Dialogue with Pakistan: Will it really reduce the trust deficit?

The Thimpu talks and the judgement on Ajmal Kasab have once again brought Indo Pakistan relations back into focus. It is apparent that the establishments in India and Pakistan have decided to look beyond the 26/11 Mumbai incident and resume the dialogue, primarily to reduce the trust deficit. Its pace and priorities will become evident when foreign ministers of both countries meet on July 15. Therefore, a review of the prevailing strategic environment and prospects of the dialogue would be in order.

After the Mumbai incident and the sharp increase in terrorist violence in Pakistan, most people in India, even more in Pakistan, seem to have realized that Indo Pakistan relations need to improve, both for India and for Pakistan. Nothing would improve India’s security at home, or enhance its ability to play a more constructive regional role, as much as reconciliation with Pakistan. And nothing could be worse for India than the continued descent of Pakistan into the horrors of terrorism which it faces currently. For Pakistan, good relations with India are a must if it has to overcome its frequent bouts of political instability, rejuvenate its economy, progress with its sociology (a Pakistani friend put it as roti, kapra, makan, bijlee, pani aur dawa) and most importantly, tackle its home grown terrorism and civil strife successfully.

It is also being realized that the strategic conditions on the sub continent have become a lot more stringent. India and Pakistan can no longer afford to fight an all out high intensity war. The old days of military victories and defeats, and forcible major changes of the border or LOC, are over. The concepts of continental or maritime strategy, and strategic depth in that context, have no relevance in the sub continent’s nuclear thresholds and border less wars.

Most people have also realized that the J & K imbroglio cannot be resolved by military means or with cross border terrorism. Any attempt to resolve our complex problems with force and violence will lead to greater instability in both countries, with serious manifestations for the region.

Such strategic changes notwithstanding, it would be wrong to expect that people on both sides will forget their recent history of conflicts completely when their lives continue to be affected by violence. We have had three wars, a limited war, and several near war border deployments. In India, beside Mumbai type terror incidents, the proxy war in J & K is continuing. In Pakistan, the terrorist mad dogs are not only biting the hands that fed them in the past but also those of innocent people everywhere, thus weakening the state. Only fools would fail to draw lessons from them. At the strategic level, we need a long memory and a longer foresight and vision.

India’s major security problem with Pakistan, which over shadows all other problems, is cross border terrorism. In recent years, whenever we have taken one step forward in the Indo Pak dialogue, a major terrorist act, like the Mumbai 26/11, takes us two steps backward. India and Pakistan seem to be playing a game of snakes and ladder. Unfortunately, it is not the dice but human beings who are swallowed by deadly snakes. Whenever, a positive step is taken to resume the dialogue, most Indians wonder if that will last beyond the next terror incident.

In a recent India Pakistan track 2 level dialogue, the Pakistani delegates, while not quite ignoring the terrorism issue, argued that (a) Pakistan was now a larger victim of terrorism than India, and (b) terrorism is a global phenomenon and a ‘common threat’ which requires regional and global cooperation. They also cited statements by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that ‘terrorism is a common threat for both our countries’.  Their argument is partly true. But how does one ignore the difference that terrorism in Pakistan is home grown like our Maoist insurgency, but the Jehadi terrorism in J&K and the rest of India is encouraged, even sponsored, by Pakistan’s state agencies. It is for this reason that all attempts to work together through joint anti-terrorist mechanism have failed.

Intelligence officials in India have no doubt that the Mumbai incident, like many such incidents in the past, was encouraged and supported by the ISI which works under the Pakistan Army. Even Dr Manmohan Singh, the Indian driver of the resumed dialogue, had said “There is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.” Some months ago, General Musharraf, who called the ISI as Pakistan’s strategic arm and its first line of defense, admitted that the ISI maintains representation in all militant outfits to promote Pakistan Army's strategic interests.

Pakistan’s slow progress on 26/11 perpetrators, and its provocative handling of Hafiz Saeed has demonstrated the limits of what India can expect from Pakistan in return for political engagement. Permission given to the terrorist groups in POK to stage a massive rally on February 5, in which Hafiz Saeed and Salahuddin openly threatened to carry the terror war to Pune, Delhi and Kanpur, has reconfirmed the view that Pakistan rejects any linkage between bilateral talks and curbs on its terror groups. So far, it has not taken any measures to stop India oriented Jehadis’ activities despite several assurances given by Musharraf and his successors, personally and in written declarations. Banned terrorist organizations continue to gather funds, recruit people, run radio networks, and maintain small-size camps openly under their original or changed names. Terrorists’ infrastructure remains intact.  As per Intelligence assessment, 42 terrorists’ training camps directed against India are operating in Pakistan. Of these, 34 are ‘active’ and eight are ‘holding’ camps. About 300 militants are waiting for an opportunity to infiltrate into India.

A few days ago, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan revealed that India and Pakistan had almost managed to negotiate their way to a settlement on Kashmir before Musharraf was ousted. He said that Pakistan Army had supported this proposal. If that was so, then why has there been a substantial increase in cross LOC infiltration and encounters recently. In the first four months of this year, there have been 65 infiltration attempts and 126 militancy related incidents. Observers look at these official figures as an evidence of Pakistan’s unchanged intent and strategy despite a tactical downward calibration noticed earlier. The conclusions being drawn from this ground situation are (a) Pakistan hopes to continue the dialogue along with supported or un-supported cross border terrorism, and (b) Pakistan Army and the government have rejected the dialogue that Kasuri mentioned.

A war, Clausewitz stated, is an extension of politics and policy by other means. The world has now come to believe that if politics and policy remains in the hand of civilians, there are lesser chances of nations going to a war. In Pakistan, issues related to India (particularly Kashmir), Afghanistan, and its own nuclear capability, are areas of special concern to its military. It is well known that the political leadership finds it difficult to assert on such matters.

In this context, the recent passing of the 18th Amendment under which the elected Prime Minister and political institutions in Pakistan acquired greater sustenance and authority, has become a new factor (apart from the water issue). In the aforesaid track 2 dialogue, Pakistani delegates, citing this amendment, were vocal about the return of true democracy and political supremacy in their country. Some also argued that progress in Indo Pakistan dialogue will strengthen their democratic institutions.

While this is indeed a healthy political step in our neighborhood, there are serious doubts about its impact in the foreseeable future. No one can overlook the fact that in almost all issues affecting the USA and Pakistan, the US leaders depend more on the Pakistan military than its civilian counterparts. The prominence given to General Kayani in the last US Pakistan strategic dialogue in Washington DC made it quite obvious. The real test of the 18th Amendment in Pakistan would be if and when the Prime Minister is able to (a) place the ISI under civilian control in letter and spirit, and (b) establish tenure based military leadership at the highest level.

My central premise is that the peace process with Pakistan can progress and develop only when there is a violence-free atmosphere. Every terror incident adds to domestic political risks in India. With every incident, suspicions tend to increase and trust tends to fray. If such a premise turns out to be unsustainable, any Government in India would lose popular support for talks with Pakistan. People would get the impression that Islamabad is leveraging terrorist violence to extract political concessions from New Delhi. The government would thus undermine its ability and credibility to negotiate. Despite that risk, the Prime Minister has taken the courage to resume the dialogue. But neither the Government nor the people have many expectations from it till there is a change of Pakistani mindset and policy on cross border terrorism. The trust deficit will reduce not through political rhetoric but when the results on the ground prove that.

Courtsey: The Tribune, 17 May 2010

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100518/edit.htm#4

Gen VP Malik is Former Chief of Army Staff

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).