The Indian Army�s Deterrence Value is being eroded

The attack on the army convoy by alleged pro-LTTE hoodlums near Coimbatore, was a despicable act. This convoy was probably returning after a field firing exercise, an important training event in which higher calibre arms, grenades, rock-launchers, anti-tank missiles, and 81mm mortar are fired, the Times of India  reporting that the convoy was returning from Secunderabad in Andhra Pardesh after training exercises. Clearly, the attack was premeditated. How does one account for the fact that the media was present the site of the incident, as if in anticipation of the attack. One should also take note of the comments of Ramakrishnan, General Secretary of Periyar Dravida Kazhagam, a pro-Tamil group, reported by the news-agency ANI, “More than 80 trucks of war material including weapons meant for Sri Lanka are being dispatched by the Indian government. We have stopped these.”  It is intriguing that how three vehicles strayed away from the convoy and how the media was present in anticipation at the site of the incident.

The perpetrators of the attack as evident from the video footage forced the army personnel out of their vehicles, smashed front and window screens and indulged in pillage of the payload, which included ammunition. 81mm ammunition was strewn all over the road, some of which was set on fire. All training in the army is for war, and the very purpose of war is the defence of the country in which every citizen has stake. If the army cannot protect its own vehicles, equipment and show its fighting wherewithal against few hoodlums, how can it be expected to protect the country?  More than anything else, the attack was on the dignity and self-pride of the army without provocation of any sort. The imperative of the movement was swift action.Convoy protection drills are a part of basic army training, but was nowhere in evidence.

‘Minimum use of force’ cannot be construed as ‘no use of force’ while dealing with situations like this. ‘Minimum use of force’ does not imply using sticks and belts, which later the army personnel resorted to, but it called for a definite and minimally appropriate response in terms of ‘fire for effect’. Two or three rounds of ammunition aimed at the legs of attackers could have prevented the humiliation the army personnel and the army as such. It is the rudimentary imperative to maintain the deterrence value of the army as an institution, and the ultimate instrument of internal security.

During the IPKF deployment in Sri Lanka, in Tamil Nadu, army personnel were jeered and greeted with slogans like, ‘IPKF dogs go back’, but never did the army personnel come under physical attack. Ironically, it is the same army in which some Tamil Nadu politicians want to see deployed to stem the imminent rout of the LTTE at the hands of the Sri Lankan security forces. The deterrence value of the army has been gradually eroding as clearly evident during the ‘Gujjar agitation’ and the recent incident near Coimbatore.

The scale, intensity, frequency and audacity of such attacks on the army will only increase if it is unduly restrained by its own leadership and the political class and consequently seen to be vacillating when confronted with such situations. When the army mobilises for war or any other purpose, its induction and de-induction is also a vital part of the operations. The time schedule for mobilisation is sacrosanct, as it impinges on the impending operations. If the army allows itself to become helpless objects of violent ire by a section of population (as invariably will be the case), which does not appreciate the national cause, then the war will be lost even before battles are joined.

Moreover, the army’s arsenal and the nation’s strategic war making assets are mainly transported by railways and road transport. These are sensitive national assets and are therefore transported under the protection of armed escorts. In the process of providing protection, if they encounter any physical interference, they are at complete liberty to use their weapons, no matter how many lives may have to be sacrificed.

Legally any state armed force is empowered to take appropriate action in defence of national property, even if it means the use of force. The army therefore should initiate strong disciplinary action against the officers and men responsible for the tactical move of the convoy, as they have failed to act in the appropriate professional manner, and some of them displayed cowardice as well. Meanwhile, the army leadership must convey a strong message to the subordinates that initiative and courage in dealing with such situations will be appreciated without any reservations and caveats.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).