legislations to bring about a decline in the Red Brigade. A similar kidnapping by Canada's Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) was also instrumental in their undoing as they were organisationally not disciplined during those times.[38]

The transition approach should envisage attacking the "change" element in a terror organisation. The change element could present the policy-makers with an opportunity to target the weaknesses. There have been innumerable missed opportunities in the past on the part of governments to tackle terrorism and insurgencies using this "change" element. For instance, the Maoists in India have witnessed lot of defections and surrenders due to their flawed recruitment strategy during the mid-2000s.[39] This also resulted in further splits with as many as five to six organisations born out of the Maoist movement in Jharkhand alone. The government failed to capitalise on this opportunity by not offering to have talks with these splinters groups which could have made the region less violence prone. Instead, it is believed that these groups were acting against the Maoists with impunity. This, in turn, resulted in internecine conflicts and turf wars, while these groups have grown in size and degenerated into criminal organisations without any ideological linkages. Had the government orchestrated talks with these groups instead of allowing them to grow, the environment would have been much more peaceful. Another aspect is that the defectors in the Maoists groups would have surrendered instead of joining the splintered group ranks.

Another missed chance was when the LTTE assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi which resulted in their losing public support in India and internationally. In stark contrast to the Italian government's actions stated earlier, the Sri Lankan government failed to capitalise on the anti-LTTE wave worldwide. It could have used this as an opportunity to highlight the actions of the LTTE to the countries in Europe, and in North America which later proved to be a strong support base in terms of funding from diasporas. The challenge for this counter-transition approach would be identifying the "change" which takes place internally in terror organisations. The change may not be always visible to the outside world. However, past experiences have provided vital clues though only a handful to begin with.

A change in the form or target of terror attacks could indicate a possible change in the source of funding. For example, there was a qualitative shift in ULFA's stand when it started bombing civilian places which is not a normal characteristic for an insurgent organisation. This could be attributed to ULFA receiving funds from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. On the other hand, organisational expansion to newer territories can possibly point to change in areas of operation due to sustained government pressure. For example, during the early 2000s, the Maoists started expanding into the newly created states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh after their rout in Andhra Pradesh. This could also point to resource diversification as Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were blessed with huge untapped natural resources, and coal deposits which are the main source of revenue for the Maoists now. Hence, the policy-makers should look for symptoms like these and develop a model which could trigger or alert a change.

Conclusion

The terror groups could attempt to counter these approaches by consolidation during cessation of hostilities, design a merger with other like-minded groups, change objectives to attract more recruits and funding, and create a broad alliance with other groups. However, these counter-approaches by terrorists are opportunities in themselves as the basis of these are the elements of "change". Regardless of whether these changes are natural or orchestrated, these reactionary approaches from groups could ideally present the policy-makers with a chance to counter terrorism. These efforts are required to be supported by a well coordinated policing and intelligence mechanism.

In the end, different approaches have different outcomes which could bring about a decline in terrorism and insurgency. However, a terrorism-centric approach may not be effective against an insurgent outfit and vice versa also holds good. A disintegration approach may not be effective

against decentralised networked outfits. The basis of a future counter-terrorism approach has to be framed with a clear understanding of the change that a terror organisation undergoes and which is in alignment with the maxim "*change is the only constant*" by Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus.

Notes

1. Steven Hutchinson and Pat O'Malley, "How Terrorists Group Decline," Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Vol. 1, 2007, available at http://www.itac.gc.ca/pblctns/tc_prsnts/2007-1-eng.asp

2. Audrey Kurth Cronin , "How Al Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 7–48; also see Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends," United States Institute of Peace, May25, 1999, pp. 1-11, available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr990525.pdf

3. Seth G Jones and Martin C Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End : Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida* (Santa Monica: RAND Publication, 2008), p. 19.

4. Full text of speech by Robert Gates available at http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/secretary-gates-speech-national-defense-university-september-2008/p17411

5. Crenshaw, n.2, pp. 1-11.

6. For a detailed analysis on insurgency declines, see Jones et al., n. 3.

7. For more on criminal degeneration, see Cronin, n. 2.

8. For more on competition among terror groups, see Stephen Nemeth, *The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations* (Kansas State University Publication.)

9. Jeffery Ian Ross, "The Rise and Fall of Quebecois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Application of Factors from Two Models," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, 1995, pp. 285-297.

10. Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 69-87; also see case studies on *Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia*. For tactical changes, refer case explanations on *Tupamaros* of Uruguay and *Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine*.

11. Jones et al., n. 3, p. 19.

12. United Nations, Comprehensive Peace Agreement Concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), October 22, 2006, full text of the agreement available at http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/report/tid_188/2006-11-29-peace_accord-MOFA.pdf

13. Audrey Kurth Cronin, "When Should We talk To Terrorists," United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, pp. 1-16, available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR240Cronin.pdf

14. Ibid.

15. Timeline: Northern Ireland's Road to Peace, *BBC News*, January 27, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4072261.stm

16. Randeep Ramesh, "Tamil Tigers Used Truce to Rearm, says Former Commander," *The Guardian*, April 4, 2007 available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/04/srilanka

17. Jones et al., n. 3, p. 19.

18. General Secretary CPI (M) Ganapathy stated this in a 2005 interview; listed as part of workshop material on the Naxalite Movement, Observer Research Foundation, 2005.

19. For example, the defection of Colonel Karuna, and execution of Mahathaiya, the LTTE's second in command till 1993 along with 250 of his associates for the *coup* in the LTTE could be representative of the tyrannical leadership within the LTTE.

20. For more on the organisational dynamics of terror groups, see Jessica Stern and Amit Modi, "Producing Terror, Organisational Dynamics of Survival," in Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, eds., *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 19-46.

21. For more on the organisational structure of Al Qaeda, see Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, "Al Qaeda's Organisational Structure and its Evolution," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 33, 2010, pp. 1043–1078; also see Rohan Gunaratna, "The Evolution of Al Qaeda", in Biersteker et al., Ibid., pp. 47-52.

22. Paul J Smith, "The Italian Red Brigades (1969-1984): Political Revolution and Threats to the State," in Jeffrey H Norwitz, ed., *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C. US Department of Navy, 2008).

23. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organisation*, Vol. 56, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 263-296.

24. Thomas Gries, Tim Kriegery, Daniel Meierrieksz, *Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth* (University of Paderborn, 2009).

25. James A Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18, 2006, pp. 159–177.

26. Charanjit Singh Kang, "The Rise and Decline of Sikh Anti-State Terrorism in India: An Economic Based Explanation," Simon Frazer University, Canada, 2013.

27. Prakash Singh, "India's North-East: The Frontier in Ferment," Joint Special Operations University, Florida, 2008.

28. For example, see Bela Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar," *The Economic and Political Weekly*, 2005 pp. 1536-1549.; also see, S Adhikari, "The Resurgence of Naxalism: Implications for India's Security," *Air Power Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2012, pp. 13-37; and, Shrey Verma, "Far Reaching Consequences of Naxalite Problem in India: Understanding the Maoist Problem," Rakshak Foundation, July 2011.

29. Jones et al., n. 3, p. 19.

30. Ross, n. 9, p. 292.

31. According to Ganapathy, qualitative military changes as serious measures caused confusion and chaos among the Maoist rank and file initially, n. 18.

32. Bruce Hoffman, "A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2010, pp. 359-377.

33. For more on blended or multi-pronged approaches, see Vivek Chadha, "Left Wing Extremism- Challenges and Approach," in Krishnappa Venkatachamy and Princy George, eds., *Grand Strategy for India – 2020 and Beyond* (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2012), pp. 93-106; also see, Vandana Asthana, *Cross-Border Terrorism in India: Counterterrorism Strategies and Challenges*, (Illinois: Eastern Washington University, 2010).

34. Ibid; according to Hoffman, the average life span of recent terror groups has increased five to ten times compared to their Cold War counterparts. Ninety percent of Cold War groups lasted only a year whereas groups in the 21st century have a life span between five to ten years. Some groups like Al Qaeda have lasted more than two decades. Hoffman argues that certain terror groups categorised as "survivors" have overcome Herculean obstacles, surmounted daunting challenges, and continue despite all odds to persevere, which should be of great concern to the international community. For more, see p. 373.

35. For more on virtual networks and organisational dynamics , see Stern et al., n. 20; for more on new terrorism, see NS Jamwal, "Counter Terrorism Strategy," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003; also see, Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (London: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 25, 2002, pp. 303-316.

36. For example, see DM Mitra, *Genesis and Spread of Maoist Violence and Appropriate State Strategy to Handle it* (New Delhi: Institute of Social Sciences, 2011). Mitra argues that the current Maoists are a different species which has evolved out of the earlier Naxalite movement.

37. Crenshaw, n. 9, p. 82.

38. Ibid., p. 84.

39. Ganapathy's interview, n. 18.