Pakistan and the Cross-Durand: Next Five Years

The US interests and strategies in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region has been recently systematically put forward by President Barack Obama, in what is referred as the Af-Pak strategy. The American objectives and the strategies pursued to achieve them are likely to create an impact in the region. How is Pakistan likely to respond? In particular, what are Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan? How is Islamabad going to pursue its own interests in Afghanistan, specifically on both sides of the Durand line?

Before attempting to forecast Pakistan’s likely policies across the Durand Line in the next few years, it is essential to understand Pakistan’s long-term interests and major assumptions. There are at least three major strategic interests in Afghanistan. First, Islamabad, would prefer to have a ‘friendly’ regime. In the Afghan context, from the British era, ‘friendly’ government always refer to a regime, which is pliable or subservient to the governments on the east of Khyber and Bolan passes. The second major strategic interest of Pakistan is to ensure that there are no external influences, which Islamabad considers as against its own interest. In this context, it refers to preventing any Indian presence. Both the above are a part of much talked about “strategic depth” concept of Pakistan. The third major strategic interest, in the current context is to end the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan and ensure that the international troops exit the region as early as possible.

Pakistan’s policies in the next few years across the Durand Line are also likely to be based on certain assumptions – genuine, imagined and exaggerated. The primary assumption, which is genuinely shared by everyone in Pakistan – from the military establishment to the common man in the streets – is that the American presence in Afghanistan is unlikely to be long term. Once the primary objective of the US is achieved, (read: Osama Bin Laden captured or the Al Qaeda effectively neutralised) Pakistan believes, Washington will pack its bags and leave Afghanistan, leaving the country in tatters. The American actions after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988, still lingers in the memories and discussions in Pakistan. The US (read: CIA), after the Soviet withdrawal, exited Afghanistan in a mess, leaving Pakistan to handle the fallout.

A second assumption inside Pakistan,: which is also shared by many is relating to the government in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai is unlikely to be a stabilising factor in Afghanistan, at best, he will remain the Mayor of Kabul, that too as long as the international troops are present.

Thirdly, the majority in Pakistan does not consider the War on Terrorism, as their war. One common theme running in the numerous discussions inside Pakistan has been: “It is not Our War”. More importantly, Pakistan not only considers the War on Terrorism as the American War, but also believes that this war is not in their interests. Many consider that the War on Terrorism is the source of all problems that Pakistan is facing in the last few years; if the former comes to an end, most of Pakistan’s current problems will automatically subside.

Fourth, majority in Pakistan consider Taliban as their own and their trump card in any future political arrangement in Afghanistan. While there is an intense discussion taking place on Pakistan’s Taliban policy, from their creation in the 1990s, a section, especially in the ISI and Pakistan’s military consider the Taliban as their strategic asset in Afghanistan.

Fifth, not many in Pakistan agree that there is an organisation called Al Qaeda. For them, Al Qaeda is a myth, worse, a creation of the CIA. Certainly, they do not share Obama’s assumption that al Qaeda is a “cancer, killing Pakistan from within”.

Finally, there is unanimous agreement within Pakistan that the Indian presence, with support from the international community, especially the US is growing in Afghanistan. The Indian presence is seen fundamentally as anti-Pakistani.

Based on the above long term strategic interests and assumptions, the following are likely to be Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Taliban. First, the region across the Durand Line is likely to witness increased violence, as Pakistan calibrates its military actions against the Taliban. Pakistan’s military will not be engaged in pursing an active military operation vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban. The argument is based on the assumptions explained above: Why should Pakistan fight against the Afghan Taliban, which is considered as their trump card and asset in a post-US, post-Karzai Afghanistan?

Though Pakistan will not openly admit that it is not in their interest to fight the Afghan Taliban, its actions will expose such an interest and strategy. Besides, Pakistan is also likely to hide behind an excuse: Pakistan’s security forces are unable to prevent the Taliban incursions on the east of Durand; how can they effectively do on Durand’s west? In all likelihood, one can see the Pakistan’s military take action selectively against a few of “Pakistani” Taliban led by Baitullah Mehsud, and certainly not against the “Afghan” Taliban led by Mullah Omar.

Even vis-à-vis the “Pakistani” Taliban, Islamabad’s approach will be dual. The Taliban is not a monolithic organisation on both sides of the Durand Line. While the Afghan Taliban consists of Mullah Omar’s militia and former Mujahideen, the divide amongst the ‘Pakistani’ Taliban is more visible. The TTP itself is an umbrella organisation; whose components always do not agree with the Baitullah Mehsud, its leader. A section within the TTP, led by Maulvi Noor in South Waziristan, for example is closer to the government and has been involved in numerous ‘peace’ deals. The Taliban in Swat, led by Maulana Fazlullah is a separate entity, though it considers itself a part of the TTP. There seems to be a national consensus, at least in the Parliament, on this dual approach. How else can one interpret the approval of the Parliament to implement Shariah in Swat? The Awami National Party (ANP), one of the most secular political entities in the North-west Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan proposed the idea, while PPP, PML-N and PML-Q, did not object to either the idea or the provisions of the Nizam-Adl Regulations.

Besides the dual approach towards the Taliban on both sides of the Durand, Pakistan is likely to allow the US to carry out selective military attacks against the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA). It is totally unthinkable, that the US could carry these attacks, especially led by the drones, without a tacit understanding with Islamabad. While the political leadership in Pakistan is likely to make idealistic statements and political threats, silently they will allow the US to go ahead. There were statements made in the US, that these attacks were in fact carried out from Pakistani soil, and not from across the Durand Line. For the political leadership in Pakistan, such a dual policy helps; it shifts the blame on the US. Besides, it also unifies the people against the US, projecting that Islamabad is helpless.

Finally, Pakistan is also likely to pressurise the US in dealing with a section of Taliban, what is generally referred as “moderate” Taliban. It appears, that Pakistan has already succeeded in this approach; Obama’s Af-Pak strategy, considers al Qaeda as a major threat and not Taliban. Besides, it also identifies “an uncompromising core”, meaning, there is a compromising periphery.

To conclude, Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the next two to five years will be purely based on what Islamabad perceives as its own national interests. This is unlikely to feed into the American plan and strategy for Afghanistan.
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).