General
The modernization and transformation plans of the Army and the Army Aviation Corps received a major setback last year in August, when the most important and critical project for acquisition of 197 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Helicopters (RSH), to replace the existing obsolete Chetak/Cheetah fleet was cancelled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This decision by the MoD was the likely result of the fallout of the ongoing investigation/probe into the Agusta Westland VVIP helicopter deal. The investigations had allegedly thrown up some unconfirmed references of corruption and technical deviations during the selection process of the 197 helicopters replacement project. This decision leaves the army bereft of a suitable helicopter to replace the ageing Cheetah /Chetak fleet and will no doubt affect the overall operational capability of the army, especially in high altitude areas where the Cheetah helicopter is the lifeline of troops deployed on those icy heights. This unnecessary cautious approach to cancel the Project has been taken despite the fact that an oversight committee appointed by the MoD during the previous Government, had cleared the trial process of any irregularity. It is also pertinent to note that the trials for replacement helicopters were conducted by a joint team of specialists and professionals from both army and air force and hence no single entity could have influenced the outcome.
The Army Aviation Corps is in its 29th year of existence since its formation in Nov 1986. It has the largest number of helicopters amongst the three services with the major part of its inventory consisting of the reconnaissance and observation class helicopters (approximately 200 plus Chetak/Cheetah helicopters). This fleet is now 40 years old and vintage and has been awaiting replacement for over a decade plus. These helicopters have been the mainstay of the armed forces for the last four decades and hence form a crucial component of the Army which holds the largest inventory of this class of helicopters. Their replacement has been a priority in the overall transformation and modernization plans of the army for quite some time. Due to the nature of terrain prevalent on our Eastern and Northern borders (mountains and high altitude) especially the Siachen Glacier, this class of helicopters is essential to maintain enhanced defence preparedness and operational readiness. In fact, presently the Cheetah helicopter is the lifeline of formations and troops deployed in these areas, but regrettably today they are of outdated technology and the Indian armed forces deserve better, especially when we call ourselves the third largest standing army in the world.
The Unending Trials Saga
The first trial for the replacement of Cheetah/Chetak helicopters was held during the year 2005-2006. Eurocopter’s (now Airbus Helicopters) AS 550 C3 Fennec and Bell Company’s Bell-407 participated. Russia’s KA-226T was also a contender but was eliminated in the technical evaluation, due to its engines not being certified. Unfortunately, in December 2007 while at the final stage of price negotiation the entire trial process was cancelled by the defence ministry due to extraneous reasons beyond comprehension. The acquisition plan was for 197 helicopters purely for the army with the transfer of technology clause built in with HAL. A fresh bid was floated in July 2008 for acquisition of 197 helicopters (RSH) for the army and air force (137 and 60 respectively). The trial evaluation for the same was concluded more than two years back. The main contenders this time were Eurocopters AS 550 C3 Fennec and Russian Kamov-226T helicopters. The third contender the Anglo-Italian Augusta Westland AW-119 was ousted midway during the trials due to a technical mismatch of nomenclature of its engine. However, as brought out earlier in the article this crucial acquisition program has now been cancelled.
After cancelling the RSH procurement process during the final lap last year a fresh RFI has been issued (published on 31st October last year), which is a ‘Buy and Make India’ procurement, with a certain number of helicopters built and supplied by the winning OEM in a flyaway condition, with the remaining number being built at a production line in India by an Indian partner through licensed transfer of technology. Basically this RFI envisages identifying probable Indian Vendors (private & public), including those forming Joint Ventures (JVs)/ establishing production arrangement with an OEM, who can provide the helicopters, followed by licensed production in the country – the response date has been extended to 17 Feb 2015 from 17 Dec last year. This is likely to generate a lot of interest during the Aero-India Show being held at Bangalore from Feb 18-22. While this is a welcome step and the prompt action taken by the Government shows their priority and concern, the entire process itself is likely to take a minimum of three years, provided everything moves smoothly with no hitches or glitches. With the current dismal state of the Chetak/Cheetah fleet and serious maintenance and safety concerns, the writing is clearly on the wall. As per reports appearing in some print media, there is an uncomfortable disquiet on this issue within the aviation fraternity, which was appropriately highlighted in an article in a recent issue of ‘India Today’. This indeed is a very sad development and needs to be taken serious note of, for it will impinge gravely on operations in the high altitude areas.
Present Status and Implications
The existing Cheetah/Chetak helicopters today are difficult to service and maintain with the spares situation critical - the maintenance of this fleet itself is becoming a nightmare. The HAL is finding it difficult to keep this fleet airborne while the armed forces have already expressed their concerns on the dismal situation. The ‘Cheetal Helicopter’ fielded by the HAL both for the army and airforce as a stop gap measure is not a satisfactory solution as it basically remains a Cheetah with a more powerful engine, with the core technology remaining the same. The HAL has stopped production of Cheetah/Chetak helicopters and is focusing on the ‘Cheetal’ to make up the current shortfalls of the fleet in the interim period. For the long term it has embarked on a Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) Project in the 3 Ton light observation category and hopes to field it by 2016 – in fact HAL had been set a target of manufacturing 187 LUH to cater for the total requirement of 384 helicopters of this class for the army and airforce (197 helicopters were being acquired ex import). As per claims of HAL the design freeze stage has been reached, however, whether it can be fielded by 2016 is anybody’s guess. Presently the HAL already has its hands full with the ALH facing manifold problems in its operations and maintenance, especially in the high altitude. The army is bearing the brunt of the above consequences with very poor serviceability, due to its large holding of this fleet (60-70 helicopters) which is increasing every year – two ALH (Dhruv) accidents in Ecuador in a span of a fortnight this month is a serious cause of concern. In addition the HAL has to deliver on its commitment of RUDRA (armed ALH), manufacture and induction for six to seven units for the army (induction already commenced) and the fielding of the Light Combat Helicopter(LCH) capable of operating at high altitudes by end of this year. It is hoped that with the cancellation of the 197 helicopters tender, the HAL will shift its focus onto the LUH and ensure its fielding in time. With the private sector expected to enter the fray in large numbers with JVs with helicopter major’s like Sikorsky, Bell, Airbus Helicopters and Kamov, the competition will be immense and HAL will have to prove its worth. In fact as per reports HAL is also a likely respondent to the RFI for RSH tender and is looking around for a suitable partner (OEM). However, the main concern remains the interim period of 3-4 years where the forces will have to perforce operate these outdated, obsolete and unsafe machines. The recent Cheetah fatal accident at Bareilly Army Aviation Base, resulting in the death of three officers (two pilots and an engineer) has already raised grave safety concerns about this machine. Some aviation experts have cautioned against the safe operations of these machines especially in high altitudes, where these helicopters are operating at their extreme envelop – some have even going to the extent of giving them the mantle of flying coffins.
The non -availability of this critical asset to the two Divisions and a Strike Corps being raised for the mountains will certainly affect their operational capability – during Kargil conflict the Cheetah’s were the only helicopters capable of operating at those altitudes and were a crucial factor in the outcome of the war. There have been suggestions in some quarters both Government and Military that we could induct more ALH’s and use them in the reconnaissance and surveillance role. This should be rejected outright - as both professionally and operationally this not a viable alternative or option, though it may help some vested interests in the short term. The recent Chinese aggressive posturing and the major standoff in the Depsang Valley at an altitude of 16000 feet has sounded the alarm bells and sent a loud and clear message- modernise and transform or perish.
The author is veteran Lieutenant General of the Indian Army. Views expressed are personal.
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