Securing Mumbai against Terrorism: Have the Lessons been Unlearnt?

Mumbai contributes 33% of India’s tax collections, 60% of Indian customs duty collections and 40% of India’s foreign trade [i]. Six years since the 26/11 attacks rocked the city; Mumbai remains the ‘numero uno’ target for potential terror attacks despite significant Government security measures.

Threats

Pakistan with its declared policy for employing terror assets to extract strategic leverage [ii] and inspired by its Kashmir obsession and the urge to exact vengeance for the Bangladesh humiliation will continue to employ terror as a strategic asset [iii]. The current lull in anti-India Jihadist attacks by extremist groups is attributable to a temporary shift westwards aimed at installing a subservient proxy government in Afghanistan [iv]. The LeT, with strong operational & training linkages to Al Qaeda [v] served a reminder of its anti-India commitment with the recent 04/05 Dec attacks in Uri, J&K. An indirect threat is posed by ISIS’s meteoric rise which obliges the Al Qaeda leadership to initiate actions that would rival ISIS in terms of attracting international attention, jihadist volunteers, funding & respect in the Islamic world. India, by virtue of its proximity & security vulnerabilities presents the most easily accessible and exploitable target.

Amongst domestic factors, the SIMI strongly advocates restoration of the Khalifat and the need to wage a jihad to establish Islamic supremacy besides rejecting democracy, nationalism & secularism as being contrary to the basic tenets of Islam.[vi] The IM, an offshoot of SIMI, is also a potential threat to Mumbai.[vii] The Mumbai underworld by virtue of its collusive role in past terror attacks, adequate influence, resources and safe haven compulsions with ISI present a viable threat to Mumbai.

Vulnerabilities

India’s CT policy is characterized by a lack of political consistency, political consensus, operational capacity, and operational coordination and hence oscillates from a conciliatory to a coercive stance [viii]. The absence of a well articulated national policy on counter terrorism severely undermines intelligence acquisition & prosecution of Terrorism offences. Currently, the only laws applicable for prosecuting terrorism cases are the amended UAPA 1967 and the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Act 1993 [ix]. The conviction rate on terrorism charges is painfully dismal and no new counter terrorism Laws have been passed since 2008.The 26/11attacks revealed an absolute lack of coordination between the various Central intelligence agencies like the RAW, IB and the state intelligence agencies [x]. Poor operational capability & coordination leads to blurring of strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence which inhibits conversion of strategic intelligence in to tactical intelligence thus leading to CT failures [xi].

Amongst other issues, the major problems hindering coastal security are the differences between the States & the Centre and the reluctance of coastal states to contribute towards training and procurement expenses. [xii] The 2012 NCRB report indicates a countrywide deficiency of 22.7 % police personnel which represents a ‘people to police ratio’ of 138(Maharashtra: 170), [xiii] far below the UN norms of 220. Considering the asset & population density of Mumbai, it is obviously inadequate. The Dawood Ibrahim led Mumbai underworld by virtue of its past history, logistic capabilities and safe haven compulsions can be compelled to either launch attacks or facilitate attacks on Mumbai.

Security emergencies like the 26/11 Mumbai attacks trigger simultaneous response drills from multiple, designated responder agencies.[xiv] Massive communication loads on the existing communications infrastructure networks render them ineffective during security emergencies as was witnessed during the 26/11 attacks. An alternative dedicated communications infrastructure for security emergencies continues to be absent in Mumbai. A major vulnerability is Mumbai’s suburban train network comprising 1030 trains transporting six million people daily which is a lucrative target. Six years since 26/11, the proposed ISS addressing most of these inadequacies is only partially complete.

Recommendations

India needs to formulate and implement an inclusive, comprehensive national level counter terrorism strategy which balances the interests of the States & the Centre [xv] and is uniformly applicable to the wide spectrum of agencies, ministries & departments. The existing Centre-state difference in approach to terrorism needs to be removed by a Constitutional amendment which moves “Law & order” from the State List to the Concurrent list to facilitate a uniform national response to acts of terrorism. Similarly, there is also the need to frame a national policy which articulates the elimination of terrorists like Hafeez Sayeed, Dawood Ibrahim, et al who takes refuge in third countries. The lack of any counter terrorism oriented laws in India severely deprives the law enforcement agencies of a mechanism for the conviction and legal punishment of the terrorists arrested in terrorism offences [xvi].

The intelligence apparatus needs approved legislations which empower the investigative agencies to conduct their investigations & collection of evidence and is consistent with the challenges of new technology & technology related threats. The NIA, designated as the apex intelligence body is characterized by severe understaffing, inadequate specialists, officers’ shortage, frugal budgeting (0.5% of US FBI) & jurisdictional issues owing to Centre State differences over Security issues [xvii]. While multiple agencies with overlapping charters are a necessity, horizontal & vertical exchanges of intelligence are equally essential [xviii]. The gap between Policy & implementation has to be eliminated in the interests of Security. To choke terror financing, India needs to develop & expand alternative money transfer services in the financial sector to allow for broader financial inclusion of legitimate individuals and entities and reduce overall AML/CFT vulnerabilities. India also needs to have procedures in place which permit agencies to freeze & confiscate terrorism related assets in the shortest time frame [xix].

The Mumbai police being locals and the first responders needs to be provided with the requisite training facilities, safety gear, and weapon system & communications equipment. The high levels of understaffing in the Mumbai police can be mitigated to a great extent by deploying the Private security agency personnel to low priority sectors & non critical functions thereby relieving the police for important security duties[xx] This opens up the possibility of relieving more police personnel for internal security duties. Coastal security requires the government to expedite the introduction of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and registration process for smaller boats & ships, which currently is time consuming. Stronger liaison & enhanced interaction with the coastal villagers & fishermen is crucial to obtaining their trust and cooperation to be the “eyes & ears” of the security agencies. As for the Mumbai Underworld, a strong political will[xxi], supported by appropriate legislations, pro-active law enforcement and policy initiatives to mitigate social disparities could easily hasten the demise of the Mumbai underworld or at the very least serve to erode the underworld’s power structure.

The 26/11 attack emphatically demonstrated the severe consequences of failing to possess a robust, well equipped and technologically sophisticated   security apparatus. It also highlighted the skillful exploitation of technological equipment by the terrorists & their handlers in executing the attacks. The security forces need to be provided with state of the art equipment for surveillance, close quarter battles, protection gear, communication redundancy, night vision equipment and establishment of temporary command centre. UAVs & drones for acquiring real time intelligence, CCTVs & access control infrastructure for static surveillance, independent UHF/VHF equipment for communications, jammers & interceptors sets, high quality bullet proof vests & helmets  complemented by night vision devices are basic to effectively fighting urban terrorism. The biggest stake holders in ensuring a ‘terror free’ Mumbai, the general Public is an important factor in combating urban terrorism effectively [xxii]. The public’s active involvement in identifying tentative, errant or suspicious behavior and sharing that input with the police is a force multiplier. There is a need to periodically sensitize the commuting public to be constantly on the lookout for suspicious behavior and objects.

Conclusion

Post the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Government had initiated concerted measures to address the inadequacies existing in the security infrastructure of India. Funding constraints, Centre state differences hindering security preparedness, bureaucratic delays and procurement improprieties reflect a laid back attitude, lack of vision & sincerity of purpose. Investments towards Security will justify itself in the innumerable lives it helps to save and the potential collateral losses it prevents in the event of a terror strike in the future. However, Mumbai continues to be just as unprepared and ill-equipped to handle a fresh terror strike. The lessons of 9/11 have somehow been unlearnt.

Views expressed are personal.