Recapture of Fallujah by al Qaeda: Regional Implications

#1135

2041

January 11, 2014

By Ganapathy Vanchinathan

On 03 Jan 2014, Fallujah in Anbar District of Iraq, just 70 kilometers West of Baghdad, was wrested from Iraqi government control by Al Qaeda-linked Sunni forces said to be part of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and Levant, fighting under the same jihadist flag as militants in Syria. These insurgents also battled local Sunni tribesmen for control of Ramadi city of Anbar. They planted their flag over various buildings in the town of Fallujah and continue to retain control of parts of the two cities. Fallujah, Anbar’s second largest city, was the site of two of the most violent battles during US deployment in Iraq in 2004 between Coalition Forces and insurgents. During the two battles of Fallujah, a total of 146 US soldiers were killed and many injured. When the US forces finally de-inducted from Operation Enduring Freedom (31 August 2010) and Operation New Dawn (31 December 2011), 4,489 service members had been killed in the theatre and more than 32,000 wounded. The sacrifice of US soldiers in Fallujah, it now appears, may have been in vain. USA has now said that the fight ‘belongs to the Iraqis’, mirroring their line of thinking in any direct involvement.

Resurgence of Al Qaeda

Shia-Sunni violence has been commonplace in Iraq. With an approximate 64:36 Shia-Sunni ratio, sectarian violence has been the main reason for body counts, especially after the US forces invaded Iraq, continuing well after their withdrawal. In 2013 alone, nearly 1000 civilians died due to sectarian violence in Iraq. Anbar, where majority of Sunnis are concentrated, has seen further increase in Sunni population due to migration from other Shia-dominated regions. However, this episode, as many others in Anbar with sectarian hues, cannot naively be put under the ‘sectarian’ heading. Sunni tribes in Anbar have been groomed by the Coalition earlier in Iraq to resist and fight the Islamist Al Qaeda brand of Sunni-insurgents. Their cooperation with US-led Coalition forces in 2007 in a movement called the ‘Awakening’ was critical for the Coalition success against radical Al Qaeda Sunni extremists in Anbar. The dynamics of the current situation seem to have attained new complexities with civil war in Syria just across the border. On 21 December 2013, a number of senior Iraqi army officers including a major general, the commander of the 7^th Iraqi Division, were killed in an ambush in West Anbar. Through the years of the Coalition Forces in Iraq, Islamist insurgents of Al Qaeda used to enter Iraq through Anbar Province along the river Euphrates all the way from Syria to Baghdad. The current development appears to be an overall assertion of Al Qaeda in the region, possibly with an independent Sunni state as a goal along the 600 km Iraqi-Syrian border given the backdrop of the civil war in Syria. Such an ‘autonomous’ Sunni state would spell disaster for Iraq in its current dispensation. There may even lurk the larger intent of these extremists to attempt and extend their reach with an ultimate goal of establishing a Caliphate of Islamic state.

Cue for Afghanistan

Events in Anbar should serve as a cue for the future of Afghanistan and hasten the ratification of the Bilateral Security Agreement by Afghanistan. The US had declared it would end combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. In November 2013, US and Afghanistan scripted the Draft Security And Defense Cooperation Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, which lays down, among other issues, the quantum of US troops who would remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014, their mandate and level of autonomy of operations, especially of operating across the borders of Afghanistan. However, the document awaits formal acceptance by President Karzai. If this agreement is not ratified, the USA may withdraw completely, as it did in Iraq. By most basic and simplistic implications, such an event will create a security void in Afghanistan, losing whatever benefit accrued after a 13-year deployment of US and ISAF. The Taliban and Al Qaeda, which is appearing resurgent, will only be too eager to strengthen their position in this vacuum, rendering the security of Afghanistan and the region more tenuous than ever before.

Threat for India?

Though it may appear unimaginative to link the Al Qaeda activism in Iraq with India, it may be prudent to bear in mind that talk of Al Qaeda making inroads into India, apparently unsuccessful so far, has always been in the air. India has the third largest Muslim community in the World, behind Indonesia and Pakistan. Al Qaeda has, as recently ago as June 2013, launched renewed efforts to establish a foothold amongst this vast population by releasing a message ‘Why is There No Storm in Your Ocean? A Message for the Muslims of India’ urging them to join the global jihad. In August 2013, Ayman al-Zawahri of Al Qaeda, in Jihad and Dawa, promulgated guidelines for continued jihad, amongst others, against Indians in Kashmir. The likely target and perpetrators are the Indian Mujahideen, SIMI, other such groups and their various avatars, all Sunni militant groups, much like Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The vulnerability of the common Indian Muslim, however, has to be seen in a different light. The Indian entity has experienced more democratic, political and economic freedom and opportunity and liberty and also exposure to media than possibly any of the Muslims inhabiting the geographical swathe extending all the way to Iraq. The Al-Qaeda bait, therefore, may be a lame lure.

Ideologies of various militant groups may be different, but common links propounded by the radical Islamists cannot be overlooked. On one hand, on the eve of the impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan appears ill-prepared and loathe for a spill-over of the Afghan conflict into its territory; neither can it afford threats of Taliban fighters within their country. On the other hand, fears that Pakistan will attempt to draw international attention to J&K, by diverting more easily available jihadi fighters to Indian territory, as in 1990s, are very real. Pakistan will be looking for ways to keep the Kashmir problem fomenting in any which way, looking to capitalise on any opportunity to trump up communal sentiments and promote militancy in India. Herein lies the threat and the connection. It is a time that both, our security establishments and other governmental agencies, should remain alert as events heat up further West in the Euphrates Valley.