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Why India, Why Not Pakistan?
Reflections on South Asian Military Politics

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Building a military establishment that is loyal to the Constitution and supports the democratically elected government poses special challenges in post-colonial environments. In this paper, I am going to examine how this objective has been approached in the two pivotal states of South Asia: India and Pakistan. The question I wish to find an—and not necessarily *the*—answer to is: why has India been successful in creating democratic civil-military relations and why has Pakistan failed so completely on this score? A hefty book would, no doubt, be necessary to produce a fully comprehensive explanation that addresses all the relevant issues that have a bearing on this subject.

My ambition in this paper is far more modest. I am interested primarily in the *origins* of Indian and Pakistani military politics as I believe they go far in demarcating the overall patterns for the entire post-Independence period. My purpose, then, is not to examine the entire post-Independence period but to cover a time-span sufficient to recognise the basic trends that shaped civil-military politics in these countries. India succeeded in placing its armed forces under firm and virtually unchallenged state control right from the beginning. My coverage, therefore, will stop in 1975, when the handling of the "Emergency" confirmed, yet again, the generals' lack of political ambition. Civil-military relations in Pakistan have been far more "eventful" than in India. In this case, I will look at the period starting with Independence and ending with 1988, the end of Gen Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship that heralded the arrival of a civilian government, once again.

This study makes three arguments. First and most important, by the end of the first post-colonial decade, the patterns for the drastically different military politics of India and Pakistan were already set. Second, of the

numerous reasons for the evolution of different civil-military relations in the two countries, several lie in the circumstances of the 1947 Partition and in the immediate post-Partition. Third, the British colonial period left behind profound legacies most of which have positively influenced military affairs in the subcontinent. After a short examination of the British legacy, I look at the impact of Partition on Indo-Pakistani military affairs. I continue with some comparative commentary on the two armies, followed by an exploration of the main themes of Indian and Pakistani civil-military relations.

The British Legacy

Few imperial powers succeeded in leaving behind such a durable impact on their subject peoples as the British did in India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. The British were more successful colonisers than their European rivals, or—and there is an important lesson here—the more recent vintage of American and other Western "democracy promoters" for several reasons.[1] They may not have been less exploitative or racist than others, but they were more effective because they worked hard at understanding the people they were governing, recruited individuals who were prepared to spend their careers in the provinces of a single alien nation, and then invested in teaching them the local language and culture. Moreover, the British established effective bureaucracies and integrated local elites into the governing structures on every level. In some cases, Indians occupied high positions in the bureaucracy so that at the time of Independence, a fairly high percentage of the elite Indian Civil Service was staffed by Indians. In short, the British thought about and planned for the long-term. That bureaucracies and large organisations are resistant to change is a truism but it is interesting that after more than six decades of independence, no other Indian or Pakistani institution retains as much of its British origins as the armed forces.

The British India Army (BIA) originated in the army first created by the British East India Company to protect its personnel and property. When the conquest of India began in earnest in the late 18th century, the British faced native troops who had a reputation for individual bravery and some of whom were equipped with cannons and muskets. The British advantage lay primarily in organisation, training, and drill which paid dividends in battlefield discipline.

British commanders soon realised not only that a few of their troops could prevail over the large but disorganised Indian forces but also, later on, that the Indians themselves were amenable to discipline.[2]

The British India Army served the empire with distinction. Even if most *sepoys* (native Indian soldiers) were highly disciplined and unswervingly obedient to the British, mutinies did occur, and two of them are noteworthy. About 70,000 sepoys joined the Mutiny of 1857, 30,000 remained loyal to the British, and an equal number were disarmed or deserted. This was a significant turning point in Indian history: had all the *sepoys* mutinied at the same time, British rule in India quite conceivably could have been ended.[3] After 1857, the colonisers changed their personnel policies and paid more attention to the "divide-and-rule" principle.[4] The second significant mutiny broke out in February 1946—after the high morale of World War II in the BIA eroded—and was joined by 7,000 sailors, a quarter of the navy's strength. The rebels hoisted the flags of the two native political forces, the Congress Party and Muslim League, on the vessels, which encouraged the rioting on shore. The mutiny—that clearly suggested the slipping away of imperial authority—stunned both the government in Delhi and the Congress Party.[5]

During World War II, the Indian National Army (INA) posed an even more important challenge to the BIA. Established in 1942 principally by Subhas Chandra Bose in collaboration with the Japanese occupying force in Southeast Asia, the INA—its recruiting message was "what's the use of fighting with/for your colonial masters when you can fight for your freedom?"—wanted to overthrow the British Raj with Japanese assistance. The INA's first members were BIA prisoners-of-war captured by the Japanese. They were joined by expatriate Indians from Burma and Malaysia and, in time, also by BIA personnel. According to British military intelligence, in 1944, 20,000 Indian (BIA) troops had gone over to the Japanese, two out of every seven captured. In 1945, they identified a hard core of 7,600 INA fighters who were devoted to their charismatic leader, Bose, had actively assisted the Japanese, and in some cases committed "horrendous war crimes."[6] The INA's potential to cause frontline soldiers to surrender was taken seriously by the government though, in the end, it did not make a major impact on the war.

The INA's size was dwarfed by the BIA – 1,789,000 Indians were fighting with the British in World War II in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.[7]

India was also a major source of industrial material in support of the war effort. The BIA also played an important role in handling the sporadic rioting, civil unrest, non-cooperation and resistance from Gandhi and the Congress during the war; its Indian officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) did not participate in the struggle for their country's independence which put them in a curious position once it was achieved.

Several attributes of the British India Army made a lasting impact on its successor forces:

- **Separating the Army from Politics:** Although in the early years, some of the pro-consuls who governed British India were military officers, the BIA quickly settled into a position that remained outside and above politics. The principle of the army's political subordination was clear and the division between the civil and military spheres was unambiguous: the army was responsible for recruitment, training, discipline, and strategic advice. Beyond that, civilians made the decisions, including when and in the service of what objective the army should be deployed.
- **Recruitment:** One of the pillars of the BIA's success was the careful recruitment of soldiers and prospective NCOs and officers. After 1857, recruiters generally avoided enlisting Bengalis and drew from the region in the west, e.g. Punjab, which had largely remained loyal to the British at the time of the Mutiny. In any event, the British firmly believed in "martial races," that people originating from the northwest corner (Punjab) of India, the Sikhs, the Gurkhas of Nepal, and members of the Kshatriya (warrior) castes were better suited for military service than others (such as Bengalis or Sindhis).[8] Most of the soldiers were middle class peasants, promotion was based solely on ability and merit, and the BIA developed a distinctive and powerful *esprit de corps*.[9] The obedience of the vast majority of rank-and-file soldiers was the result of attracting politically reliable and pliable individuals.[10]
- **Training and Professionalism:** The British provided rigorous and modern training to native Indians and a career that was attractive to many. The cream of the crop received officer training at Sandhurst in England but training was on-going in the garrisons and bases of the three armies headquartered in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. After the opening of the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun in 1932, all Indian

officers were trained there. Until 1939, the officer corps was relatively small and tight-knit, but the need for a much larger force in World War II required its quick expansion and the abandonment of some recruiting principles. During the War, the ratio of British to Indian officers changed from 10:1 to 4.1:1.[11]

- **Religion and Caste:** Perhaps the greatest achievement of the British in the military realm was the creation of a personnel system based on competition and excellence rather than religious identity. That religion was not a central issue in the BIA was the consequence of careful British policy in this regard. To avoid tensions, most units were organised by religion and soldiers took a religious (Hindu, Sikh, or Muslim) oath administered by regimental priests. Because the British were particularly concerned with Muslim recruits after the Mutiny of 1857, there were no all-Muslim regiments. Nonetheless, Muslims were well represented among the ranks of the prestigious King's Commissioned Officers and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers; in fact, they held slightly more than their proportionate share (roughly one-third) of positions.[12]
- **Aid to the Civil Power:** The British developed a system – called "aid to the civil power" – for contingencies when local disturbances could not be contained by law enforcement personnel. In such cases, authority was passed from the civil administrator to the local military commander for the duration of the conflict. Though the danger that the loyalty of *sepoys* and Indian officers would be tried by these manoeuvres against the civilian population that few of them desired was real, there were hardly any cases of insubordination or desertion. In any event, there were conscious efforts to use troops from other regions (thus, south Indians might be used to put down riots in Bombay).

The Partition and Its Impact

The partition of British India into an independent India and Pakistan in 1947 remains *the* formative moment in the political path of the subcontinent that explains many of the profound differences between the two states and their armed forces. More specifically, it helps one understand not so much why India became a democracy – with civil-military relations befitting a democracy – but, far more so, why Pakistan did not.

The Muslim movement in British India was distrustful of democracy due to its conviction that in an independent India, the large Hindu majority would marginalise the Muslims. The main Muslim political organisation, the All-India Muslim League, announced its support for a separate state, to be named Pakistan, in 1940. It has been argued that the League's long-time leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, did not really want an independent Muslim state but overplayed his hand by making such excessive demands – e.g., a separate Muslim electorate, guaranteed seats in Parliament – that the Hindus could not accept it.[13] In this sense, by the mid-1940s, Pakistan had become a virtual inevitability. Although Jinnah wanted a homeland for Muslims, but not an Islamic state, in its final stages the campaign for Pakistan became a religious movement.[14]

The most ardent support for an independent Pakistan originated principally from the minority Muslim provinces – in fact, most of Pakistan's leaders came from there. In the provinces where Muslims were in a majority, they expected to retain political control and, therefore, did not see the need for a Muslim state. On Independence Day, Jinnah (originally from Bombay) became governor-general and his close associate, Liaquat Ali Khan (who spent most of his life in north India), became prime minister. Resentment built up quickly against these "foreigners," called Muhajirs, in the new state because they monopolised leadership positions and designated their mother tongue, Urdu, as the country's official language even though Urdu language and tradition was alien to much of Pakistan – and certainly to all of Bengali-speaking East Pakistan, where the majority lived.[15] Many Muslims still felt that their interests lay with India or were simply unable to emigrate and stayed there: they now comprise the world's largest religious minority.

The British ruling on the boundaries of the two states was based in part on the result of the 1945-46 elections for the Constituent Assembly and various other legislative bodies. The Radcliffe Award – named after its author, Cyril Radcliffe, who had never set foot in India and worked from outdated maps and census information – was presented in August 1947. Pakistan was carved out of five provinces of British India – including two partitioned provinces, Punjab and Bengal – and some princely states. The arrangement required the relocation of as many as ten million people – some six million Muslims from India to Pakistan and four million Hindus and Sikhs to India

– and its announcement was followed by extensive riots in several regions, particularly in the Punjab. The ethno-religious bloodletting that took place there and elsewhere after Independence – a series of massacres and counter-massacres, looting and arson – claimed the lives of at least half a million people.[16] The fact that the British did not make the necessary preparations to help accommodate the population exchange exacerbated the situation. The matter of the princely states' accession on the eve of Independence heightened the animosity between Muslims and Hindus and brought the armed forces into the conflict. Although parts of the army became embroiled in the violence and could not be relied upon to reestablish order, most of the military units in the area – British, Indian, and Pakistani – tried to contain the killing and prevent even more destruction.[17]

The eastern part of Bengal – what became East Pakistan and, after the 1971 civil war, the independent state of Bangladesh – was slightly more populous than the western part, and about 85 per cent Muslim, with a 15 per cent Hindu minority. All in all, the population of Pakistan was about one-fourth of that of India. There were many disagreements that can be traced back to the hastily prepared Partition and the pro-India sympathies of Lord Mountbatten – the last viceroy of the British Empire and independent India's first governor-general (1947-48). The feud regarding the state of Jammu and Kashmir could not be resolved and eventually led to a war in October 1948, ending with a United Nations-brokered ceasefire in the following January. This issue has not been settled and has been the source of numerous serious conflicts – some armed – between the two states.[18]

Muslim suspicions about Hindu intentions were only reinforced by India's handling of the division of British India's assets. Delhi refused to release large amounts of funds that were Pakistan's due and cut off the flow of water of the Indus river despite a water sharing agreement because it did not want to aid Pakistan while they were embroiled in an armed conflict in Kashmir. In protest against Indian policies, Mahatma Gandhi started a well-publicised fast in January 1948 which he declined to break until the government adopted an "honorable" course regarding the release of Pakistan's property.[19] India's inequitable treatment extended to the BIA's military equipment that was to be divided between the two successor states. The Delhi government failed to honour its pledge to deliver Pakistan its share: for instance, only three

per cent of the Pakistani portion of 165,000 tons of ordnance stores was delivered by April 1948 and none of its allocation of 249 tanks was ever transferred.[20]

The Pakistani share of institutions and infrastructure amounted to important naval bases in Karachi and Chittagong, the Staff College at Quetta, the Royal Indian Service Corps School at Kakul, and some other facilities such as regimental training centres.[21] In terms of armed force personnel, Pakistan's inheritance was a paper army of roughly 150,000 officers and men in 508 units – 40 per cent of them still on Indian soil on Independence Day (14 August 1947). In fact, the staff of the new Pakistani General Headquarters arrived only in October 1947 in Rawalpindi – but without many key documents because Indian officials refused to release them.[22]

The officers of the BIA were told to choose between the Indian or the Pakistani armed forces. For Muslim officers who lived in India – and for the far fewer Hindu and Sikh officers living in Pakistan – Partition meant having to leave their homes, uprooting their families, and losing their property. After Partition, nearly all Muslim officers went to Pakistan and virtually all Hindu officers moved to, or remained in, India proper. The departure of Muslim officers to Pakistan after Partition was not unexpected given their background and the opportunities that opened up in a new and understaffed army. A few Muslim officers stayed in the new Indian Army and some actually managed to rise high in the hierarchy.[23] During the politically tense years leading up to Partition, a remarkable amity prevailed among most Hindu, Muslim and Sikh officers. Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, the Pakistani leader of the 1950s and 1960s, recalled in his memoirs that in 1947, the senior Indian officer of the BIA, Gen K M Cariappa asked him to support efforts to keep the army undivided which, of course, Ayub could not do as "the army was the instrument of sovereignty and the shield of the people."[24]

In spite of their different post-Independence development, at the time of Partition, the two armies were not that different from one another. They came from the same body, shared a single ethos and institutional culture, and played no role in the political movement that led to Independence. Owing to the shortage of high-ranking officers, both the Pakistani and Indian armed forces employed British officers for more than a decade after Independence.

Pakistan's 150,000-man army should have had 4,000 officers but there were only 2,500; to fill this deficiency, the government retained 500 British officers and accelerated the promotion of native officers to fill higher ranks.[25] The first Indian Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Ram Dass Katari, assumed office only in April 1958 – nearly eleven years after Independence – with the retirement of his predecessor, Vice Admiral Stephen Hope Carlill.[26] The real difference lay in the political culture in which the two armies were to function. The very nature of the creation of Pakistan goes far in explaining their different evolution.

Seven Reasons for Pakistani Praetorianism

By the mid-1950s most of the important moves were made on the Pakistani chessboard that determined what kind of state it was to become. A number of often interrelated factors of varying importance help to explain why Pakistan – as opposed to India – has failed to sustain democratic governance and why its armed forces have assumed a dominant political role. Some of these are rooted in British India, others in the Partition, still others in the early post-Independence years.

- **Less Exposure to the British Institutions:** Some regions of Pakistan – especially in the west and northwest – were colonised by the British only in the late 19th century whereas much of what became India proper had been under British rule since the 1770s. Notwithstanding the many adverse effects of British reign, it established a number of institutions indispensable to democratic governance: an independent judiciary, an effective and relatively upright civil service, political parties, apolitical police and armed forces. Regions with shorter exposure to these institutions were at a disadvantage when Independence came.
- **The Social Consequences of Partition:**
  - The movement of millions of migrants to the new state – by 1951, migrants from India constituted about 10 per cent of all Pakistanis – created instability and social upheaval.
  - The superimposition of the Urdu-speaking political and intellectual elite that was alien to the extant population of Pakistan (comprising numerous distinct ethnic groups) generated widespread and long-term resentment and mistrust and made governance more difficult.

- **The Geographic and Social Separation between East and West Pakistan:** The Pakistani political establishment is responsible for its short-sighted and divisive policies – Bengali, the mother tongue of the largest number of Pakistanis, did not even become an official language, Bengal's economic development was impeded by pro-West Pakistan (and especially Punjab-centric) economic policies – that all but ensured losing the eastern part of the country. During the 24-year union of East and West Pakistan, tensions between the two were constant over Islamabad's patronising, inequitable, and heavy-handed policies toward its poor relations in the East. Nevertheless, the geographic disconnection between East and West Pakistan was produced by Partition itself and it facilitated the isolation of the politically less influential but numerically superior Bengali population.
- **Insecurity Syndrome:** From the beginning, Pakistani elites believed that India was an adversary, out to harm their country, and, therefore, it was imperative to turn Pakistan into a fortress against India.
  - Pakistan's obsession with security was reinforced by, and is partly rooted in, India's failure to adhere to the terms of Partition, viewed by Islamabad as an act of supreme betrayal.[27]
  - Being the smaller, less populous state with what it viewed as an untrustworthy much larger neighbour has continually reinforced Islamabad's need to possess a strong military machine.
  - Pakistan's security deficit justified the disproportionate share of the state budget to be devoted to the military realm, increasing the armed forces' influence and diverting scarce resources from social and economic projects.[28] The Pakistan Army came to have a vested interest in continued hostility – thus, rationalising its claim on the budget. In fact, the Kashmir conflict was a ready-made cauldron that the army had a stake in keeping on the boil.
- **Bad Luck with Founding Fathers:** Sheer misfortune also contributed to Pakistan's woes. Within a year of Independence, its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah died of tuberculosis. The country's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated at a political rally in 1951

– one of the first in a long line of Pakistani politicians to be murdered. This is not to suggest that they were necessarily wise politicians – Liaquat, for instance, in more than four years as prime minister, made no serious attempt at writing a Constitution – but the contrast with India is striking. While India benefited from experienced and brilliant leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and others who represented stability and continuity in the country's formative years, Pakistan became rudderless soon after Independence, at a time when political direction, constancy, and steadfastness was most needed. This pattern has continued to play out throughout the last more than six decades: India has been led by legitimate and, by and large, effective civilian leaders without whom no democratic civil-military relations can exist. Pakistan has not been so fortunate.

- **Low-Level Social Development, Incompetent and/or Corrupt Civilians:**
  - In 1947, Pakistan was essentially a feudal state with land concentrated in the hands of a few families, virtually no middle class, and a miniscule intelligentsia. The extremely low level of literacy limited the evolution of public opinion.
  - The state structures the British had developed continued in India; in terms of political and administrative infrastructure Pakistan started with little more than nothing. It is worth looking at the photographs of a 1948 issue of *Life* magazine depicting the seat of the new Pakistani government as a row of tents.[29] Contrasting this image with the palatial government buildings of India, housing a small army of experienced and capable administrators, makes the troubles of the young Pakistani state easier to appreciate.[30]
  - Pakistan started out with extremely weak political institutions; its bureaucracy was small, disorganised, and incompetent. In fact, the only functioning state institution Pakistan inherited was the military. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the civilians were unable to control the educated, disciplined, and ambitious armed forces. The disparity with India – with its relatively cohesive institutions and a strong political leadership bent on subduing the military – could hardly be sharper.

- **The Military as a State Builder:** In traditional societies, the armed forces often play three functions: maintain the established order, provide a channel for upward mobility, and spearhead modernisation.[31] In time, the Pakistan Army fulfilled all three of these missions. They were more disciplined, deeply patriotic, and especially early on, better educated than civilians. The primary motivation in the Pakistani generals' drive for political power was not self-enrichment but guarding the national interest. Although Pakistani officers were not responsible for achieving Pakistani independence, they did play a crucial role in keeping the country together.[32] Circumstances practically forced them to abandon the "military-stays-out-of-politics" dictum of the BIA and become the essential state-building institution. A few months after Pakistan's founding, its army was deployed against its former brothers-in-arms in the October 1948 Kashmir War. The army acquitted itself well despite its restrained all-British high command and made an important contribution to the stabilisation of the post-Partition situation. Given the political vacuum and the feebleness of political institutions, the army soon adopted the role of political administrator of the country. Obviously, this is a most ominous position for a military establishment to be in from the perspective of democratic development. In stark contrast, the Indian military's political masters did their utmost and succeeded in ensuring its continued apolitical stance.

As Hussain Haqqani has observed, "The dominance of the military in Pakistan's internal affairs is a direct outcome of the circumstances during the early years of statehood."[33] The earliest experiences of Pakistan forced its leaders to recognise the need for strong state institutions to protect the country's basic interests. But who were the people who comprised the state as a collection of institutions? Young, mostly inexperienced bureaucrats, on the one hand, and army officers with superior discipline, education, and a proven record of personal sacrifice, on the other. The early political role of the Pakistan Army was – in spite of repeatedly revised Constitutions and quasi-democratic interludes – a prologue to the four *coups d'etat* mounted by its generals and, subsequently, several decades of military rule. It is important

to add that, as coup-makers in many other contexts, Pakistani officers usually enjoyed significant support from a population fed up with dishonest and inept politicians. And, not surprisingly, the generals were quick to justify their political interference on the inability and corruptness of civilians.

Two Different Armies

In both the Indian and Pakistani Armies, recruitment along the lines of the British "martial races" principles continued for decades after Independence. In India, officers and NCOs from the Punjab were over-represented, while regions like Madras, Kerala, let alone West Bengal, had produced far less than their fair share of recruits. The Indian government had decided to abolish caste-identity as the organising principle of military units decades ago. The units of the two relatively young Services, the air force and the navy, have been for long completely integrated.

The abolition of all units based on ethnic, religious, or caste identity has not been completed in India though it has been the subject of an on-going public debate. Opponents have argued that people from similar backgrounds fight better together and sacrifice more readily for one another than those in mixed units. In any case, only a few single-group regiments remain in the army; these units go back a long way – some trace their histories to the 18th century. Conversations with military officers indicate that pure regiments are the repositories of tradition and history and are often characterised by extraordinarily high morale and pride in service.[34]

Three types of infantry battalions emerged: pure (single-caste or ethnic group), mixed (regiments segregated by company) and totally mixed battalions that were open for anyone eligible for military service. Although concerted efforts were made to make the army more representative, in 1974, Punjabis still comprised over 15 per cent of the army, several times more than their share of the population.[35] In 1978-1982, 57 per cent of the cadets attending the Indian Military Academy came from the northwest, suggesting that the over-representation of this region in the Indian armed forces has declined hardly at all since Independence.[36]

Their numerical strengths in the officer corps notwithstanding, Sikhs, particularly, have been concerned about the lack of Sikhs in the high command. The 1984 government assault on the Golden Temple in Punjab

to remove Sikh militants precipitated a Sikh mutiny in the army, including about 2,000 personnel. It showed that the armed forces – often viewed as a symbol of national unity, hardened in battles against the Chinese and the Pakistanis – can be an example of ethno-religious rift.[37] These chasms have been bridged, however, and, according to one of the country's top military experts, "With its multi-religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural composition, the army is a shining example of the national goal of achieving 'unity in diversity'."[38]

As in armed forces everywhere, the appeal of the military profession is negatively correlated with the fortunes of the national economy. Under the British and in the first couple of decades of Independence, the military – along with the elite administrative services – was the occupational bailiwick of the upper middle class. Since then, there has been a gradual shift toward the lower middle class, given the profession's fading lustre owing to faraway deployments, considerably lower salaries, and fewer advancement opportunities than for comparable civil service personnel. By one calculation, the total benefits of company and battalion commanders fell between 60-70 per cent in real terms during 1947-1982.[39] This trend has served to eradicate the elitist aura surrounding the officer corps and diminish its social status. The occupational prestige of soldiering is far higher in Pakistan for several reasons: national defence is a higher priority, the Pakistani economy offers fewer promising employment opportunities, and the military's dominant socio-political rule practically ensures that its personnel would be better provided for. Pakistani society has a genuine connection to the armed forces; as in Turkey and Indonesia there is a profound social connection, rooted in history and traditions, that is missing in India.[40]

The Indian Army is the largest volunteer military establishment in the world. Until 1977, soldiers enlisted for seven years with an additional eight years in the reserves; since then, they have enlisted for seventeen years. The threshold of entry for enlisted men has been relatively low — little more than a successful physical exam and literacy.[41] Although a generation or two ago, many officers' sons followed their fathers into the armed forces, this is no longer the case: new cadets tend to be the sons of NCOs and come from small towns.[42] Unlike in the rest of Indian society, corruption is not a major problem in the armed forces partly because its disciplining structure remains excellent.[43]

Since Independence, both the Indian and Pakistani militaries have become highly professional forces with rigorous training and educational requirements. One of the basic tenets of Indian military training is that armed forces and politics do not mix; for decades, junior officers were taught to be political illiterates.[44] Although the Indian Army may no longer get the best and the brightest young people, entry into the profession remains competitive. The new National Defence Academy (NDA) opened its doors in 1955 – the ceremony witnessed by the Shah of Iran, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and his Defence Minister, Marshal Georgy Zhukov. Its success persuaded the Ethiopian government to request the NDA's help in setting up a similar institution, the Haile Selassie Military Academy.[45]

One of the key differences between the two armies is that in Pakistan, the Muslim identity of military personnel is supposed to prevail over historical and cultural differences. Because officially, all Muslims are equally eligible to bear arms and serve in the armed forces, the ethnic imbalances in the Pakistani Army are all the more noticeable. Bengalis, long considered unsuited for military life, suffered harsh discrimination under this system and constituted only a small percentage of military personnel. Even though they were Pakistan's majority population, in the 1960s, they made up only 7 per cent of the Pakistan Army – their proportion in the bureaucracy was 24 per cent.[46] Not surprisingly, Bengali grievances fuelled their drive for independence. For many years, Pakistani officers were actually taught that the country's "core area" was Punjab and the other regions were merely "invasion routes," something that could not but increase the defiance of Baluchi, Bengali, Sindhi, and other non-Punjabi citizens.[47] With the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the discrimination against those of Baluchistan and Sindh backgrounds appeared even sharper.

On the other hand, the British regard for the martial virtues of Punjabis and, to a lesser extent, Pashtuns, continued; some experts even talked about the "Punjabisation" of the Pakistani armed forces. Political activists from Baluchistan and Sindh have called the Pakistani armed forces the instrument of the Punjabi-Pashtun ruling elite, not of the federation of Pakistan.[48] In the 1980s, 75 per cent of soldiers came from three districts of Punjab and two districts of the Northwest Frontier Province that contained only 9 per cent of Pakistan's male population.[49] Nevertheless, Punjabis and Pashtuns (who share ethnic identity with roughly 50 per cent of Afghans) are divided on a

number of issues, especially on their views of the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the Northwest Frontier. Most Pashtun pilots, for instance, refuse to shoot at, or bomb, the Taliban.[50]

Another major difference between the two armies is that while the Indian Army's personnel remain relatively isolated from mainstream society, Pakistani officers and NCOs are much more integrated into it. Pakistani soldiers spend as many as 200 days a year away from their units – annual or casual leave, vacation, holidays, weekend – and during this time, they return to civilian life.[51] Perhaps this close social proximity makes the military more acceptable and its appearance in other – including political – roles, more palatable. Upon retirement, Pakistani officers, particularly those who achieved higher ranks, are often rewarded with lucrative jobs in the country's large defence-related civilian sector as bureaucrats, advisers, and experts. This has not been a widespread practice in India – particularly given its far larger military establishment and proportionately smaller defence sector – though in recent years, retired officers, appalled by the politicians' shabby treatment of armed forces personnel – have entered the political arena.[52]

India: Comprehensive State Control over the Military

On Independence Day, 15 August 1947, the Government of India adopted the collaborationist army – that is, the Indian component of the British India Army – as its national military force, and with it, accepted the attendant problems of legitimacy and trust.[53] Partly because the British kept the BIA apart from Indian society, its native-born officers and soldiers proved generally reliable in quelling riots and fighting nationalists. Still, Nehru and the rest of the political leadership agreed early on that India needed stability and an effective and disciplined military force, and there was no alternative to the army in place. In any case, virtually all serving Indian officers in the BIA were young and posed no political threat.

The retention of the native component of the colonial army is an unusual occurrence in post-colonial states. Independence movements ordinarily had their own liberation armies that, once independence was achieved, served as the nucleus of the new military. In liberation armies, however, officers tended to have highly developed political views and were used to voicing these views. Perhaps if Nehru and the new Indian leadership had been

interested in recruiting the remnants of Subhas Chandra Bose's INA – they were not, though some INA fighters did receive pensions – then the new Indian Army would have been less apolitical. Nehru and most Indian leaders viewed the BIA as a repressive feudal institution, wanted to hold the new army separate from society, and drastically reduce its internal policing role so prevalent under the British.

Nehru had little interest in defence matters, was indifferent to the armed forces, and had no strategic vision. He famously said that "India doesn't need an army, it needs a police force. We have no enemies."[54] A contemporary army officer likened the Cabinet's attitude towards the military as that of "a teetotaler who had inherited a brewery."[55] The government did its utmost to prevent military interference in political matters – efforts were redoubled after the 1958 coup in Pakistan owing to worries about India's own army – through a number of mutually reinforcing regulations, arrangements, and practices. The position of commander-in-chief (CiC), theretofore the chief of the army and the main source of military advice for the government, was abolished on Independence Day in concert with Nehru's and others' view that in a democracy, the head of state should be the supreme commander.

The heads of the three Services – the army, navy, and air force – were placed on the same level and rank, signifying a tremendous blow to the prestige and influence of the army, by far the largest and oldest Service. The three Service chiefs were now reporting to the civilian defence minister. In this new system, the CiC designation made no sense; in 1955, the heads of the Services were renamed the Chief of the Army/Navy/Air Force Staff. For decades, the military has lobbied in vain for the appointment of a fourth chief – the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) – something similar to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States, but one has yet to be appointed. From the government's perspective, the introduction of a CDS would go against the grain of earlier regulations as it would almost certainly increase the influence of the army (the two other Services would have little hope of having one of their own selected).

The Indian Constitution of 1950 vests supreme command of the armed forces in the president but the *de facto* control over the government is the prime minister's responsibility. Through the years, no president has attempted to independently command the military.[56] The government's top forum

dealing with defence issues changed as the years went by, from the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs to the current Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) whose members include the prime minister and the ministers of defence, finance, and home (interior). This body – assisted by a large civilian bureaucracy – makes the most important decisions regarding defence and security matters. The one constant feature of this institutional evolution has been the continued shrinking influence of generals and admirals. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence conducts several reviews annually of different areas of the armed forces. The actual reviews are carried out by civil servants; most committee members, in any case, have modest knowledge or background in military affairs. Only about five per cent of their recommendations are eventually adopted and they play only a minor role in military politics.[57]

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) became dominated by civilians. MoD bureaucrats received a great deal of decision-making authority which only expanded with the passage of time and allowed them to further reduce the access of uniformed personnel to politicians. There is no formal interaction between military leaders and members of Parliament except in cases when a legislative committee asks generals to testify.[58] MoD bureaucrats intervene even in relatively minor military matters: their approval is necessary for all promotions above the rank of major. In the meantime, the Finance Ministry's power to make adjustments to the defence budget and to expand its control on how funds are spent has increased.

The relative standing of military officers vis-à-vis civilian bureaucrats has gradually diminished.[59] The military goes through a pay review every ten years, a process that – with the exception of 1984, when salaries were substantially increased – has been synonymous with the steady devaluation of military salaries compared to civil service wages.[60] After the politicians' interference in the conduct of the 1962 War against China, the generals received unprecedented operational freedom although at the price of the growing civilian mistrust and monitoring of the army.[61]

Indian officers have never contemplated a political intervention. To be sure, there were, and are, jokes among military officers about politics and there is privately voiced criticism of the incompetence or corruption of this or that politician – just like among other occupational groups. Indian soldiers

enjoy the right to vote but their voting participation is lower than the rest of the population. This is partly explained by the process: the Election Commission has to announce new elections minimum thirty days in advance. There are postal ballots for soldiers on duty in remote areas but often there is not enough time to mail their ballots or when they return to their camps and bases, voting is not their first priority.[62]

In private, Indian officers are critical of the inefficiencies of the political process and resent politicians' lack of interest in strategic issues and their reluctance to involve military leaders in defence-policy discussions. Their attitude points at the most important shortcoming of Indian civil-military relations: in their concerted efforts to ensure the political submissiveness of its armed forces, politicians do not take advantage of the tremendous store of strategic and doctrinal knowledge that the military possesses, and Indian society has paid for.

Challenges to Indian Civil-Military Relations

Over more than six decades, Indian military politics has been devoid of serious crises and has weathered – without major upheavals – defeat and victory in war, the government's ever more frequent requests to the army to stop civil conflicts, and the armed forces' diminishing socio-economic status. Some stresses did develop in the 1947-75 period, however; I will briefly mention four. The theme common to all of them is that civilians – mostly political leaders – not the military, originated them.

The War with China (1962)

India's leaders early on decided that defence did not deserve a high priority and limited their focus on Pakistan as the country's likely enemy. Defence spending was held at a minimum, in keeping with the government's view that it was detrimental to both economic growth and civilian dominance.[63] This view was to have dire consequences in 1962 when China – responding to Nehru's provocative Himalayan border policy – attacked a largely unprepared India. The Indian Army's reluctance to enter into war was rooted in its concerns about tactical challenges and the continued supply of war material from the Soviet Union. Most importantly, however, the generals were keenly aware of the political constraints imposed upon their conduct of the war.[64]

They were not disappointed. To begin with, the Communist leaning Defence Minister, Krishna Menon – a friend and long-time associate of Prime Minister Nehru – refused to believe that China would attack India. Although they advocated the strict separation of politics from military affairs, Menon and Nehru – neither had any military experience – supervised the placement of army units from individual brigades to platoons, with disastrous results. When Indian troops were overrun by superior Chinese forces, Menon resigned, and perhaps the best general in independent India's history, Gen Sam Manekshaw, was rushed to the front to rally the retreating Indian forces until a ceasefire was declared.[65]

The War with Pakistan (1971)

The Nehru government's naiveté in strategic issues, its aversion to things military, and especially its reluctance to utilise the armed forces as a source of strategic advice changed drastically once his daughter, Indira Gandhi, became prime minister in 1966. She was quite willing to link military force with political power and remains India's most militaristic prime minister.[66] At the height of the "Bangladesh crisis," in December 1971, after an eight-month long build-up, the Indian Army soundly defeated the Pakistani forces, profiting from the increased operational freedom and expanded autonomy to fight the war according to its own plans that it gained in 1962. The slight civil-military tension in this case was caused by the trigger-happy Mrs. Gandhi who wanted her forces to attack Pakistan in the spring of 1971, displaying a "complete lack of awareness… about India's ill-preparedness for war."[67] Gen Manekshaw resisted her demands, insisting that the campaign be put off until the monsoon season ended and the military was better prepared. Just before the campaign began in December, she asked him, "General, are you ready for the war?" He replied, "I'm always ready, sweetie" and within three weeks, delivered. (The ever-quotable Manekshaw said that he could not bring himself to call Mrs. Gandhi "Madame" because it reminded him of a bawdy-house). [68]

The Emergency (1975)

In June 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of Emergency and suspended democracy in response to widespread demonstrations, strikes,

and rioting that, in her judgment, threatened social order and the economy. The disturbances also had national security implications given that a war with Pakistan was just recently concluded. (The protests originated in a court decision convicting Indira Gandhi on minor election-related charges and declaring her election to Parliament null and void.) After 18 months of ruling by decree, constructing an economic programme, and defeating the civil disobedience campaign (140,000 people were arrested, 40,000 of them Sikhs), elections were held in 1977 in which the Congress Party's dominance was reduced and Mrs. Gandhi lost her parliamentary seat. The main concern for us here is the military's behaviour. Even in this heavily charged atmosphere, the ever-obedient military was willing to follow the government's lead. Naturally, there was anxiety in the armed forces regarding the drift into disorder. In particular, commanders were concerned about the effect of the chaotic economic and social conditions on military personnel on home leave.[69] Still, when Mrs. Gandhi questioned Field Marshal Manekshaw about rumours that he was plotting to depose her, he asked if she wanted his resignation on the grounds of mental instability.[70]

Aid to the Civil

Unlike the singular events above, the army's involvement in containing civilian – mostly ethno-religious – conflicts originated in the colonial era, was on-going in the 1947-1975 period, and since then, has become only more frequent and pervasive. In 1951-1970, the army had been called out 476 times; in 1982-1989, 721 times.[71] It constitutes the most troubling aspect of Indian civil-military relations so much so that, according to Stephen Cohen, "India is not a democracy in many of its districts where the army and the paramilitary forces supplanted the judiciary, the civil administration, and the ballot box as the ultimate arbiter."[72] (The army's "aid to the civil" is concentrated in Kashmir and the tribally unstable northeast and, during the 1980s, in the Punjab.) The fundamental problem with the state's increased reliance on the military for internal security duties is exacerbated by several factors. First, the army is rarely free to deal with the situation as it sees fit, particularly because many internal operations involve paramilitary forces and the police. Second, this law-and-order function harms morale in, and the integrity of, the forces. Third, professional socialisation and experience has ingrained in

the Indian armed forces the belief that the suppression of civil disturbances is one of their important and legitimate functions — in other words, that they are the only effective force standing between chaos and order.[73] Indian military experts seem more bothered with political incompetence that necessitates the army's involvement than the fact of the army's deployment against civilians.

Few endeavours could be more antithetical to democratic civil-military relations than the army's involvement in domestic law-and-order issues. It poses a challenge to the political neutrality of the armed forces as has been clearly demonstrated in many contexts in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. Thus, it is all the more remarkable that in India, the state's control over the military has remained virtually unshaken.

Pakistan: The Evolution of a Praetorian State

Above, I have identified seven reasons for the development of authoritarianism and military rule in Pakistan that set it so clearly apart from India. The disparities between the two states also help to understand why, given the circumstances, the political intervention of Pakistani generals was not only not surprising but almost inevitable. How did this happen?

Instead of the general elections that followed Independence in India, in Pakistan only indirect elections were held through Provincial Assemblies. Elections, starting with those held in the Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province in 1951, soon began to be tainted by allegations of foul play. (In fact, with the sole exception of the 1970 elections, there were no Pakistani elections between 1947 and 1988 that were not affected by varying levels of corruption and cheating.) After the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the swiftly deteriorating conditions of Pakistani domestic politics were indicated by the rapid turnover of prime ministers and other top office-holders. Two important clues of the erosion of democratic practices were offered by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad: in 1953, he dissolved Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin's Cabinet and, a year later, he disbanded the legislature when it attempted to place checks on executive authority. One consequence of the protracted squabbles between political actors was their difficulty in approving budgets which directly threatened the flow of funds for defence.

The traumatic experience of Partition, the Kashmir War, and a number of subsequent war scares had increased the Pakistani officer corps' distress about military weaknesses and soon taught them that the exigencies of state-building overrode the old British insistence on the separation of politics and the armed forces. The army's conviction of civilian incompetence was reinforced from early on by the frequent "aid-to-the-civil" missions when the civil administration called out the troops to quell sectarian riots.[74] In 1951, army officers in Rawalpindi, dissatisfied with the government's moral and material support to the military in Kashmir, conspired to assassinate Gen Douglas Gracey, the army's British commander-in-chief and some top officials. The plot was easily suppressed but it hinted at future military involvement in politics.[75]

From the beginning, the Pakistani state gave its armed forces priority treatment. Already, in 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan announced that "the defence of the state is our foremost consideration; it dominates all other governmental activities."[76] In January 1951, he appointed active-duty Gen Mohammad Ayub Khan as defence minister, an action that was tantamount to relinquishing civilian supremacy over the military establishment. If the competition with social and economic institutions for resources brought the military into politics, pressures on the defence establishment provided the earliest impetus for its role expansion.[77] Responding to the protracted political instability, in October 1958, President Iskander Mirza – himself a Sandhurst-educated former general – abrogated the Constitution, abolished political parties, removed the civilian government, and appointed Ayub Khan as chief martial law administrator. Three weeks later, Ayub replaced Mirza – in what was the first of four Pakistani coups to date – starting Pakistan's long history of military rule (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008).

The first four years of Ayub's rule comprised a moderate martial law regime in which the military's chain of command was preserved and major decisions were reached at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. Ayub launched the "Basic Democracy" initiative with the stated objective of strengthening democracy at the grassroots level but the real purpose was to increase rural support for his regime.[78] The system – relying on elected and non-elected representatives with a local administration "acting as the eyes, ears, and stick for the central government" – was a form of guided democracy not unlike President Sukarno's experiment in Indonesia after 1957.[79]

In order to stabilise the political situation, Ayub created an equal relationship between the military – that lacked the administrative experience – and the civilian bureaucracy, and ended up running the country more efficiently than his civilian predecessors. Through the coercion of some politicians and the cooption of others, the military succeeded in creating a reasonably successful and legitimate political regime that accommodated its own corporate interests.[80]

In 1960, Ayub, having retired from the army, had become a civilian president and began to involve influential civilian politicians in governance. In 1962, he introduced a new Constitution that promised a return to democracy and he started the gradual civilisation of his administration. By the time of his 1965 electoral victory, Ayub was primarily relying on civilian political allies for their networks in securing his victory.[81] He not only did not disturb the position of Pakistan's ruling economic elites, his economic policies actually widened the large disparities between East and West Pakistan and the inequities between rural and urban areas. In 1968, 22 families owned 68 per cent of Pakistani industries and 87 per cent of its banking and insurance assets.[82]

In 1969, the ill and politically isolated Ayub Khan handed power over to Gen Yahya Khan, the Chief of the Army Staff, who declared a new martial law regime. This second bloodless coup was exceptional because the new leader had no plans to reform the state or to "straighten out" Pakistan's political order.[83] The transition was also unconstitutional since in a case of presidential resignation, power should have been transferred to the speaker of the Assembly. Even though Ayub strengthened civilian institutions in the second half of his reign, the top brass were reluctant to give up power. The transition from Ayub to Yahya merely underscored the armed forces' super-constitutional authority.

During his shortlived regime (1969-1971), Yahya Khan extended the military's role as the guardian of the country's "ideological frontier," a notion that has prevailed ever since.[84] His rule is most remembered by the December 1970 general elections – the country's first – and the war that followed and resulted in Pakistan's dismemberment. The Awami League won 160 of the 162 seats reserved for East Pakistan in the 300-seat National Assembly; the runner-up Pakistan People's Party (PPP) only 81 of the 138 seats reserved for

West Pakistan. The two parties' support came exclusively from the eastern and the western parts of the country, respectively.

Post-election talks between the two sides – regarding the division of power between the central government and the provinces and the formation of a national government to be headed by the Awami League – went nowhere because West Pakistanis were unwilling to be ruled by the despised Eastern part of the country they viewed and treated as a colony. Yahya Khan indefinitely postponed the pending National Assembly session, precipitating massive civil disobedience in East Pakistan. In March 1971, despite a military crackdown by the Pakistan Army, the Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, proclaimed East Pakistan's independence as Bangladesh. As fighting escalated between the Pakistan Army and the Bengali Mukti Bahini ("freedom fighters"), about ten million Bengalis, mainly Hindus, sought refuge in India. In early December, India intervened on the Bangladeshis' side and within two weeks, the outmatched Pakistani forces surrendered. Yahya Khan handed over political power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the head of the PPP, who emerged as the country's undisputed leader.

Bhutto reinforced the concept of civilian control over the armed forces and took political, administrative, and legal steps to disengage the military from politics. A new Constitution was drafted in 1973 that endorsed a parliamentary form of democracy and vested executive power in the prime minister and turned the president into a figurehead. Still, some of Bhutto's closest advisers were generals, he shared the military's hawkish views on national security matters, and he embarked on an ambitious weapons acquisition and modernisation programme. In order to further appease the armed forces, Bhutto granted generals a role in the administration. Nonetheless, when he asked military leaders to curb political unrest in major cities, they refused to shoot at people.[85]

In March 1976, Bhutto appointed Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq as the new Chief of Army Staff. Zia was not known for his brilliance and he was junior to six other generals in line for the position but his sycophancy went far enough to earn the job for him. When he changed the army's credo to *Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabil Allah* (Faith, piety, and *jihad* for the sake of God) soon after taking office, Bhutto did not object.[86] In fact, the army's Islamisation began much earlier. Although Jinnah favoured a secular state, Muslim officers already in

1947-48 used the Islamic notion of *jihad* to mobilise the tribesmen they had recruited for the fight for Kashmir.[87]

Zia's coup in 1977, the third in Pakistan's brief history, was a case of reactive militarism. The military – once again assuming a self-appointed role as the final arbiter of politics – responded to widespread allegations that Bhutto had rigged the 1977 elections and declared that he was no longer capable of running the country. Upon taking power, Zia needed to build a strong support base and succeeded in coopting the bureaucracy as a junior partner in the martial law government. More significantly, he started the practice of involving military officers directly in politics—who now, for the first time, received the opportunity to advance their careers and seek lucrative jobs in the civil sector – and of appointing reliable retired officers into high ranking civilian posts.[88] Zia accelerated the nuclear programme started by Bhutto and worked hard to restore the army's flagging post-1971 War morale and prestige.

Zia managed to stay in power for more than a decade for a number of reasons. Realising the importance of constitutional protection against unchecked powers, he strengthened the role of the president in a constitutional amendment which served as the legal basis for his dismissal of National and Provincial Assemblies (and later the firing of civilian governments). Just as important, Zia maintained his control over the military – even as president, he remained the Chief of Army Staff – thereby virtually guaranteeing his job security as head of state. He ruled with a firm hand and further enhanced the role of the armed forces as *the* quintessential *political* institution of the state.

Zia died in a plane crash in August 1988. His demise was followed by a military-controlled transition to civilian rule and a decade-long experimentation with democracy featuring four elections and four civilian governments (two each headed by Benazir Bhutto – Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter – and Nawaz Sharif) none of which completed their scheduled tenure. Even during this brief quasi-democratic interlude, there was merely an appearance of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. In Pakistan, only a thin line separates military and political power, and once the generals decide that their institutional and corporate interests are no longer sufficiently safeguarded by the government, they take over the reins of power. So did, in October 1999, Gen Pervez Musharraf who

stayed in power for nine years before very reluctantly allowing the return of a civilian administration.

Conclusion

As I mentioned at the outset, there are many ways of answering the question that constitutes the title of this paper. Rather than offering a comprehensive account, my more modest objective was to establish the basic patterns of Indian and Pakistani civil-military relations, to show where their different trajectories originated, and to underscore the importance of the British colonial legacy, the Partition, and the initial post-Independence period. Had the analysis extended to the entire post-1947 period, my conclusions, quite possibly, might have been somewhat different. But I am confident that the fundamental dynamics that underscore the disparities in which civilian politicians and military men interact and conceive of their role in India and Pakistan have not fundamentally changed since 1975 and 1988, respectively.

Notwithstanding the many commonalities in their heritage, the polities and the armed forces of India and Pakistan have experienced starkly contrasting developmental trajectories. In terms of the institutional arrangements governing civil-military relations, the two states could not be more different. The executive branch possesses great power over the Indian armed forces, power that is – in this parliamentary democracy – both formally and substantively complemented by legislative authority. In Pakistan, both branches of government are much weaker in their position vis-à-vis the military. In India, the political position of the defence minister – who is a bona fide civilian – is powerful while that of the Service chiefs (there is still no first-among-equals chief) is almost negligible and is limited to an advisory function. In Pakistan, the minister is a retired military officer with little influence; real political power is vested in the Chief of the Army Staff. The Indian legislature receives complete and detailed information necessary to generate the defence budget and it has various institutional channels to ensure that monies are disbursed appropriately. In Pakistan, however, legislators can obtain little specific information about, and, in practice, have, modest influence over, military expenditures.

Active duty military personnel in both states enjoy the right to vote. In Pakistan, at least from a legal perspective, soldiers and officers should

stay out of politics, but "extraordinary circumstances" have caused them to enter the political realm. Pakistani generals have tended to be concerned about the legality of their political interventions and attempted to legitimate their actions, at least retrospectively, through legislation. In India, there is a network of sophisticated and independent defence experts employed by newspapers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and universities, while under the conditions of Pakistani authoritarianism, a pool of truly independent defence experts could not develop. In both states, the armed forces maintain a number of highly professionalised research institutes.

The most important foreign influence on Indian and Pakistani civil-military relations was, of course, the legacy of the British Empire. Although with the passing of time, the shadow of the Empire has gradually faded, no institution has remained more "British" in either country than the military. Pakistan, both during the Cold War and since, has been strongly affected by its alliance with the United States that allowed its armed forces access to weapons, technology, and high-level training.[89] This alliance, it is important to note, was conceived to offset Pakistan's disadvantages in resources and at no point meant that Islamabad was "pro-American." In a similar vein, India developed close relations with the USSR, but it did not mean – as many in the West thought – that Delhi was enamoured with Moscow or Soviet-style Communism.

India has baffled democracy experts because against many odds – widespread poverty, illiteracy, social, religious, and ethnic divisions – it has maintained its fiercely democratic institutions save for the eighteen months of the Emergency.[90] The Indian military played – and continues to play – a negligible role in defence and security policies, which is a disservice to the people of India. Perhaps no other democracy – other than Argentina that did experience recurrent military rule in the recent past – has so tightly constrained its officer corps as India. In Pakistan – notwithstanding the many similarities between the two societies – a political system evolved in which power is held by the military. Whatever authority they grant to the politicians and for how long is entirely up to them. There are a number of different ways to explain this outcome,[91] but historical circumstances – namely, the colonial heritage in general, the Partition and its aftermath, and the first decade or so of Independence – have played an exceedingly important role.

Notes

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73. Sumit Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in Contemporary India," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 26, Nos. 1-2, 1991, pp. 11-26.
74. Aqil Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, No. 4, October 2008, p. 18.
75. See Khan, n. 24, pp. 36-39.
76. Cited in Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military & Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), p. 42.
77. Schofield, n. 64, p. 36.
78. Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 56-60.
79. Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 74.
80. Ibid., p. 73.
81. Schofield, n. 64, p. 40.
82. Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), p. 57.
83. Cohen, n. 2, p. 125.
84. Haqqani, n. 14, p. 51.
85. Cohen, n. 27, p. 81.
86. Haqqani, n. 14, pp. 111-12.
87. Ibid., p. 29.
88. Sattar, n. 48, p. 391.
89. Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics: Pakistan, 1958-1982* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983), pp. 200-03.
90. See Ashutosh Varshney, "Why Democracy Survives," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1998, pp. 36-50.
91. Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory helps understand the different political roles of the Indian and Pakistani Armies. She argues that four factors (the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the method of recruitment, and military style) yield a solid explanation. See Schiff, "Concordance Theory: The Cases of India and Pakistan," in David Mares, (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations* (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 27-44.