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India's Strategic Culture:
The Impact of Geography

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Abstract

Geography is a key element in strategic thinking and is an important source to explain strategic culture. There are many misconceptions about India's strategic culture, perhaps because it has not been clearly articulated and its security environment is relatively unsettled. The country is both a continental and maritime nation. Its geography offers a number of explanations to its insular nature, sense of civilisation and destiny. As the country did not inherit clearly demarcated borders on Independence, its reliance on its frontiers being bastions for defence and security has proved delusive. A deeper understanding of the nature of terrain along its borders is necessary. India's maritime heritage and responsibilities are also based on its geographic location. While geography remains unchanging, it is the shape of human behaviour that has changed geo-political equations.

Introduction

Power and national security are essentially based on geographic factors. The significance of geography, climate and resources is a key element in strategic thinking and remains an important source of strategic culture. Geographical circumstances are the key to understanding why some countries adopt particular strategic policies rather than others. Deeply embedded thoughts related to Indian geography have exerted a powerful influence in shaping its strategic thinking.

Geography affects strategic and operational planning, tactics, logistics, operations, relations with civilian populations, and the military evaluations of areas. Geography is not itself an element of national power, which is normally

described as having political, economic, and military elements. Geography is better viewed as the foundation on which these three elements of national power are built. A thorough knowledge of a broad range of geographic factors is necessary in order to effectively wield the elements of national power in pursuit of national interests. Any credible military response to a regional conflict requires an understanding of the geography of that region, as geographic conditions may enhance or constrain the exercise of military power. "Military operations are drastically affected by many considerations, one of the most important of which is the geography of the region."[1] Geographic factors in the context of changing political scenarios exert their own influence on the making of strategic policy.

A country's strategic culture is the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour of its national strategic community. It is underlined by continuity of thought amongst individuals as well as by organisations within a country. It is often said that India lacks a strategic culture. This view is especially prevalent amongst the Western analysts, and needs to be corrected. There is always a considered rationale for the manner in which a nation acts.

India's extraordinary history is intimately tied to its geography. At a focal point in the Asian landmass, it has always been an invader's paradise, while, at the same time, its natural isolation from the rest of Asia allowed it to adapt to, and absorb, many of the people who entered the subcontinent. No matter how many Persians, Greeks, Mongols, Arabs, Portuguese, British and other peoples came to plunder, trade or rule, India has survived their depredations. India has always been simply too big, too complicated, and too culturally strong to let any single empire or constituency dominate it for long. In any case, history has a different slant depending on who has recorded it. India's national security environment is determined by a complex interplay of its geographical attributes, historical legacy, and socio-economic circumstances as well as regional and global developments.

Overview

The Indian subcontinent is the southern geo-political region of Asia comprising territories which geo-physically lie on the Indian Plate (bordered on the north by the Eurasian Plate) and are south of the Himalayas and the Hindu

Kush mountain ranges. It is surrounded (from west to east) by Western Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Asia, and Southeast Asia. This vast and natural entity has the Arabian Sea on its west, the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea to its east and the Indian Ocean to the south. Its area of over 4.5 million sq km is home to one-fourth of the world's population. It now comprises the independent countries of Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. India is by far the largest entity and shares borders with the other four, none of whom share borders amongst each other. Non-contiguous to the mainland are the Lakshadweep Islands in the Arabian Sea and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands located 1,300 km from the mainland in the Bay of Bengal.

India is the seventh largest country in the world with a land area of 3.2 million sq km. Its territorial borders were settled by adjudication but later have been forged through conflict and are still contested. India's land boundaries total 15,106.7 km. India shares common borders with Pakistan (3,323 km; the Jammu and Kashmir border is 1,085 km), China (Line of Actual Control is 3,488 km), Bhutan (699 km), Nepal (1,751 km), Myanmar (1,643 km), and Bangladesh (4,096.7 km).[2] Although India and Sri Lanka do not share a land boundary, the narrowest distance between the two countries is only 64 km across the Palk Strait. Most of Jammu and Kashmir is contested with Pakistan, and the Aksai Chin area of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed with China, as is the border of Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India. Nepal claims a 75 sq km area called Kalapani. Possession of the recently emerged New Moore Island (South Talpatty) in the Bay of Bengal has been disputed by Bangladesh, and much of the border with Bangladesh is not demarcated.

India shares maritime borders with five countries.[3] Its total coastline is 7,516 km in length, comprising 5,422 km for the mainland, 132 km for the Lakshadweep Islands, and 1,962 km for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Indian peninsula juts 1,980 km into the Indian Ocean. Fifty percent of the Indian Ocean basin lies within a 1,500 km radius of India, a reality that has strategic implications. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, India has a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, a 24 nautical mile contiguous zone, and a legal continental shelf extending to a depth of 2,500 metres or to the end of the continental margin. India has 1,197 islands in the Indian Ocean. (572 in the Andaman and Nicobar – 38 of which are inhabited – and 23 in the

Lakshadweep – 10 of which are inhabited. In addition, there are 447 islands off the western coast and 151 islands off the eastern coast).

While India is seen as one entity, when viewed physically against the backdrop of Asia, it is physically separated from the rest of Asia by high mountain ranges. India has three main geological regions, the Indo-Gangetic Plain and the Himalayas—collectively known as North India—and the Peninsula, or South India. Geographically, India is divided by the Vindhya ranges into north and south (or peninsular) India. India has diverse regions that include highlands, plains, deserts, and river valleys. The country's highest elevation is 8,598 metres at Kanchenjunga, which is the third highest mountain in the world and located in the Himalayas. The Gangetic plain, and the rivers of the Punjab irrigate the fertile soil making it a rich agricultural region, which has attracted invaders through the millennia. India has approximately 14,500 km of inland waterways, but their transportation potential is vastly underused.

The exact number of ethnic groups in India depends on the source and method of counting. Only the continent of Africa exceeds the linguistic, cultural, and genetic diversity of India: 72 percent of the population is Indo-Aryan, 25 percent Dravidian, and 3 percent Mongoloid and other. Each of these groups can be further sub-divided into numerous combinations of language, religion, and caste.

The total number of languages and dialects varies by the source and counting method, and many Indians speak more than one language. The census lists 114 languages (22 of which are spoken by one million or more persons) that are further categorised into 216 dialects or "mother tongues" spoken by 10,000 or more speakers. An estimated 850 languages are in daily use, and there are more than 1,600 dialects. Hindi is the official language and the most commonly spoken, but not all dialects are mutually comprehensible. English has official status and is widely used.

Approximately 80.5 percent of the population is Hindu, 13.4 percent Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, 1.9 percent Sikh, 0.8 percent Buddhist, and 0.4 percent Jain; another 0.6 percent belongs to other faiths, such as Zoroastrianism and numerous religions associated with Scheduled Tribes. The Indian Constitution confers religious freedom for individuals and prohibits religious discrimination, but in spite of this, there have been enduring tensions

among religious communities, most notably between Hindus and Muslims.

India has the distinction of being the largest, the first and the poorest state created by the ebb of the European empire after World War II. India's multiple borders are confronted by different strategic factors at each point of contact with neighbouring states, raising multiple security dilemmas. In the Indian subcontinent, the past never leaves the present. Also, it is a region that chooses its memories selectively. A strategic culture evolves over time, yet possesses a strong degree of continuity. Past lessons settle into the collective consciousness of a population or group. Strategic culture is, therefore, a fluid, continuously evolving concept.

The Identity of India

The identity of India refers to the kind of country it is, and wishes to be. The essence of Indian security policy lies in its quest for strategic autonomy. To understand this, it must be realised that India is largely friendless in the world today. India has friendly relations with many states but friendship with none. India's relationship with the US is constrained by many factors, including the latter's security links with Pakistan. An important factor that places limits on US-India security relations is that the former does not regard India as a member of the 'democratic core' of states, as it is not a part of any security pact led by the US. India, therefore, cannot rely on the US for security back-up as it successfully depended for two decades upon the Soviet Union. Also, India is just too big to be accommodated in any security pact as a junior partner. Faced by varied threats and adversaries, India has no option but to rely on its own capabilities. These capabilities, while significant in certain contexts, are by no means sufficient and are prone to debilitating weakness in critical areas.

Geography, history and resources have been key elements in strategic thinking throughout the millennia and remain important sources of strategic culture. Maintaining democracy and promoting development—and treating both as equally important and necessary—is the biggest security challenge facing India. Over 60 years of genuine liberal democracy in a pluralist, multicultural, socio-economically deprived, continent-sized setting is surely an achievement of world historical importance that deserves to be recognised.

In 1947, India inherited many disadvantages—the accumulated subtractions

of many centuries — but one great advantage, that of resurgent nationalism. There are five important features of the Indian identity. These are:

- India is a republic, i.e. a democracy with an elected head.
- It is a secular country. The state is not committed to a particular religion.
- India is committed to social justice and equality for its citizens. The Directive Principles of the Constitution are an egalitarian vision of Indian society.
- India is a plural society. It cherishes its diversity and allows its different communities full freedom to express themselves.
- India is not just a nation-state but a distinct civilisation with its own perspective on the world. India sees the world through its own eyes, avoids being tied to a particular country or bloc, and brings to the international community its own distinct voice. India's traditional neutrality is a political expression of this.

India has not inherited any strategic thought, as it has always been a land divided geographically and otherwise. History shows that there had been little opportunity or reason for conceptualising any such thought, as it was never considered a *sine qua non* of statecraft. Against this backdrop, to understand better the security challenges that confront India, there is a need to analyse who we are, what moves us, what we stand for, where we are planning to go, why we want to go there and how we propose to get there. "Deeply embedded habits of thoughts related to Indian geography, history, culture.... exert a powerful influence....they will, in the foreseeable future, help to shape its strategic thinking and its strategy."[4]

A strategic culture serves to explain how a country's culture influences its strategic behaviour. Equally important is how the political and military elite of a country view an adversary or potential adversary. A nation-state's view of itself—its national character, its intended regional and global roles, and its perceptions of its eventual destiny—are important facets. National culture, thus, plays a significant role in influencing security policy. Interests, power, and violence are staples of international relations. States cannot avoid the responsibility of pursuing their national interest. Nor can they be indifferent to the cultivation of power—their own and that of other states.

States must look after themselves in a world in which violence is a regrettable last resort.[5] India's view is that international laws and institutions, military restraint, negotiations and compromise, cooperation, free intercourse between societies, and regard for the well-being of people everywhere and not just one's own citizens can overcome the rigours of the international system.[6]

India is an ancient civilisation and Hinduism is the oldest of the world's religions. It is a country where the burden of history hangs heavy over the national psyche. Its way of looking at the world and at itself is unique, shaped by its geography, history and religious influence. Its civilisational heritage makes it place morality above reality, yet it has the ability to absorb or permanently subdue other influences. It is a country where ethnic identity can transcend national identity, yet nationalism is placed at a high pedestal in the minds of the people. It, therefore, shapes national behaviour and defines values in discernible and measurable ways. India's historical experience has generated various ideas on issues of national strategy and policy.

India's approach to the world is naturally a function of its values, history and geography, and of how it defines its interests.[7] India has several strategic issues that are yet to be resolved in its quest for its rightful place in the comity of nations. Pakistan and India share the world's most dangerous nuclear border. The rise of China looms large against the backdrop of a long-standing border conflict. India's geographical location—at the natural junction of busy international shipping lanes that crisscross the Indian Ocean—has a major impact upon the formulation of her maritime strategy in support of the pursuit of her national interests.

There are many shibboleths about India's strategic culture, perhaps because it has not been clearly articulated. The country is both a continental and maritime nation. Its location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a vantage point in relation to both West, Central, continental and Southeast Asia, and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, from East Africa to Indonesia. India's projection into this vast and critically important waterway gives it a major stake in its security and stability.

Continental Aspects

While geography is the study of the physical environment, its centrality is to discover in what ways and to what extent this environment affected history. Geographical analysis can offer more towards the understanding of international politics than just an appreciation of the facts of location.[8] Borders define nationhood and sovereignty. India never had borders till Independence. Essentially, its boundaries over the centuries can best be termed as 'frontiers' i.e. a demarcation between territories with independent sovereignties. A frontier constitutes "an area of separation" between two regions of "more or less homogeneous, and usually denser, population."[9] It is of such frontiers that Lord Curzon spoke when, in his classic essay bearing that name, he described them as "the razor's edge" on which hang the modern issues of war and peace and of life or death to nations.[10] Warfare has always occurred for the defence of frontiers.

In the making of frontiers, international law has a significant role to play. The recognition of the existence, sanctity and permanence of frontiers is one of the foundations on which the law of nations has been built. Frontiers once negotiated and demarcated cannot be altered unilaterally. They are inviolate and unalterable save through negotiation, for any use of *force majeure* in such cases would be a denial of international law itself.[11] Vital as the element of power politics is, human geography plays an equally important part.[12] What makes for frontiers, and frontier problems, are such factors as race, population, language, geography and access to the sea.[13] Religion also plays an important role in varying degrees, e.g. the birth of Pakistan (1947) and Israel (1948). Also, self determination has been a powerful weapon in creating new frontiers by disrupting ancient ones.[14]

There is a further distinction between a boundary and a frontier. Geographical and historical boundaries, shown as lines on a map, represent the edges of frontiers. A boundary does not merely demarcate geographical regions or divide human societies but represents the optimum limits of growth of a particular society.[15] In an address to the Royal Society of Arts in 1935, Sir Henry McMahon maintained that a frontier meant a wide tract of border land which, because of its ruggedness or other difficulties, served as a buffer between two states. A boundary, on the other hand, was a clearly defined line expressed either as a verbal distinction (delimited) or as a series

of physical marks on the ground (demarcated); the former thus roughly signified a region, while the latter was a positive and precise statement of the limits of sovereignty.[16]

The Great Wall of China connoted the domain that it was thought proper to include in the *tien h'sia*, marking it from the outer darkness of the barbarians. So too did the Roman Empire's frontiers along the Danube, which separated it from the uncivilised tribes beyond its pale.[17] Much the same holds true of the northern mountain ranges in Indian history. The issue here was not only one of keeping the barbarians out, but also of setting limits to the imperial rule.

The long and sprawling land frontier between India and China is now the subject of a bitterly raging conflict between the two countries. The Himalayas were always considered as a natural barrier 'forbidding' or 'preventing' passage. A mountain system – and the extent to which it is a barrier is inversely proportional to the ease with which it can be crossed – tends to mark a separation between economic and strategic regions. While mountains were a barrier to older societies, they do not pose insurmountable problems to an industrialised society that is equipped with airplanes or the frightening armoury of thermo-nuclear weapons; here it is not nature that has changed, but man.[18]

Today, the sea, the desert, the mountain and the river no longer guarantee natural security as they once did. Even artificial contrivances as a neutral territory, state or zone, or a buffer state, e.g. Afghanistan and Tibet during the British period, do not inspire in the guarantors, much less among those so guaranteed, any measure of confidence. Frontiers today have evolved from being mere geographical barriers into human bulwarks against political ideologies and systems of government, each of them claiming ultimate perfection and allowing at best a modicum of peaceful, if highly competitive, coexistence.[19]

The frontier, in both geo-political, as well as the human geography contexts, has played a significant role in India's long and sprawling and frontier to the northeast which, for most of its length, is co-terminous with Tibet. For further understanding of its intricacies, it is imperative to analyse its historical geography under its obvious sub-divisions of northwest and northeast segments. This is done later in this paper.

From the very inception of its recorded history and the fight of Chandragupta Maurya against the Greeks, India's northwest frontier has been a subject of considerable concern to her rulers.[20] It was to protect the Khyber and other passes from the northwest against these onslaughts from 'barbaric hordes' that every powerful Indian Empire evolved a 'frontier' policy. Thus, the policy of Chandragupta Maurya against the post-Alexander Greeks, of Anangpal vis-à-vis the Ghaznavids, of Balban against the Mongols, or of Akbar or Aurangzeb when faced with threats from Central Asia was essentially the same.[21] Ranjit Singh's acumen in the handling of the frontier in the post-Nadir Shah /Ahmad Shah Abdali period, earned him a well-merited tribute from his British successors. The latter, whose span has been the most recent in Indian history, deserves close examination, if only to understand the present situation in that region.

For India, the Himalayas comprised a frontier of both ingress and egress. With Tibet in the north, the intercourse was largely one of religious doctrines and their practice, the mountain barrier being far too formidable to mount any large-scale invasion. But on the western side, the Khyber did provide a route for any hostile power to challenge the northern Indian polity, unless the latter was in a position to defend itself. As to the southern frontier, the peninsular barrier did not constitute any major obstacle; though both Ashoka (273-237 BC) and the Mughals (1565-1820) did hold sway over lands south of the Vindhyas.

It is difficult to sum up the British epoch in a nutshell, but it may suffice to suggest that during the colonial period, the theory and practice of the frontier, as also the foreign and defence policy of a united India, rested on the evolution of a buffer state. Both Afghanistan and Tibet fulfilled this role.

The Changes After Independence

When a state is enclosed by three other states, its territory is focal. He who first gets control of it will gain the support of All-Under-Heaven.[22] This Sun Tzu's dictum speaks directly of one of the most important geographic factors—location—and why some countries or regions have long histories of recurring warfare. There are many other aspects of geography that bear directly on the power that a nation develops and the strategies it employs in seeking to secure its national interests.

India-Pakistan-China (Kashmir)

On partition of India in 1947, the border and tribal problem along the Hindu Kush fell in the lap of Pakistan. The ongoing problem of the Durand Line as the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan does not form part of this analysis. However, Pakistan has referred to the importance of this region as part of its "strategic depth", a military term that refers, broadly speaking, to the distance between the front lines or battle areas and the nation's core areas or heartland.

The gaining of strategic depth in Afghanistan has been a major objective of Pakistan's policy.[23] Islamabad's anxieties about its northern neighbour commenced almost immediately after Independence. The combination of Pashtun ambitions in Pakistan, the uncertain status of the Durand Line, memories of long military campaigns in the Northwest Frontier and the fierce independence of Afghanistan made Pakistan anxious. A strong military sense of geo-politics has led it to perceive the need to gain control over Afghanistan. The notion of strategic depth has emerged stronger after the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union and emergence of independent Central Asian states. Strategic depth is a relational concept. It is sought as protection against an adversary. Pakistan's search for strategic depth is essentially a hedge against India.

The adjudication/demarcation of the border between India and Pakistan, and the dispute over Kashmir has only opened another frontier of conflict, with its own intractable dynamics. When India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, the various princely states, including that of Jammu and Kashmir, could accede to either country. When the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India in order to gain military aid, following a Pakistani-inspired incursion, Pakistan objected and the countries went to war. The matter was taken up by the UN Security Council in 1948, which adopted a resolution calling for the restoration of order, the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and reduction of Indian forces, and a UN plebiscite. Both India and Pakistan objected to several of these provisions. They went to war over Kashmir again in 1965. In 1971, India intervened in Pakistan's civil war that led to the independence of Bangladesh. A border conflict also occurred in the Kargil area of Kashmir in 1999.

The border between Indian and Pakistani controlled Kashmir was delineated as the Ceasefire Line, following the Karachi Agreement of 1949. Both sides fell back to this line after the 1965 War. The current line was established by the 1972 Simla Accord and is now referred to as the Line of Control (LoC). However, the line was never delineated in the area of the Siachen Glacier. The text of the agreement defines the Ceasefire Line in this area as running to map coordinate NJ 9842 and ". . . *thence north to the glaciers*." The Indian interpretation is that the LoC should run northeasterly from NJ 9842 along the Saltoro Range to the Chinese border. The Pakistani interpretation is that the LoC should run from NJ 9842 straight to the Karakoram Pass on the Chinese border. Both nations have incurred heavy economic costs and casualties in this conflict.

In 1963, China and Pakistan delimited a boundary that illegally gave part of Kashmir to China. In 1987, a Sino-Pakistani protocol formalised demarcation of their boundary, terminating it at the Karakoram Pass.

India-Pakistan

The international border between India and Pakistan has been demarcated with boundary pillars constructed. In 1992, India completed fencing most of the 547-km-long section of the boundary between the Indian state of Punjab and the Pakistani province of Punjab. This measure was undertaken because of the continuing unrest in the region caused by both ethnic and religious disputes among the local Indian population and infiltrators from both sides of the frontier. The more rugged terrain north of Punjab along the entire Ceasefire Line between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir continues to be subject to infiltration and local strife, though fencing has been undertaken here also. Most of the border in the desertic areas of Rajasthan has also been fenced.

In April 1965, a dispute in the Rann of Kutch (a region of salt flats that is submerged for six months of the year in the state of Gujarat) contributed to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Later the same year, both countries set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. A verdict was reached on 19 February 1968 which saw Pakistan getting 10 percent of its claim of 9,100 sq km. The majority of the area, thus, remains with India. A new border was subsequently demarcated as an established international boundary.

India-China

India came to Independence within a particular and accepted territorial framework, the source of its legitimacy being within the framework of international law in the territorialist conception, whereby it is entitled to the boundaries established by the colonial power, i.e. Britain. Today, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the effective border between India and the People's Republic of China. It lies along the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Tibet had been one of the most important buffer states with a 3,520-km border with India. India felt safe behind the buffer until the Chinese occupied Tibet in the early 1950s. The Sino-Indian border dispute is a legacy of the British Raj, though the problem of demarcation/delineation of the India-China border actually started shortly after Independence. The Chinese military invasion into India in 1962 shattered the myth of India's impregnable Himalayas.

Geographically, the India-Tibet border can be divided into three sectors; the eastern sector consisting of the erstwhile Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the present Arunachal Pradesh, the central sector comprising Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the western or the Ladakh sector from Demchok to the Karakoram Pass. The dispute between India and China lies mainly over sovereignty over two separated pieces of territory. One is Aksai Chin, located either in the Indian province of Kashmir or the Chinese province of Xinjiang in the west. It is demarcated by what is known as the "Johnson Line". It is a virtually uninhabited high-altitude wasteland crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway. In Ladakh, the LAC is actually ambiguous because of several "claim lines" and due to the paucity of easily recognisable terrain features on the Aksai Chin plateau.

The other disputed area lies to the east over the territory referred to as Arunachal Pradesh by India and South Tibet by China. It is demarcated by what is known as the "McMahon Line" established in a 3 July 1914 agreement by Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the British plenipotentiary, to a conference of Indian, British, and Chinese representatives at Simla, which was initialled by British, Tibetan, and Chinese representatives.[24] It is a sparsely inhabited area with numerous local tribes. The eastern sector was neglected by the British Raj and independent India, and remains a geographical problem that has not been appropriately resolved. The line agreed to by Britain and Tibet generally

follows the crest of the eastern Himalayas from Bhutan to Burma. It serves as a legal boundary, although the Chinese have never formally accepted it. China continues to claim roughly the entire area of Arunachal Pradesh south of the McMahon Line.

In the Kameng sector of Arunachal Pradesh, the McMahon line runs along the crest of the Greater Himalayas from the eastern boundary till it reaches the Thagla ridge in the west. The actual demarcation was not easy as the watershed principle does not hold good in this sector, leading to different interpretations by India and China, both claiming Thagla, the highest ridge in this area. The Thagla-Bumla-Tulungla routes converge on Tawang, but it is also possible to bypass this township and proceed directly to Sela. This route lies along the foothills of Chaku-Eagle's Nest—Tenga Valley-Bomdila-Dirang-Udalgiri-Kalaktang-Mandala ranges from 14,000 to 17,000 ft. The most significant of these tracks is from Tawang-Mago-Poshingla-Changla-Thembang-Bomdila, also known as Bailey's Trail, which played a vital role in the1962 border war with China.

China and India have yet to address the fundamental and very large land boundary disputes. Moreover, their bilateral relations are complicated by the issues of Tibet and Kashmir. China has actually made an overreach in Tibet against the dictates of geography. The Beijing-Lhasa rail link is 4,064 km. Moscow is 4,358 km from Delhi. Geographically and culturally, Tibet and China are poles apart.

Some aspects of the India-China boundary do need emphasis. To start with, it is by no means easy to translate an undemarcated traditional boundary into map lines. The Chinese have persisted with their rhetoric of mutually acceptable borders and charged New Delhi with being a little too rigid, legalistic, and even unwilling to negotiate. The British had tried hard not only to identify traditional or customary boundaries, but also helped evolve strategic boundaries. In the event, McMahon's thick line drawn on a small scale map is hard to transpose on the ground and stick to natural features or such dicta as the highest crest in very high mountains.

India-Myanmar

The frontier with Myanmar has been delimited but not completely demarcated. On 10 March 1967, the Indian and Burmese governments signed a bilateral

treaty delimiting the boundary in detail. India also has a maritime boundary with Burma in the area of the northern Andaman Islands and Burma's Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal.

India-Bangladesh

India's border with Bangladesh is essentially the same as it was before East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971. It passes through West Bengal (2,216.7 km), Assam (263 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Tripura (856 km) and Mizoram (318 km). It consists of plains, hills and jungle with hardly any major obstacles. The area is heavily populated and cultivated extensively up to the border. India's border with Bangladesh has a peculiar problem of 'enclaves and adverse possessions'. "There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India."[25] These enclaves were established in the period from 1661 to 1712 during fighting between the Mughal Empire and the principality of Cooch Behar. This complex pattern of enclaves was preserved by the British administration and passed on intact to India and Pakistan. Thirty-four tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India's adverse possession. Though the Land Border Agreement of 1974 has provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it has not been implemented as the problem is politically sensitive. The Teen Bigha Corridor is a strip of land formerly belonging to India on the West Bengal-Bangladesh border which has been leased indefinitely to Bangladesh so that it can access its Dehgram-Angalpota enclaves.[26]

The India-Bangladesh border is marked by territorial complexities which render the border porous for illegal immigration. This is a challenging proposition for India.

India-Nepal

India's borders with Nepal and Bhutan have remained unchanged since the days of British rule. The border with Nepal runs along the foothills of the Himalayas in northern India. The Siliguri Corridor, narrowed sharply by the borders of Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh, connects peninsular India with the northeastern states. The border with Nepal was virtually unattended till very

recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 treaty between the two countries.

The dispute between India and Nepal involves about 75 sq km of area in Kalapani, where China, India, and Nepal meet. India occupied the area in 1962 after China and India fought their border war. Three villages are located in the disputed zone: Kuthi, Gunji, and Knabe. India and Nepal disagree about how to interpret the 1816 Sugauli Treaty between the British East India Company and Nepal, which delimited the boundary along the Maha Kali river (Sarda river in India). The dispute intensified in 1997 as the Nepali Parliament considered a treaty on hydro-electric development of the river. India and Nepal differ as to which stream constitutes the source of the river. Nepal regards the Limpiyadhura as the source; India claims the Lipu Lekh. The countries have held several meetings about the dispute and discussed jointly surveying to resolve the issue.[27] Although the Indo-Nepali dispute appears to be minor, it gains strategic value because it lies near the Sino-Indian frontier.

India-Sri Lanka

India and Sri Lanka share a maritime boundary. However, there was a dispute over the territorial control of Kachativu, a small 285-acre island in the Palk Bay, where Indian fishermen ventured to catch prawns and other fish. On 28 June 1974, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ceded control of Kachativu to Sri Lanka, presumably in an effort to foster good relations with the neighbour. Mrs. Gandhi brushed Kachativu off as having no strategic importance. But now there are calls from within India to take Kachativu back, and the protection of Indian fishermen is the primary justification for such arguments. Advocates of Indian control over Kachativu who are also sensitive to diplomatic constraints suggest that India lease the island in perpetuity, thereby skirting sovereignty issues while still addressing pragmatic security considerations. One of the solutions proposes that India offer Sri Lanka territorial or economic incentives in return for a permanent lease on Kachativu.[28]

Inner Line Areas

Many parts of India fall within the purview of restricted areas (defined by the establishment of an "Inner Line"). The introduction of the Inner Line

permit was done in order to protect the culture, ethnicity and socio-economic rights of the indigenous people of the state. The Inner Line varies but is usually between 50-100 km of the border with China and Burma. The border with Pakistan is open only at Wagah. A visit to anywhere within 50 km of Pakistan in Rajasthan (except Jaisalmer) requires special permission. Apart from border areas, special permits are required for visits to Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya in the northeast; the Lakshadweep Islands; the Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Sikkim and the hill areas of West Bengal; parts of Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh and Bastar in Madhya Pradesh.

Sir Creek

Sir Creek is a 96-km strip of water disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch marshlands. The creek, which opens up into the Arabian Sea, divides the Kutch region of the Indian state of Gujarat from the Sindh province of Pakistan. It is named after the British representative who was requested to mediate in a dispute between the ruler of Sindh and the Rann of Kutch over a pile of firewood lying on the banks of the nearby Kori Creek.[29] The long-standing dispute hinges in the actual demarcation "from the mouth to the top of Sir Creek, and from the top of Sir Creek eastward to a point on the line designated on the Western Terminus." From this point onwards, the boundary is unambiguously fixed as defined by the Tribunal Award of 1968.

The creek itself is located in the uninhabited marshlands. During the monsoon season between June and September, the creek floods its banks and envelops the low-lying salty mudflats around it. During the winter season, the area is home to flamingoes and other migratory birds. The dispute lies in the interpretation of the boundary line between Kutch and Sindh as depicted in a 1914 map. At that time, the region was a part of Bombay Presidency of undivided India. After India's independence in 1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan while Kutch remained a part of India. Pakistan lays claim to the entire creek. India sticks to its position that the boundary lies mid-channel as depicted in another map drawn in 1925, and implemented by the installation of mid-channel pillars back in 1924.

India supports its stance by citing the Thalweg Doctrine in International Law. The law states that river boundaries between two states may be, if

the two states agree, divided by the mid-channel. Though Pakistan does not dispute the 1925 map, it maintains that the doctrine is not applicable in this case as it only applies to bodies of water that are navigable, which the Sir Creek is not. India rejects the Pakistani stance by maintaining the fact that the creek is navigable in high tide, and that fishing trawlers use it to go out to sea. Several cartographic surveys have upheld the Indian claim.

Border Management

The management of India's borders presents many challenges requiring coordinated and concerted action by administrative, diplomatic, security, intelligence, legal, regulatory and economic agencies of the country to secure the frontiers and serve the nation's best interests.

The India-Pakistan border has varied terrain and distinct geographical features. It is characterised by attempts at infiltration by terrorists and smuggling of arms, ammunition and contraband, the LoC being the most active and live portion of the border. It has now been fenced and floodlit by India, except for some gaps in riverine areas, as part of the strategy to check anti-national activities across the Indo-Pakistan border. The India-Bangladesh border is partially fenced.

Maritime Aspects

Throughout history, the sea has been an important medium for economic prosperity. India's peninsular projection in the ocean which bears its name, gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters. As the only ocean to bear a country's name, the Indian Ocean evokes a subliminal sense of pride in the Indian mind. Writing in the 1940s, K M Pannikar stated,

> The interests of India in the Indian Ocean are different from those of other countries whose shores are washed by its waters. The other countries are not so entirely dependent as India on this ocean…..the peninsular nature of this country with its extensive coast line, and a rich and fertile littoral makes India entirely dependent on the Indian Ocean……while to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial

development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected."[30]

India is fortunate to have inherited a maritime heritage that is rich and diverse, dating back to 3,500 BC. Ancient India enjoyed active trade links with Africa, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, the empires of ancient Persia, Greece, Rome, and China, and a number of kingdoms in Southeast Asia, including present-day Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The wide-ranging nature of this sea-borne trade required the assurance of a complex and well-developed maritime strategy. Till the end of the 14th century, several Indian kingdoms in the peninsula possessed significant sea-going navies of their own. Ship-building was a well-established craft at numerous points along the Indian coastline long before the arrival of the Europeans and was a significant factor in the high level of Indian maritime activity in the Indian Ocean region.

India under the Raj was a sub-imperial force autonomous of London whose weight was felt from the Swahili coast to the Persian Gulf and eastward to the Strait of Malacca. There was, in fact, an "Empire of the Raj" until at least World War I, in which Indian foreign policy interests were powerfully expressed and represented in the Gulf and on the Arabian and Swahili coasts, often in conflict with other British imperial interests.[31]

Circumscribed on three sides by land masses, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) houses a third of the world's population in about 25 percent of its landmass. The states around the Indian Ocean, ranging in size from tiny island nations to continents, are at different stages of economic development. Amongst its littoral nations are some of the richest, poorest and fastest growing economies which subscribe to different political beliefs and follow diverse methods of governance. Many provide shelter and encouragement to terrorism, which, in turn, encourages drug production, smuggling, piracy and other illegal activities. The existence of the IOR as a regional entity is often questioned because it is seen as a confusing muddle of military, economic and racial turmoil.[32]

Almost two-thirds of the known reserves of the world's strategic raw materials, 30 percent of its natural gas and almost half its oil reserves lie in the IOR. Mineral resources include generous deposits of uranium, tungsten,

cobalt, tin, gold, and diamonds. The region includes the largest producers of rubber, tea, jute and spices. In spite of widespread poverty and other handicaps, the region has abundant agricultural wealth as well as significant human resources and technological capabilities. Many IOR countries are becoming globally competitive and are developing new capabilities which could be harnessed through regional cooperation.[33]

Annually, over 100,000 merchantmen transit the waters of the Indian Ocean, carrying cargo worth about a trillion dollars. Both East-bound and West-bound shipping has to pass through a number of "choke points" where it is vulnerable to interdiction or interference by state and non-state entities. Any disruption in the supply of energy, or commodities would send prices skyrocketing, and destabilise industries as well as economies worldwide. Of these the important ones are:

- The ***Strait of Hormuz***, which connects the north Arabian Sea to the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf is arguably the world's most critical choke point today. The entry/exit is relatively narrow and closure of the Strait would have a most serious impact on energy flow, especially to the Asia-Pacific economies.
- The 195-km-long ***Suez Canal*** connects the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the narrow Red Sea. The closure of this strategic waterway, and re-routing of shipping via the Cape of Good Hope, has, in the past, had serious repercussions on world stability as well as economy. Today, with a million and a half barrels of oil transiting the canal daily, north and south-bound, its importance has grown manifold.
- Passage through the ***Malacca Strait*** constitutes the fastest and most economical route connecting the Persian Gulf with East Asia and the USA via the Indian Ocean. At its narrowest point, the Strait is just about two kilometres wide and a shipping mishap through accident or sabotage could create a bottleneck requiring re-routing of traffic. The extra distance involved in re-routing would have freight and marine insurance implications resulting in heavy economic penalties.
- The alternate route in the event of a blockage of the Malacca Strait would be through the ***Lombok*** or ***Sunda*** Strait**.** Apart from the distance penalty which such a passage would impose, there are legal issues of sovereignty since the Strait lies in Indonesian archipelagic waters.[34]

The Indian Ocean is seen neither as a composite political or economic entity, but merely as a geographical region.[35] Maritime power, in its true sense, is military, political, and economic power, exerted through an ability to use the sea or deny its use to others. It has traditionally been employed to control 'use-of-the-sea' activities undertaken by states for their general economic welfare and, often, even for their very survival. Maritime power and naval power are not synonymous, the latter being a sub-set of the former. India's maritime power includes a host of factors that are external to the navy, such as:

- Degree of dependence upon the sea for economic well-being.
- Maritime bent of mind of the government and the people.
- Size and enterprise of the sea-faring population.
- Ship-building capability.
- Size, age, and condition of the merchant fleet – both coastal and foreign-going.
- Percentage of imports and exports being carried by ships flying the national flag.
- Number, types, and functional efficiency of major and minor ports.
- Infrastructure for multi-modal transport of sea-borne goods.
- State, size, and technological advancement of coastal and deep-sea fishing fleets—and their geographic spread.

After trade, the next strategic maritime imperative is energy security. Of all the cargo that moves along the international shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, perhaps the most critical is energy, as defined by petroleum and petroleum-products. Almost 1,000 million tonnes of oil from West Asia passes close to Indian shores annually. A large portion of this traffic is destined for the oil-intensive economies of the USA, China and Japan. Today, almost 45 percent of all new world oil demand is attributable to the rising energy needs of China. Over 70 percent of China's oil imports come from West Asia and Africa and all of this is transported by sea. India is emerging as a major stabilising force in this great movement of energy across the Indian Ocean.

India's EEZ is a repository of abundant living and non-living resources. It has enabled India to mitigate, to some extent, her dependence upon foreign

sources of energy by way of crude oil, natural gas, and liquid petroleum gas, with about 20 percent of India's overall petroleum demand being met by offshore production. Any disruption of these activities would impose a cost on the economy.

Another major national maritime interest that shapes maritime strategy is undersea mineral resources. At present, India imports nearly all its needs of cobalt and nickel and some 60 percent of its requirements of copper. India has been recognised by the United Nations as a pioneer investor in deep sea mining and been allotted a mining area of some 150,000 sq km in the central Indian Ocean, well outside its EEZ.

Antarctica is an important maritime interest of India. Antarctica vitally important for the environment, is a treasure house of potential mineral resources, including petroleum, besides being an enormous marine storehouse of the human food chain, thanks to its abundant holdings of krill. Antarctica determines, in significant measure, the Indian monsoon—upon which agriculture, and hence the economy, depends.

The primary area of Indian maritime interest ranges from the Persian Gulf in the north, to Antarctica in the south, and from the Cape of Good Hope and the East Coast of Africa in the west, to the Strait of Malacca and the archipelagos of Malaysia and Indonesia in the east. Thirteen major and 185 minor ports constitute the landward-ends of the country's sea lanes of communication. Though India's share of global trade is still quite small, it is growing steadily. India has a merchant-shipping fleet, presently comprising 756 ships and totalling 8.6 million gross registered tonnes (GRT), with an average age of around 17 years as compared to the global average of 20 years. In terms of foreign trade of India, as much as 90 percent by volume and 77 percent by value transits over the seas. Ensuring the safety and freedom of this sea-borne trade is of a major strategic maritime imperative.

India's sea borders are an open threat to India's security. There is a need to keep sea lanes free and secure. Threats to the sea lanes of communication can arise from several directions: piracy, drug-trafficking, gun-running, human smuggling, pollution, accidents, mines, closure of choke points, inter-state conflicts and territorial disputes. None is independent of the other and failure in one often leads to failure in others. India's strategic space in the seas and oceans around it is rich in minerals like hydrocarbons. Maritime

nations are bound to start exploring the bottom of the sea soon enough. Even landlocked nations will demand sea space for exploration purposes and such moves may start conflicts for the control of sea routes.[36]

Although a maritime oceanic thread binds the littorals together, maritime cooperation and maritime issues have not attained the importance they deserve in this region. To begin with, there is considerable debate on the extent of the Indian Ocean rim itself. Differing definitions have been applied to the region, and the number of states included ranges from 29 to 35.[37] A stable and peaceful regime in the IOR is essential for continued economic and political development of the littoral states. India, being the largest state in the region, must be sufficiently strong militarily, not only to ward off any threats to her security but also to counteract and deal with threats to smaller countries of the region. As one prominent American scholar noted, "Especially powerful states are strongly inclined to seek regional hegemony."[38] India has concluded maritime boundary agreements with Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Maldives.[39] The maritime boundaries with Bangladesh and Pakistan have not yet been finalised.

Conclusion

A nation's strategic culture is its relationship with its physical and psychological environment. It is continuously evolving but it does have a core from which it grows and evolves. There are many elements that go into shaping a culture that specifically influence or shape perceptions of threat or opportunity. The main factors are its geography, history, economy, and religion. The physicality of a country or a nation, whether considered in isolation or in the context of surrounding nations or states, shapes and defines a people's perception of threat and opportunity. It also influences the evolution of core values and ideals. Strategic culture plays an important role in determining a state's behaviour and its responses to emerging threats and its policy formation.

Geography has profoundly affected India's history and insular outlook, and, therefore, its strategic culture. India's strategic location, size and large population have contributed to its importance, its preeminence in the Indian Ocean Region and its global relevance. Its geographic barriers have contributed to its insular conception, allowing India to develop its own unique culture. Historically, it has developed through a northwest population flow

till the 18th century. It has the great advantage of being a compact landmass, with a large unindented coastline. It has evolved with the development of river basin civilisations. Xenophobia has never been a part of India's culture, but its experience of colonisation has made it wary of foreign influences and interventions. Yet, India is a spiritual culture that has the ability to bring others into its fold.

It has been said that "India is an abstraction…. It is no more a political personality than Europe. India is a geographical term. It is no more a united nation than the Equator."[40] An ancient Indian parable tells the story of four blind men, who each describe an elephant in different ways. Depending on the part they touch, the beast is variously a wall, a rope, a tree or a snake. The fable fits India well, as no country seems to offer so many contrarities. This may hold true politically but geographically India is one entity.

The major geographic problem that India faces, at present, is its ill-defined borders. Like most boundary disputes, those of India with its neighbours are symptomatic of wider bilateral relations. India is larger than all its immediate neighbours in South Asia taken together, giving rise to insecurity and a feeling of being dominated in them. Boundaries are manifestations of national identity. They can also be trip-wires of war. Effective border management is now, and should always be, a primary national security priority.

Geographic conditions may influence or constrain the exercise of military power. The larger the area under consideration and the longer the time period involved, the more extensive does the problem become. The realities of military geography and national diplomacy tend to be summarised in the geo-political attitudes and objectives of a nation.[41] India has a vision of South Asia as an integrated and single entity. It is based on the fact that although South Asia is divided by political boundaries, the region forms a single geographical and economic unit. It occupies a shared cultural space and a shared cultural legacy.[42] India also needs to focus on the development of its border regions and jettison outdated concepts like "Inner Line" areas. Geo-politics places geography at the centre of international relations, and through it attempts to decipher fundamental factors that dictate state and foreign policy. Geography is relatively unchanging, but politics falls squarely in the human domain.

India is a significant nation. It is the world's seventh largest country in area. It has the world's fourth largest economy,[43] and third largest

military,[44] and it is the ninth largest in terms of the ratio of water to land.[45] Properly harnessed, these are important sources of domestic strength and of international influence. As the 13th most globalised nation on earth[46] (based on international economic integration, personal contact, technological connectivity, economic flows, economic restrictions, information flows and political engagement), India's future is highly dependent on what happens in the outside world. The global financial crisis is a reminder of this interconnectedness and could radically reshape India's role in the international economic, political and strategic environment, with unpredictable and potentially major impacts on India's security and prosperity for decades to come. In the face of this and other complex challenges, India should be an influential international actor.

However, India has not kept pace with its interests or with a changing world. This is because India does not belong to any natural regional grouping or economic bloc to multiply its influence (except the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation – SAARC). India's geo-political circumstances are also significantly more challenging than those faced by most other developed nations. The ability to understand the international environment, to anticipate developments affecting India's security and prosperity and to generate appropriate responses to them is considerably attenuated by the lack of a proactive intellectual infrastructure to support its international agendas.

All states identify interests that they need to pursue outside their own borders in order to protect their people, expand their economies and, more generally, shape the world in which they want to live. Each government pursues this task in its own way. To achieve their objectives, governments need tools – or instruments. Since the ancient Greek city-states first shaped the international system, such instruments have involved elements of both coercion and persuasion. Coercive elements most often take the form of military forces, to dissuade others from attacking national territory and interests, or defend them if deterrence fails. These are the instruments of national security policy. However, India is not itself a major economic or military power beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It lacks the strategic weight required to shape its wider international environment. Moreover, its strategic situation and geo-political circumstances are much more challenging than those of most other developed nations.

Geography is the matrix of history and it is the stage upon which history is enacted. However, a culture makes a civilisation. Geography has made a physical north-south divide in India, roughly along the Tropic of Cancer. It has contributed to a lack of Indianness, though all of India has contributed to its culture. The ethnic distribution of population makes homogeneity a major problem in developing a common strategic programme or vision. Geography has made different parts of India progress differently and can partially explain why it has developed as it has and where it may go. One aspect is clear – India's international policy lacks a natural domestic constituency.

A useful starting point is to understand India's self-definition and self-image. A succinct and authoritative statement is the Preamble to India's Constitution. The Constitution was not imposed upon India by an outside force. It was made by a freely elected Constituent Assembly and was the work of Indian law-makers, lawyers, and politicians. It was argued point by point in public, and was subject daily to criticism in the newspapers. It is the people's document. The Preamble is a remarkable statement flowing from, above all, India's historical experience, as well as from the aspirations of the Indian people as they embarked on what Prime Minister Nehru famously called its "tryst with destiny," and, finally, from the enormous tensions and dangers that existed for the newly independent nation in 1947 and still exist.

The Preamble as adopted, reads as follows, with words capitalised as in the official version of the document:

> We, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation.
> IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.

The words "unity," "sovereignty," "democracy," "socialism," "secular," and "the people" resonate with India's history and aspirations. They are

particularly important for understanding India and are the product of tensions woven into the fabric of Indian social and political life. Importantly, these terms do not necessarily have the same connotations in other countries.

There is both unity and diversity in India's pluralistic and fragmented society. Democracy, in Indian usage implies a system of laws and legal structures for people to change their leaders. It gives Indians a sense of empowerment that the government belongs to them. Declaring India a secular state was an expression that appealing to religious identity would cease to be a factor in Indian politics, for, as Nehru put it, "the cardinal doctrine of modern democratic practice is the separation of the state from religion." As early as 1926, Nehru, who saw religious ideologies as an impediment to India's progress, had expressed the hope that the passage of time "would scotch our so-called religion and secularise our intelligentsia" lessening the appeal of religion.[47] However religious violence remains a factor in Indian life.

To preserve its integrity, the Indian government has been involved in three bitter struggles by groups demanding self-determination: in Nagaland in northeast India, in Kashmir in the northwest, and in Punjab. In all three provinces, the leaders of militant uprisings based their demands for autonomy on common historical experience, shared history, territorial contiguity, language, and religion, all of which they alleged were threatened by oppressive rule of the Government of India, which had no legitimate claim to the area. The uprising in Punjab was ended, but with much violence, while in the east and northeast, sporadic resistance continues, and in Kashmir successive attempts at negotiating a peaceful settlement have broken down through mutual mistrust.

Globalisation is driving the emergence of new regional and world powers. It is also propelling a steady shift in the centre of world economic power away from the Atlantic Ocean to Asia, which now accounts for over 30 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in purchasing power parity).[48] The consequences for India are profound. China is predicted to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy some time after 2020.[49] India's GDP is forecast to grow to six per cent of global GDP over the same period, and will probably overtake Japan to become the world's third largest economy in the coming decades. Within a few decades, Asia is forecast to produce more than twice what it does today; incomes in the region will

also double, as will consumption and living standards. The rise of India is part of a global phenomenon. The rise of a global middle class in developing nations, estimated at 400 million in 2005 and projected to number more than three billion by 2030,[50] is driving the emergence of new regional centres of economic and political power. Geography has been both munificent as well as provided India with great challenges.

As a nation's power increases, it "will be tempted to try to increase its control over its environment. In order to increase its own security, it will try to expand its political, economic, and territorial control, and it will try to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests."[51] India, however, is still unsure about most of the answers about its future. It is like a line or shadow beyond which little or nothing is distinctly discernable. India is a supreme cultural experience and the more it is probed, the greater becomes its complexity, the more inexhaustible its variety and the more inconceivable its complexities.

Notes

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3. Government of India, *Annual Report 2006-07* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2007), p. 2.
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5. Gopal Krishna, "India and International Order: Retreat from Idealism," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 270-71.
6. See Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961,* (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), pp. 132-81.
7. Remarks by Minister of External Affairs at Council on Foreign Relations, New York on "India's Foreign Policy and Future India-US Relations" on 01 October 2007. www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpoints1/mukherjee-10-01-07.htm (Accessed on 24 May 2008).
8. W Gordon East, *The Geography Behind History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967), p. 182.
9. Brigadier-General Sir Osbert Mance, *Frontiers, Peace Treaties and International Organization* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 1; and C B Fawcett, *Frontiers, A. Study in Political Geography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 21.
10. George Nathaniel Curzon, *Frontiers: The Romanes Lectures* (London: Oxford University Press, 1907).
11. W K Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central Asia*, 2nd edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 308.

12. Harold George Nicholson in his book *Peace-Making 1919* charged that geographical, economic and transport considerations were not given enough weight in determining the best frontiers for a stable territorial arrangement at Versailles.
13. Mance, n-9, p.1.
14. Sir Alfred Cobban, *National Self Determination*, 2nd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), is a valuable contribution to an understanding of the havoc wrought by the workings of this doctrine.
15. All objective frontiers have some width. The common conception which is expressed in such terms as 'frontier line' and 'border-line' is a result of the natural human tendency to think of things in sharply defined separate compartments: it is not based on a careful observation of facts. Fawcett, n-9, p.17.
16. Sir Henry McMahon, "International Boundaries," *Journal of Royal Society of Arts*, Vol. 84, 1935-36. Professor Lattimore contends that "the linear frontier," as it is conventionally indicated on a map, "always proves, when studied on the ground, to be a zone rather than a line."
17. Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 2nd edition (New York: American Geographical Society, 1951), pp. 238-40.
18. The changing significance, for changing societies, of an unchanging physical configuration leads to the axiomatic statement that frontiers are of social not geographic origin.
19. Reference here is to the "Iron Curtain" or its counterpart in Asia, loosely and inaccurately, described as the "Bamboo Curtain." These "curtains" have a connotation apart from mere geography. UNESCO's emblem stressing that defence against war must be built in the hearts of men is a case in point.
20. R C Majumdar (ed.), *The Age of Imperial Unity* (History and Culture of the Indian People. II). (Bombay: Bharatya Vidya Bhavan, 1951).
21. Fairly accurate, though brief, accounts of these policies may be delineated through the appropriate volumes of the *Cambridge History of India*. A one-volume history for ready reference is R C Majumdar, H C Raychaudhari and Kalikinar Datta, *An Advanced History of India* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967).
22. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Translated by Samuel B. Griffith) (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
23. See V R Raghavan, "Strategic Depth in Afghanistan," *The Hindu*, 07 November 2001.
24. Although the US government has a general policy of staying neutral in foreign boundary disputes, the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict prompted the US president and secretary of state publicly to affirm India's claim in Arunachal Pradesh.
25. http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2008/10/indias-borders.html (Accessed on 24 November 2008).
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27. *The Kathmandu Post*, 16 July 1997, 2 July 1997, 31 May 1996; *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 9 June 1997, p. 13; *Xinhua*, 11 April 1997.
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29. See Observer Research Foundation, "Next Steps in Peace Process," http://www.observerindia.com/analysis/A568.htm.
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32. Peter Lehr, *The Challenges of Security in the Indian Ocean in the 21st Century*. Heidelberg Papers, Working Paper No. 13, November 2002.
33. Captain Frank C Rooyen, *Operationalizing Regional Maritime Cooperation*, Paper presented at the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 12 February 2008.

34. Government of India, *India's Maritime Strategy* (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2006).
35. Lehr, n-32.
36. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, while inaugurating the two-day seminar on "Maritime Dimensions of India's Security" on 05 and 06 January 2001 in New Delhi.
37. Rahul Roy Chowdhury, *India's Maritime Security* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000) p. 30.
38. See John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W W Norton, 2001), p. 232.
39. For details of these agreements, see http://meaindia.nic.in/parliament/rs/2005/05/05rs24.htm (Accessed 14 February 2009)
40. Winston Churchill's speech on 18 March 1931 at the Royal Albert Hall, London. Quoted in Colin Coote (ed.), *Maxims and Reflections* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947).
41. Louis C Peltier and G Etzel Pearcy, *Military Geography* (Princeton, New Jersey: D Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p.168
42. "Does India Have A Neighbourhood Policy?" Talk by foreign secretary at ICWA (New Delhi), 9 September 2006. meaindia.nic.in/speech/2006/09/09ss01.htm (Accessed on 28 January 2009)
43. See http://www.aneki.com/largest_economies.html
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2009.pdf
47. Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics India, 1885-1930* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991), p. 285.
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49. In purchasing power parity terms.
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