Massacre at km 43 : The Unanswered questions

Much has been written and said about the Maoist ambush on 25 May at Km 43 in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar Division, which eliminated a large part of the Congress Party’s state leadership. Among the 31 people killed were the state Congress President, Nand Kumar Patel, his son Dinesh and some present and former MLAs. Amongst these was Mahendra Karma, a powerful tribal leader form Bastar who had founded the Salwa Judum movement. VC Shukla, a former union minister was seriously injured and succumbed to his injuries 16 days later on 11 June 2011. The tragedy however leaves many important questions unanswered, primarily because the questions were not asked or if asked were suppressed.

The first of these is the strength of the police party with the ambushed convoy. Personal security officers accompanied some of the Congress leaders, but their total number as also the total number of state police personnel in the convoy remains shrouded in secrecy. There is also no information available of the number of weapons and ammunition carried by the police forces, communications available within the police protection party, and who was the police officer in charge of security of the convoy. While most press reports suggest that about 50 police personnel accompanied the convoy, the more realistic assessment is that the number was about 20 police personnel only. Even Karma was not moving with his full complement of personal security officers despite having Z category security, which has a complement of 26 personnel from the CRPF/ITBP along with an escort vehicle. Personal security officers move on the orders of the person whom they are protecting. Evidently, Karma and some others chose to dilute the strength of the protection afforded to them. Karma in all likelihood had less than half a dozen personnel with him, which to an extent proved to be his undoing. These lapses must be avoided when VIP protection is afforded. 

The second question pertains to the change in route. From Sukma, the convoy was to go to Dantewada and then head for Jagdalpur on NH 16. The delay in Sukma, where the Congress held its ‘Parivartan Yatra’ presumably caused a change in plans and the group decided to return via Darbha, on the route it had earlier come. It is true that this route was shorter and would have saved some time, but plans are not changed just for an hours saving in time. There were security issues involved in terms of road opening, which would be difficult to do at short notice. Why then was this decision taken? Based on the original plan, Congress workers had organised a reception for their leaders at Dantewada, which is also a district HQ and welcome buntings dotted the area. From there, the move would have been on the relatively more secure NH 16. This aspect has not received the attention it deserves.

The third question is what gave the Maoists the level of assurance that the Congress convoy would return on the same route? This was not an opportunity ambush but a deliberately planned one. The ambush party would have assembled at least a day prior in the general area. UAV pictures taken two days before the ambush indicate the presence of a large group of Maoists in the area, which substantiates the assessment that the ambush was pre planned. Why then was the convoy not attacked while moving to Sukma? The ambush was located on a series of bends on the road and the placement of the improvised explosive device (IED) on the northern side of the bends indicates it was planned for the returning convoy. For the incoming convoy, the IED would have been placed on the southern side of the bends. The return journey of the convoy was planned on a different route, yet the Maoists set up the ambush for the returning convoy. What made them so sure that the convoy would come back on that route when the convoy was supposed to go back via Dantewada? Evidently, the Maoists had insider information, which enabled continuous tracking of the movement of the convoy. This shows up intelligence deficits, both in assessing Maoist intentions and in preventing breach of information security. 

With respect to police operations, the prime weakness appears to be an organisational failure. The small contingent accompanying the convoy, consisting of both personal security officers and state police personnel operated as individuals and were not grouped to function as a team. When the Maoists opened fire at 4.30 in the afternoon after blasting the third vehicle, the convoy was spread over a distance of about 200 meters. There was however, no organised resistance. In a couple of minutes, the firing ceased and the Maoists were in total control of the area. Eight police personnel lost their lives and seven were injured. Some were killed after the Maoists had taken over the area. The Maoists also took away all their weapons and ammunition. 

It has been suggested that the number of police personnel provided were inadequate to combat the Maoists who were in much greater strength. That may be so but even a larger contingent of police forces would have met the same fate, as they were not organised to fight. Conversely, even a small force, if organised well could have put up heroic resistance and paid put to the plan of the Maoists. This once again highlights critical deficiencies in training and leadership. Stories emanating from certain quarters that the battle with the Maoists lasted for over two hours do not match with ground realities. The Maoists swarmed the convoy after the initial burst of fire and the occupants surrendered thereafter. Where then was the resistance for two hours? This in no way is meant to berate the police personnel accompanying the convoy. Resistance requires synergy in operations, which is a product of organisation, grouping, training, communications and leadership. In the instant set up, the police personnel had no chance. Greater numbers too would not have made a difference to the ultimate outcome.

The change in route and Maoists having prior knowledge of it has thrown up conspiracy theories and placed a question mark on information security. If the route was changed at the last minute, how did the Maoists come to know? Who informed them of the change in plans? Who stood to benefit by the killing of the senior leadership of the Chhattisgarh Congress? Was it the second rung leadership in the party or was it someone else? Why did the Maoists not ambush the convoy when it was going to Sukma when there was no surety of the convoy taking the same route back? A host of questions exist, but the answers will take time before they unravel.

So where do we go from here? The Centre is not unaware of weaknesses in command, control, training and group cohesiveness of the police forces designated to fight the Maoists. In a letter to the DG CRPF, written before the ambush, the Home Secretary expressed concern over the fact that since the Dantewada massacre of 76 CRPF personnel in April 2010, company level operations had come to a halt, which has made junior level commanders defunct and lacking in initiative. At the same time, senior officers too have become excessively cautious, relying on using larger and larger forces to avoid failure in operations.  He also spoke of morale issues wherein a ‘lack of sync and feel’ for each other existed amongst the police, which leads to operational failure as the ‘feeling of sacrifice’, is lacking. Of concern was yet another observation, which spoke of the local police not sharing information with the CRPF, as they then might have to take part in operations with them. These observations point to leadership deficits at the higher level within the CRPF. Police officers by training are managers and not leaders but the requirement for a counter insurgency environment is leaders with operational experience at the level of commandant and above. Addressing this issue will remain a challenge.

Another factor which requires consideration is employment of CRPF in company groups. This practise needs to change. We must deploy CRPF units in battalion groups, controlled by their own commanding officers. Headquarters of the DIG Police and IG police looking after operations also should be located in the area of operations to create the requisite synergy between commanders and troops as is the norm in the army. This would infuse the necessary camaraderie and esprit de corps in the force and will over time lead to focussed and successful operations against the Maoist armed wing. As of now, the police have limited capability even to combat the base level force of the Maoists called the ‘Jan Militia’. They still have a long way to go to defang the main cadre of the Maoists. On the policy plane, we need to revisit the decision in which CRPF was made the nodal agency for counter insurgency operations against the Maoists.

Despite the success achieved by the Maoists on 25 May, the larger conflict remains in a stage of strategic stalemate. While the Maoists may have won a brilliant tactical victory, the horrific incident may yet turn out to be a strategic blunder for them. For that to happen, all organs of the central and state government have to present a united front to combat Naxal violence, along with ensuring the rights of the local inhabitants and looking into development issues. A concerted effort encompassing Security, Rights and Development can yet lead to a lasting peace in India’s tribal belt.

The author is Director at CLAWS