Army Equipping Strategy

The Indian capital defence budget has been growing at a meager percentile plan-on-plan over the past two decades. The tardy progress in defence modernisation, capability building and capacity enhancement is further accentuated by a defence procurement system, which is craving for increased transparency, accountability by decision makers and above all indigenisation. In such present and futuristic scenario there is a need to evolve and implement an efficient equipping strategy for the Indian Army to achieve the three-fold outcome – conserve capability, exploit the inherent stretch potential of the equipment and be seen as economically wise in defence spendings.  Such a strategy will aslo need to achieve a balance between effectiveness and affordability.  

An effective equipping strategy must ensure that the force is capable of operating with the right amount, types and modern equipment to meet its mission requirements in combat, training and internal security roles.

Challenges Necessitating an Equipping Strategy

The challenges facing the Indian Army equipping have changed significantly over the past years and the ways in which we equip the force have changed even more significantly. The challenges that dictate an equipping strategy are :-

• Modernisation and Recapitalisation.    The Army constantly needs to manage obsolescence by replacing / recapitalising aging equipment to preserve equipment and also ensure future capabilities. Our equipment inventories will therefore need to be an ideal mix of new, fully modernised equipment and operationally acceptable substitutes.
• Necessity to Adapt.           With the change in the geopolitics of the region as well as global arena, coupled with the advent of advanced technologies there has been a consequent change in our tactics and doctrine.   It is thus imperative to enhance equipment capabilities and shun “adhocism” requiring a unique assembly of personnel and equipment.
• Growth and Accretions.   Indian Army equipping norms have been challenged with a growth in equipping requirements for accretions and new raisings. The WETs of units/ formations have been revised atleast two to three times in the past two decades, which has shown enormous increase in the range and depth of inventory. This growth can also be measured in the increased demand for technology and the need to equip soldiers performing decisive, shaping and sustaining operations with the required survivability and lethality to operate in today’s battlefield environment. Further, with no classical “rear areas” in the present battlefield, the soldier’s individual equipment needs to provide a base level of protection and lethality. Further the requirement of accretion forces needs to be factored in to ensure there operational readiness.
• Equipment Management and Sustenance in a Hostile Operational Environment. The protracted and prolonged engagement of the Indian Army in CI/CT operations and greater demands on LC/LAC/ border management impose greater challenges to equipment management including repair and maintenance. The increased usage of equipment has resulted in enhanced usage rates up to five or more times greater than the rates initially planned for at the time of equipment acquisition.
• Budgetary Constraints.    The emerging reduction in resource availability alongwith constant increase in operational requirements compound the Army’s challenge to equip the force. We therefore must continue to adopt new ways to conserve resources while preserving the decisive edge for combat.

Present System of Equipping Indian Army

The present system of equipping the Indian Army is based on Weapon & Equipment Table (WET) authorisations approved by the Govt for each unit/ formation. All units / formations are required to be operationally ready at all times and thus work out their holdings/ serviceability based on this mother document. The impending/ current tasking/ role has no implications on the equipment required to be held.

The present situation is such that probably no unit/ formation is 100 % equipped. Both intrinsic and extrinsic factors viz, inventory, obsolescence and technology   management alongwith the slow pace of induction of new acquisitions of weapon systems and platforms directly impact equipment holdings with units. Further the sustenance issues often contribute to reduced serviceable equipment availability particularly in respect of complex weapon systems procured ex-import.

US Model : A Rotational Equipping Strategy (RES)

To meet the demands of the past decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army has graduated from the erstwhile traditional Cold War Era strategy to a full spectrum Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) based strategy referred to as RES. Such a model equips units differently based on their designated state of readiness. The objective being to equip a rotational force at least cost while preserving capacity and capability. The RES is pre-dictated on equipment being available somewhere in the Army for surge deployment alongwith the associated functional logistic linkages. The various states of readiness that a unit may be designated under the RES, are as under :- 

• Reset.   Units in ‘Reset’ are equipped with minimal specific equipping expectations. However, this does not imply that they are devoid of equipment. Units in this state have much, but not all, of their individual equipment and other equipment that is not subject to ‘Reset’. The Army delivers equipment to units following the Reset phase to prepare them for entry into the ‘Train’ state. This requires synchronisation with the arrival of new personnel into the unit, to ensure that the unit is prepared to receive, account for, store and maintain the equipment.
• Train/Ready.   The Army provides equipment judiciously to units to support their training requirements and ensure that it can adequately equip units in the other force pools. Units in ‘Train/Ready’ pool can expect to enter this phase filled to about 80 percent of their Unit Modified Tables of Organisation and Equipment (MTOEs) authorisation – akin to IA WET. As units approach the ‘Available’ phase, they adjust their equipping levels to meet the specific requirements of their designated/impending mission.
• Available     Units entering the ‘Available’ phase are equipped to ‘90%+’ of their MTOE authorisations based on their assigned mission. Some equipment authorisations are specific to a mission and are not authorised in MTOE in such cases the final equipping is provided by Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) specific to a theater of operation.

The US Army RES is not only a significant change in how an Army equips units but also how the commanders view their units and organisations. It involves a change in the unit/ organisational culture towards equipment management and training, which impacts efficacy of force structuring and equipping.

Recommendations

Although the US Army RES has no immediate relevance to the current threat based capability approach and force structuring of the Indian Army, even moreso when there are major equipment voids in our inventory, but as we graduate to a capability based approach we can draw useful lessons from the US equipping strategy. This will align are stated doctrine with the desired capability.

As a precursor a RES may be considered for certain components of the Indian Army as we transition to a threat – cum- capability based force, where the airborne/ amphibious components of the force structure may be enlarged based on rotation equipping plans, with mission ready/ deployable force being equipped to its complete operational requirement, while the reserve component may be kept in the ‘train/ ready’ state. Similar strategy may also be applied to CBRN enabled forces/ assets, in view of the limited equipment holdings and capital intensive equipping and training processes.

The implementation of an effective equipping strategy may be measure of success by contributing to overall Army readiness while supporting a cost culture. As we move toward the goal of increased readiness, the field Army should have clear expectations regarding what levels of equipment they will receive and when. Commanders and staff also need to have a clear understanding of how to allocate equipment most efficiently and effectively to support Army’s training and readiness goals.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS

Views expressed are personal