Is Pakistan Disintegrating?

In dealing with the contradictions created by its successive rulers, since the beginning of 2007, Pakistan has been going through one of the most difficult periods of its existence. Souring of the military and ISI’s relationship with the jehadi groups commenced after General Musharraf was coerced into cooperating with the US in the fight against terrorism. The current chain of events started with the Army’s action against the jehadis holed up in Lal Masjid in Islamabad. Nothing seems to have gone in favour of General Musharraf since then. There have been over 50 suicide attacks all over Pakistan, killing and maiming a large number of soldiers and civilians, surrender of over 200 military and para-military troops in Waziristan, capture of sizeable areas of Swat by the jehadis and refusal by some tribal troops to fight their kin, a stand-off between General Musharraf and the assertive judiciary to preserve the constitution resulting in declaration of emergency by the General, removal of the chief justice and some judges of the Supreme Court, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto that resulted in a huge backlash and rioting in Sindh, leading to enormous loss of life and property.

Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment have gradually lost control over the jehadi groups they had created and nurtured since 1980s. It may be unfair to blame Musharraf alone for the malady afflicting Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Haq was the architect of the policy of bleeding India with “ a thousand cuts” to weaken it to the brink of disintegration, while simultaneously providing “strategic depth” to Pakistan through control of Afghanistan.  Zia carried out this policy through the jehadis created by spreading the madrassa culture in Pakistan. This policy remained unchanged whether civilians or the Army ruled Pakistan. Musharraf is guilty of perpetuating this political legacy. He erred by not seizing the opportunity provided by 9/11. His duplicitous policy of supporting Taliban leadership in Baluchistan while cracking down on their supporters in the tribal areas finally backfired and today has undermined the integrity and security of Pakistan.

The Pakistani state today lacks control over swathes of the NWFP, and not just autonomous tribal areas like Waziristan. Jehadi forces have spilled over into the Swat valley. Baluchistan is in turmoil post Nawab Bugti’s assasination by the military. Sindh is also going through unprecedented unrest since the assasination of Benazir Bhutto. Civil society is terribly divided along sectarian lines, a situation also reflected in the Pakistani military. In essence, the security situation in Pakistan is explosive. NWFP and Baluchistan may be seeing the start of a civil war that could polarize the country between fundamentalist and liberal forces. This will split the army and all other institutions of Pakistan. Can Pakistan military deal with such a situation and succeed?
 
Post-18 February 2008 elections, whether free and fair or otherwise, some kind of civil government will emerge and the practice of the “troika” – consisting of the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Army Staff – will be revived. The democratic government in its fight against jehadis will have to lean heavily upon the army. Therefore, the army will continue to play a dominant role in Pakistan’s political and social scene for quite sometime to come.

The Pakistan army is as well trained, equipped and motivated as the Indian army. Years of military rule has made little dent in its inherent strength. Even though the higher echelons of the army are politicized, lower ranks remain insulated from outside influence. What worries the Pakistan army is its Islamisation. Zia-ul-Haq, in order to legitimise his rule had not only developed nexus with the rightist parties but also deliberately encouraged an Islamist orientation of the army by incorporating Islam into its organizational fabric. The Army under him let jehadi groups fight Pakistan’s proxy war in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Many had thought that the process of Islamisation would peter out after Zia’s death. But it proved to be a legacy that his successors were compelled to carry forward. It is this legacy, along with the inexperience of the army in dealing with insurgency, which will come in the way of the moderate senior military hierarchy in dealing with the jehadi insurgency. On the other hand, tribal militants are seasoned fighters in the art of guerilla warfare. There are already reports that pro-Taliban tribes in the northwest have buried their ancient feuds, and are joining hands to fight the army.

In the coming months, the Pakistan army will have to deal with terrorism, the domestic law and order situation, and the insurgency in the northern and western region of the country. Prolonged military operations in the tribal and border areas will further alienate the local population, pulling Pakistan army deeper into the quagmire. The army will have to change its doctrinal orientation and prepare for a long haul to deal with the Frankenstein monster of its own making. Pakistan is fast heading towards disintegration; arresting this slide towards an abyss will demand a great measure of maturity and sagacity on the part of its ruling elite.