Unresolved Armed Conflict in Northeast India

Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Tripura and Sikkim make up the Northeast region of India. Since the inception of the Indian republic, parts of this region has been plagued by armed revolt and political violence directed against settlers, different ethnic groups and the authorities. The situation is often attributed to the region’s underdevelopment and its peripheral position within India. But one of the major problem areas is that the Northeast region is territorially organised in such a manner that ethnic and cultural specificities were ignored during the process of delineation of state boundaries in the 1950s giving rise to discontentment and assertion of one’s identity.

The reconfiguration of post-colonial areas in India’s northeast was not a very smooth one. On the eve of India’s independence, several ethnic groups had made effective use of the factors of ethnicity and regionalism as basis of ethnic rage, democratic struggle for self-rule, greater autonomy and militant actions. However, in 1947, the interim government of India appointed a sub-committee of constituent assembly called the North-East Frontier Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committee, which sought to reconcile the aspirations of the hill people for political autonomy to integrate them with the plains.

The more assertive tribes who consistently rebelled against their incorporation within the new Indian nation-state such as the Nagas and Mizos ultimately succeeded in attaining status of statehood and greater autonomy. Even after the formation of Nagaland, however, the Naga movement remained active, as A.Z. Phizo, who had originally given the call for a ‘long Naga struggle’ in 1953 continues to occupy centre stage even today. The Naga movement, in which both ethnicity and extreme nationalism are used as operational strategies, is regarded as the mother of all movements in the Northeast.

To put in context, by early 1950s, the Naga rebellion was in full swing and in 1955, Indian Government sent in the army to restore order and contain the insurgency. Peace talks commenced in 1957 and Nagaland was recognised as a self-governing Indian state in 1963. That the talks continue to the present day is testimony of the failure to deliver a long-term solution beyond the subsequent ceasefire. Till the present day, NSCN-IM is under ceasefire.

From the 1980s onwards, various ethnic movements plagued the entire Northeast. Most of the movements were non-violent in their initial stages, but gradually assumed severe militant nature. In the present context, it has been argued that more than 30 insurgent groups operate which aids the protracted armed struggle of the region. In the states of the region, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Tripura have shown the greatest propensity to separatist and ethnic violence. Overall, though violence has shown a tendency to abate in the region, in Assam and Manipur, violence levels continue to remain very high with frequent and bloody ethnic clashes and breakdown of governmental authority.

Militarily speaking, even the most formidable of them, the faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Thingaleh Muivah and Isaak Chisi Swu (NSCN-IM) has not been difficult for India’s security forces to overwhelm though the Naga struggle itself, which the NSCN-IM now leads has persisted as a low-intensity conflict for over five decades. Organisations such as United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), Bodoland Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF), Dima Halim Daoga (DHD), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Revolutionary Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and Kuki National Army have been influential for a significant period.

These armed groups’ strategy involves a complex mix of political legitimisation, support base, symbolic gestures, and historical narratives. The NSCN (IM), ULFA, UNLF and DHD have a declared strategy of protracted armed conflict. Ceasefires are seen as a phase when an outfit can regroup, recruit, finance and re-arm themselves.  It has therefore been argued that the ULFA and NSCN (IM) re-armed and regrouped during the ceasefire phase.

Despite ceasefire between the Union government and the armed groups, violence has dominated the social fabric of Northeast India. Even when violence ceases between the armed groups and security forces, violence between the multiple armed groups continues resulting in deaths of both combatants and non-combatants. For instance, the NSCN (IM)’s fratricidal killings against the NSCN (K) had vitiated the atmosphere in Naga areas in recent years. Similarly, the break-up of UNLF in the 90s resulted in a bloody factional clash leaving hundreds of people dead. Further, when BLT was in ceasefire in Assam, they carried out fratricidal killings of the alleged supporters of NDFB. Though BLT has been disbanded, there still exists an atmosphere of animosity between the erstwhile BLT cadres and NDFB cadres who are now split and under ceasefire. 

One of the arguments for the prolonged armed conflicts in the north-east is attributed to the failure of the Indian state to reproduce the consent of the governed through the participation of citizens in routines such as tax payment and elections or the citizen’s reliance on the state for key services such as guaranteed public order. In a situation where one ethnic group is organised as an armed ‘national liberation force’ threatening the security of a rival group and the state is not seen as a reliable provider of security, it is easy to assume why that group, which feels the threat would self-help themselves by turning towards forming their own armed group as a way of finding security.

According to Archana Upadhyay, the counter-terrorism policies pursued in the region ensure the continuation of the terror industry. The ‘surrender schemes’ devised by state governments aim to bribe terrorists away from their violent activities. However, a large portion of those who surrender are far from being hardcore militants and some do not have have anything to do with militancy. As for weapons, not only do the surrendering cadres fail to surrender all of their weapons, they were subsequently provided gun licenses and armed guards by the state, on the grounds of their personal security against retributive attacks by their former comrades. A nexus between mainstream politician, militants and surrendered militants is a frequently noted dimension of contemporary politics of Northeast India.

However, there have been some positive developments in the Northeast. Several of the states have seen significant decline in insurgent operations in the recent past as various negotiations and ceasefire agreements have made considerable progress. Perhaps the era of large insurgent groups in the Northeast that could present a major strategic threat independently appears to have passed as almost all the larger movements have fractured. Nevertheless, even if the government has managed to establish some form of ceasefire with various groups, there is a high chance of violence if one group feels threatened by another, which could subsequently lead to tit-for-tat violence that eventually can turn into a major episode of ethnic violence and massacres. Finally, Northeast India’s armed groups’ rather convoluted relations with neighbouring countries will continue to represent a significant security threat to the country.  

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The author is a Research Assistant at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal