Government cannot shy from Somalia Deployments

The Gulf of Aden-Somalia coast has witnessed a significant rise in incidents of sea piracy. From a mere 10 reported incidents in 2004, the region has recorded an eightfold increase in piracy attacks on merchant vessels. Currently there are over a dozen vessels and nearly 200 crewmembers being held hostage by the pirates including M V Faina, a Ukrainian flagged ship carrying Russian tanks and heavy weaponry. These numbers appears to remain steady as the pirates continue to hijack vessels on regular basis and release them after receiving ransom. This is notwithstanding the fact that warships of the US led Combined Task Force 150, NATO flotilla, Russia and India are deployed in the Gulf of Aden.

Significantly, the pirates are getting bold and in a short span of 12 days in November have hijacked seven vessels including MV Sirius Star, a Saudi Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) carrying crude oil valued at $100 million. Interestingly, the hijacking took place some 450 nautical miles from the Kenyan coast clearly showcasing the extended reach, new sea areas for attack on shipping and by a new group of pirates.

In the Indian context, after keeping them in captivity for over two months, the Somali pirates finally released the 18-member Indian crew of Japanese chemical tanker M V Stolt Valor. The exact ransom paid is not known; the estimates vary from US $ one million to 2.5 million. Although much of the Indian focus has been on M V Stolt Valor, smaller Indian vessels too have fallen prey to the Somali pirates. Shiv Shambhu, a country craft with 15 crew members hailing from Salaya, Saurashtra and Zuber and Bashir, from Gujarat were hijacked by the Somali pirates and were later released on payment of ransom.

The Secretary-general of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a maritime body under the United Nations, has argued for a UN mandated maritime force built around warships from member countries, similar to land forces deployed under the UN flag during crisis/peacekeeping, particularly when the international community is “faced with an issue of serious but common concern.” India too has called for an anti piracy force under the United Nations, but the Indian suggestion has been prompted by an incident of piracy attack involving an Indian flagged vessel that was refused assistance and protection by a western warship noting that the merchant vessel “could not be provided immediate protection”.

The Indian government had earlier rejected Indian navy’s proposal to deploy its warships off Somalia to release the vessel on the grounds that the operation involved wider political and legal implications. After long deliberations, the government has allowed the Indian navy to deploy its most modern vessel INS Tabar and provide security to Indian flagged vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden. The ship was successful in thwarting two pirate attacks in quick succession; in the first case, the pirates attempted to attack the Saudi chemical and oil tanker NCC Tihama who made distress call for assistance and INS Tabar responded by launching its helicopter and the pirates fled. In the second case, M V Jag Arnav, an Indian flagged vessel with a 20-crew members and owned by Great Eastern Company came under simultaneous attack by pirates and the same helicopter was diverted with pirates aborting the attack.  

Although the Indian government must be quite satisfied with the success of its naval deployment, it has brought to fore the disconnect between political and miltary establishment on issues relating to the deployment of the Indian navy and merits attention. The government was quite justified in not allowing the Indian navy to engage in ‘hot pursuit’, enter Somalia’s territorial waters and rescue the crew of M V Stolt Valor. The UNSC Resolution 1816, adopted in June 2008, authorises deployment of forces in Somalia's territorial waters only by those states that have an arrangement with the Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, the government could have given its go ahead to deploy the navy purely in a deterrent role. In 2006, a small Indian flag cargo ship, Bhaktisagar was hijacked by Somali pirates. The Indian navy was in a high state of combat readiness to sail with full dispatch to Gulf of Aden, but the government did not permit deployment. Interestingly, before the Bhaktisagar hijacking, another Indian flagged vessel was rescued by the US navy after it was hijacked by Somali pirates. Ironically, not much was learnt from these incidents.  

The Indian maritime strategy and the naval doctrine place counter or anti piracy operations as one of the important mission role of the force, yet the navy is hamstrung to conduct offensive operations due to lack of synergy between the political-bureaucratic establishment and the force. The Indian government cannot shy away from deployment of its navy in distant waters, as it would entail loss of creditability of the country given that it is a significant naval power and is an important stakeholder in the stability and security in the Indian Ocean. Besides, successive political leaderships have endorsed the area of responsibility of the Indian navy stretching from the Indian Ocean to South China Sea.

Pranab Mukerjee, India’s Defence Minister, had noted that “Our location on top of the Indian Ocean between the sea routes from the Cape of Good Hope and the Mediterranean and the energy sources of the Gulf to the strategic Malacca Straits gives us a vantage point and responsibility to safeguard the security of our energy supplies and shipping in the Indian Ocean region”. This statement naturally thrusts great responsibility and obligations on the Indian government given that the Gulf of Aden is of strategic importance to India and nearly US$100 billion of its maritime trade transits through the region.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)