Zarb-e-Azb: An Analysis of Operations

The Pakistani military operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched against the Taliban in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) is now in its seventh week. Public support for the operation remains high, but that appears to be its only major achievement. The Pakistan Army is committed to take on militants of all hues, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its foreign allies such as al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The US is hoping that they will also dismantle the Haqqani network and other Afghan based groups operating from NWA against Afghanistan. Despite claims of success by the Pakistan military, the ground reality is more sobering. The conflict has forced a million people from their homes as recorded by the Pakistani authorities. The number of internally displaced persons (IDP) is possibly even higher, as the figures from the camps established by the Pakistan government do not take into account those that fled west to Afghanistan. More importantly, most Taliban fighters from all groups left the area well before the launch of operations by the Pakistan Army. Many also slipped through with the fleeing IDPs.

The military is operating under the command of Lt Gen Rabbani, who is commanding Pakistan’s XI Corps. 7 Infantry Division of XI Corps is conducting operations in NWA. The troops of 7 Inf Div were already in location, being garrisoned at Miram Shah and Mir Ali. They simply moved out of their protective bases and surrounded both the towns to prevent the militants from fleeing. While Pakistan has claimed killing about 500 militants in attacks, the reports emanating from the IDPs contradict such claims. As per the local residents, most militants had fled, well before the operations started. While some of the people killed are most certainly militants, the majority appear to be civilians caught in the conflict. Both the Pakistan Taliban and the Afghan Taliban groups have therefore been displaced but not neutralised. Eventually, they will relocate and reorganise, and be in a better position to take on an overstretched Pakistan Army, reduced to guarding every inch of ground it holds, along a tenuous line of communication for logistic support. In the conflict so far, air strikes and artillery bombardment have reduced large parts of the township of Miram Shah and Mir Ali to rubble, as graphic pictures of destruction in the media show[i]. The ground operations launched after days of bombardment yielded numerous IED factories, suicide bomber training schools, militant training camps, arms and ammunition caches, militant literature, and evidence of al Qaeda’s presence in the area. Of the militants belonging to the Haqqani group or the Pakistani Taliban, there was little trace[ii].  As of now, the Pakistan Army is also in control of the previously militant-controlled towns of Boya and Degan in Datta Khel sub-district, some 12 miles west of Miram Shah. Pakistan Army casualties have been limited, with only 30 soldiers killed in operations. 

Pakistan’s counterinsurgency doctrine advocates the use of aerial strikes, artillery bombardment and employment of armour for conduct of operations. The mass evacuation of local populations therefore takes place to facilitate military operations. The Pakistan Army did this earlier in the Swat Valley and in South Waziristan Agency (SWA). However, success of any counterinsurgency operation has to have the support of the local population. A displaced population whose homes have been ravaged, looted and reduced to rubble is unlikely to extend any form of support to the Pakistan military when they return. The long-term prognosis for the region is therefore bleak. The Pakistan military will perforce have to remain deployed in the areas they have cleared of militants, to prevent the return of militants. In the earlier operations conducted in the Swat Valley and SWA, the Pakistani Army continues to maintain a heavy deployment of troops. As of now, Pakistan’s 9 Infantry Division of XI Corps and 327 Infantry Brigade of 40 Infantry Division remain deployed here.

What the militants have lost is territory, which permitted them safe bases for recruitment, planning, training and execution of operations against the state. The loss of a sophisticated physical terror infrastructure, where they enjoyed facilities to make bombs, manufacture weapons and train recruits is serious but by no means crippling. Dispersal of militants has however not affected their core strength, which remains intact. Regrouping to a different area is simply a matter of time. As an example, the TTP reconstituted itself in NWA after being ejected from their strongholds and ancestral homeland in the Mehsud tribal areas of SWA in 2009. In the instant case, Taliban fighters have moved into the Shawal Valley and to areas such as Datta Khel sub-district, home to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Taliban faction with which the Pakistani government has maintained a long-standing truce.  It is not clear whether the Army will open yet another front to hunt down the displaced TTP, IMU and al Qaeda fighters. Many militants have also fled further west into Afghanistan, where the Pakistan military will not be able to reach. The Afghanistan government is embroiled in its own battles and has neither the capacity nor the desire to look into Pakistani concerns with respect to such fighters. In any case, Pakistan’s support to the Haqqani group is unlikely to flag, which will make cooperation with Afghanistan all the more difficult. It is no secret that no Haqqani fighter has been killed or captured over the course of the operations so far. How Pakistan deals with the Haqqani network will indicate its sincerity in eradicating terrorism from its soil.

North Waziristan, where operations are currently underway, is but one base of the militants. As of now, the networks of various militant groups such as the TTP, al Qaida and Haqqani, has spread far beyond North Waziristan to tribal areas such as Mohmand and to Kunar and Nuristan provinces in Afghanistan. Metropolises like Karachi too are severely affected. For the Pakistan state to win its war against terror, it will have to pursue these groups throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan, where they have support. The Pakistan Army lacks the capacity for such action. Pakistan will have to raise a very large counterinsurgency force to combat terrorist activity, but its economy, already at the break point, will not be able to absorb such expenses. The future hence looks bleak. The war is far from over. It has perhaps only just begun.