Home Pakistan�s Afghan Subterfuge

Pakistan�s Afghan Subterfuge

1Writing about the elusive peace in Afghanistan, Sajjad Ashraf, former Pakistani High Commissioner to Singapore, writes that the stunning victory of Afghan Taliban in Kunduz was a psychological blow to the Afghan government and the ANSF, and that the “Kabul government is unlikely to survive even in the medium term without foreign troops”, adding that “the Kabul government instead of always shifting blame on Pakistan must take on responsibility of governance”. The governance part is well taken but in saying that Pakistan is without any blame, Sajjad Ashraf is parroting the same official line that Pakistan  rather its military dictates. At the recent Herat Security Dialogue held in Afghanistan on October 2-3, Afghan speakers openly blamed Pakistan for supporting the Afghan Taliban and the situation in Kunduz and surrounding areas.2What led to the bombing of the ‘Doctors Without Borders’ hospital in Kunduz by US forces on October 3 was USSF intelligence that the facility was a Taliban command and control centre, a Pakistani ISI operative present was coordinating operations and possibly a store house of heavy weapons.3Post the August 7 truck bombing in Kabul that killed seven and wounded over 400, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) stated that the attacks were carried out by elements of the Pakistani army with the help of mercenaries – Haqqani terrorist network. It was at the site of this bombing that Afghan clerics called for Jihad against Pakistan.

If the Taliban have invested Kunduz, captured Warduj district east of Kunduz, and Ghormach district of Faryab province consolidated in Badakshan region of northern Afghanistan, far beyond their usual southern strongholds, it has been planned and executed beautifully by Pakistan. BBC documentary ‘Secret Pakistan’ provides proof of Pakistan’s ISI training, advising and directing the Taliban.4Not only has Pakistan been helping Taliban, both the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan are linked and have been supporting each other by way of finances and even exchanging cadres.As it is, Mullah Omar lived in Pakistan under ISI protection since 2001. Because of the premature drawdown of ISAF, a sweet pill was given to Afghanistan that Pakistan would be able to bring Taliban to the negotiating table. The talks at Muree were part of the same subterfuge without any results. Possibility of further progress was stymied by the sudden announcement of Mullah Omar having died while actually he had died two years ago and was largely ineffective in his last years. But the masterstroke by Pakistan was installing Mullah Akhtar Mansoor as Mullah Omar’s successor.5The Haqqanis embedded in Pakistan since past 30 years are in sync with the ISI that even trumps US pressure. Not only has Akhtar Mansoor declared he is not interested in any talks with the Afghan government, he is serving as the master lynchpin between both the Taliban and the Haqqanis.6Pakistan’s continuing Op ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ has displaced over 1.5 million and by November 2014, some 2,50,00 refugees had already crossed over to Afghanistan.This has also provided the opportunity to Pakistan to infiltrate itsregular troops and part of the 20 Mujahid battalions trained to operate as Taliban during 2012-2013 into Afghanistan as refugees, part of these Mujahid battalions reportedly dispatched to Saudi Arabia for ground offensive against Yemen. During the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, some 26,000 Pakistani regulars and Pakistan Taliban (3000 Pashtun and 6000 Punjabis) were battling inside Afghanistan, whom the US let Pakistan evacuate. However, Pakistan used the opportunity to take along hundreds of Afghan Taliban for further indoctrination and proxy war, the same way it has been using Afghan refugees in Pakistan.7

Over the last few years, the Afghan Taliban has widened its recruitment to become a multi-ethnic force while the TTP pushed into Afghanistan too, headed to north Afghanistan in large numbers while the US-NATO forces were focused against the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan – which explains the ease with which Kunduz could be invested with non-Pashtuns joining the Taliban. This long-term strategy has worked beautifully, endangering Central Asia as well. There is little doubt that Islamabad holds the key to terrorism in Afghanistan but appears intent to expand her strategic depth in Afghanistan even at the cost of a Taliban takeover and keep India out of even the Afghan market at any cost.8But the new danger emerging for Afghanistan is from the ISIS that reportedly already controls seven districts of Nangarhar province of Afghanistan and has already begun attacking the ANSF. The ISIS is fully into the narcotics trade but what has not been commented upon is how did such sizeable number of ISIS cadres get to Nangarhar? One look at the map will tell you certainly, not from Iraq-Syria but from Pakistani sanctuaries, including contributions from Uighurs of China, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the like, possibly even from Maldives, India and Bangladesh. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has already declared they are “part” of ISIS and hundreds of youth from Central Asia are joining ISIS – some 400 hundred from a small country like Turkmenistan alone with a population of just 23 million.

Afghanistan is certainly heading towards greater instability. Extension of stay of US-NATO forces means little. The Taliban are surging ahead and the ANA continues to be terribly deficient of artillery, air, logistics support, medical and even transport. Because of Taliban concentrations in northern Afghanistan, Russia has had to increase its troop presence in Tajikistan with whom she has a security agreement. The enlarging Taliban influence needs to be taken note of by India in order to calibrate its own policy and responses. Pakistan appears to be in a high; but the bad news for Pakistan is that while the Taliban are claiming to take on more moderate and softened stance towards non-Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan, these non-Pashtuns have deeply entrenched anti-Pakistan sentiments. There is, therefore, no clear run for Pakistan. The ISIS eyes Pakistan as part of Khorasan. Besides, the Taliban will continue to frequent their bases within Pakistan, so there are always chances of backlash varying in magnitude.

Views expressed by the author are personal. The author is former Lieutenant General of Indian Army.

 

References
References
1. Ashraf, Sajjad, Elusive Peace in Afghanistan: Taliban Control More Territory, RSIS Commentary, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 23 October, 2015
2. US alalysts believe ‘Pakistani operative’ was using MSF hospital for Taliban activity: AP, Dawn, October 18, 2015,
3. Afghan clerics declare Jihad against Pakistan amid growing violence, Khama Press, August 13, 2015,
4.  Markey, Daniel S, The Different Taliban Worlds, Council for Foreign Relations, June 10, 2014,
5. Shah, Pir Zubair and Gall, Carlotta, For Pakistan, Deep Ties to Militant Network May Trump US Pressure, New York Times, October 21, 2011,
6. Gall, Carlota and Mangal Jan, Farooq, In Shift, Pakistanis Fleeing War Flow Into Beleagured Afghanistan, New York Times, November, 2014,
7. Wolf, Siegfried O, From FATA to Kunduz: The Pakistani Taliban’s new northwards orientation, International Security Observer, 19 October, 2015, 
8. Mahmood, Sara, ISIS in Afghanistan: A Growing Threat to Pakistan? RSIS Commentary, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October, 2015, 
 
Research Area
Previous ArticleNext Article
Prakash Katoch
Prakash Katoch is veteran Lt Gen of Indian Army.
Contact at: [email protected]
Share
More Articles by Prakash ...
CCIT � Future Prospects?
# 1338 February 18, 2015
Developing with Robotics
# 1322 January 12, 2015
Counter Terrorism in Cyberspace
# 1281 November 07, 2014
more-btn
Books
  • Surprise, Strategy and 'Vijay': 20 Years of Kargil and Beyond
    Price Rs.930
    View Detail
  • Space Security : Emerging Technologies and Trends
    By Puneet Bhalla
    Price Rs.980
    View Detail
  • Securing India's Borders: Challenge and Policy Options
    By Gautam Das
    Price Rs.
    View Detail
  • China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands: Conflict in the East China Sea Amid an American Shadow
    By Dr Monika Chansoria
    Price Rs.980
    View Detail
  • Increasing Efficiency in Defence Acquisitions in the Army: Training, Staffing and Organisational Initiatives
    By Ganapathy Vanchinathan
    Price Rs.340
    View Detail
  • In Quest of Freedom : The War of 1971
    By Maj Gen Ian Cardozo
    Price Rs.399
    View Detail
  • Changing Demographics in India's Northeast and Its Impact on Security
    By Ashwani Gupta
    Price Rs.Rs.340
    View Detail
  • Creating Best Value Options in Defence Procurement
    By Sanjay Sethi
    Price Rs.Rs.480
    View Detail
  • Brave Men of War: Tales of Valour 1965
    By Lt Col Rohit Agarwal (Retd)
    Price Rs.320
    View Detail
  • 1965 Turning The Tide; How India Won The War
    By Nitin A Gokhale
    Price Rs.320
    View Detail
more-btn