What ails India�s China perspective?

The recent episode wherein a Union Minister came under fire from several quarters for speaking out against so called ‘restrictions’ on Chinese companies in India ignored the fact that there were others who voiced similar apprehensions in the past. The security threats from Chinese telecom companies notwithstanding, the tenacity and the alacrity with which the media tried to mobilise public opinion against one person brings home the truth that the Indian perspective on China suffers from some serious flaws.

As witnessed in the recent controversy, Indian perspective on China often tends to become ‘reactive’. Rather than reporting and commenting on events in China with a keen eye, Indian media reacts only when something goes wrong on the bilateral front. While most political parties and academic experts would agree that China is the most important country in Indian foreign policy priorities, very few have a comprehensive vision about handling relations with China. During the 2009 general elections, for example, very few political parties spoke of handling relations with China in their election manifesto. The Left parties did, but then there were few takers for their views on China. In the absence of a clear vision, many a times, Indians tend to over react and over interpret, to Chinese developments on the bilateral front.   

Indian perspectives on China are further complicated by ‘sensationalisation of trivial issues’. In recent times, there have been frequent cases of Chinese incursions into the Indian side of the LAC. Such issues, though quite sensitive, are minor given the differential perceptions of LAC and, therefore, should be left for diplomats to handle. Instead, many in print and electronic media have adopted a judgmental outlook on the issue, raising a war-cry and perhaps jeopardising India’s diplomatic interests in the process. Very few of them are sensitive enough to handle China related developments with caution. On the other hand, coverage on the constructive aspects of Sino-Indian relations is still given a miss since they fail to attract high TRP ratings.

Much of the Indian perspective is also shaped by a ‘high degree of emotionalism’. The bitter memories of the 1962 War still plays a formative role in the psychology of Indian public opinion on China. Though the episode is forty-eight years old, many Indians are still fighting the 1962 War nursing a sense of ‘hurt and detachment’. Rather than looking towards the future, they have been demanding the de-classification of the Henderson Brooks Report to know exactly what led to losses in 1962! While the appropriateness of the same is debatable, the emotional baggage of 1962 does deter a futuristic debate on building relations with China.

Indian perspectives on China also do not provide adequate consideration to ‘contemporary realities and global power balance’. The symbolism of ‘BRICS’ apart, very little has been suggested to bring China on board functional organisations and institutions of interest to India. In places where they are together, very little cooperation has taken place. Witness for example, the fate of the Kunming Initiative that has not been able to move beyond car rallies. There is still no clarity of opinion about optimising the benefits of mutual membership in such sub-regional cooperative ventures. Perhaps that also explains why China and India are wary of each other in larger regional groupings and institutions such as SCO, SAARC and even ADB. It is also a fact that China’s political and military reach has been enhanced and consolidated in India’s neighbourhood and beyond. Concerns apart, Indian strategic thinkers have little to offer as pragmatic and implementable policy options.

In a paradox of sort, Indians while being reactive, also display a ‘lack of urgency’ in handling relations with China. While the Indian government has painfully built relations with China spanning many sectors, the key issue of the border remains unresolved. This is likely to remain the core issue in the future. Unfortunately, if not resolved in time, this could also lead to another Sino-Indian war. However, except for the usual suggestion of keeping the issue in abeyance, the media and China experts in India have no new initiatives to offer. That leaves the Indian negotiators to carry the entire burden of negotiations on their own head without getting any lateral feedback or public support.

But perhaps the biggest issue that clouds the Indian perspective is its ‘sharp polarisation’ on the future of bilateral relations with China. While all agree that Sino-Indian friendship would be the best bet, very few are optimistic. These opinions are based on different ideologies, come from people of different backgrounds and can be broadly clubbed into three schools – the pacifist, the hawkish and the pragmatic. While the pragmatists do find favour with policy makers in South Block, others schools are also influential that appeal to particular constituencies. Unless and until the three schools of thought dilute their internal differences and forge a minimum understanding, policy makers in South Block would continue to have difficulties in getting a correct feedback on forging relations with China.

Bhartendu Kumar Singh is Deputy Director, National Academy of Defence Financial Management, Pune

The views expressed are personal.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).