Maoists� Serial Strikes

Abstract: In relation to the latest multiple strikes by the Maoists in Bastar, we need to look at the macro issues that warrant attention.  The state police force of Chhattisgarh has endeavoured to control the operations against the Maoists, which is a positive aspect. However, the centre’s backing to state efforts need to continue in an all-encompassing manner, and not otherwise. Also, the police heirarchy should abstain from criticising and blaming local units. This is necessary to ensure that the troops do not lose faith in their commanders and start shirking bold initiatives essential for any counter insurgency campaign. A strong-arm backlash as reaction, on part of the security forces will be detrimental to the overall cause and will only further the Maoist agenda.

The Chhattisgarh Police lost 12 personnel in two major attacks in 72 hours,commencing 11 April. This has been the biggest Maoist onslaught this year so far. Going by the Maoist strategy that they adopt between the months of February to May (prior to onset of monsoons) each year, these attacks may be categorised as tactical counter offensives (TCOs), which they plan for various reasons. Most of the major Maoist attacks in Bastar region have been executed in the window from February to May, and, despite being aware of this pattern, security forces have repeatedly suffered.  The reasons behind the latest incidents are a matter of speculation. However few probable ones could be - increasing pressure by security forces (as claimed by Chhattisgarh government), to reiterate & reinforce their hold, as a psychological measure aimed at gaining moral ascendancy and consolidating gains.

The criticality of TCOs was stressed upon during the Polit Bureau Meeting of CPI (Maoist) on 12 June 2009. Ideally, such offensives were to be undertaken in different states in tandem to divert the ‘enemy’ (read government forces) from attacking their guerrilla bases and organs of political power[1]. In relation to expanding the so called struggle in different states, it can be added that at present, the Maosists’ only stronghold in terms of a major military capability remains limited to south Chhattisgarh (in Bastar), where they repeatedly endeavour to make a mark. By its own admission, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) is a flailing force, fighting a futile war[2]. Political mass mobilisation is largely absent and sporadic violence has become their primary pursuit, to ‘ticket-punch’ their existence. 

The aim of this article is not to bring forth the tactical pitfalls. An ‘armchair’ attempt to flag such errors would be irresponsible and unethical, since, in such scenarios the leader on ground, being custodian of lives of his comrades, is the best man to take decisions. These decisions ought to be backed by rear echelon officials. Having said this, within the organisation, lessons need to be learnt and worked upon to obviate recurrence.

Unfortunately, as a routine reaction in the aftermath of incidents like these, a blame game ensues. An effort is made to bring out the blunders committed by personnel on ground. After the 11 April attack, aspersions were cast on the commander of the ill-fated column- that he acted upon his own, did not keep his hierarchy in loop, violated laid down SOP etc[3]. Ironically, such statements have been given by senior officials of the same organsation, thereby shaking the confidence of foot soldiers in their commanders; having a retarding effect on future operations.

The CRPF has been on back-foot after the Chintagufa ambush of 1 December 2014 where they lost 14 personnel. Shaken by the mishap, instructions were issued to field units not to undertake any operation without clearance from headquarters. Following diktats from Delhi, CRPF has mostly remained in its barracks for last few months[4]. If the state police too follow suit, the Maoists would have more than achieved their aim.  

In the wake of the 1 December ambush, Home Minister Rajnath Singh had declared that the States ought to take the lead in anti-Maoist operations, on the lines of success stories of counter-insurgency campaigns in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Mizoram and Tripura where the state police led the campaign with support from central forces. The Centre has been rightly harping on strengthening the state police towards countering the Maoist challenge.

A report submitted by senior IPS officer DM Mitra, MHA in July 2012, had proposed to set up special commando forces - on the lines of the Greyhounds (of AP) - in five Maoist-affected states. The aim was to provide money to the states to clone the Greyhounds in totality in forming a special commando force to take on the rebels[5]. The force was to be imparted mission-oriented training and equipped accordingly. The Special Task Force (STF) that suffered casualties on 11 April, was a beginning made towards such a policy, aimed at taking the battle into Maoists’ territory, in the so- called ‘liberated zones’. The only ‘positive’ that can be taken out from the latest incidents is that the state police endeavoured to control the affairs.

The central forces were conspicuously absent from the scheme of things, for reasons unknown. Notwithstanding the effectiveness of state-centric actions, not much ground could be expected to be covered without backing by the central forces. The states need to be empowered by decentralisation, rather than by (hands off) devolution. Of late, there have been several developments that point to the Centre’s intentions of pulling back its financial support to the states. The Centre has hinted towards withdrawing funds from infrastructure plans applicable to Maoist-affected states. This is being done on the plea of implementing 14th Finance Commission's (FFC) recommendation to devolve 42% of total tax share to the divisible pool of states.

The key security scheme meant for affected states, to help them create Special Anti-Naxal Forces (SANF) based on Andhra Pradesh's elite Greyhounds crack commando force, is also under scanner. The decision definitely will weaken the anti-Maoist strategy as SANF was meant to be the lead force to tackle the Maoists. All its personnel were being inducted from the tribal region of states from where the Maoists also get the cadre for their People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA)[6].

The Modernisation of Police Fund (MPF) is to be slashed by Rs.800 crores as part of an effort to contain the fiscal deficit. State governments will now be expected to provide their own funds for of police modernization through the additional 10% share of central tax revenue they were granted by the FFC[7]. The experts have warned that states, already struggling even to meet salary bills, are unlikely to enhance budgetary allocations for police infrastructure.

The avoidable chain of tragedies in south Chhattisgarh dramatically underlines the imperatives of a strategic shift in India’s CI responses. As per Ajai Sahni, the ‘Clear, Hold and Develop’ catchphrase, and the objectives of ‘territorial dominance’ (or recovery, as the MHA expresses) reflect fantasies, not strategies, within the framework of current national and state capacities. The Centre and the states must jointly evolve a strategic response that can be reconciled with existing and evolving capacities; as against pulling the rug off the states’ feet, by the Centre.

Of course, local shortcomings and errors of judgment or leadership that culminated in the debacle need to be looked into and rectified, but it should not become a blame game or a shield to overlook strategic failures. It has to be accepted that strategic infirmities force tactical errors. The crucial macro-level issues in ‘security’ domain that need to be flagged are  - political will, centre-state alignment, human resource management & leadrship aspects of uniformed forces, affiliations amongst executive outfits etc. And finally, a strong-arm backlash by security forces as reaction to such incidents has to be watched against, since it would be like walking into the Maoist trap. Provoking the security forces is a viable Maoists strategy, which helps them recruit more by fanning ‘blowback’.

The author is Senior Fellow at CLAWS. Views expressed are personal.