Pakistan�s Unending Tryst with Extremism: The Killing of Amjad Sabri

On 21^st June, renowned Sufi singer Amjad Sabri sang on Pakistan’s Samaa TV for the last time. A few hours later his bullet riddled body lay in a car in a busy Karachi street, bringing an end to a vibrant personality who brought Pakistan respect worldwide. The shooting spree did not end here as barely two hours after Sabri was assassinated, his friend as a well as a popular Noha (mourning songs in the shi’te tradition) reciter Farhan Ali Waris narrowly escaped an attempt on his life by armed militants, again in Karachi. Waris belongs to the minority Shia sect.  What disappointed the most was Sindh Chief Minister’s condolence statement, in which he misspelt Amjad Sabri’s name as Junaid Sabri (despite his fame), insinuating at a sense of indifference to the political class of the nation over the killing of the legendary singer.

These threats to the Sufi and the Shia communities have revived since the days of of Zia-ul-Haq, whose policy of ‘Islamization’ institutionalized the sectarian tensions and discrimination against minorities. The Sabri brothers belong to one of the thriving Qawwali traditions in the Sub continent.  The terrain on which the modern day Pakistan stands has had a rich Sufi heritage. Punjab and Sindh have their glorious past of Sufi traditions which even had an impact on Delhi’s Sufi traditions in the past. Unfortunately, the nationalistic discourse in Zia’s regime (1977-88) was so much obsessed with defining the socio-cultural milieu in Pakistan in puritanical Wahabbi framework that the Sufi syncretic traditions were forgotten. The after effects are still felt in the form of attacks on minorities.  Added to this, Pakistan has taken no serious steps to tackle this problem.

Combating extremism

Extremism in Pakistan doesn’t show any weakening signs. Hopes did revive when the Punjab Police eliminated Malik Ishaq, the leader of the notorious Sunni extremist outfit Lashkar-e-Jahangvi last year, which was accused of plotting Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. In the past, Malik Ishaq is reported to have enjoyed enjoyed state privileges, including a monthly stipend from the Punjab government but the growing menace of sectarianism and extremism across the nation (and specifically Punjab, the political bastion of Sharif brothers)  made it an urgency to put an end to the problem.

Previously, President Musharraf also tried to curb the extremist tendencies but the ignorance of extremism had allowed such institutions to expand and strengthen their ideological tentacles among a large section of population, especially the one devoid of economic mobility.  Musharraf had attempted to check extremism by bringing the Madrassas under a regulatory framework, but the step generated protests from the clerical class and the proposed ordinance was dropped.

With some groups becoming increasingly hostile, a force based approach was devised to deal with extremists who began to threaten the state directly. The result of a military solution was clear with the Lal Masjid fiasco, in which the firebrand cleric Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who allegedly had links with Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda, was killed. But, the operation also took toll on the lives women and children, killing over a hundred people in total. 

The Pakistani establishment’s approach to combat extremism still remains lopsided. The war waged by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan did sensitize Pakistan on how destructive consequences extremism could have and there is indeed no doubt in the seriousness which the army has shown in its fight against the Pakistani Taliban by launching Operation Zarb-e-Aazb. Contrastingly, there have been no efforts to reign in the outfits which have been waging war against Afghanistan, India and even China to some extent (Uighur extremism) using religion as a tool. 

Strengthening roots

A number of groups still operate on the Pakistani soil, taking comfortable refuge in Pakistan’s oversight.  Till date, the Haqqani network operates freely in Quetta preparing suicide bombers to destabilize the nascent nation-building process in Afghanistan. The roots of Haqqani network go back to the year of independence, that is, 1947, when a madrassa was established by Maulana Abdul Haq in Akora Khattak (District Nowshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Interestingly, this madrassa, Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania is located in very close proximity to Pakistan army’s School of Artillery. The passouts from the madrassa were called ‘Haqqanis’. It was this seminary’s graduate Jalalduddin Haqqani, who went on to establish a madrassa in Miranshah (North Waziristan), where Mujahideen were trained wage war on the Soviet army. Haqqani’s influence (in collaboration with Taliban leader Mullah Omar) on Afghanistan’s Pashtun society (Jalaluddin Haqqani hailed from the Zadran tribe) is still being used by the ISI to destabilize Afghanistan. The extent of state collusion with these extremist organizatons even is evident from the fact that in its present budget, the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (led by cricketer turned politician Imran Khan’s party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) allocated Rs. 300 million to Madrassa Haqqania. 

Turning to Karachi, another famous seminary Jamia Binoria trains thousands of students, inculcating them with the Deobandi tenets of Islam. The sight of this madrassa’s students donning Arab robes is an unusual sight, quite unlike the traditional South Asian dress Muslims of this region wear. The Madrassa, established in 1979 was among the thousands of seminaries established during the reign of Zia-ul-Haq and performed the dual role of launching pad for Mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan and more importantly legitimizing Zia’s rule. Similarly, outfits like Hafiz Saeed’s Jamat-ud-Dawa/Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Masood Azhar’s Jaishe-Mohammad and Syed Salahuddin’s Hizb-ul-Mujahideen have served as an intellectual preparatory ground to prepare the Mujahideen who have been waging war to ‘liberate’ Kashmir.

The reason why Pakistan has willingly or unwillingly failed to act against extremism is the lack of realization that it is impossible to compartmentalize extremism. The groups working to destabilize the neighborhood using religion as a tool take no time turning against their own state or its citizens, if they find any instance of digressions against their ideologies. No wonder, the recent killing of Amjad Sabri is also part of this long chain of events which point towards a lax approach towards extremists still existent within the establishment.

The Author is a Post Graduate in International Relations from South Asian University and is presently an Intern at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal.