Anti Naxal Operations: Focus on the Basics

An analysis of recent incidents of clashes between the Naxals and the police forces indicate both positive trends as well as high degrees of concern in the conduct of anti naxal operations. On night 27-28 March 2013, a breakaway group, ‘Tritiya Prastuti Committee’ (TPC), gunned down 10 cadres of the CPI (Maoist) in a gunfight that took place at Lakramand, a small hamlet of about 40 homes near the Palamu border in Jharkhand’s Chatra district. Amongst the killed was Lalesh Yadav, alias ‘Prashant’, secretary and chief spokesperson of the Bihar-Jharkhand-North Chhattisgarh Special Area Committee. Also eliminated were three lower level leaders, a platoon commander and two members of the sub zonal committee of Eastern Palamu zone. The TPC is a Left Wing Extremist organisation composed of Dalits and tribal, which is against Yadav domination in the ranks of the CPI (Maoist). As per newspaper reports, the Jharkhand police is exploiting this schism and covertly supporting the TPC to take on the Maoists in the Palamu, Latehar and Chatra districts. In the instant case, the Maoists had arrived at Lakramand on the morning of 27th March, the village serving as a pit stop for Bihar Maoists moving to Saranda forest. They split up into three groups for the night. The TPC cadres moved in by 1 AM on 28^th morning, surrounded the houses and eliminated the Maoists, recovering in the process the weapons carried by them. The bodies of the dead were handed over to the police forces, which came in thereafter. While the police had no direct role in the above incident, their ability to exploit schisms within various Maoist groups indicates an improvement in intelligence capability at the grassroots level, which is a welcome sign.

Another positive was the encounter, which took place on April 16, 2013, in Kanchala forests in Khammam district of Andhra Pradesh, bordering Chhattisgarh. Here the police forces apparently got the better of the Maoists, killing nine Naxals, five of whom were women. The credibility of the operations rests in the recovery of the bodies as also in seizure of weapons wherein two INSAS rifles, four SLRs (self-loading rifles), two 303 rifles and a few other weapons were recovered along with communication equipment and revolutionary literature. 

While the above developments indicate that the police forces are slowly gearing up their act to counter naxal terror, much still remains to be done. Training remains a major weakness especially with respect to shooting skills and sub unit level operations. As per newspaper reports, (TOI, 8 April), firing practise results of police officers in Jharkhand indicated that over half could not even hit the target. Poor shooting skills remain a worry. Most policemen fail to attend the annual range classification firing and many have not fired a weapon in years. This, combined with poor physical standards and inadequacy in group cohesion reduces efficacy in conduct of anti Naxal operations. The Naxal’s on the other hand lay great emphasis on training and regularly carry out shooting practise, albeit with restricted quantities of ammunition. The CPI (Maoist) has also set up its own elite training institute in the Dandakaranya forests to transform tribal cadres into effective fighters. Here, the cadre undergo training for six months, the venue being changed for each subsequent batch to avoid detection and disruption by the police. If the state police forces are to match the Naxal’s in the difficult terrain where they reside, their training skills would require dramatic enhancement. Merely increasing the size of the force sent to counter Naxal presence is counter-productive in the absence of well-honed individual and sub unit fighting skills. A large untrained force is simply a bigger target for the Maoist to hit as seen in the many instances over the years where the police have suffered heavy casualties.

Increasingly, voices are being heard within the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) for infusion of greater technology into anti Naxal operations. While technology is a useful supplement, it cannot compensate for lack of skills at the operating level. For the most part, lack of high technology platforms such as UAVs are being cited as prime reasons for inadequate performance. This is a myth, which must be dispelled. The CRPF, the nodal agency nominated for anti Naxal operations has made a bid to the union home ministry to have its own fleet of UAVs of the Heron class to fight the Naxals. Approval of this bid is likely; it will however do little to improve the fighting efficiency of police forces on the ground.

The extensive use of UAVs by US Forces against the Taliban, mostly in Pakistan’s tribal belt bordering Pakistan has caused some damage to the former in terms of losses to some elements of its leadership, but has not impacted the ground situation to the level desired. Two basic problems arise when using such systems. The first is the high incidents of collateral damage, which occur with deadly frequency, killing many innocents. This in turn sets the people against the security forces and leads to a surge in people wanting to join the rebels to seek vengeance. Such trends are increasingly coming to the fore in Pakistan and Afghanistan, defeating the very purpose of their use. The second is the large numbers required for continuous surveillance over designated target areas, and the extensive support network system required to ensure that the information is made available to the user, to permit real time operations taking place. Such support networks take years to develop. It involves the skills to operate, maintain and repair UAVs as also systems networks to receive images sent by the platforms, process them and pass them on to troops as actionable intelligence. It would require matching troop mobility to operate in real time, necessitating very high standards of training and motivation. Operations would still involve closing in with the Naxals and engaging them in close quarter combat. Without well-trained and well-led police forces, such operations are bound to fail despite infusion of any amount of technology.

Let us not then get blinded by technology. The Naxal’s are not fighting a high tech war. Countering them in the remote and inaccessible jungles requires high standards of training, motivation and leadership, which must remain the sine qua non. If UAVs are deemed essential, they must be of the hand held tactical variety which operating troops could use to good effect while closing in with the Naxals. The best of technology unfortunately cannot compensate for lack of fighting skills. Let us remember that in the boxing ring, the thing that matters is the boxer’s ability to fight. We need to get back to basics and ensure that we only send well-trained and well-led personnel to combat the Maoists. In that lies the road to operational success.

The author is Director at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal