India's Nuclear Doctrine and Tenuous Chain of Command

Article 5.1 of India’s nuclear doctrine states that nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level and the authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s). Under India’s constitutional system, the Prime minister is the head of government and the President  head of state. It is also mentioned in India’s constitution that it is the duty of the President to aid and advise the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. In a nuclear stand-off, who advises whom, to what degree and to what consequence?

India’s nuclear doctrine states explicitly that unauthorised access or use of nuclear weapons will not take place. What happens if the Prime Minister or the designated successor(s) and entire communication systems are wiped out in a first strike? Who controls the nuclear button? Will it be political operatives in the Prime Minister’s office or the field commander in actual charge of the nuclear weapons or the civilian bureaucracy? How will the coordination in policy formulation and rapid response mechanism be maintained in the National Security Council that was formed in aftermath of the 1998 nuclear test? Would it be possible for a lower ranked officer to launch a weapon without authorisation in the atmosphere of mixed signals and/or political vacuum emanating from New Delhi? Even at the highest level, there may be moments of rash decision-making and recklessness. The former US president, Richard Nixon, under the strain of his final days in the presidency due to Watergate scandal, was reported to have sobbed, beaten his fists on the power of his office, and brooded over his ability to release the sinister forces of nuclear holocaust. Also, in a surprise first attack by the other side, could India retaliate with rapid, punitive response when some of the missiles may be submarine-based or in mobile launchers status and which require safe and secured communication lines at all times?

Unlike in the American system, where there is a clear chain of command should the president be temporarily incapacitated due to death, resignation or impeachment, there is no such provision in the existing Indian constitution other than following the official protocol in order of precedence. On a comparative note in the US on September 11, 2001, the US president was taken to the strategic forces headquarters and the vice-president was whisked away to a secret location. Whenever a threat is anticipated, the vice-president is separated and kept in an unknown destination in constant touch with the president and other members of the National Security Council through safe and uninterrupted communication channels.  US law provides for succession of up to more than twenty. Military succession is also well-defined. The command chain runs in normal times from the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, to the Defense Secretary, the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff and all the way to the strategic forces both in the US and NATO.                 

There is also the danger of conflict between the civilian and military units battling over control of nuclear button. While India’s air force and army feels that it has the capability to deliver nuclear weapons, the navy may very well reason that the ultimate nuclear decision making in the operational arena belongs to it as it has both maritime and aviation roles. Although, belatedly, the position of Chief of Defence Staff was created in order to provide a single point of military advice to the government, the turf battle between the services still remain. Defence Minister George Fernandes on October 5, 2003, had declared that a nuclear command chain, including alternative nerve centers was in place giving India an effective retaliatory capability. He had disclosed that other nuclear command and control structures like nuclear command shelters for protecting Rastrapathi Bhawan, the Prime Minister's Office and Parliament were under contingency plan. What is also needed is to provide more attention to the tri-service strategic forces command for maintaining functional control over the nuclear weapons and related matters such as surveillance, early warning, intelligence, targeting and damage assessment system. The strategic triad in the strike force should also make sure that the command and control chain from the political level to the operational level should also reflect its survivability under the worst case scenario of a decapitation attack. This way the notion of deterrence can also be validated.

According to security analysts, an ideal case for India must include, (a) to state succinctly its nuclear deterrence doctrine, (b) continue development of testing procedures, methodology, (c) fully articulate war termination concepts, (d) acquire adequate supporting infrastructures such as intelligence and early warning system, meteorological system, secure communications network, physical command and control infrastructure, damage assessment system, develop procedural system such as posture negative control system, national command authority, civil-military coordination arrangements, nuclear planning structure.
 
On the positive side, there have been some transparent steps taken in this regard. As per new directions taken by Indian Cabinet, once the attack is verified through an alternative source, the Nuclear Command Authority comes into play. It has two components   the political and Executive Councils (EC). The Political Council need not meet physically in New Delhi. If by chance, the political council is eliminated in the initial attack, India, under the Red Book of 1995 and the Blue Book of 1999 has an alternative system made up of specially designated constitutional authorities in the political, administrative and military hierarchies, to authorise retaliation. The government will also convert the Prime Minister's plane into a fully operational centre, like the United States' Air Force One. Once the political council orders retaliation, the EC conveys it to the SFC (Strategic Force Command). The SFC is capable of taking decisions within minutes and all it needs is time to mate the warheads into the platforms. Furthermore, as former Army Chief of Staff, V. P. Malik had elaborated, the escalation ladder would be carefully climbed in a carefully controlled ascent by both protagonists. In spite of some tangible progress and strategic discourse being undertaken in these aspects among influential circles, what is needed is more clarity and a vigorous debate so as to look and examine all the complexities and nuances of India’s chain of command structure.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).