Improving Civil Military Relations

“Woe to the government, which relying on half hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like untamed elements knows no law other than his own.  Any defect of action and effort will turn to the advantage of the enemy”

Carl Von Clausewitz

Delivering the USI National Security Lecture 2013 on “Civil Military Relations: Opportunities and Challenges” on 6thDecember 2013, Hon'ble Shri N.N. Vohra, Governor J&K called for reasonable clarity about use of the term “civil military relations”. He alluded to an earlier seminar where a statement about “unsatisfactory civil military relations are having an adverse impact on the functioning of the military in India” was made and said that a free use of the term “civil and military relations” would lead to “altogether unfounded doubts and suspicions in the minds of millions of people in India especially when more than 2 crore people enjoy the trust and affection of all the people of our country”.

Civil Military Relations (CMR) is, in general terms, the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organisation or organisations established to protect it. However, when discussed amongst the practitioners of CMR, it more accurately describes the relationship between the civil authority of a society and its military authority. So, while the Hon'ble Governor may have rightly cautioned against casual use of the term CMR, his targets may also not have been off the mark when commenting upon the state of CMR in India. Needless to say healthy CMR, and in this discussion the term will refer to relations between the military and the civilian apparatus positioned to oversee it, is crucial to the security of a nation.

Discussions have always raged on who, the military or the civilian echelons, should hold the bigger power in calling the shots. In a liberal democracy, civilian control of the military is a fundamental premise.  The level of inter-play, autonomy, control between the military and the civilian apparatus controlling it, however, always has been a matter of debate and discussion.  From the times of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, it has been argued in various treatises that the military should always be subordinate to the state. Samuel Huntington the well-known political scientist and scholar in the field of CMR spoke of the ‘Institutional Theory’ in “The Soldier and the State”. He believed that the military and the civilian were inherently different and inhabited different worlds. The solution to the control dilemma, he articulated, was "objective civilian control" as opposed to "subjective control". Subjectivity would lead to a more intrusive and detailed control, while, in his words, more the "objective civilian control," more the military security. In such a model, military effectiveness would be a variable, dependent on civilian control, which then is an independent variable. Morris Janowitz talked of the Convergence theory.  Janowitz agreed that both entities inhabited different worlds. However, he felt that the military would benefit from outside intervention, hypothesising ‘civilianisation of the military’ and/or ‘militarisation of society’ and was a strong proponent of conscription and Reserve Officer Training Corps (analogous possibly to our NCC and Territorial Army). 

CMR in the Indian context has been characterised by turf protection, prejudices and mistrusts, which often colour policy-makers. CMR has also been dictated by individual personalities. Civilian leaders with limited or no experience in matters military relying on advice of aggressive military commanders on one hand, and opinionated bureaucrats on the other may result in micromanagement of military affairs. The spectrum is broad.  In the Indian context, CMR has had its ups and downs. The 1962 debacle of the Indian Forces in the Sino-Indian Conflict highlight the nadir of CMR.  The decision-making system during 1959-62 was said to be ad hoc, designed to suit the personalities of the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. The Defence Minister was reputed to have been disregardful of professional opinion and advice, violating all channels and levels of communication, often encouraging the same within the army hierarchy. Thevitiated atmosphere, with too much civilian control, rendered the military too weak to defend the nation. In stark contrast was the 1971 War. Field Marshal Manekshaw’s plain-speak with a strong but attentive Prime Minister and a supportive bureaucracy resulted in one of India’s finest hours. There are many more examples. 

A small explanation of how the civil military interface works in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is in order. At the political helm are the Defence Minister and Minister of State for Defence. At this level, there has never been a requirement that the Minister or other political masters have acquainted themselves in their earlier avatars in matters defence, though a desirable. Shri Jaswant Singh was an exception having rendered service in uniform. Ministers rarely intrude into the military space directly, for reasons of organisational structure, limited domain knowledge and possibly a throwback to the 1962 debacle. There is the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Defence (SCoD) that meets throughout the year to discuss defence matters and present their study/report and recommendations to the Parliament. The SCoD is unlikely to have any politician clued up on defence matters by previous experience. The Chairman and members are enlightened about military issues under consideration by bureaucrats and replies (evidence) they receive from the service headquarters, through the MoD. The civilian bureaucrats who staff the MoD are from the IAS and other allied services on deputation.  The MoD does not have its own main cadre, like, for instance, the MEA has the IFS.  The few bureaucrats who stay longer, are either transferred or promoted within the MoD, which is not a rule.  Notwithstanding this obvious deficiency in domain expertise, these bureaucrats wield much clout when it comes to influencing decisions, since the final word in many cases is either with them or the Minsters they directly interact with, often shielding them from their military equivalents. The military autonomy lies within its service headquarters, their internal process well-shielded from civilian oversight. The few civilians who matter in the service headquarters are from the allied services who normally keep moving within the service headquarters, with rare openings into the MoD. Differences between the service and bureaucracy occurs, when, after sanction from service headquarters, cases are processed at the MoD, and any pen-wielding bureaucrat may reduce, stop and divert the pace of its movement. Such compartmentalised functioning arises from inadequate dialogue between the politician, the bureaucrat and the military.

Many committees have been constituted and reports prepared for the cause of defence reforms; right from the time of independence when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru commissioned Patrick Blacket, British Military Consultant and Scientific Intervener to help ‘Indianise the Military’ to the most recent Ravindra Gupta Task Force focused on Indigenisation.  The interlude period has been filled by Major-General M S Himmatsinhji Report, the H M Patel Report, Kargil Review Committee Report, Naresh Chandra Committee Report et al.  Significantly, all these have underscored the need for integration of the civilian and military functionaries, with the obvious underlying intent of developing trust amongst each other. Without moving forward on this front, enacting or implementing other reforms would be like giving shape to a body, but without a soul. There is thus a need to identify institutional ways to create, build, foster and maintain trust between the civilian and military functionaries. Some of these measures could be -

·         A specialist cadre among the IAS for the Ministry of Defence.

·         Posting and integration of such cadre officers upto Command Headquarters.

·         Posting and integration of the defence of selected officers, during early service, in field with military units.

·         Increased allocation of vacancy in courses of military instructions for such cadre officers and mandatory attendance, linked to career prospects. (Eg in Junior Command and Higher Command courses)

·         Increased integration of military officers in the MoD.

With India’s aspiration for a place of prominence in the global hierarchy, it is crucial that healthy civil-military relations help propel the country towards achieving its goals. Such relations can foster only in an atmosphere of trust. The need of the hour are senior leaders on both sides who understand the importance of professionalism and trust in fostering healthy civil-military relations.

The author is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.

References:

Samuel Huntington,The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981)

The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait [Free Press Paperback] by Morris Janowitz

http://www.idsa.in/resources/speech/CivilMilitaryRelations_NNVohra

http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/18chin.htm

(Remembering a War : The 1962 India-China Conflict. The Rediff Special/Wing Commander (retd) R V Parasnis)

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-10-14/india/30278592_1_defence-ministry-report-central-information-commission

http://casi.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Patrick+Blackett,+PART+ONE+-+May+1999.pdf

http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/intro/p21.htm

http://www.academia.edu/1029294/Facing_Future_Challenges_Defence_Reform_in_India

http://chinaindiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/1253181057-epw-sinoindian-bdy_srinath.pdf

http://persmin.nic.in/ersheet/MultipleERS.asp?HiddenStr=01MT006000

http://persmin.nic.in/ersheet/MultipleERS.asp?HiddenStr=01HP009400