A Relook at Our Nuclear Deterrence

The recent revelation that the yield of the fusion bomb tested in 1998 was low puts the spotlight again on the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. The subject was ferociously debated during the run up to the signing of the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement. At that time the support for the deal was so overwhelming that the few, who expressed concerns about the limiting effects of the proposed agreement, went unheard.

Nuclear deterrence is determined by its credibility. Credibility flows from demonstrated capability and the potential adversary’s perception of our national resolve. Claims may not always convince. Consequently, an unconvinced adversary can be tempted to gamble; besides uncertainty fuels instability.

Nuclear deterrence is built primarily around warheads, their yield and delivery systems. The range of delivery systems is dependent on the weight of the warhead; heavier the warhead lesser the range.  Hence the imperative of maximising yield to weight ratios. Efficient fusion bombs give yields in megatons as against the kiloton yields of fission bombs. 

We claimed the yield of the hydrogen bomb we tested in 1998 to be about 42 kiloton. Agencies monitoring such tests assessed it to be of a much lower value. This is the nub of the current debate. 

The big question that it poses is: does India need to carry out further tests to construct a credible nuclear deterrent capability?

As against the two tests that we have conducted over a span of 24 years, China has carried out 45 tests within a period of 32 years; at the rate of more than one test per year. Its first test was in 1964. Within 3 years it conducted 6 more tests including the first hydrogen bomb test in 1967. Let us look at the other nuclear weapon states. The USA has conducted more than 1000 tests, the Soviet Union (Russia) around 800, the French more than 200 and the British about 50.

Admittedly, simulation techniques in the 21st century are much more sophisticated than they were earlier but whether they can totally obviate the requirement to test is highly questionable. In any case, if they did, the CTBT would lose its relevance and consequently we should have no issues about becoming a signatory to it.

Before taking the discussion forward it is important to recapitulate a few features of our nuclear doctrine. First, our nuclear weapons capability is not country specific. To quote: ‘The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India.’ The second equally important commitment: ‘Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.’ 

How has our conventional and nuclear deterrence been effected in the last decade? Kargil, Op Parakram and 26/11 have each highlighted two obviously very unpalatable deductions: first, that our conventional deterrence is inadequate and the second, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is effectively in place. Militarily, India stands neutralised against Pakistan. So, all we can do is to “talk” and “not talk” interspersed with complaints to all and sundry. We seem to have no other options. The preceding is admittedly an overstatement, but necessary to make my point.

The equation between Pakistan and India can in some ways be compared to the equation between India and China. China’s conventional military capability is greater than India’s but both are nuclear weapon states. Yet China seems to be getting away with intimidation and intrusions with no country in the world raising alarms about the possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and China. Should not China be worrying about India’s nuclear threshold and drawing ‘red lines’ of the kind we have been engaged in drawing against Pakistan? Why can we not indulge in nuclear brinkmanship of the kind that Pakistan has practiced?  Is it because we do not possess the nuclear deterrence that we should and China knows it, as also the rest of the world? The Naval Chief’s much commented upon prescription on how to manage the glaring national and military power asymmetry between India and China should be viewed in this context. Having said this I do believe that as an enlightened military professional he would have offered numerous propositions to redress the growing imbalance between the two countries. It is also my belief that for more than a decade as a flag officer and as the Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta would have pushed for decisive action to improve our military posture. I would therefore surmise that it is the outcome of such effort that has provoked the Naval Chief to suggest a placatory approach towards China.

But for the debatable ‘no first use’ stipulation, our Nuclear Doctrine is extremely sound and well crafted. To illustrate I have two important quotes from the preamble: first ‘India’s security is an integral component of its development process’ and the second, ‘Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people.’

Our failure lies in not having the national resolve and commitment to acquire the conventional and nuclear forces that the doctrine postulates. The price of such failure, it must be emphasised, can be catastrophic.

The complexity of pursuing nuclear weapons capability or for that matter even conventional military hardware is recognised. It should also be accepted that the institutional decision making apparatus with its inherent caution and conservatism is unlikely to be up to the challenge of addressing these intricacies without political direction. Can our political leadership provide such direction? 

On available evidence it would appear that India has to test. The timing and how the event is to be orchestrated are issues that merit examination, unless we can access the technology from those who have it.

Lastly an unrelated though relevant observation: this is about the perennial gap in perception of the performance of military hardware between the users (military) and the designer-scientists. In such instances it would be prudent to go by the views of the military. 
 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).