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# Changing Nature of Conflict:
## Trends and Responses

Centre for Land Warfare Studies
New Delhi

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The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an autonomous think tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach.



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# Changing Nature of Conflict: Trends and Responses

**Proceedings of an international seminar hosted jointly by Army HQ and CLAWS 23 & 24 November 2009**

The Indian Army and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) jointly organised a two-day international seminar on **"Changing Nature of Conflict: Trends and Responses"** on 23-24 November 2009 at the DRDO Auditorium, New Delhi. The Keynote Address was delivered by the Hon'ble Defence Minister, Mr **A K Antony**, and the Inaugural Address by the Chief of Army Staff, Gen **Deepak Kapoor**, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, ADC. Dr **Shashi Tharoor**, Minister of State for External Affairs, delivered the Valedictory Address. Held over four sessions, the seminar was attended by delegates from 20 countries, senior serving officers of Indian armed and paramilitary forces, officials from the government and central police organisations, members of the strategic community, representatives of human rights institutions and the media.

# Introduction

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have witnessed what can justifiably be termed a paradigm shift in the nature of conflict. The world is no longer concerned primarily with threats of a conventional nature such as conflicts between states or groups of states. Sub-conventional conflicts, ranging from intra-state conflicts to global terrorism, are gaining prominence. The world is being increasingly confronted with violence so amorphous that security forces are struggling to cope with it.

The emerging security environment is radically different from what it was even a decade ago. In the increasingly globalised world, the new security

challenges are products, not of conventional inter-state rivalries, but of economic, demographic and societal tensions that are trans-national in nature. Incidents of conflict are on the rise due to a multiplicity of factors, ranging from weak and illegitimate state institutions, marginalisation of people in border areas (generating sanctuaries for various insurgent groups), large scale population displacements and ineffective regional security arrangements.

Given the rising importance of cities as political, economic and cultural centres of gravity, armed conflict will increasingly take place in urban settings. There is now an ongoing global insurgency, which is using techniques of information warfare, conventional criminal activities and terrorism, and is fostered by cross-border linkages between different terror organisations, involving military training, funding and transfer of technology. The proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons has led to armed groups having increased access to small arms and, consequently, augments the chances of a terrorist group coming into possession of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Homeland security needs to be enhanced by an order of magnitude against information and infrastructure attacks.

Terrorism is now a global phenomenon. A key challenge facing policy and decision-makers today is how to meet this threat collectively, without compromising on individual national interests. The all-encompassing nature of the threat and the need to fight it comprehensively has given rise to the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare. The rising competition over limited sources of energy is generating new tensions in geo-political relations. Its adverse impact is being felt increasingly in the Southern Asian region as well. Future water wars are already being spoken of in hushed tones. Though these are in the realm of the imagination at present, with increasing economic competition in the future, trade wars may not be far behind. However, at present, asymmetric, amorphous, cross-cultural conflict will continue to dominate the strategic landscape.

To understand the changing nature of conflict, the factors influencing the same must be examined comprehensively, so as to arrive at a clear perspective about its emerging contours. This enhanced understanding of the strategic and operational level would be necessary for nations and governments to come to grips with sub-conventional conflict and to transform the military and other security forces and decision-making processes to combat the emerging threats, challenges and vulnerabilities.

## The Emerging Security Environment: International and Regional

It is important today to understand the emerging international and regional security environment and the likely flashpoints. Modern conflict is more likely to be a consequence of regional struggles involving a range of actors rather than inter-state tensions or instability. This instability, in turn, is likely to arise as a consequence of the rise of autonomous armed groups and non-state entities and the weakening of governments and state institutions, coupled with population displacement, trafficking – both human and material – and ethno-religious tensions.

It is the rise of these and other non-traditional security threats, such as financial turmoil, environmental degradation, various crimes at/on the high seas, and healthcare (the H1N1 virus being a prime example) that will influence both domestic and international policy in the years to come. While these concerns have been part and parcel of human existence for many years, never before have they had such a serious impact on countries individually or the international community as a whole.

Along with West Asia, Southern Asia has gradually emerged as one of the key epicentres of conflict and instability in the world. It is, therefore, important to take stock of the prevailing regional security environment. Being host to a mix of indigenous peoples and migrants, Southern Asia has witnessed the movement of people and ideas for several centuries and the states therein have never seen true political unity. Territorial disputes, religious fundamentalism, radical extremism, ethnic tensions and socio-economic disparities are all hallmarks of the region. All these factors have contributed to instability in this conflict-ridden region and bear careful examination.

The changing nature of conflict is indirectly influencing the concept of national security in the 21st century. In the new world order post-World War II, power blocs have given way to cooperative regional groupings like the European Union (EU) and the concept of the Westphalian nation-state has begun to gradually fray at the edges. On the other hand, non-state actors with a trans-national presence are emerging as important entities. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Multi-national Companies (MNCs) are gaining a prominence that is completely disproportionate to their size and status. The primacy of the United Nations (UN) has been considerably

eroded by the proclivity of the P-5 to repeatedly undermine its credibility by promoting their national interests rather than the collective good.

Under these circumstances, the very concept of national security needs to be re-examined. It is readily accepted that a nation may legally call out the cavalry to defend its territory and its people and, should it need to, vital economic and other interests abroad. However, this concept is questionable in the broader context of intervention in the defence of another nation-state that has strategic significance, or when the security of such a nation becomes a test of strategic resolve.

Is the responsibility to intervene and the responsibility to protect a matter of humanitarian consideration or national discretion? Where does one draw the line between wars of 'interest' and wars of 'conscience', between wars of 'choice' and wars of 'necessity'?

## Conventional Conflict: Emerging Trends

The next step is to identify the emerging trends in conventional conflict in the light of the prevailing security environment, international and regional. In recent years, there have been fewer and fewer armed conflicts between two or more states, but there has been a remarkable increase in the number of intra-state armed conflicts. However, territorial disputes abound and, if not resolved quickly, these disputes could yet lead to inter-state conflict. Battles today are not fought by soldiers alone, but by irregular armed groups and members of the police forces as well. There is a blurring of distinctions between the roles of the police forces on the one hand, and the armed forces, on the other.

Further complicating this dimension is the increasing role played by private security companies that are being given responsibilities which were traditionally carried out by the state. When regulated, they make an important contribution to security in conflict-ridden areas, but on the flip side, tend to become a law unto themselves and can present governance problems as yet unseen. Thus, these companies have an impact not only on the provision of security in conflict zones but also on new perceptions of global governance and international relations.

These developments in warfare have prompted a transformation of military forces, formerly designed primarily for conventional war, to be

oriented towards both conventional war as well as non-state adversaries. As future threats and challenges are becoming increasingly difficult to predict in the prevailing era of strategic uncertainty, in areas that are devoid of territorial disputes, the trend is to move from threat-based to capability-based forces. An ongoing debate focusses on the inescapable need for boots on the ground vis-à-vis winning the war from the air. The emerging trend lines clearly point to the need for information superiority as a prerequisite for success in operations. Net-centric warfare and effects-based operations can create a decisive advantage, facilitate and increase mission effectiveness.

Modern militaries have also begun to exploit opportunities in the realm of cyber war, with countries around the world developing strategies designed to affect an adversary's command and control structure, early warning systems and other critical functions, both military and civilian. Such tactics are also likely to be increasingly adopted by non-traditional adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities wherever they may be found. Cyber warfare will almost certainly play a tangible role and lead to adverse consequences in the wars of the future.

## Sub-conventional Conflict: Emerging Trends

Though it may be too early to write an obituary for conventional conflict, one must look ahead and focus on the emerging trends in sub-conventional conflict, as the predominant paradigm of the international security environment. An inquiry into this exemplar of modern conflict would be based on wider international perspectives as also comparatively specific Asian perspectives, somewhat of an in-group, out-group approach. Limiting discussion to a singular perspective would invite the danger of mishandling the subject, while a comprehensive review would make a contribution to the international debate on the issue.

A major aspect of the emerging trends in sub-conventional conflict is the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare. The attention the concept devotes to the non-conventional nature of the current paradigm, its emphasis on political will and mass mobilisation, the rise of non-state actors and the confluence of civil-military spheres, merit detailed examination and further thought. While it may exhibit some lacunae in historical establishment, its relevance is unquestionable.

An examination of the influence of the emerging human rights and international humanitarian law on the nature of conflict must also be undertaken. Despite the sharp focus on human rights and international humanitarian law in recent decades and the clear distinction now being made between civilian populace and combatants, some governments have misused sovereignty to suppress the people under the mandate of emergency regulations. Such abuse has further engendered instability in conflict-ridden regions. It would be useful to study how human rights and international humanitarian law can be strengthened further while addressing the genuine requirements of the armed forces and other security forces.

With regard to both Fourth Generation Warfare and human rights/ humanitarian law, the role played by the media must be taken into consideration. The impact of an image of war increases every time it is broadcast. As a result, the public perception of war can well change with the immediacy of the reporting of events. Governments can be influenced by the public reaction to the same.

A valid view aired by analysts today is that the images of war one sees in various media are not an accurate reflection of the actual operations. While its proponents boast of it as a fourth branch of government, the media does not adhere to a standardised system of checks and balances. Yet, to control or regulate it would involve no lesser danger.

## Cooperative Security for Peace and Stability

An inquiry into the new approaches required to maintain peace and stability would be now logical. Cooperative security would be explored as the preferred avenue of approaching conflict resolution on a regional basis. The military's role in cooperative security would be posited primarily in mobilising cooperation and building relationships to augment regional and international security. Intervention operations on a multilateral platform would be preferable to unilateral or even bilateral ones. These would include promoting friendly political authorities and subtly limiting adversary control and influence. Military effectiveness within this sphere will often require joint operations and joint capacity building.

There is an increasing possibility of future peace deployments being handled under the aegis of regional organisations. The Southern Asian region

is marked by various regional groupings such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). While such organisations enjoy the advantage of proximity and cultural understanding, not all of them may possess operational capabilities in the domain of peace operations. Regional groupings have been better at issuing declarations and identifying principles than formulating concrete operational measures, for reasons of national priorities and domestic political considerations. This is not unusual, given that most of them were founded on the mandate of trade and development and have begun exploring security cooperation only recently. Case studies of Aceh, Nepal, Palestine and Sri Lanka will serve to highlight past practices and future requirements.

# Inaugural Session

### Welcome Address

☐ Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd), Director, CLAWS

This is the second Indian Army-CLAWS joint international seminar and is part of a series of deliberations on India's security concerns. The subject chosen is timely and important as the deliberations will distinguish between threats that are real and those that are transitory. The sessions have been structured in a manner to cover the entire gamut of issues pertaining to the changing nature of conflict.

### Inaugural Address

☐ Gen Deepak Kapoor, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, ADC, Chief of Army Staff

The character of warfare is determined more by political, social, economic and strategic imbalances than it is by changes that may occur on the military front. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the end of the Cold War. However, the cataclysmic events of 9/11 have transformed the definition of security and today we have an uncertain security scenario of "no war, no peace".

The period from 1945 to 1991 was marked by the Cold War and witnessed the evolution of the use of violence to impose ideology, the struggle for self-determination and wars against political, social and economic suppression. It led to the emergence of non-state actors as future adversaries that were also used as tools of proxy war of one nation against the other. Armed conflicts have cross-border linkages and are shifting from insurgencies to urban terrorism, making borders irrelevant in shaping the changing nature of conflict.

Southern Asia is one of the epicentres of conflict and instability due to territorial disputes, provocation by proxy war, radical extremism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic tensions and socio-economic disparities. However, there is neither political nor diplomatic unity to fight them. Nations can be forced to undertake interventions purely on humanitarian grounds. It is difficult to draw a line between wars of interests and wars of conscience; between wars of choice and wars of necessity.

Future threats would now also encompass the war on drugs, radical groups, control of resources and religious extremism. The use of space and cyber space has added a new dimension to conventional wars. As the battlefields merge, the wars of the future would also be conducted with energy, trade, and aid being used as weapons. Therefore, the very concept of national security needs to be re-examined.

Nations are under attack and humanity in general is under constant threat. Options are limited: split to suffer or unite to survive. Collective responsibility and sharing of information on the part of nations will be the key to stemming the threat arising from non-state actors as well as avoiding the escalation of conflict between nations. Thus, capability and capacity building is imperative, as also the nations' ability to deter, dissuade and contain the adversary. Escalation control and conflict termination on favourable terms is an essential part of military strategy. However, conflict resolution and transformation strategy have emerged as tools to deal with the new asymmetric and unrestricted war. Cooperative security and multilateral military cooperation to deal with the common threat, preferably under the aegis of the UN, is likely to be an inescapable requirement that will need consensus.

**Keynote Address**

☐ Mr A K Antony, Defence Minister

There has been a paradigm shift in the nature of conflict. Though territorial issues are important, other issues related to historical differences, ideological biases, economic disparity, energy security and water shortage are contributing factors for conflict. Modern-day conflicts are not merely confined to states, but have expanded to include sub-nationalities, terrorists, insurgents, religious fanatics and ethnic interests. The nature of conflict today arises from sabotage, subversion, confrontation and armed conflict. Thus, the state's response needs to be balanced, inclusive and one that incorporates political, economic, societal and military measures.

Various developments in our neighbourhood, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, have brought South Asia to the centre-stage of sub-conventional conflict and instability. Additionally, terrorism, low intensity conflict motivated by economic disparity, religious fundamentalism, narcotics

trade, and the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands remain issues of concern in our region. Nations are seeking new ways and means to combat terrorism. In this regard, civil society, human rights organisations, media and law enforcement agencies all have a role to play. In addition, the armed forces must be used optimally to shape an adequate response to such threats.

While there is a virtual absence of direct armed conflict between nations, internal armed conflicts have witnessed an upward trend. The entry of non-state actors has added a new dimension to low intensity conflicts. Responses to such challenges need to be addressed in a focussed and credible manner. The conventional armed forces need to maintain an edge by upgrading technologies; intelligence and security agencies need to coordinate nationally and internationally; and cooperative security as a strategy needs to be enforced at regional and international levels.

# Session I – The Emerging Security Environment: International and Regional

## Chairperson's Remarks

☐ Ambassador Kanwal Sibal

We have no single functioning international security architecture, except the United Nations, which has proven inadequate. At the regional level, there are two regions which have a functioning security architecture – the Euro-Atlantic region and Southeast Asia – in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) respectively. With the end of the two bloc situation, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has lost its relevance. The rise of China is another feature of this new environment. How China deals with the territorial problems it has with its various neighbours, the contradiction between its political and economic systems, the ramifications of its increased military strength on Japan, Taiwan, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia and South Asia and, most importantly, what its role will be in the United Nations, will be watched with interest. China's collaboration with Pakistan in nuclear and other technology transfers, and its arming of Pakistan (alongside the US) has serious security implications. China is also filling up the vacuum in the international system left by Russia.

Globalisation, by creating interdependence, should have had a positive impact on the global security environment. Multipolarity should have eased the security environment by making multilateralism more necessary. The need for collective security should have gained more acceptance. In the case of India's security concerns, territorial issues such as those between India and Pakistan, and India and China, still retain ascendancy. Afghanistan, with the rise of the Taliban and Pakistan's strategic ambitions there, is a security concern. The potential collapse of Pakistan adds to this concern. On the nuclear side, North Korea's and Iran's nuclear defiance and the civilian nuclear power renaissance could increase the likelihood of many other countries acquiring nuclear capabilty. Terrorism, religious extremism, asymmetric warfare, non-

state actors, drug-trafficking and money laundering are other serious security concerns.

### International Security Environment and Emerging Flashpoints

☐ Dr Timothy Hoyt, US Naval War College

Flashpoints are not just a matter of geography, political or terrestrial. What makes them flashpoints is the degree to which they destabilise regional or global politics. The dangers of instability may be much greater now than during the Cold War. Climate change, demography and religious extremism now create new problems. States which formerly had benign security relationships suddenly find themselves enmeshed in broader conflicts. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Taiwan, North Korea, and Iran are all states which may deliberately instigate or become embroiled in internal, regional, or great power conflicts in the coming decades. Shattered or collapsing states will continue to invite international intervention, primarily in southern Africa, but also quite possibly in either coastal areas (due to climate change) or Central Asia.

Iraq's rather tepid support for international terrorism in the 1980s became a major element of the *casus belli* for US intervention in 2003. Iran's on-and-off support for elements of Al Qaeda and its dabbling in Afghanistan may cause much greater difficulties with the US than anticipated. And Pakistan now faces a "blowback" from some of the dozens of militant groups it has fostered and supported in an effort to influence its neighbours. These states are also critical because they may either fail catastrophically or invite extra-regional intervention, should a crisis occur. In either case, the possibility of protracted conflict increases, as does the possibility of escalation – at least in part because each state has a large population. Should conflicts in these regions lead to war, we can no longer predict with certainty what those wars will look like.

Other flashpoints may emerge for other, non-traditional security reasons. Their geographic location will be more widespread than the Asian focus – Africa, for example, is particularly hard hit by poverty, demographics, and potentially by disease. The re-emergence of populism in Latin America, exemplified by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, threatens to reverse a trend

toward more stable civilian democracies in that region. Europe and the Maghreb face significant potential threats from radical Islamist groups – in Europe in particular, the inability of the concerned governments to integrate Muslim populations into a larger national identity poses threats to Britain, France, Spain and Germany. The emergence of terrorist campaigns in any of these states is, perhaps, less likely to lead to regional conflict – Europe, after many generations, looks more like a region of peace than most continents – but could still constitute a very significant and troubling event in terms of international security.

However, the inability of the international community to generate broader coordinated responses to predictable threats is disappointing. The United Nations continues to play a deeply constrained role in international conflict. Regional security organisations and alliances have proven only marginally effective. Flashpoints, therefore, will remain with us in the future. The more traditional ones may be amenable to traditional practices – hedging, negotiation, deterrence – but the volatility of local polities in many of the critical states may create unanticipated crises or consequences.

### Regional Security Environment in Southern Asia

☐ Dr Manpreet Sethi, Centre for Air Power Studies

The security environment in Southern Asia is complex and marked with several uncertainties. The region as a whole requires peace and development so that abysmal human security indices may be improved. However, instead of retaining complete focus on them, most individual nation-states have tried to garner absolute, individual security through military means. This has naturally resulted in exacerbating the insecurities of others and putting into motion a vicious circle of security-insecurity.

The peculiar geography of Southern Asia, its imperatives for transit and connectivity, the need for internal and external stability in order to retain national focus on developmental priorities, and shared cultural traditions bind the region together. Southern Asia is the most populous region of the world and is home to nearly half the world's population, most of who count among the poorest in the world. However, the traditional challenges of nation building, such as ensuring effective governance for the necessary

human development, have been complicated by the spread of radical fundamentalism and terrorism, proven nuclear proliferation between states in the region and a growing danger of loose nukes or nuclear material being procured by non-state actors to conduct nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, regional power equations are changing rapidly as China amasses economic and military strength and India too grows in stature and reach. All these realities impact the security of the region. For instance, while China and India as economic engines of growth can provide opportunities to the smaller states in the region, an uncomfortable bilateral relationship between the two could equally impinge upon the states if both were to vie for their individual areas of influence.

The region has ample potential for cooperation in order to foster economic development based on inter-dependence, so that a vested interest in each other's stability and prosperity is created. The diversity and complexities present therein, however, prevent it from developing a common identity. The acceptance of pluralism and cooperative peace will have to be the answer to the security problems of the region. The failure to act collectively will catapult the region into a spiral of violence and hatred. Unfortunately, though, the region has no security mechanisms to handle the myriad challenges. Formations like SAARC, SCO, ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) have their limitations, given the limited composition of sub-regions within Southern Asia. In most cases, the challenges transcend these artificial divisions.

## Concept of National Security in the 21st Century

☐ Lt Gen SS Mehta, PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (Retd)

In terms of its conception of national security, India has been at the forefront in drawing the attention of the international community towards security concerns. It was the first to lead the call on a ban on nuclear weapons. It drew the world's attention towards terrorism and cross-border terrorism in particular. In both respects, the world paid no heed to these warnings. Yet, despite the fact that all these warnings manifested themselves as threats, the world continues to draw attention to India's perceived lack of a strategic culture. In the *Arthashastra*, Kautilya's epic manual on statecraft,

the key focus is on the four kinds of threats which any nation is likely to face at a particular point of time, namely: an external threat externally abetted; an external threat internally abetted; an internal threat externally abetted; and an internal threat internally abetted. It is the fourth kind of threat which is the most dangerous and the one the nation must pay most attention to. In the Indian scenario, the nation faces a number of security threats of all four kinds, in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the Northeastern states, left-wing extremism, rising unemployment and economic disparities, nuclear proliferation and *jihadis*. It would be wise for the nation's leaders to take Kautilya's recommendations seriously.

Security and defence today are not inter-changeable terms. Security is an inclusive term, and stands for political consultation, and an overarching approach, including economic aspects, security concerns, human resources and public discourse. Defence stands for sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal discord, response to disasters (natural and man-made) and international obligations. Therefore, security incorporates defence.

Numerous changes in the landscape of the world have an impact on conceptions of security and defence. Due to globalisation, interdependence between countries is increasing. As a result, the vulnerability quotient is also on the rise. India is a perfect example, bordered as it is by states which are largely failing, and if/when they do, will have a critical impact on India. A new range of security threats is on the horizon, such as cyber war, non-state actors, and so on. Not only are they anonymous for the most part, they may also be pseudonymous. As a result, it is going to be difficult to extrapolate the rate of change on the basis of the past, for all indications point that the next 100 years will go at the rate of 20,000 years, technologically. Military force will no longer serve as the primary means of exerting force and/or control

For India, security will be the most imposing challenge. It will have to deal with rivalry both regionally and internationally, unsettled relationships with its neighbours, the increasing divide between the rich and the poor within the country, the fractious nature of its polity, and so on and so forth. But the silver lining for the country, which will lead the world to take note of it, will be its youth. India has a demographic advantage, and resultantly, it will remain the youngest country in the world till at least 2035, adding 10 million people to the workforce every year. This potential workforce will also have

to be trained accordingly. And for this purpose, a change in mindset needs to be figured in. Security today does not recognise boundaries of any sort and therefore, policy making for this purpose also needs to be as unhindered. The disparity between what is promised and what is delivered must be narrowed to the lowest point.

Technological advancement is a key concern. We must move from labour arbitrage to knowledge arbitrage. If there is a shortfall, it must be made up for, by indigenous development, foreign collaboration or direct imports. With collaborations in this respect, jointness in the Services must also follow. If the country can function on the lines of 'unity in diversity', there is no reason for it not to translate into unified command and control. There is a need for the country to develop a platform or mechanism for members of the scientific, diplomatic, legal, defence and political communities to debate and arrive at a security policy for the country. The security concerns of the past, dealing with sovereignty, territorial integrity, 20th century warfare and the military-industrial complex, were all linear problems which could be tackled with linear solutions. But the information age today requires non-linear solutions to deal with the non-linear problems that the country is facing today and will face in the future.

## Discussion

- It is true that defence and security are not interchangeable terms and that defence is a part of national security. If India is able to take care of its defence needs, only then can it contemplate larger concerns like collective security. But given the neglect that defence issues have seen, with the ad-hoc policies adopted on the border issues, and so on, defence will continue to be very important.
- Climate change is an important concern. However, it may not be as immediate as other security concerns. And even if it were, there is little that a country can do independently. Efforts need to be made at the level of the international community and will revolve around negotiations to arrive at an equitable solution. Also, there is a need to accurately designate the ramifications of various security threats.
- The US has limited options in dealing with Pakistan, since it requires access to the Arabian Sea, which is a vital route to maintain supplies to Afghanistan.

If Iran can be brought on board, it would ease logistical problems to a great extent. Yet, despite the Obama administration's attempts, it appears that the US and Iran are at a stalemate on the nuclear question.

- With the change in the nature of and spaces in which wars are fought, there is a need for India to equip itself accordingly. For example, the US and the UK already have cyber commands in their armed forces. India is still lacking in this regard.
- There has been a decline in the military capability of the European countries. It would appear, therefore, that contrary to its history, Europe has become a *de facto* zone of peace. So much so, that the US Navy, while still being a two-ocean navy, now focusses on the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, and not the Atlantic. However, with regard to capabilities, the European nations are feeling the pinch with their involvement in NATO/ ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).
- There is a large number of private security contractors in conflict zones today – 68,000 in Afghanistan, 115,000 in Iraq, 10,000 in Pakistan. While most of them deal with logistics more than soldiering, a significant number is posted for security purposes. This can have both positive and pernicious consequences, as contractors have different rules of engagements as opposed to Coalition forces.
- The Sino-Indian conflict was not focussed on as a flashpoint, because though it is a problem area, and has received a fair bit of press on the same, it still should not (optimistically) be listed as a flashpoint. The high degree of trade between the two countries is especially contradictory to their political stance.
- It is foreseen that in the next five years, 49 million people will be required for the global workforce and India will be able to meet much of these needs. India's neighbours may react to this development positively or negatively – positively, if they take it as a challenge to equalise with India, negatively, if they wish to bring India down. The world has issues with immigrant youth from non-democratic countries, and the same concerns may not apply to India. There is a concern, however, of what the youth will do, if they are not employed.
- Small arms proliferation is a serious concern, especially in the developing world. The P-5 countries produce 88 percent of conventional weapons

in the world. So, while technology transfer of nuclear weapons may be a grave concern, technology transfer of conventional weapons is far more dangerous. While there have been efforts to limit their supply, the problem is three-fold: one, nations must have arms for their national security, so their supply cannot be extinguished; two, there are also private manufactures, who may not have the same compunctions as the state; and three, most of the arms which are proliferating in war zones are less from direct sale, and more from re-sale in the grey market, which is far more difficult to control.

- There is a risk in dubbing Southern Asia as the second most dangerous region in the world. The danger is in clubbing India into this omnibus term, when it is Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are the epicentres of conflict. India, by including itself into the mix, invites unnecessary pressure on itself.

# Session II – Conventional Conflict: Emerging Trends

## Chairperson's Remarks

☐ Gen VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

It is important to take note of a few salient features of the strategic environment today to understand conventional conflict. Statistically, there are fewer conventional conflicts between states today, but intra-state conflicts have increased. Territorial disputes do exist and they can be cause for inter-state conflicts. Internal and external security are meshed today more then ever before. Battles are, therefore, fought by irregulars and the police as well. Private security personnel, if not regulated well, will be trouble-makers. We have to keep in mind both known and unknown threats. Developments in weapons and equipment have given rise to new tactics and strategies. We are now moving into Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare. There is now talk of 'no contact war'. The military has a tougher job than ever before. It has to be receptive to new ideas and adapt to changes faster.

## Conventional War: Emerging Perspectives

☐ Lt Gen A K Singh, AVSM, SM, VSM, GOC, I Corps

In the last few decades, the enormous destructive power of strong conventional and nuclear capabilities has resulted in weaker states and non-state groups shifting to sub-conventional and irregular means to achieve their political objectives. Conventional conflict is increasingly intertwined with sub-conventional conflict, with irregular forces using unconventional means and tactics. The irregular forces are becoming increasingly lethal, with access to technology and equipment that previously only conventional state forces could afford.

Some recent conflicts like the Lebanon War (2006), Russia–Georgia Campaign (2008), Sri Lankan Conflict (2009) and the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan clearly indicate the changing nature of conflict. The characteristics of future conflict can, thus, be summarised as under:

- The spectrum of conflict could range from conflicts between states to conflict with non-state actors and proxies.
- The boundaries between regular and irregular warfare are blurring. Even non-state actors are increasingly acquiring conventional capabilities that were earlier the exclusive preserve of nation states.
- Conventional conflict could either be preceded or succeeded by a period of irregular conflict, which would include low intensity conflict and stabilisation operations.
- Technology has empowered the individual and today, a single terrorist/ guerrilla can cause severe damage to adversaries through cyber, financial and kinetic attacks, which earlier only large organisations or states could do. Future hybrid conflicts will demand concurrent investment in sharpening softer skills like cultural awareness training, language skills, psychological operations and human intelligence.
- The constant fear of non-state actors acquiring WMDs poses the greatest global threat, due to the potentially catastrophic consequences.
- Air power will play a significant role in conventional conflict; however, to remain relevant and sustainable for hybrid threats of the future, some reassessment and calibration on the use of air power will become necessary. The focus will be to minimise collateral damage and enable the provision of intimate close air support to ground forces.
- Sea denial and sea control will remain essential elements to enforce deterrence on the potential adversary. Operational manoeuvre from the seas and coercive diplomacy will also form important components of capability development.

The destructive potential of nuclear weapons and the large number of nuclear weapons states has limited the scope of conventional conflict. The dynamics of deterrence and escalatory control are more relevant against nation states. Against non-state actors, these capabilities have little effect. However, several diplomatic, informational, military and socio-economic measures can be effectively used in a complementary and comprehensive approach to enforce restraint on the activities of non-states actors.

**Military Transformation, Including Net-Centric Warfare**

☐ Maj Gen David A Fastabend (Retd), US Army

The top ten "Tall Tales of (Military) Transformation" are:

- "The Network Changes Everything": Although its character evolves, the fundamental nature of war does not. Direct and indirect engagements no longer go away, but the network does enable collaborative engagements. The network is additive, not supplantive.
- "The Network is our Asymmetric Advantage": A network or any other capability cannot be inherently "asymmetric". It can only be applied asymmetrically, and both sides in the "network contest" have the motivation and opportunities to do so.
- "All Networks are Essentially the Same": A perfect network has no "center": each node is linked to all other nodes; each node has the replicated data of the entire network, and the ability to process it. Such networks have extraordinary redundancy and resilience.
- "Data = Information = Knowledge = Understanding = Wisdom": We are awash with data. But that data must be organised and structured to become information. If you can take that information or knowledge and link it to the context of your actual situation, then it is understanding. Such linkage is greatly facilitated by experience.
- "Net-centric Warfare Mitigates Uncertainty and Volatility in Warfare": In the early days of military transformation, it was presumed that technology and its "net-centric" application to the battlefield would significantly mitigate uncertainty and volatility in warfare. In fact, exactly the opposite has occurred.
- "Network-Centric Warfare Facilitates Seizure of the Initiative": Networks are integral to the contest for the initiative, but they do not necessarily favour the technically advantaged. In fact, the technologically advantaged combatant may often face an enemy network that is quite elusive.
- "Cyberspace is a New Domain": Although cyberspace exhibits unique physics, it is not spatially distinct from the other domains; rather it pervades all the other domains.
- "Terrain no Longer Matters": Even in stability operations, there is logic to the struggle for terrain. People still need a place where they can feel

relatively safe, where they can store material, train, and plan. People still fight for terrain.

- "Military Transformation is Useless Against Asymmetric Opponents": It is true provided the adversary does not move, shoot, or communicate. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), sensors, better linkages and connectivity have been found to be useful to detect and destroy the enemy.
- "Military Transformation Drives Specialisation": Specialisation is not going away, but the miniaturisation of technology is enabling single platforms to perform multiple tasks, particularly in the irregular environment.

There are three areas in which we are particularly in need of good ideas: strategic art, conflict theory, and categorisation. Improvement in the art of strategy will not be possible unless we broaden our understanding of conflict. It is a broader category of competition than war and is not synonymous with war. The older, more established theories of war do not scale up comfortably to this broader activity of conflict. We need some integrating ideas that describe conflict across the entire competition of ideas through logic and violence.

### Role of Air Power in Conventional Conflict on Land

☐ Air Marshal T M Asthana, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd), CAPS

Recent military operations witnessed by the world give us a glimpse of how economical and precise they can be, if they are supported by air power. This is the emerging trend of air power, which is bound to be adopted by all nations, commensurate with their capabilities. Aerospace forces can conduct deterrence, denial, coercion, decapitation and humanitarian missions. Perhaps the most important mission of these is the mission of deterrence. These forces make a potential enemy think twice before launching a preemptive strike, be it nuclear or conventional. The speed, range and flexibility of aerospace forces give a nation the decisive advantage in achieving conventional deterrent value.

In the "fog of conflict", most observable techniques employed need to be covert as far as possible. It is possible to achieve this with the

judicious use of aerospace power. Air power can, to a large extent, provide mobility, cutting down on time frames to the extent possible. Alongside, the Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) charter of aerospace continues to function with a subtle difference. The employment of UAVs can now also be overt in some cases. As we move into the future, both the range and endurance of UAVs and aircraft will increase. We can expect that 50 percent of these platforms will also be equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) capability, which will ensure that inclement weather will have no adverse effects on the final results. Better endurance and range will also permit these platforms to visit more than one area of interest, provided the friendlya air power ensures their safety. Alternatively, they can make a quick exit after one mission is accomplished and return for the next one.

Air power tackling the reserves will ultimately deliver the highest dividends. These could either be the strategic reserves like the Army Reserve North/Army Reserve South (ARN/ARS), or the 2nd and 3rd tier of forces facing us. Considering the improvements in endurance and weapon-carrying capability, the aircraft will also be capable of multi-tasking. This does not mean that there will be no Battlefield Air Strikes (BAS). Suffice to say, the lesser the requirement of BAS, the better would be the situation.

## Discussion

- The military objective, and, therefore, the political objective, can be achieved by synergy among all the forces, particularly in a conventional conflict. Joint planning is necessary.
- Information technology and network-centricity have the potential to qualitatively transform the methodologies of warfare. Their impact, however, needs to be pragmatically assessed against realistic battlefield scenarios. Aerospace capability is a potent dimension of land warfare, with a vast applicability in all forms of conflict.
- Insurgent and terrorist activities have added complex politico-military dynamics to the nature of conflict. The contemporary nature of conflict mandates realistic transformation in the conventional force structure, deployment methodologies, support structures and emerging technologies,

to be able to face the multi-spectrum challenges that would emerge in the future.

- In any conflict, it is important to take note of the international environment and the politics involved among the key international actors. The external factor played a crucial and decisive role in the recent conflicts in Lebanon and Sri Lanka.
- India's stated policy has been not to be part of any military alliance. Therefore, we had to develop our own independent capability. Force structuring has always depended on this point.
- It is important to have compatibility of equipment among the various forces – military, para-military and police – apart from interoperability.

# Session III – Sub-Conventional Conflict: Emerging Trends

## Chairperson's Remarks

☐ Lt Gen R K Nanavatty, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd)

In India, as indeed in several other countries of the region, sub-conventional conflict is internal armed conflict. And internal armed conflict is either insurgency and counter-insurgency or civil war, with or without external involvement. Notwithstanding what Clausewitz might have said about the objective nature of war, internal armed conflict is not war and insurgents are not the enemy.

A study of the literature on the subject suggests that little has changed with respect to the fundamentals, principles and concepts of sub-conventional conflict. What has changed are the techniques, tactics and technologies. Also, there is an explosion in new terminology. This might suggest analytical sophistication but adds considerably to confusion in the mind of the soldier. Today, even the United States military has reverted to the familiar terms: insurgency and counter-insurgency. There is a need to be circumspect in adopting new terms in the military vocabulary.

The world is passing through a phase wherein subversive forms of conflict are predominant. This is principally because of the limitations on other forms of warfare. Subversive threats to a nation's security can be domestic, externally supported, or externally fostered. The problem is exacerbated by the moral sanction that is accorded to external support to "freedom fighters" and "freedom struggles".

Apart from terrorism, which is part of any insurgency, the world is witness today to the phenomenon of terrorist groups, driven by fanaticism and extremism, that are embedded in sympathetic populations around the world; exploiting new technologies and globalisation to their advantage; and posing a threat to those they perceive as their enemies. Whereas such groups are unlikely ever to attain their abstract goals against resolute peoples and states, they are capable of causing extreme harm to civil society. It is this latter threat that has caused the United States to adopt an aggressive,

preventive, and preemptive counter-terrorism policy. The latter has led the United States and its allies into 'forced' military interventions that, in turn, have antagonised local populations and resulted in situations of insurgency and counter-insurgency. It has also led the United States to believe that under the circumstances, a people-centric 'whole of government' counter-insurgency approach is more suitable than a military, adversary-centric counter-terrorism approach. Whereas terrorism is indeed a global phenomenon, it is misleading and premature perhaps, to talk in terms of a global insurgency.

**Fourth Generation Warfare**

☐ Col Thomas X Hammes (Retd), US Marine Corps

The 'generation of war' model is a very simplified version of history. It sees four generations of modern war – with a fifth emerging. The first generation of war drew on all the changes in political, economic, social and technical fields, and culminated in the massed manpower armies of the Napoleonic era. In the same way, the second generation of war made use of the evolution to an industrial society to make firepower the dominant form of war. The third generation of war – mechanised war – took advantage of the political, economic and social shifts from an industrial to mechanical era to make mechanised warfare dominant. The fourth generation of war makes use of all the shifts from mechanical to information/electronic society to maximise the power of insurgency. It continues to evolve along with our society as a whole – making Fourth Generation Warfare increasingly dangerous and difficult to deal with.

Fifth Generation Warfare will employ the continued shift of political and social loyalties to causes rather than nations, the increasing power of smaller and smaller entities and the explosion of bio-technology. It will truly be a 'nets and jets' war. The network will bring the key information, provide a source for the necessary equipment and material, a field to recruit volunteers, and the jets will provide for worldwide, inexpensive, effective dissemination.

The key point of the generations of war argument is that the changes in warfare were not driven by technology but rather by the political, economic, social and technical states of society. While Fourth Generation Warfare provides one theory of why warfare has evolved into insurgency,

the key question for today's practitioner is: what has changed and what has remained constant in insurgency and counter-insurgency in the last couple of decades?

### Sub-conventional Conflict: International and Asian Perspectives

☐ Lt Gen Prakash Menon, AVSM, VSM, National Defence College

Sub-conventional wars are essentially wars between the weak and the strong. Such wars are fought for winning the political loyalty of the people and are people-centric. The principal strategic challenge, thus, is to apply multiple means–political, military, diplomatic, social, intelligence, informational and cultural–to produce the desired strategic effect that will eventually result in the desired outcome. These wars are always protracted and political outcomes determined by the staying power, reflected in political will and the ability to achieve the desired strategic effect by application of all means. Military force is a vital component but not in terms of its destructive ability, which is normally the key in conventional wars.

Insurgency and terror are challenges on the global stage. In geographic terms, they are mostly rooted in the Asian continent but pose a threat globally, especially to the Western powers. The ideological fuel and the motivating platform is wholly religious extremism and is presently centred in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The Western choice of policy goals does not lie in the revision of assumptions in the nature of the enemy or attempts to improve their military effectiveness, but an acceptance that conceptually, it is better to tackle insurgency and terrorism with indigenous efforts. In the context of counter-insurgency and terrorism, the Western strategic weaknesses in terms of war-fighting are characterised by:

- Stress and over-reliance on firepower.
- Casualty aversion, exacerbated by the advent of the suicide bomber and the remotely detonated Improvised Explosive Device (IED).
- Proclivity of the Western public to be impatient and constantly weakening domestic support.
- Over-reliance on technology
- Inability to field the large quantities of troops required.

- Inability, or rather the impossibility, of bridging the cultural gap with the local population and, hence, inability to win over the locals, makes the West unsuited for such wars in the Asian continent.

The Indian experience in counter-insurgency and terrorism has been extensive. But the approaches to counter-insurgency and terrorism have been substantially different, especially in relation to the style of use of force and, more importantly, in leveraging the soft power of the armed forces. People-centricity has been the bedrock of the Indian counter-insurgency doctrine. Of course, each counter-insurgency campaign will have its own mix of strategic vectors with considerable contextual variations. But these differences do not detract from the principle of people-centricity.

There is need to accept that technology has given lethality to small groups of people, especially with the advent of the suicide bomber and IEDs. But those groups, though seemingly tactically lethal, still require the support of the people, which ironically, they are deprived of, due to the indiscriminate application of their lethality with explosives. Ironically, their tactical success carries within it the seeds of strategic failure. From the strategic perspective, terrorism will remain a long-term nuisance, but it cannot succeed unless our reaction converts it into an insurgency with significant popular support.

### Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Adapting to the Changing Nature of Conflict

☐ Mr P Michael Siromony, National Human Rights Commission

The implementation of human rights and humanitarian law should be with respect, dignity and with minimal injury. It will be the responsibility of the state, which is a signatory to the convention, to disseminate the same to its personnel as also to train them in their role and responsibility in implementing human rights and the humanitarian law. The duty of implementation lies first and foremost with the states.

Both human rights and humanitarian law practitioners work for peace and progress and for mitigating/reducing suffering. Humanitarian law ensures more than a series of rights. It imposes duties on the combatants such as to treat all protected persons without any distinction on the basis of race,

religion, political opinion, etc. Both human rights and humanitarian law mutually influence each other as they are contemporaneous in their origin and have a lot of convergence. The convergence points are the rights of the children, rights of the women, sick persons, disabled, etc.

The human rights institutions at times also invoke humanitarian law when the situation so requires. Both human rights and humanitarian law appeal to the public conscience so that members of the human race are treated with respect, in times of both peace and conflict. The declaration of minimum humanitarian standards in 1990 called the "Turku Declaration" is another positive and forward looking step.

In the 21st century, science and technology have created the capability of colossal damage, which has to be restrained by all means, so that we do not experience another Nagasaki or Hiroshima. In the present scenario of conflicts, lead to without any open declaration of war, sub-conventional conflicts provide a lot of investment in military capabilities at the cost of development. It would, thus, be in the larger interest of states to maintain peace, despite possessing the military capability to wage war.

## Discussion

- The strategy being adopted in Afghanistan, i.e. holding towns in strength and leaving the countryside to the Taliban, does not work. Terrorists there have firm bases, mobility, and their lines of communication are open. This situation will continue unless these are interrupted. A similar situation prevails in the North-east of India, Jammu and Kashmir and the Naxal belt.
- We, as a society, have to take note of geo-physical technology. The government's perspective on insurgency is lacking, i.e. bad governance and lack of socio-economic development. We should pick up good lessons from the successes against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Taliban in Sri Lanka and Pakistan respectively.
- India-China need to cooperate in handling terrorism. In this direction, a beginning has been made by both countries by holding joint military training at company/platoon levels at the Infantry School, Belgaum.
- Most of the insurgencies in India are mainly due to bad governance. That is the root cause. If this is set right, half of the problem will be solved.

- The international humanitarian law and human rights law should not just bind the state actors, but also the non-state actors like terrorists and insurgents, who indulge in brutal killings and other human rights violations.
- It is important to open the information locked in by the government archives to analyse and learn lessons for the future. The Indian government has been very conservative on this point.
- We are in the phase of a subversive form of conflict. Terrorism is part of insurgency and even subversion is targeted violence.

# Session IV – Cooperative Security for Peace and Stability

## Chairperson's Remarks

☐ Ambassador Lalit Mansingh

I have my reservations about the role of regional organisations in facing regional and global challenges. SAARC has been ineffective mainly because of the existing imbalance among the members. India shares land or sea borders with all the members of SAARC and has bilateral contentions with some of them. India does not have a concrete foreign policy towards its neighbours. As recently pronounced by the Prime Minister, having a cordial relationship with our neighbours should be a priority. I raise two questions to provoke the panelists so that the house may gain out of the deliberations: Why should India go beyond the region to form global alliances? And why is the UN not recognised as a global peacekeeping organisation?

## International and Regional Military Operations

☐ Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

The changing nature of the international system, particularly in the last few years, has generated several debates among the members of the UN regarding fundamental policies on peace and security. These debates include the effectiveness of unilateral and collective responses to international threats like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, violation of human rights and changing notions of state sovereignty. Lacking UN endorsement, the US-led Coalition's attack on Iraq had already challenged the basic principles of the UN. The time has come to question the UN's capacity to respond.

Enough provisions exist within the ambit of the UN Charter, such as Article 51 and Chapter 7, for self-defence and collective responsibility. Collective responsibility has covered the fields, which were earlier considered internal matters of the state. Particularly, since the genocide

in Rwanda in 1990, when the state failed to protect its citizens, it was accepted that the international community has the responsibility to first protect the innocents through intervention or use of force and then rebuild the shattered societies. Despite greater integration of Europe, the concept of state sovereignty remains important for both the international community as well as post-colonial developing countries. However, all the member states endorsed the concept of "responsibility to protect" at the 2005 World Summit in New York. Developed nations, however, are not contributing enough to UN peacekeeping missions, but focussing more on NATO or EU initiatives. The post-Cold War world has witnessed the increasing importance of regional organisations in Europe, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, even in terms of their contribution to international peace and security.

The Indian contribution to UN peacekeeping and training the troops from the developing countries has been appreciated and acknowledged globally. Despite this, India lacks the capability to influence UN decision-making. India has to realise, that with economic growth, it has to gear up to take on more international and regional responsibilities. India should, therefore, plan for a sizeable tri-Service, multi-dimensional, rapid action force under the unified command, ready for intervention, stabilisation or peacekeeping operations within the region or beyond.

### Regional Organisations and Conflict Resolution with Special Reference to Southern Asia (SCO, SAARC, ASEAN)

☐ Dr Arabinda Acharya, RSIS, Singapore

In the post-Cold War era, institutionalised regionalism in the form of several regional organisations gained prominence and has played a significant role in conflict resolution. The role of identity is an important aspect in determining institutional structures and efficacy. ASEAN is based on the Southeast Asian identity. In the case of SAARC, identity, geographical or cultural, does not play any role.

The key principle of cooperative security is inclusiveness, which can be described as "security with" as opposed to "security against". Cooperative security is not against the concept of bilateral and multilateral security

mechanisms but complements it. The strategic culture of Europe is more formalised and legalised, as compared to that of Asia, until the ASEAN Regional Forum was formed. In the case of SAARC, bilateral issues are kept out of its agenda, despite the fact that several bilateral issues have been sorted out during SAARC summits. ASEAN and SCO have shown impressive patterns of security cooperation since 9/11. Concepts like state sovereignty and non-interference remain obstacles in the deepening of regionalism in SAARC.

ASEAN has never used military force in any conflict resolution initiatives and this example is worth emulating. Due to inherent problems like the lack of a common culture, political institutions and mutual trust, security cooperation in SAARC is weak. However, since terrorism is a global threat, it needs to be countered through a multilateral and multifaceted approach and cooperation between the states in the region. Despite the fact that the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was one of the earliest regional cooperative frameworks to deal with the threats of terrorism, cooperation in this area through the organisation is negligible.

### 'Good Offices': Informal/Semi-formal Arrangements for Peacemaking in the Asian Context (Cases of Aceh, Palestine, Nepal and Sri Lanka)

☐ Brig Gurmeet Kanwal and Dr N Manoharan, CLAWS

The role of 'good offices' in conflict resolution was important in the cases of Aceh, Palestine, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Norway, supported by a group of countries, played a significant role in facilitating dialogue between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. While the dialogue failed in bringing total peace, the process was instrumental in buying time for the Sri Lankan government, enabling the state to consolidate its military and political apparatuses and seek international support. Finland, supported by the international community, was instrumental in resolving the conflict in Aceh. The inter-governmental agency of the UN remained marginally successful in resolving the conflict in Nepal. In Palestine, the mixed efforts of individual states and inter-governmental agencies have yet to bear fruit.

Several lessons can be derived from these cases. For conflict resolution, 'ripeness of the conflict', which means the right time, when both the fighting parties are ready for the conflict resolution through dialogue, is desirable. Neutrality, negotiating capacity and legitimacy are important attributes of the facilitator. Owing to their vested interests, spoilers can cause grave damage to the negotiations and should be outmanoeuvred. By selecting friends with utmost caution and carrying out confidence-building measures, including development and ensuring peace, 'good offices' have achieved remarkable results.

## Discussion

- Southern Asia contributes 40 percent of the troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions. South Asians cooperate amicably with each other when operating outside the region. This feeling has to be inculcated among the people working within the region as well.
- In Afghanistan, only a local solution can work. Although Kashmir's case is ripe enough for conflict resolution, there are spoilers from across the border. India has failed to assert itself and get Pakistan to the negotiating table. India's counter-insurgency strategy of winning hearts and minds is yielding results, but it is a time consuming process. The World Bank-sponsored resolution in the case of the Indus River Waters Treaty was accepted by India, but Pakistan still questions the diversion of waters and the construction of new dams.
- If economic growth is achieved in Southern Asia, the rest of the issues will fall in place. India should take the lead in the resuscitation of SAARC by resolving bilateral issues with its neighbours. Being the only country having borders with all SAARC members, India should get its diplomatic, political and military acts together and strive for economic growth and prosperity, rather than harping on the idea of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Having a permanent seat will only add to its responsibilities. At the same time, the UNSC needs to be more representative of the modern-day power structure. India should play a more proactive role in its immediate neighbourhood and could build an expeditionary force for swift response to calamities, share intelligence, and so on.

# Valedictory Session

## Valedictory Address

☐ Dr Shashi Tharoor, Minister of State for External Affairs

There is a paradigm shift that is taking place in the nature of conflict. Geography is no more a constraint for those who wish to perpetuate violence. Most conflicts are now internal. Sub-conventional conflicts characterised by intra-state strife have gained ascendency over traditional conflicts, which used to be mostly conventional inter-state wars. The easy availability of cheap, mass-produced small arms, landmines and IEDs has exponentially increased the ability of aggrieved groups to orchestrate violence within societies. The trans-national nature of these threats and the increasing involvement of state actors in using sub-conventional conflicts as "war by other means" have exacerbated their complexity.

India is an "island of stability" in a churning sea. Pakistan and Afghanistan have become epicentres of terrorism, which, of late, has become the single most dominant national security concern for India. The presence of weapons of mass destruction and the danger of their falling into the hands of terrorists is yet another cause for concern. The internal political situation in Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar has taken a turn for the better in recent months but continues to be unpredictable. Sri Lanka is still in the process of settling down politically after the government's military victory over the LTTE. It will take some time for these countries to stabilise themselves.

It is in India's strategic national interest that Southern Asia be peaceful and prosperous on a sustainable basis, as our progress as a successful and secure regional power depends largely upon regional stability and a favourable security environment. While dealing with these 'new conflicts', it is vital that the government be doubly conscious of human rights and humanitarian law that are built on two fundamental concepts: the separation of combatants from civilians and the doctrine of proportionality in the use of force.

Given the nature of 'new conflicts', cooperative security should be explored as the preferred avenue of approaching conflict resolution and, in turn, to augment regional and international security. Southern Asia should evolve as the 'most integrated region' in the world, for which there has to

be a willingness to undertake conscious effort to build interdependencies among Southern Asian nations. This could be achieved through a smooth flow of goods, services, capital knowledge, ideas and even people. The UN has enormous potential to act as an intervening agent in today's conflicts. The UN aims to resolve conflicts without any biases and is a mirror of the world–reflecting not just our divisions and disagreements, but also our hopes and convictions.