Emerging Threats of LWE in Dispersed Pattern: Case of Kerala

Abstract: The issue of LWE is generally addressed with the focus on the states that constitute the Red Corridor. But a more recent set of events show that the growth of naxalism has appeared in a few villages of Kerala which is not a part of the Red Corridor. The paper aims to identify and analyse the implications of such growth of dispersed nature on the government and its strategies to improve its internal security.

Between 2007 and 2013, the naxal activity across India has shown some significant changes. Along with the reduction in the intensity of their activities in the Red Corridor, new growth has been recorded in a state that is not a part of the Red Corridor; Kerala[i]. Although, the naxalites have been active even during 2007 in the districts of Palakkad and Ernakulam in Kerala, the data from Institute for Conflict Management reflects that by 2013 they have stopped their efforts in these districts and can now be seen influencing the districts of Kannur, Kozhikode, Wayanad and Malappuram in Kerala[ii]. These new districts form a contiguous region which is neighbouring to the naxal affected areas in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. As the police record the movement of the naxalites from Karnataka to Kerala and Tamil Nadu[iii], the Home Ministry suspects a shift of their focus around the tri-junction of the three states[iv]. Low as it maybe, their activities in this region, considering its marginalized tribal population which has a rather long history of being exploited till date, the area is under potential threat[v][vi].Some locals have already cautioned the police with the possibility of the angered youth of the tribes joining Left Wing Extremist (LWE) as recruits[vii].

The LWE groups might function in different socio-cultural environment with varying objectives that are region specific, but have a unanimous vision which is to overthrow the government[viii].LWE can be expected to use every opportunity against the government. Whether the war can be won by them is a synonymous enquiry to ‘how can the governmentbring development to the group that is adopting it?’ This is a question that needs to be looked into, given that the government has not been able to deliver the basic rights and privileges that it has promised to certain sections of the people within the nation. The existing as well as emerging social and economic disparity is a lethal weapon to fuel this uprising. Although it has been stated and identified at several occasions that using force against the naxals is not an ideal and desirable way of tackling the issue[ix][x] as it may backfire by making the government look like an oppressor, the alternative i.e. development is often neglected. It is also in the LWE groups’ interests to not let development happen in such areas so as to remain in their control. Hence, they may offer resistance by use of arms or through social mobilization. Thus the deterrents of development have two axes; one from the government and the other from the naxals.

While the naxal package announced by the government has helped development in areas like Sringeri in Karnataka, reportedly reducing naxalite activities in these areas, it must be noted that once the government has lost its control over the population of an area to the LWE, it is not possible to have the same repair remedy (allocating resources, creating infrastructure, machinery efficiency, checking corruption etc). Rather a total replacement of the system is now necessary. Because, one system has to fail in order for the other to succeedin the minds of people, it is in the naxalites’ interests to observe the areas in which the government is failing and then take control. They have followed this method for many decades and plan to sustain it longer. The same can be observed as a reason that is responsible for re-orientation of their focus into new regions. The new region of growth strategically encompasses areas like Kalasa where people have been victim to land alienation and eviction. Given that the magnitude of naxal activities has reduced over the recent years, it is to the state’s interests and favour to stop further growth in their activities.

What may be the options for interventions in such a scenario?

1. Government doesn’t wait and attempts rapid change
2. Government decides to wait for the system established by the LWE to fail and intervenes when possible

If the Government attempts to intervene immediately, then it may have to face social resistance depending on the level of legitimacy the locals have given to the naxals.Considering that the areas in the ‘tri-junction’ have low level of naxalite activities, it might be viable to move government projects in these areas under security.  In such cases, where the social legitimacy is low, the LWE is certain to use arms as propaganda and social participation is a long term strategy as in the case of Bhilai Steel Plant at Dalli-Rajhara in Chhattisgarh[xi].

The nature of threat can be assessed with the hypothesis that the enemy may attempt to prevent the entry of the government and create a communication gap among the people and the government so as to stop the welfare motives from reaching the people. The prevention can be attempted by intimidation and demoralization through sabotaging, assassination, abduction or other means that can be carried out in a veiled manner and will not involve destroying of the facilities that can affect the lives of the people living in the area but only prevent them from being built[xii].

The government is currently planning to provide incentives to the security forces and officers that are being deployed in the naxal affected areas[xiii] and has announced a special scheme to develop 33 of the 83 LWE affected districts[xiv].  The priority districts from the scheme do not include districts from Kerala, Karnataka or Tamil Nadu[xv] reflecting the burden of the government to address this new growth with its limited resources.

The projects must essentially be of immediate value to the locals for which surveys and interactions become essential to understand the needs of the people and for perception development. This means that public infrastructure projects, which the Integrated Action Plan for LWE areas focuses on, won’t work alone and must be supplemented by livelihood options. Experts, departments, institutions and NGOs must work with the people to bring out livelihood solutions and increase per person productivity for which programmes dealing with aspects like skill-development and microfinance play an important role. As a large part of the population is primarily rural, these areas must develop in rural sectors to become stable before being transformed to industrial towns.

The author is Intern at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.