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"Trust, but verify." US President Ronald Reagan’s stand on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War carried military overtones, with a subtext of restraint, but from a position of strength. The same comment repeated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the context of India-Pakistan relations (the Manmohan Singh Doctrine?) gratuitously neuters itself by delinking action on terrorism by Pakistan from resumption of the so-called "composite dialogue" between the two countries, and also unilaterally precludes any military alternatives, whatever the degree of provocation in future. Pakistan is strategically linked to China, India’s other and vastly more powerful neighbour, in the relationship of surrogate and principal. The question that naturally arises next is: How relevant would India’s new doctrine be in the context of China, with whom relations are also under strain at present?
India and China both emerged as independent Asian giants at around the same time — 1947 for India and 1949 for the People’s Republic of China — but subsequent events witnessed a much greater degree of hard-headed realpolitik by China in managing its interest and affairs, until the two emerging neighbours ultimately collided in the border war of 1962, in which China’s definitive military victory over India clearly established the leadership order in Asia.
The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was a watershed. In its aftermath, support for India was primarily articulated by the United States and the West, entirely understandable in the context of the Cold War, but nevertheless subtly tinged with more than a trace of ridicule and even contempt that a vast country, which had so far attempted to moralise and preach to the rest of the world, should prove so utterly incompetent in defence of its own heartland. Within the Asian neighbourhood, the silence was deafening. China had arrived with a blast of trumpets, and Asia trod warily. China lost no time in hammering home its regional primacy with a masterstroke of realpolitik, a strategic linkage with India’s traditional opponent —Pakistan — through the Sino-Pak Treaty of Friendship of 1963, followed through with its first nuclear explosion in 1964. That position remains unchanged to this day.
The domestic fallout from 1962 impacted the country’s self-esteem and confidence as well, pushing it on a subconscious backfoot with regard to China, and though much water has flowed down the Tsangpo since then, India’s "1962 syndrome" is unaltered. This notwithstanding the Indian Army’s post-1962 successes against Chinese attempts to intrude at Nathu-La in 1967 and Sumdurong Chu in 1989-90. China is well aware of this, and periodically exploits the psychological advantage conceded by India to maintain pressure by various methods.
Sino-Indian border issues have been discussed extensively at national, bilateral and international forums, but misperceptions still persist in the public mind regarding the "border" between the two countries. What actually exists is the "Line of Actual Control" in the Indo-Tibet border region, with differing perceptions of its alignment by each country. Both send military patrols upto their respective claim lines, and signal their visit by leaving token indicators of unmistakable national origins like cigarette packets, newspapers and similar debris. Patrol movements generally take place on foot, and often on vehicles in Ladakh where the terrain permits such movement, but the Chinese helicopter reported there recently is certainly a first in its category. In fact, from the Indian side, patrolling along the LAC has been developed into a highly stylised ballet to avoid contact or confrontation between opposing patrols, and a degree of overwatch if it happens in spite of best efforts. So when there are reports in the Indian media of an increase in frequency in Chinese patrolling activity to disputed areas in various sectors in those regions, what is not reported whether Indian patrols too have also conversely increased their own frequency, or whether the Indian government has imposed restrictions on Indian movements to avoid "provocations". This would be a key indicator if India is apprehensive regarding China.
But perhaps even more sensitive than Sino-Indian border issues is China’s extreme umbrage to India’s sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, which might conceivably have triggered Chinese ambassador Sun Xi’s spectacularly timed reiteration of China’s claims on Tawang and indeed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh ("Southern Tibet" in Chinese eyes) on the immediate eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006, though the Indian people did take note of Dr Manmohan Singh’s avoidance of Tawang during his tour of Arunachal Pradesh in 2008. The publication of the Zhong Guo Zhan Lue Chinese think tank’s dissertation on dismembering the "Indian Federation" into 30 or more states with the help of China’s friends and allies, as well as the reported renewal of support and training to anti-Indian militants in Manipur may also form part of a overall pattern of coercive orchestration.
India’s responses to all these have been non-confrontational and even passive, sometimes to the point of apparent deference. The psyche of the Han race, who constitute the dominant majority of the Chinese people, is another factor to be understood when interacting with China, irrespective of the political system prevailing, whether Communist as at present, Kuomintang earlier, or Imperial Beijing even earlier still. Xenophobic by natural mindset, the Han consider China as the "middle kingdom" of the world, superior to those countries and peoples on the periphery, which in current perspective includes India. The underlying inflexibility in matters of territory considered national, no matter how long ago in history, has its origins in this perception, and applies to territorial frontiers, whether Taiwan, Vietnam, the South China Sea, or in India’s case the Sino-Indian border in Tibet.
Against this background, India’s preferred life insurance policy has to remain unchanged: build up sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear military capabilities and create the long-neglected military infrastructures along the country’s land, sea, and airspace frontiers until a credible level of dissuasion and even deterrence is achieved, whether for China, Pakistan or any one else.
In the meanwhile, the "trust, but verify" mantra needs a little modification in the context of China. How about an alternative: "Speak softly, but carry a big stick"?
Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury (Retd) is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament
Courtsey: The Asian Age, 26 September 2009.
http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/opinion/on-china,-talk-softly,-but-carry-a-big-stick.aspx
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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