The Shifting Sands of US-Pak Relations

Between the US and Pakistan, relations usually swing between two ends of a pendulum.  For the US, Pakistan is either an ‘indispensable ally’ or it is inconsequential. For Pakistan, the US is either its greatest benefactor (besides China) or its most hated nation (besides India). In this see-saw of relations, India has been affected by each swing of the pendulum. Today, after years of downturn, US-Pak relations seem to be heading for an ‘indispensable ally’ phase again and Pakistan is playing its cards with elan to facilitate a US withdrawal from Afghanistan, at the same time securing its own strategic interests.

Pakistan and the US have always been strange bed-fellows.  Since the sixties, the US supplied it with arms and provided material and political support during the 1965 and 1971 war against India. The halcyon days of their relationship began in the 80’s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan now became a frontline state in this war and reaped in the largesse of arms and aid that came in its wake. Then the Soviets withdrew in 1993, the US departed and Pakistan was discarded and left to its own devices, except that the US turned a blind eye to its nuclear ambitions and blatant nuclear proliferation, leaving it free to prop up the Taliban in Afghanistan in its quest for strategic depth. Both these issues rebounded a decade later with grave consequences for the US and the rest of the world.

Pakistan’s resentment at its abandonment soured the US-Pak relationship considerably. Their own nuclear testing and support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda did not help matters either. US-Pak relations lurched along till 9/11 took place and Musharraf turned against the Taliban bringing the ‘War Against Terror’ dangerously home. For over eight years now, Pakistan has been engaged in that war – often running with the hares and hunting with the hounds – during which it has been reviled, cajoled, scolded and coaxed in equal measure to pursue US aims in Afghanistan.

The Bush administration managed to keep it going as a reluctant ally in its ‘War Against Terror’ with just enough carrot and stick. In the initial days of the Obama administration, Pakistan’s complicity with terrorist groups in its territory seemed to be unfolding even as they launched half-hearted actions against them. Some hard-talking, some elbow-twisting and lavish promises of aid – including a $7.6 billion package proposed by the Kerry- Lugar bill has helped keep Pakistan afloat and given it enough incentive to launch its much belated offensives against the Taliban. The Kerry-Lugar Bill and its clauses of accountability raised hackles in Pakistan but its terms and aid were readily accepted. The aid though, has not assuaged public sentiment which feels that Pakistan is merely fighting the US war and bearing the consequences on its own territory.
 
The turning moment came with Obama’s new Afghan strategy which announced a surge of troops and a dateline for withdrawal. Suddenly, Pakistan became vital for the US to prosecute both its military campaigns in Afghanistan and to chalk out its exit strategy. The recent US offensive in South Afghanistan, the largest since 2001, coincided with Pakistani operations in Waziristan. Both operations have been hailed as grand successes but the actual number of militants killed or captured is negligible. Perhaps this is part of US strategy to declare victory in the region – even if they are only media victories – and then scoot.

The victory has also been reinforced by the capture of Taliban’s number two – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Pakistan, a major catch. Coincidentally, both the Pakistani offensive and capture came just before Kayani and his team visited Washington this March for a comprehensive strategic dialogue to eke out a $ 35 billion aid bill for its role in the War Against Terror, seek a greater role in Afghanistan (and edge out India in the bargain), acquire weaponry to match India’s conventional superiority and try to secure a nuclear deal on the lines of the Indo-US deal. 

The “strategic dialogue” has not really achieved the hype behind its run-up. True, Hilary Clinton virtually apologised to Pakistan for abandoning it earlier and proposed a long-term partnership, but its is to be seen how far the US goes to appease its new ally. There has been a promise of military aid in the form of 18 F-16 C/D aircraft and upgrades for 60 older versions; 115 M-105 self-propelled howitzers, a Perry-class missile frigate and 20 Huey Cobra attack helicopters. Not really the weapon package one associates with counter-terrorism operation, after all. A nuclear deal though, is not likely to be on the cards. Pakistan’s proliferation record is one of the worst in the world. But they will undoubtedly get a greater role in Afghanistan at India’s expense.

But after the US declares its victory and withdraws from Afghanistan, what will be the nature of US-Pak equation? Is it likely to discard Pakistan again? In Pakistan itself, over 64 per cent of the population view the US as an enemy and only 9 per cent feel that it can be trusted. But the Pentagon in its Quadrennial Report of 2010 has called for a “long-term strategic partnership” with Pakistan for ensuring stability in the region. This is a dramatic shift from the 2006 report which called for a strategic partnership with India. So will the bonhomie last? After all there are no economic or cultural ties worth the name and US investment in Pakistan is negligible. Irritants such as their nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya and North Korea will crop up, Pakistan’s support to Islamic fundamentalism will resurface and with another change of US administration the pendulum could swing again.

Yet in the recent upsurge in US-Pak relations Pakistan will push it own agenda. It will try to extract concessions vis-à-vis India on Kashmir and the newly-evoked water-issue. An emboldened Pakistan, flush with aid and new weaponry; its friendly Taliban cadres free and unoccupied will then focus on Kashmir. With the Obama administration turning a blind eye on Kashmir, it could perhaps start another cycle of violence in the sub-continent. In these changing equations, India must firm up allies such as Russia, and safeguard its long-term interests in the region and maintain its position in the world.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).