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Self-Reliance in Defence Equipment: A Long Journey Ahead

The recently concluded 8th edition of the DefexpoIndia, a biennial exhibition of Land, Naval and Internal Homeland Security Systems, held in New Delhi from 06-09 February 2014 had 567 arms companies and 63 official delegations from 32 countries participating. A look at the level of self-reliance achieved by India in defence equipment makes for dismal reading. Even today, India remains dependent on imports for about 70 percent of her defence equipment requirements and the SIPRI Year Book 2013lists India as the world's largest arms importer, accounting for 12 per cent of the import share during the period 2008-12.

 

The ramifications of such a high level of India's import dependence for defence equipment on the country's national security are obvious and need no reiteration. The fact that India is a long way off in achieving its goal of being self-reliant in defence equipment, does have a direct bearing on the operational preparedness and operational efficacy of the Indian Armed Forces which are the world's third largest.Such concerns get magnified due to the operational commitment of the Armed Forces in manning disputed borders with two of her adversaries,as also in employment in counter insurgency operations in J&K and the North East.

 

The Indian Defence Industry as late as 2000 consisted of public sector entities,namely,forty one ordnance factories (OF), nine defence public sector undertakings(DPSUs) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The private sector was permitted only in 2001. The performance of the OFs and the DPSUs, inspite of a large manufacturing base and liberal central funding has been extremely poor because of government’s protective policies, having a captive clientele in the Armed Forces, lacking modernisation and latest technology, and overall inefficiency, which is inherent in most public sector enterprises. The DRDO,with the exception of the successful development of strategic weapon systems, has largely not been able to provide the required technology with many of its important projects having large time and cost over runs.

 

One of the key reasons for the current state of the Indian defence industry is that it does not have access to the latest technology and there are no two opinions on the issue that availability of latest technology is an imperative and a prerequisite for developing a modern, strong and robust defence industry. The quality of technology that is available is not of the desired standards and is mostly dated. The technology access, besides that made available by the DRDO, has mainly been in the form of transfer of technology (ToT) by the foreign OEMs (original equipment manufacturer) but both have not yielded the desired results.

 

The defence R&D, which is the responsibility of the DRDO, is the most essential and an important pre requisite for the development of a nation's defence industry. However , the track record of the DRDO has not been encouraging in developing the needed technology except in the area of strategic weapon systems. Most of its important projects like LCA (Tejas), MBT Arjun, ATGM (Nag), Future Infantry Combat Vehicle, to name but a few, have had large time and cost over runs. In addition, the import content in these indigenous projects is high. One of the major constraints of DRDO in developing technology is inadequate funding, as the allocation to DRDO is just about 6 percent of the defence budget, which is inadequate and needs substantial enhancement. As a comparison, US and China have 12 percent and 20 percent of their defence budgets for R&D respectively. The government needs to take a holistic view of the scientific and technology related research funding at the national level since the present research allocations are minuscule in comparison to other developed countries. Talent induction and its retention in the DRDO is another area of major concern, as DRDO is neither able to attract the best talent in the country nor retain the trained and experienced work force which eventually is picked by the corporate world. Thus, the focus needs to be on having a strong scientific and engineering talent base by providing attractive financial packages and incentives. The user interface of DRDO, which is an important requisite, is also inadequate, with very few officers from the armed forces on secondment/ deputation to the DRDO, to provide vital inputs. Even a large number of sanctioned appointments lie vacant. The DRDO also needs to shift focus on critical and cutting-edge technology and co-opt centres of excellence in their R&D projects. Furthermore, the private industry must be integrated and liberal government funding and incentives given.

 

Certain drawbacks in transfer of technology (ToT) also need to be appreciated. ToThas inherent limitations like not being upgraded to the next generation. There is also the hard reality that no OEM, come what may, will ever part with the complete technology and will keep back the critical part so as to ensure future dependency. It has also been experienced that the OF and the DPSUs, in majority of the cases have not been able to either absorb the ToT satisfactorily or draw the intended pay offs. The preferred option should therefore be the joint ventures, co-production or co- development and tie-upsshould be permitted between foreign OEMs, private sector and the public sector. The existing cap of 26 percent on FDI should be raised to 74 percentto attract large-scale foreign investment, whichyet has not been encouraging.India needs to follow the Chinese example and aggressively access technology. From being the world's largest arms importer until 2010, Chinais today the world's fifth largest arms exporter with a 6 percent share. In her quest for achieving self-reliance, China focused relentlessly on acquiring technology globally, undertaking reverse engineering and hiring foreign talent, irrespective of the high costs. China was able to achieve quick success because of large allocations for its defence R&D and obtaining foreign technology. A recent example is the way China had gone about in building its aircraft carrier Liaoning. It acquired a decommissioned aircraft carrier from Ukraine, towed it to China and completely refurbished it in its Dalian Shipyard with the assistance of Ukrainian Engineers. Two more aircraft carriers are under construction and three more are to follow in due course.

 

The Indian Defence Industry needs the latest cutting-edge technology to develop into a modern, strong and a robust industry. This must be taken as a national commitment and considered as a vital national interest if India is to achieve her aspirations to be a major player in the world stage.

 

Major General Rajesh Singh (Retd) is a Defence and Strategic Analyst based in Greater NOIDA. Views expressed are personal.

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Col (Retd) RS Sidhu
Comments on article �Self Reliance in Defence Equipment� � by Maj Gen Rajesh Singh

Modern armies training to fight the last war are destined to lose. They have to train to anticipate and simulate future warfare dimensions to win future wars. - Ibid

1. Maj Gen (Retd) Rajesh Singh is to be complemented for writing a well researched and incisive article in an area of core national interest. In the future scenario reliance on imported equipment is likely to be suicidal for the Indian Armed forces as it would be well nigh impossible to detect malware/viruses embedded in advanced weapon systems by OEMs.
2. Owing to the cumbersome process of implementing change in DoD weapons & equipment procurement system it would be worthwhile for the Armed Forces to themselves initiate the process from grassroots level from within their own resources. Some practical aspects are mentioned below.

Unit/Regimental Training Centres/Line Directorates
3. Mechanised Forces and other equipment intensive fighting units, training centres and Line Directorates have annual training grants of approximately INR 10 Lakhs to 50 Crores each. Same holds true for infantry fighting units. Collaboration with technical institutes and universities within the country would be the easiest form to commence this process, albeit at lower scales of revenue.
4. Whereas the formation Headquarters at various levels are engaged in directing, marshaling and deploying force combat potential, it is at the unit level that the battles are won and lost in the ultimate analysis. The area of interest of a combat unit ranges from 20 to 60 square kilometers. 30 % of the fighting field force is actively deployed in counter insurgency operations at any given point of time. Under given circumstances collaboration in following equipment may be considered:-
a) Miniature land based robotic surveillance vehicles.
b) Static and mobile detection sensors for deploying along camp parameters.
c) Miniature UAVs in surveillance role.
d) Compact All Terrain Vehicles.
e) Alternative energy sources.
f) Weapon simulators.

Formation Level
5. Availability of funds at the formation level is incrementally higher from the unit level.

Service Headquarters
6. Availability of funds at the Service/Command Headquarters is exponentially higher. Some options that may be explored:-
a) Optimum management of surface transport system.
b) Satellite based real time monitoring and managing control over critical lines of communication.
c) Weapon Simulators.
d) Information Warfare systems
e) Aerostat radars.
f) Portable bunkers etc.

24 Feb 2014 - Col (Retd) RS Sidhu
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