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Mao Zedong's 'Art of the 1962 War'

Perception of Opportunity Versus Perception of Threat

Amrita Jash

Centre for Land Warfare Studies
New Delhi

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Centre for Land Warfare Studies
RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010
Phone: +91.11.25691308 Fax: +91.11.25692347
email: landwarfare@gmail.com website: www.claws.in
CLAWS Army No. 33098

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Introduction

In the *Art of War*, Sun Zi posits that "He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior force … He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared […]."[1] This strategic guideline of Sun Tzu does pertinently explain the Chinese attitude, more specifically, that of Mao Zedong's decision to go for war with India in 1962. As noted, in early October 1962, Chairman Mao Zedong dispelling the notion of 'armed coexistence', declared for war with India by stating :

> "We fought a war with old Chiang [Kai-shek]. We fought a war with Japan, and one with America. During none of these, did we fear. And in each case, we won. Now the Indians want to fight a war with us. Naturally, we don't have fear. We cannot give ground; once we give it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province. […] Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity."[2]

Owing to Mao's decision, on October 20, 1962, Chinese offensive was launched in both the western and eastern sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As Brigadier John P. Dalvi distinctly describes it as the "Day of Reckoning"[3], when:

> "At 5 in the morning of October 20, 1962 massed Chinese artillery opened up a heavy concentration on the weak Indian garrison, in a narrow sector of the Namka Chu Valley, of Kameng Frontier Division, in the North East Frontier Agency. Massive infantry assaults followed, and within three hours the unequal contest was over."[4]

By November 20, 1962, China had succeeded in driving out all organised Indian armed forces from any territory claimed by China in the western sector, and it controlled the whole area between the McMahon Line and the Outer Line in the south.[5] Given the military balance tilted in favour of China, on November 22, 1962, Mao declared a unilateral ceasefire and the Chinese troops withdrew to 20 km from what China perceived to be the Line of Actual Control since November 07, 1959. Given this 'push-pull' factor at play on the Chinese side during the war, what deems important is the understanding of Mao's decision-making process that shaped the war,that is, what motivated Mao Zedong to choose the 'option of war' against India in 1962.

What makes this intervention timely and significant is the fact that the 1962 war still holds relevance in the Sino-Indian relations even after 55 years to the War. The consequence of this was strongly testified by the 2017 Doklam stand-off that brought the two countries at loggerhead, wherein 1962 became the key point of reference to the current dilemma. To note, the Chinese media's propaganda offensive emphasised on the need for India to seek 'lessons from the past', wherein the message pointed at "[r]emember your defeat in 1962 and accept China's position in the current stand-off at the Sikkim border."[6]

This Chinese warning was met with a strong Indian response, as India's then Defence Minister Arun Jaitley remarked saying "[i]f they [Chinese] are trying to remind us, the situation in 1962 was different, the India of today is different."[7] Given these contrarian perspectives, it is interesting to note that even after five decades the Chinese attitude towards India remains unchanged, wherein the onus of any crisis still rests with India. For example, in the statement calling for a unilateral ceasefire in 1962, the Chinese government warned that if India violated the ceasefire,

> "China reserves the right to strike back in self-defense, and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising there from. The people of the world will then see even more clearly who is peace-loving and who is bellicose, who upholds friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples and Asia-African solidarity and who is undermining then, who is protecting the common interests of the Asia and African peoples in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism and who is violating and damaging these common interests."[8]

Furthermore, *People's Daily* editorial titled 'If This Can Be Tolerated, What Cannot?' from September 22, 1962, warned of serious consequences for India if the conflict lingered, stating that "Chinese people would not tolerate the provocation by the Indian Army."[9] In view of this, the Chinese predominantly argue that it was Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's misunderstanding and miscalculation of the border situation that pushed China, then reeling under the impact of large-scale famines, into war with India.[10] More specifically, the Chinese pointedly argue that:

> "It was Nehru's 'Forward Policy'[11] of wanting to define the border unilaterally and go beyond the McMahon Line that really provoked China. Finally, Chinese leadership got irritated. The language used at that time (by leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was something like 'teach (India) a lesson'".[12]

Likewise, in the case of Doklam, China's reactive response towards India exemplified a similar response. That is, putting the onus on India, as China stated:

> "The Indian military's trespass into Chinese territory is a blatant infringement on China's sovereignty, which should be immediately and unconditionally rectified. […] The withdrawal of Indian troops from Doklam remains a precondition for bilateral peace, and China will take all necessary measures to ensure its territorial integrity. […] India should rectify its mistakes and show sincerity to avoid an even more serious situation creating more significant consequences."[13]

Contextualising these Chinese justifications at the two events exemplifies the tendency in the Chinese behavioural pattern of turning the opponent's actions as a precondition to their choice of reactions. As witnessed, China under the leadership of Mao Zedong meticulously turned Jawaharlal Nehru's 'Forward Policy of November 1961' into their goodwill by taking the adversary (India) by strategic surprise with its 'self-defence counterattack' on October 20, 1962. However, this explanation suffers from a deficit as it fails to explain the Chinese decision to wage a sudden war against India after years of passivity. This very factor then necessitates an understanding of the Chinese decision-making process, more specifically, the leadership factor in the decision-making process.

Aim of the Paper

Calling 1962 as China's 'Forgotten War', John Garver pointedly notes that very little was published in China regarding the process through which China decided for war—unlike the cases such as the Korean War, the Indochina wars, the conflicts over the Offshore Islands in the 1950s, and the 1974 Paracel Island campaign.[14] This reflects the gap in terms of understanding the Chinese motivation behind the war.

In this perspective, the present paper aims to fill this existing gap in the literature by taking a departure from recounting incidents and outcomes to assess China's decision to the 1962 war. In doing so, the paper seeks to understand 'how the war was played out' on the Chinese side, more specifically, what motivated Mao Zedong's choice of the 1962 war.

This assessment gap, therefore, necessitates significant deliberation on certain key questions, such as what enforced Chinese leadership to opt for war in 1962 after being passive for years without any armed aggression against India? Was the war a tactical response to India's 'Forward Policy' or was it a mentally calculated measure to wait for the right time? Did the war have direct links to China's domestic and international confrontations? Was the war in the best interest of Chinese leadership?

In view of this, the key variable of the study is 'perception' and how it shaped the Chinese decision-making to fight the 1962 war. Wherein, taking Mao Zedong's individual cognition as the key factor, the paper seeks to asses Mao's decision to wage the war based on his 'perception of opportunity' vis-à-vis 'perception of threat or injury'.

Cognitive Approach in International Relations: Role of Perceptions in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

In international relations, there is a dearth of understanding in linking perceptions to war or violence. The focus has been on assessing the objective factors in a conflict situation such as the distribution of power and the bipolarity and multipolarity of the international system. This approach assumes rationality in decision-making to be embedded in the state-centric realist ambitions of power and interest, of which the 'state' is perceived to be the unitary rational actor. The 'rational actor model'[15] presupposes that governments and their political leaders think and act in a rational manner in their quest for power and order. Wherein, it is argued that rationality 'assumes that individuals perceive the world accurately and arrive at decisions through an open intellectual process: where goals are ordered, a search is made for relevant information, a wide range of alternatives is considered and the option that maximises the benefits and minimises the costs is selected.'[16]

This outcome-oriented approach, therefore, fails to take into account the national characteristics including the perceptions of national leaders about foreign policy problems.[17]

This assumption that policy-makers act rationally then results ina neglected approach to delve into the psychological predispositions or closely examine the government's policy-making process. That is, the goals and interests of rational actors are taken to be exogenous, meaning that all actors (states as well as individuals) are assumed to share the same interests and have the same goals irrespective of people's different psychological traits and social environments.[18] In view of this, alternative courses of action are evaluated and then chosen in light of their expected consequences for actors' goals.[19] This,therefore, marks the weakness of the 'rational model' as it fails to probe as to how decisions are made inside the 'black box', given the desires of actors are 'assumed', wherein preferences are 'not empirically investigated but posited by assumption'.[20]

What contributes to this lacuna is that in understanding decision-making, one fails to take into account the 'human cognition'. To say so, as it is not the nations/states that act, rather it is the individuals who act on behalf of the state. This makes the role of human cognition an important factor in politics, foreign policy and world politics[21]—and this factor challenges the assumption of individual rationality. Unlike the 'rational actor model', the cognitive approach assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and decision-making.[22] It does not assume individual awareness, open-mindedness and adaptability relative to an 'objective' environment,[23] but assumes individuals are likely to view their environment differently and operate within their own 'psychological environment'.[24] That is, the 'objective' reality is not the locus of meaning and therefore,not the key to understanding political behaviour and practices, rather individuals are the source of meaning.[25]

These make perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reason that we can understand.[26] It is argued that "an understanding of how decision-makers view the political world may lead to explanations of the difficulty they have in recognizing, agreeing upon and responding to its transformations."[27] To suggest, the key to the understanding of decision-making in international relations lies in studying the 'minds' of the individuals and this makes them more of 'cognitive actors' than rational actors.[28] Here, the central questions that form the base of this analysis are—how do policy-makers view the world? What influences the beliefs and images of policy-makers over time? What impact do the beliefs of policy-makers have on foreign policy-making and the practice of foreign

policy? These questions related to the role of cognition help in understanding the formulation and conduct of foreign policy where the idea of 'perceptions 'in shaping foreign policy decision-making comes into being.

Perception of Threat/Injury versus Opportunity in Decision-Making

Perception is an important component of human cognition, which can be defined as a way of processing information based on the differences in pre-existing images of others or general views of the world or differences in specific experiences.[29] They help us to understand how national actors see the world and how this affects their decisions. It is the cognitive analyses of the role of the policy-maker's beliefs and images that help in the understanding of how the decisions are made.

More specifically, as argued, no crisis can be understood without direct reference to the decision-making of individual leaders. That is, the psychology of decision-making adds to the assumption that 'leaders make a decision based less on their objective circumstances than their perception of these circumstances'.[30] In any event, what is crucial to understanding the role of perceptions is to 'comprehend the extent to which *differences* in beliefs or perspectives shape events'.[31] To suggest, in a crisis situation, a leader's choice of a solution is calculated by their perceptions of threat or of opportunities.

In view of this, to say that two decision-makers perceive a situation differently is not to say that one is correct and the other is incorrect. Rather that they act on what they believe their situation is and that consequently, the actions of each may surprise the other. That is, the choices made by the players are influenced by their perception of the situation. That is, 'the political dimension is important in foreign policy decisions not so much because politicians are driven by public support but because they are averse to loss and would, therefore, reject alternatives that may hurt them politically'.[32] Furthermore, a leader's perception of the political consequences of his or her policies plays a decisive role in affecting the means chosen to deal with the foreign policy crisis.[33]

Under the umbrella of perceptions, decision-making during a crisis can be further understood based on two perspectives: perception of threat or injury and perception of opportunity—reflect the motivating power of national interests.[34] Here, the assumption is that strategic choices follow not only from estimates of another actor's intentions as either status quo or imperialist but also by a judgement relating this estimate to the interests of the observer.[35]

To explain, for any particular observer, the key enquiry remains—'Do the other actor's intentions threaten to reduce my country's current achievement of valued objectives or does the other actor present an opportunity for me to advance and expand my country's interests?'[36] In view

of this, 'perception of threat or injury' is seen as a causal factor as to 'why leaders choose war'—as they perceive a threat to their control of power and authority. In this, decision-makers tend to perceive their own nations as the target of high levels of injury, while the enemy nations are perceived to be operating in a favourable international environment. The perception of injury then contributes to the breakdown of deterrence and the exacerbation of conflict.[37] This explains further that when decision-makers view their own nation to be suffering as the target of injury, they may be unwilling to negotiate or compromise.[38]

While 'perception of opportunity' provides another alternative to the decision-making of war, in this, an actor's propensity to attack increases as his/her expected utilities from the war rises.[39] In this case, the opportunity for gain is perceived in two ways: first, the other actor can represent a direct opportunity that the observer's country can exploit in a zero-sum sense, and second, the other actor can represent an opportunity for allied cooperation that benefits both parties in absolute terms.[40] Here, the central factor is that of opportunity perceived as a zero-sum gain rather than a mutual gain. This is based on the assumption that if not acted, the window of opportunity to accomplish some goals might be closed permanently and that it would lead to the opening of the dangerous window of vulnerability. This perception of opportunity can be attributed to the overconfidence of the decision-maker in action, where war is seen as desirable.

Perception of opportunity guides a leader to choose war as motivated biases prevent the perceiver from recognising the risk involved in the decision that he/she makes when the greater interests—whether political or personal—are involved in the decision. Perception of opportunity to seek a war becomes more profound when decision-makers perceive war to be imminent, and this makes them shift from a 'deliberative' to an 'implemental' mind-set resulting into 'overconfidence' which causes an increase in aggressive or risky military planning–driven by the likelihood of victory, gains from war, ability to control events and underestimate the costs of war and negate negotiations.[41] This implemental mindset then acts as the causal factor in the outbreak of war as it raises the perceived probability of military victory and thereby, encourages 'hawkish and provocative policies'.[42] Therefore, the perception of opportunity makes conflict more likely to occur and thereby, making decision-makers overconfident to choose to go to war.

With the interplay of such factors, it can be rightly argued that it is the perception of the decision-maker that determines the policy choices during a crisis situation. This further explains that a decision-maker 'acts upon his image of the situation rather than upon objective reality'.[43]

Mao Zedong's Decision to Choose War in 1962

Roderick MacFarquhar in his book *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution* notes that :

> "Sometimes earlier [to the War], Mao had complained that the Indians had been pressing the Chinese along the border for three years, 1959–61; if they tried it a fourth year then China would strike back. The Dhola clash apparently decided the Chinese leaders that a military engagement was [now] inevitable. On 6 October, the order was sent to the border forces: 'If the Indian army attacks, hit back ruthlessly ...If they attack, don't just repulse them, hit back ruthlessly so that it hurts'."[44]

This statement makes it imperative to study Mao Zedong's decision-making as a key variable behind the 1962 war. As Claude Arpi argues,if Mao did not manage to stage a comeback in August/September 1962, the war with India would have probably not taken place.

Owing to Mao Zedong's declaration to go for war against India under the pretext that "[s]ince Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy emphasizes reciprocity,"[45] there is very little documentation on the decision-making process that shaped Mao's choice to go forwar. To note, the war has widely been studied from realist state-centric assumptions of 'balance of power' and 'balance of threat' owing to the rationalist explanations,to which,the dominant scholarship on the war the 'Whiting–Maxwell hypothesis' has largely attributed that "China's resort to war in 1962 was largely a function of perceived Indian aggression"—rooted in Beijing's concerns regarding Tibet that led to the formation of Chinese perceptions of foreign threat (India) in 1962.[46] However, as noted,"[p]reconceptions can act as filters for selecting relevant evidence of intention as well as determinants of bias in assessing the degree of threat to be anticipated"—and in case of 1962, this largely shaped Mao's 'authoritative judgments about Indian motives'.[47]

What makes these queries pertinent is the question of the decision-maker's rationality. That is, Mao's decision to choose war against India in 1962 came at a time when China was caught in its own domestic and international predicament. That is, in the domestic context, China's economic crisis as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward 1958-59,[48] was compounded by the Soviet withdrawal of economic assistance in 1960, catastrophe of natural disasters and the internal turbulence with respect to Tibet uprising that led to internal instability. Simultaneously, China's international position

was also in a state of quandary owing to the Americans fighting in Vietnam, Chiang Kai-shek's threats to invade the Mainland from Taiwan and the Sino-Soviet animosity supplemented by India's close links with both the superpowers. With such complexities at play, it would have been rather rational for Mao to avoid any hostility against India as China itself was so vulnerable. This dichotomy thereby, demands an understanding of what defined Mao's rationality to choose war over peace in 1962.

Mao's Perception: Interplay of Self Interest and National Interest

Every international event is the result, intended or unintended of a decision made by the individuals. This makes it imperative to closely examine Mao Zedong's idea behind the 1962 war. What prompted Mao's decision is driven by how he perceived and interpreted Nehru's Forward Policy. To explain, Mao's analogical reasoning deeply shaped his motivations as he recounted the 'half war'[49] that India and China fought 700 years ago, and that to enjoy peace, China had to use force to 'knock' India back 'to the negotiating table'.[50] That is to suggest whether it was perceived to be a deliberate and opportunistic challenge or his decision was fear-driven and a defensive gamble. These binaries, therefore, can be mapped by drawing from the cognitive model based on the matrix of Mao's perception of threat or injury along with the perception of opportunity based on his self-interest and national interest.

In view of this, how did Mao cognitively map the war with India at the right time needs deeper understanding. There are many factors that interplayed Mao's 'art of the 1962 war' that delves deep into how Mao calculated the dynamics both domestically and internationally. The major factors that shaped Mao's perceptions were that of Tibet, Taiwan, the Soviet Union and the United States with its bearing on India. Thus, China's road to the 1962 war can be traced in Mao's perceptions in terms of his self-interest and his national interest.

Mao's Calculation of Self-Interest: *Perception of Opportunity*

In crisis decision-making, political ingredient plays a very vital role. This is mainly witnessed in relation to how political actors are always apprehensive of losing their political capital. That is to explain, it is the leader's perceptions of the political consequences of their actions that act as a decisive factor in processing their choice of foreign policies.[51] This anxiety of political survival was one of the key factors that significantly played in Mao Zedong's decision to go for war in 1962 against India.

What justifies this argument is the failure of Mao's ambitious Great Leap Forward (*dayuejin*) of 1958—which affected and weakened China both economically and socially. It set ambitious targets for both agricultural and

industrial growth, and attempted to develop the country via the mobilisation of the masses instead of technological advancement, as Mao believed that he could achieve the target through "more rational use of human labour and the stimulus given to peasants' enthusiasm for work."[52] However, on the contrary, Mao's well-planned policy failed and resulted into a great famine in China (as some call it Great Leap Famine), which is infamously known for its 'calamitous legacy', the result of which was famine on a vast scale that caused millions of deaths.[53] This economic tragedy was further compounded by successive natural disasters such as flood, drought and cold weather, which further exacerbated the death toll.[54] This policy catastrophe resulted into a humanitarian crisis in China till 1962.

What was more evident was Mao's loss of absolute power. That is, Mao suffered a downfall in his stature—politically, socially as well as physically. Most importantly, this failure shook his leadership position in China as is evident from the Shanghai meeting of April 1959 that endorsed Mao's retirement from the post as the Chairman of the People's Republic, or the de facto head of the state. To note, this post was taken by Liu Shaoqi, who replaced Mao as the new Chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, Mao continued as Chairman of the Party and played from behind the scenes[55]—suggesting that Mao was 'practically out of power'.[56] This argument can be further validated from the accounts of Dr Li Zhisui, Mao's personal physician, who in his book *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician* recounts that in 1961 Mao was "… depressed over the agricultural crisis and angry with the party elite, upon whom he was less able now to work his will, Mao was in temporary eclipse, spending most of his time in bed."[57]

This suggests that Mao's self-esteem suffered a significant jolt and the idea of the weakening of his stature in Chinese political system was well-witnessed at the 'Seven Thousand Cadres Conference' held in January 1962. This Conference marked the lowest in Mao's leadership position, as his power was challenged by leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who emerged as the new leadership of China. This political power transition in China reflects the changing dimension of Mao's self-perception wherein his erstwhile position of being the strongest man in China was faced with a decline.

What factored greatly was his determination to create a new Chinese man who 'stood up' and overcame the preceding 'century of humiliation'. This self-perception was greatly reinforced by his growing megalomania and paranoia after the mid-1950s that made him intolerant of disagreement, no matter how carefully phrased. As recorded by his personal physician Dr Li,

who notes that "Mao had grandiose ideas of his place in history…he was the greatest leader, the greatest emperor of them all….His own greatness and China's was intertwined…."[58] Since the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao felt increasingly isolated from the mainstream of decision-making and even thought his signature continued to be sought on Central Committee (CC) documents before they were disseminated and likewise, Mao ceased sitting in on Politburo meetings as of January 1958—reflecting the perception of being isolated and neglected.[59]

Given this political downfall, Mao was seeking an opportunity to reassert himself in the system and regain his authoritative position. To which, Dr Li suggests that "Nineteen sixty-two was a political turning point for Mao. In January [1962], when he convened another expanded Central Committee work conference to discuss the continuing disaster, his support within the party was at its lowest."[60] This was evitable in President Liu Shaoqi's speech at the meeting, wherein he refused to accept Mao's official explanation that China's economic disasters had been caused by the weather. As Liu pointedly remarked "Natural disasters hit only one region of the country," while "Man-made disasters strike the whole country. We must remember this lesson."[61] This direct criticism resulted in Mao withdrawing from the political scene after the Seven Thousand Cadres' Conference.

This factor of Mao's political retirement is closely linked to his comeback into the political scene with the 1962 war. That is, Mao's policy to wage a war against India was greatly influenced by the perception of his own declining position. This then explains that the ideological aspect of the 1962 war was primarily driven by the ongoing power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to which Roderick MacFarquhar posits a pertinent intervention by questioning that :

> "if Mao had still been in retirement, would Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai have chosen to teach Mr. Nehru a lesson in quite so brutal a fashion? Probably not, in the light of their support for san he yishao."[62]

To say so, as in the early 1960s, Wang Jiaxiang, an erstwhile comrade-in-arms of Mao and a former Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union proposed the policy of 'san he yishao', known as the theory of 'Three Reconciliations and the One Reduction'. Wherein, the 'three reconciliations' were with the imperialists(the United States), the revisionists (the Soviet Union), and the reactionaries (India), and the 'reduction' referred to reducing unnecessary foreign expenditures and aid to the world's revolutionary forces.[63] This approach reflected a softer foreign policy line towards the

United States, the Soviet Union, and India which stressed on the need for peaceful coexistence.As Sergey Radchenko, a specialist on Sino-Soviet relations argues that Mao was 'fiercely opposed' to Wang's such a policy, Radchenko posits that :

> "Mao talked about national security and national pride. He wanted the world to know that China could not be intimidated, and that Beijing's stern warnings to India were not a bluff. He knew that the People's Liberation Army was in a position to inflict a shattering blow to the Indian Army and so assert China's claim to regional hegemony. National security concerns and illusions of grandeur were very good reasons for a war with India."[64]

This suggests that Mao's political actions and ideological authority greatly faced a precipitated decline.

Furthermore, this asymmetry in the Chinese political thinking was mainly evitable in China's policy towards India. While Mao in his argument with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, 'rejected the possibility of "peaceful transition" from bourgeois regimes like Nehru's India to proletarian dictatorship and insisted that they would have to be overthrown by revolution'.[65] However, defying Mao's viewpoint, China following Wang's idea practised a softer approach towards India that sought to 'revive the Bandung line' of the 1950s in the initial months of 1962.[66] In addition, China's soft leaning towards India was also witnessed in *People's Daily's* June 03, 1962 editorial that adopted a 'moderate' approach to the Sino-Indian relations.[67]

In view of this, the transition in Beijing's India policy came with the return of Mao Zedong to the centre stage with the Beidaihe Conference of September 1962. As Dr Li recollects, "In the summer of 1962, [Mao] emerged from his retreat. …I knew that his counter offensive was about to begin." Dr Li further suggests that "He [Mao] intended to remain the center, the nucleus, of the nation even as he retreated to the second line."[68] Besides, Mao also knew that Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were not loyal to him and it resulted into a scenario where "The country had two chairmen, two centers, two nuclei, and that Mao could not accept."[69] That is, the inner-Party struggle greatly escalated the stakes for Mao to regain his erstwhile power. In this regard, what provided Mao the right opportunity was the 1962 war with India.

To note, in Beidaihe, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai gave a report on the Sino-Indian border and some orders were subsequently sent to the Army, to which, Mao is said to have approved and given two reasons as to 'why China

should not yet counterattack'.[70] Mao cited, "Nehru had to be allowed to expose himself and the international community had to be convinced of India's aggression."[71] However, 2days later, Mao wrote an eight-character comment on the situation on the Sino-Indian border: *wuzhuanggongchu, quanyajiaocuo* (armed coexistence, jigsaw pattern). Wherein, 'armed coexistence' meant that while both the countries' armies were building their positions in the Western and Eastern sectors, the governments of China and India would continue to 'coexist', exchanging voluminous correspondence, sometimes bitter, sometimes more conciliatory, and the 'jigsaw policy' referred to opening new posts and offering negotiations.[72] What is noteworthy is that by this time, it was decided, "No matter with border defence is small; every matter must be checked with Beijing."[73] Here, Beijing was now synonymous with Mao Zedong—signifying the return of Mao to China's political decision-making scene.

Of which, the most evitable outcome of Mao's return to power was the worsening of the Sino-Indian relations. The change of Chinese attitude towards India was evident, as a *People's Daily* editorial in a few days before the war, issued an implicit warning with a declaration that "a massive invasion of Chinese territory by Indian troops in the eastern sector…seems imminent," strongly positing :

> "How could the Chinese possibly be so weak-kneed and faint-hearted as to tolerate this? It is high time to show to Mr Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory. … All comrade commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army guarding the Sino-Indian border, redouble your vigilance! Indian troops may at any time attempt to carry out Nehru's instructions to get rid of you. Be well prepared! Your sacred task now is to defend our territory and be ever-ready to deal resolute counterblows at any invaders."[74]

This reflects the way Mao exaggerated the Indian threat to his own advantage to take back the lost power in Chinese polity. In this regard, what came to Mao's rescue to assert his perception from his declined position was the accuracy of his perceptions of Nehru and Indian policy. Wherein, the first is the mind of Mao with its strong tendency to attribute malevolent intentions to his opponents, and its strong, even paranoid, propensity to discover conspiracies among those opponents. The second is the accuracy of Mao's belief in Nehru's intentions, including his understanding of Central

Intelligence Agency operations in Tibet.[75] These factors strongly refurbished Mao's agenda of shifting towards a hard-line policy towards India, as highlighted in the Beidaihe Conference of September 1962. Mao's strong stanceled to China's adoption of 'a militant PLA border stance' in 1962.[76] What clarifies this is Allen Whiting's assessment of Mao's propensity towards 'worst case' analysis wherein, Chinese tradition and Communist Party vulnerabilities both inclined Mao to perceive foreign powers seizing on China's internal difficulties to injure China.[77] Here, for Mao, internal difficulties reflected the power struggle within the Chinese political system.

This change in Chinese temperament with the return of Mao marked the hardening of China's foreign policy, wherein the sudden attack on India on October 20, 1962, exemplified to be the first manifestation. Wherein, the PLA attacked in overwhelming strength, both in the west and across the McMahon Line in the east, and within four days, captured almost all posts established by the Indian army in both sectors over the previous several months.[78] This border dispute with India provided a useful distraction from the power struggle and most importantly, acted as a significant catalyst that would 'either silence Mao's rivals or bring them back into the fold'.[79]

In this regard, the 1962 war caused Mao's return to power by putting the power struggle to rest and once again brought back China 'united behind Mao'.[80] Therefore, with this victory over India in 1962, Mao not just regained his absolute power over China but also reinforced his ambitions of becoming the leader of all the revolutionary movements in the world. This further reflects that China's foreign and defence policies were coterminous with the outcome of the power struggle among the CCP leadership. To explain, given the changes in China's ideological basis which Mao called as 'leftist adventurism' under the leadership that resulted into the hardening of China's foreign and defence policies, and in this process, Mao's 1962 war with India was the ultimate consequence.

Mao's Calculation of National Interest: *Perception of Threat*

The Tibetan Roulette

For Chinese, the root cause of the 1962 war was India's attempt to undermine Chinese rule. The predominant argument suggests that India's desire to 'seize Tibet', to turn Tibet into an Indian 'colony' or 'protectorate', or to return Tibet to its pre-1949 status was the root cause of India's Forward Policy and the 1962 War.[81] These assertions strongly shaped Chinese leadership's perception of India as the Chinese beliefs about the nature of Indian objectives regarding Tibet 'deeply coloured Chinese deliberations regarding India's moves along the border."[82] In addition, the official PLA history of 1962 war

argues that India sought to turn Tibet into a 'buffer zone' (*huanzhongguo*) as for Nehru, control of Tibet was essential for 'mastery over South Asia' and the 'most economical method for guaranteeing India's security'.[83] To explain, the Chinese perceived that :

> "Creation of such a buffer zone had been the objective of British imperial strategy, and Nehru was perceived as a 'complete successor' to Britain in this regard. Nehru's objective was seen as the creation of a 'great Indian empire' in South Asia by 'filling the vacuum' left by the British exit from that region."[84]

China–India bilateral relationship gradually entered into a tumultuous phase with India's objection to China's suppression of the Tibetan rebellion in 1959. In the aftermath of the uprising in Lhasa on March 10, 1959 and the subsequent flight of Dalai Lamato India and his public welcome by Nehru piqued the Chinese side even more,to which, CCP decided to dissolve the Tibetan local government, assert its own direct administration, and likewise implemented social revolutionary policies in Tibet. This policy measure was strongly driven by the Chinese leadership's perception that India wanted to seize Tibet. To say so, as on March 25, 1959, at the 'central cadres' meet in Shanghai to discuss the Tibet situation, Mao Zedong in his assessment stated that :

> "India was doing bad things in Tibet, but China would not condemn India openly at the moment. Rather, India would be given enough rope to hang itself (guoxingbuyi- literally, 'to do evil deeds frequently brings ruin to evil doer'. China would settle accounts with India later). China would settle accounts with India later."[85]

Tibet became a very important factor that contributed to the tensions on the border. As the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out in 1959, "the Indian attitude toward Tibet 'was at the heart of the Sino-Indian dispute'."[86] That is, for Beijing, the Tibet issue was entirely an internal issue, and China was not prepared to allow a third party to become involved. India's intervention in the Tibet uprising and Dalai Lama's exile prompted Chinese suspicion towards India that the Indian government, and Nehru in particular, were involved in the 1959 revolt in Lhasa. As noted, Mao Zedong at the central cadres meet on April 25 instructed the CCP propaganda apparatus to change its tone about India and Nehru, stating :

> "For a long while we have said that 'the imperialists, Jiang Jieshi's bandit gang, and foreign reactionaries have instigated the rebellion in Tibet and interfered in China's internal affairs.' This is completely inappropriate and should be re-tracted and changed to 'the British imperialists have acted in collusion with the Indian expansionists to intervene openly in China's internal affairs, in the hope of taking over Tibet.' We should directly point to Britain and India and should not avoid or circumvent this issue."[87]

This reflects the change in Chinese perception about India in the wake of the deterioration of the Tibetan question. Given that Mao was convinced about the Indian government having incited the rebellion, this provided an opportunity that by exposing a foreign government (India) as the instigator of the rebellion, China could further justify its suppression of the unrest.[88] As Mao noted :

> "the [Tibetan] revolt had provoked 'concern both at home and abroad' and that "Britain, the United States and India are now making all kinds of noises and engaging in a big anti-China chorus opposing China's suppression of the rebellion."[89]

With this threat perception, Mao proposed that Beijing launch "an open counteroffensive"[90] justifying its stand on Tibet.[91] In this regard, the two set of factors that preoccupied Chinese leaders' action were: first, a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet. And second, a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border.[92] This prompted the Chinese leadership to believe that "escalation was necessary to teach 'the invaders' [India] that they would not be able to conduct similar 'nibbling' in the future without severe costs."[93] In view of this, the Chinese justification for attacking India in 1962 strongly pointed out that :

> "[Nehru's ambition since the mid-1940s was the] establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history… [that would] far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by the British empire… [The Indian leadership] took over from British imperialism this concept

> of India as 'the centre of Asia'…. It is precisely from this expansionist viewpoint that the Indian ruling circles regard China's Tibet region as an Indian sphere of influence…. After India's declaration of independence, the Indian ruling circles regarded as India's those Chinese territories which the British imperialists had occupied and those which they had wanted to occupy but had not yet succeeded in occupying [Tawang]…. Again and again, the Indian authorities arbitrarily and unilaterally altered their map of the Sino-Indian boundary to incorporate large areas of Chinese territory into India [Aksai Chin]…. The total area so claimed is about the size of China's Fukien [Fujian] Province, or four times as large as Belgium or three times as large as Holland."[94]

This further resonated in Mao's decision to go for war against India, as he argued: "we cannot give ground, once we give ground it would be tantamount to letting them seize a big piece of land equivalent to Fujian province."[95] In this regard, Mao's decision to go for war was primarily driven by the perception of losing control over Tibet. As noted, in his conversation with a visiting Nepali delegation in 1964 stated, regarding the 1962 war, "The major problem in [Indian–Chinese relations] is not the problem of the McMahon line, but the Tibet question," as Mao pointedly remarked "In the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs."[96]

Thereby, how the Tibet factor motivated Chinese leadership's decision-making process in 1962 is three-fold:[97] First, the PRC leadership believed that India wanted to undermine Chinese control in Tibet and even wanted to restore its ambiguous international status that existed prior to the PLA's 1950/51 invasion. Second, the PRC leadership wanted to punish perceived Indian aggression as a consequence of India's 'Forward Policy' against what it believed was Chinese territory. Third, the PRC leadership feared that India was pursuing a policy of 'containment' of China in partnership with the United States and the Soviet Union. Hence, the interplay of these forces influenced Mao's drive which ended in an armed conflict in October–November 1962.

Mao's ideological struggle with the Soviet Union: The Sino-Soviet Rift

China did not miss the opportunity to denounce Nehru as "a lackey of US imperialism" and "a pawn in the international anti-China campaign." The tone and content of the 15,000-word vitriolic article in the *People's Daily*on October 27 was, as British analyst Roderick MacFarquhar states, "consonant with that of Beijing's anti-Soviet polemics of 1960 and prefigured in its anti-

Soviet polemics of 1963/64, thus marking it as a weapon in the ideological struggle with Moscow rather than in the military struggle with India."[98] This suggests that the Sino-Soviet divide played a significant role in Mao's calculations to decide for the 1962 war.

To note, armed conflicts on the Sino-Indian border first occurred in August 1959 with the Longju incident[99]—resulted into a lack of mutual understanding between PRC and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and thus, creating an ideological strain between the two allies. To explain, although Moscow supported Beijing in the suppression of the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, it refused to stand so unequivocally on China's side in the border incident. In the Soviet Union's view, in many ways, the flare-up was provoked by the Chinese themselves, in order to demonstrate in practice their refusal to accept the McMahon line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by British and Tibetan officials which India accepted as the correct Sino-Indian frontier) as the state border between the PRC and India.[100]

Furthermore, Moscow clarified its neutral stance in a September 1959 TASS statement by "calling on both sides to reach a negotiated settlement"—which the Chinese saw as evidence of the Soviets breaking ranks with their communist partners.[101] In a September 13, 1959 letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the CCP (CCCCP) accused the Soviet government (although in a veiled form) of "accommodation and compromise on important matters of principle" and noted that "the TASS statement showed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union in regard to the incident on the Indian–Chinese border.[102] In addition, as tension between China and India was brewing in 1962, Mohan Ram in his 1973 book *Politics of Sino-Indian Confrontation* points that Chinese called upon the leaders of the Soviet Union to 'denounce the Indian bourgeoisie as a lackey of imperialism'—which they refused to do.[103]

The Sino-Soviet rift was further widened on the question of responsibility for the crisis in Tibet. This factor figured prominently in the contentious talks between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev in Beijing on October 02, 1959.[104] In his conversation, Khrushchev pointedly stated to Mao :

> "You [China] have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position. We may say that Nehru is a bourgeois statesman. But we know about it. If Nehru leaves, who would be better than him? The Dalai Lama fled from Tibet,

> he is a bourgeois figure. This issue is also not clear for us. [..] If you let me, I will tell you what a guest should not say the events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled in Tibet, you should have had your intelligence [agencies] there and should have known about the plans and intentions of the Dalai Lama."[105]

Highlighting the difference in understanding of the issue, Mao responded that :

> "Nehru also says that the events in Tibet [were] our fault. Besides, in the Soviet Union they published a TASS declaration on the issue of conflict with India [supporting India]". [...] With this, "You attached to us two labels—the conflict with India was our fault, and that the escape of the Dalai Lama was also our error. [...] The TASS announcement made all imperialists happy."[106]

In addition, Khrushchev made another staunch point, as he categorically remarked, "If you allow him [Dalai Lama] an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru's fault."[107] These words of Khrushchev clearly hinted at Mao's failure to control situations and questioned his authority. To this, Mao replied, "No, this is Nehru's fault". [...] "The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them."[108]

These statements point to the clash of perceptions between Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev regarding the border issue. As Mao perceived the conflict within the context of class struggle on an international scale and thereby, sought support from all "fraternal parties", while for Khrushchev this did not hold any correspondence as he desired to maintain good relations with Nehru.[109] In Mao's view, Nehru was "half man, half devil" and the task of communists was to "wash off his face so that it won't be frightening, like a devil's."[110] This created a perceptual shift in Mao's mind towards the Soviet Union, as he perceived that on the surface the Soviets were supporting China, but in reality, they were sympathising with India and were providing clandestine material and moral support to India.[111]

There was a growing Chinese contention towards the Soviet Union's tilt towards India. In a letter to the Soviet Union, the CCCCP stated :

> "…we believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity."[112]

This further explains that the widening ideological shift between PRC and the Soviet Union provided Mao with another motive to decide for China's road to the 1962 war. Mao's attack on India was an attack against the Soviet Union as India was considered as a "lackey of Moscow."[113] As noted, after the war was over, Khrushchev came out in support of India, saying "we absolutely disallow the thought India wanted to start war with China"[114]—exemplifying how the rift played out between the Beijing and Moscow and influenced Mao's decision-making process.

Taiwan and Goa: An indirect link to Mao's Calculus

Although not directly related, but factors such as Taiwan and India's annexation of Goa played an indirect role in China's decision to the 1962 War. First, the Taiwan factor was primarily influenced by the United States' attitude towards the Kuomintang Government in Taiwan. The way this factor played out, as Roderick MacFarquhar[115] argued that :

> "All this Nationalist excitement reportedly caused a certain amount of panic among Chinese leaders, and it resulted in a massive reinforcement of the PLA positions in Fujian province opposite Quemoy, perhaps by as many as half-a-million troops, in case a full-scale assault should take place. General Luo Ruiqing, the PLA Chief-of-Staff believed that it was not a question of whether there would be a war, but how the PRC should fight the war: repel the enemy before he reached the coast or lure him deep into the hinterland."[116]

This created a perception of threat among the Chinese leadership of a KMTattack on the Chinese mainland, supported by the United States. Thus, the crucial question for Mao was to ascertain whether the United States would support their Taiwanese ally. This uncertainty of United States position on Taiwan was cleared when the Chinese Ambassador Wang Bingnan

invited the American Ambassador John Moors Cabot to a special session of Warsaw discussions on June 23, 1962. To which, Wang was assured that "U.S. Government had no intention of supporting any GRC attack on [the] Mainland under existing circumstances."[117] And the Governance, risk management and compliance, Wang was told, was "obliged not to launch an attack without U.S. consent."[118] This was formally confirmed by President John F. Kennedy, who at a press conference reiterated US opposition to the use of force in the Strait and emphasised on the defensive nature of the US treaty's commitment to the Republic of China.[119] Hence, this certainty of non-US involvement in the Taiwan sector provided an important opportunity for Mao to engage in an armed showdown with India.

Second, Mao's perception towards India was also shaped by Indian army's invasion of Portuguese Goa by the armed support of both United States and the Soviet Union in December 1961. Goa was rapidly constitutionally incorporated into the Indian republic. Although no real protests or opposition occurred as a result of this action, the annexation of Goa reinforced China's view of India as being 'expansionistic'.[120] This has a direct link with that of India's role in Tibet and the way China, under Mao, perceived it.

Given this interplay of self and national interests, Mao Zedong's motives behind the 1962 War can,therefore, be primarily assessed to be three-fold, first, to reassert his dominance in China's political sphere which was lost with his ambitious plan of Great Leap Forward; second, to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing Indian weakness, and third, to expose Khrushchev's policy of supporting Nehru against a Communist country and the perceived need to stop a Soviet–US–India matrix of encirclement and isolation of China.

Conclusion

There is an in-depth reason as to why China under Mao Zedong decided to go for war with India in 1962. This decision to war can be correctly traced in the way Mao—the architect of 'China's 1962 War with India' perceived the domestic and external situation. It was more in the 'mind of Mao' that mapped the war in the making, which came as a sudden blow to India.

This pertinent factor helps explain the causal factor behind the sudden change in the Chinese attitude towards India after years of passivity. In this regard, it also clarifies that the much-debated Nehru's 'Forward Policy' was not the key or only factor behind the Chinese decision to war, rather it provided Mao with an opportunity to rationalise the war from the vantage of his self and national interest.

As assessed, Mao's decision was a well-deliberated attempt weighing the options of opportunity driven by his self-interest and the Chinese national

interest. In view of this, striking at the right time was driven by the changing matrix of Mao's motivation of political survival, both domestically as well as in the Communist regime at the world stage.

With perceptual calculus of opportunity, the war with India was a win-win situation for Mao. In having inflicted a sudden strategic attack on India, his stature both in the CCP as well as on the international level was reinforced. In addition, Mao's meticulous move coupled with the Cuban Missile Crisis was like 'a stitch in time saves nine'. That is, Mao's decision was informed by his calculative advantage, which also resonates with Sun Tzu's saying that"[m]ove not unless you see an advantage; use your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical."[121]

Given the decisive nature of Mao's calculus of 1962 War, it can be strongly argued that if it was not Mao Zedong, who staged a comeback during October 1962, the Sino-Indian War would not have taken place. Thus, it was Mao who cognitively crafted the war for his perceived benefits both in the name of self-interest as well as national interest, wherein each augmented the other. Mao aimed for total victory rather than a local victory. It was his perceptual motivations embroiled in political compulsions that made him trigger the barrel of the gun against India in 1962.

Notes

1. Sun Zi, *Art of War* (Mumbai: Wilco, 2009), p. 5.
2. Cited in John W. Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962," in Alastair Ian Johnston and Robert S. Ross eds. *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 115.
3. John P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth about India's Most Crushing Military Disaster* (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2010), p. 364.
4. Ibid., p. 1.
5. Oriana Skylar Mastro, "The Great Divide: Chinese and Indian Views on Negotiations, 1959-62," *Journal of Defence Studies* vol. 6, no. 4, 2012, p. 72.
6. "Remember 1962 Defeat: Chinese Media Warns India Again Amid Sikkim Standoff," *Business Standard*, (July 13, 2017). http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/remember-1962-defeat-chinese-media-warns-india-again-amid-sikkim-standoff-117071300376_1.html, accessed on April 10, 2018.
7. "India of 2017 different from that of 1962: Jaitley to China," *The Times of India,* (July 01, 2017), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-of-2017-different-from-that-of-1962-jaitley-to-china/articleshow/59394967.cms, accessed on April 10, 2018.
8. Quoted in Oriana Skylar Mastro, "The Great Divide,"2012, p. 92.
9. Quoted in "People's Daily to India: Borderline is Bottom Line," *People's Daily Online,* (July 11, 2017). http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0711/c90000-9240280.html, accessed on May 05, 2018.
10. Sutirtho Pratnabis, "China blames Jawaharlal Nehru for 1962 war,"*Hindustan Times*, (October 07, 2012), https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/china-blames-jawaharlal-nehru-for-1962-war/story-cFv9MZjltsWjCGy8HmuxVO.html, accessed on April 15, 2018.

11. Forward Policy was designed to secure the entire Sino-Indian frontier in Ladakh in the west to the North-East Frontier Agency in the east. This policy move was decided upon a meeting in New Delhi on November 02, 1961, less than a year before the 1962 war. It is argued that Nehru's Forward Policy was not aimed at provoking the Chinese but to reassert what the Indians considered to be the traditional boundary and to check the continuing Chinese advance by connecting all the gaps and plugging the holes along the frontier by establishing new outposts and sending out patrols even to the remotest parts of Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency. In view of this, action was to be taken only if there were any new Chinese army camps south of where the Indians had decided that the McMahon Line should be. See, BertilLintner, *China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 11, 98–99.
12. Ibid.
13. "Commentary: India must understand borderline is bottom line,"*Xinhuanet*, (July 10, 2017). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/10/c_136432645.htm, accessed on May 05, 2018.
14. Ibid., p. 86.
15. The rational actor model, along with the organisational process and bureaucratic politics models derives from Graham Allison. In the rational actor model, the basic unit of analysis is the action chosen by the national government to maximise its strategic goals and objectives. As Allison and Zelikow note, two of the central assumptions of classical realism, namely that unitary states are the main actors in international affairs and that states act rationally in selecting the course of action that is value-maximising, find resonance in the rational actor model. The model assumes that a nation's actions are in response to strategic threats and opportunities in the international environment [24–27].
16. Jerel A. Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy," in L. Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney,eds.,*Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, (Prentice Hall, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 50.
17. Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, "How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War,"*International Studies Quarterly* vol. 39, p. 51.
18. Christopher S. Browning, *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 20.
19. Volker Rittberger, "Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Derived from International Relations Theories," *Center for International Relations, University of Tubingen,* (2004). https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/47326/pdf/tap46.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on May 20, 2018), p. 8.
20. Ibid.
21. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) argue that decision-makers are participants in a system of action, wherein, the key to explaining why a state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision-makers as actors define their situation. This approach views decision-making in an organisational context, where the emphasis is laid on the decisional unit, that answering "*who* becomes involved in a decision, *how*, and *why* is essential to an explanation of why the decision-makers decided the way they did". See, Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*(New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 65, 92–98. While Simon (1985) argues that to understand and predict human behaviour, we have to deal with the realities of human rationality that is with bounded rationality. See, Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," *American Political Science Review* vol. 79, 1985, pp. 293–304.
22. Jerel A. Rosati, "The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics," *International Studies Review* vol. 2, no. 3, 2000,p. 50.

23. Individuals tend to simplify and be more closed-minded due to their beliefs and the way they process information; thus, they are not fully aware of, and are much less adaptable to, changes in the objective environment. The individuals involved within the policy-making process are likely to view their environment differently. The cognitive approach problematises the subjective environment of individuals and views the world as perceived and represented by those actors involved in the decision-making process.
24. Rosati, n. 22, p. 50.
25. Roxanne L. Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 37, no. 3, 1993, p. 300.
26. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 3.
27. Martha L. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 2.
28. The objectivity lies in the understanding of the policy maker's cognitive structures—how they understand, order and simplify the world, may lead to an understanding of how information is processed and political events judged.
29. Robert Jervis,*Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* 1976.
30. Jonathan Renshon and Stanley Renshon, "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Political Psychology*vol. 29, no. 4, 2008,p. 511.
31. Kim and De Mesquita, n. 17, p. 52.
32. Alex Mintz and NehemiaGeva, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making," in NehemiaGeva and Alex Mintz,eds., *Decision Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive- Rational Debate*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 84.
33. Steven B. Redd, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Experimental Evidence," in Alex Mintz,ed.,*Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 104.
34. Richard K. Hermann et al., "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata,"*International Studies Quarterly* vol. 41, 1997, p. 408.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ole R. Holsti and Robert C. North, "The History of Human Conflict," in Elton B. McNeil ed.,*The Nature of Human Conflict*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965). In their study, Holsti and North argue that an international crisis preceding the outbreak of World War I, foreign policy decision-makers of the nations involved tended to view themselves as the victims of injury, but regarded their political enemies as the targets of friendship and agents of hostility, pp. 164–165.
38. Randolph M. Siverson, "International Conflict and the Perception of Injury: The Case of the Suez Crisis," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 2, 1970, pp. 157–165.
39. Kim and De Mesquita, n. 17, p. 58.
40. Hermann et al., n. 34, p. 408.
41. Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return," *International Security* vol. 36, no. 1, 2011, p. 7.
42. Ibid.
43. Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* vol. 6, 1962, p. 244.
44. Quoted in Jaswant Singh, *In Service of Emergent India: A Call to Honor* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 139.
45. Garver, n. 2, p. 115.
46. Ibid., p. 87.
47. Ibid., p. 88.

48. Under Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong's objective was to surpass Great Britain in industrial production within 15 years. For this purpose, every Chinese had to start producing steel at home, with a backyard furnace. In agriculture, Mao thought that very large communes would achieve manifold increase in the cereal production, turning China into a heaven of abundance. Introduced and managed with frantic fanaticism, it was not long before the program collapsed. See, Claude Arpi, "Why Mao attacked India in 1962,"*Indian Defence Review*, (December 06, 2015). http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/maos-return-to-power-passed-through-india/ accessed on May 15, 2018.
49. Mao recounted the circumstances of the 'one and a half' Sino-India wars: "The first war had been in 648 A.D. when a Tang dynasty emperor had dispatched troops to assist the legal claimant to a throne to a subcontinental kingdom—after the other claimant had killed 30 members of a Tang diplomatic mission. A Tang-strengthened force defeated the usurper, who was captured and sent to the Tang capital Changan [Xian], where he lived the rest of his life." Then Mao spoke of the 'half war' in 1398 "when Timurlane captured Delhi. This was a great victory, but was followed by the slaughter of over 100,000 prisoners and looting of all precious metals and gems across the land. This was a 'half war' because Timur and his army were Mongols from both Inner and Outer Mongolia. Mongolia was then part of China, making this attack 'half' Chinese."For the Chairman, the morale to be learnt from history: "First, the PLA had to secure a victory and knock Nehru to the negotiating table and second, Chinese forces had to be restrained and principled." Cited in John W. Garver (2006), "China's Decision for War with India in 1962", p. 116.
50. Henry Kissinger, *On China* (UK: Penguin, 2011).
51. Mintz and Geva, n. 32. such a ailed and "" peasants' Development, M.E. Sharpe: failed result of ues s.hey are averse to losspolarity and multipola
52. Raymond C L Yeap, "The Theory of Transition in China: The Thought of Liu Shaoqi" (PhD diss., Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 2007), p. 214.
53. Ibid.
54. Mark Selden, *The Political Economy of Chinese Development* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 18.
55. Kenneth G. Liberthal and Bruce J. Dickson, A *Research Guide to Central Party and government Meetings in China 1949-1986* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), p. 87.
56. Claude Arpi, "Why Mao attacked India in 1962," 2015.
57. Li Zhisui, *Private Life Of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician* (London: Arrow Books, 1996).
58. Ibid., p. 124.
59. Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership 1958-65," in Roderick MacFarquhar,ed.,*The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 122.
60. Ibid., p. 384.
61. Ibid. pp. 385–386.
62. Bertil Lintner, *China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 105.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Arpi, n. 56.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. See, "Mao's return to power passes through India," http://www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Mao_1962_war.pdf, accessed on June 07, 2018.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.
72. Arpi, n. 56.
73. "Mao's return to power passes through India."
74. "The Origins of the Cultural Revolution," http://www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Roderick_MacFarquhar.pdf, accessed on June 07, 2018.
75. John W. Garver, "India, China, the United States, Tibet, and the Origins of the 1962 War," *India Review* vol. 3, no. 2, 2004,p. 173.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 172.
78. "The Origins of the Cultural Revolution," http://www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Roderick_MacFarquhar.pdf, accessed on June 07, 2018.
79. Lintner, n. 62, p. 114.
80. Ibid.
81. Garver, n. 2, p. 89.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Garver, n. 2, p. 93.
86. Cited in Lei Guang, "From national identity to national security: China's changing responses toward India in 1962 and 1998," *The Pacific Review*vol. 17, no. 3, 2004, p. 403.
87. Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 8, no. 3, 2006, p. 87.
88. Ibid., p. 86.
89. Ibid.
90. On May 04, 1951, in a conversation with Fei Yimin, a pro-Communist 'democratic figure' in Hong Kong, Zhou Enlai vowed not to yield to New Delhi's challenge but expressed concern that the Tibet question might trigger a deeper conflict between China and India on the border issue. As Zhou said, "We must carry out a counteroffensive against India. It is they who initiated the whole thing. They have been waging a cold war. We must pay them back in the same currency. Our strategy in this fight should be on just grounds, to our ad- vantage and with due restraint, and should combine struggle with unity, so that unity can be achieved through struggle. On the Tibet question, it seems that Nehru has developed some illusions, hoping to use the Dalai Lama as a bargaining chip [on the border issue]. When our troops entered Tibet in 1950, India's interference was barely concealed. Only after our troops won the Chamdo campaign and forced the Tibetan upper stratum to come to the negotiating table did the Indians call it quits. Now our troops have reached the borders [with India] and will seal them to trap the rebels. We must carry out a counteroffensive. The Indians may put the Tibet question aside to launch an anti-Chinese and anti-Communist wave [on the border issue]. So we must be mentally prepared". Cited in Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959," 2006, p. 88–89.
91. Ibid.
92. Garver, n. 2, pp. 86–87.
93. Mastro, n. 5,p. 94.
94. Quoted in Manjeet S. Pardesi, "The Legacy of 1962 and China's India Policy," *Journal of Defence Studies* vol. 6, no. 4, 2012, p. 195.
95. Cited in John W. Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962," 2006, p. 115.
96. John W. Garver , *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 59.
97. Pardesi, n. 94, pp. 191–192.
98. Quoted in Bertil Lintner, "The Sino-Indian War Was "A Masterstroke That Placed China As The Leader Of The Third World","*The Caravan*, (October 22, 2017). http://www.

caravanmagazine.in/vantage/sino-indian-war-masterstroke-placed-china-leader-third-world, accessed on June 05, 2018).

99. On August 26, 1959, the Chinese surrounded the small Indian garrison at Longju and the Indian personnel opened fire in self-defence. This version is contradicted by China and maintains that it was India who opened the fire first. Following the Longju incident, India saw it as a deliberate Chinese aggression on Indian territory. While China stated that provocations from the Indian troops necessitated the Chinese action in self-defence, China reiterated that Longju was Chinese territory, even the British maps had shown Longju within Chinese territory.
100. M. Y. Prozumenschikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,"*Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, (1962): 251. http://www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/Cuba_and_SinoIndian_conflict.pdf, accessed on May 20, 2018.
101. "How Mao and Khrushchev fought China-India Border Dispute,"*South China Morning Post*, (August 05, 2017). http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2105501/how-mao-and-khrushchev-fought-over-china-india-border-dispute, accessed on May 25, 2018.
102. Prozumenschikov, n. 100, p. 251.
103. Quoted in Bertil Lintner, "The Sino-Indian War Was "A Masterstroke That Placed China As The Leader Of The Third World," 2017.
104. NikitaKhrushchev visited China at the end of September 1959 to hold a summit with the Chinese leadership. This visit came just months after the Dalai Lama had fled to India.
105. "Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong," Digital Archive: International History Declassified, Wilson Center, (October 02, 1959), https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112088.pdf?v=401979fac3f7d5e1d51d0bcd3a80f4c5, accessed on May 20, 2018.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Prozumenschikov, n. 100,p. 251.
110. Ibid.
111. B. R. Deepak, *India & China, 1904–2004:A Century of Peace and Conflict* (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005), p. 271.
112. Mastro, n. 5,p. 96.
113. "The Tibetan Factor in 1962: The Importance of Stable Operation Base,"*Indian Strategic Studies,* (April25, 2018). http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2018/04/the-tibetan-factor-in-1962-importance.html, accessed on May 25, 2018.
114. Quoted in Bertil Lintner, "The Sino-Indian War Was "A Masterstroke That Placed China As The Leader Of The Third World," 2017.
115. As Roderick MacFarquhar notes, Nationalist (Kuomintang) agents were being infiltrated into the mainland on sabotage missions and the American commander-in-chief in the Pacific and the CIA's station chief in Taipei urged US support. On May 01, 1962, the KMT impose 'return to the mainland' consumer taxes amid reports of military preparations on the island. Taipei's long-standing invasion plan was revised with instructions to make it operational in the shortest possible time,' and purchases of additional naval vessels and amphibious craft were negotiated. See, Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
116. Cited in "Mao's return to power passes through India."
117. Sean Mathew Turner, "Containment and Engagement: U.S. China Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Administration," (PhD diss., Adelaide, Australia: University of Adelaide, 2008), pp. 128–129.

118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. James B. Calvin, "The China India Border War (1962)," *Globalsecurity.org,*(1984).https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB. htm, accessed on May 25, 2018.
121. Sun, n. 1, p. 105.