Dimensions of the McChrystal episode

The US President Obama recently accepted the resignation of his commanding general in the AfPak theatre, Stanley A. McChrystal. A reporter from Rolling Stone magazine had been embedded temporarily with McChrystal’s staff, self-styled as Team America, to do a profile of the general. Due to the eruption of the volcano in Iceland, cancelled flights led to him spending more time than originally planned and thereby getting a closer look. The resulting story revealed indiscretions of the staff and the general himself leading to the dismissal.

What can we learn from McChrystal’s moment in military history? This article attempts to outline implications along several dimensions: operational and military sociology.  

At the outset, McChrystal needs to be credited with exemplary leadership in taking responsibility for his utterances and those of his staff. His parting words were: ‘Throughout my career, I have lived by the principles of personal honour and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard.’ Once a Special Forces commander, his profile suggests austerity and a focus on organisational goals. His record in Afghanistan reveals perspicacity and moral courage in making an honest assessment on his arrival and garnering the resources necessary. When the Obama administration debated over three months over the crucial decision on another ‘surge’, he faced criticism over the leaking of his report to the Pentagon. It influenced the debate in the White House in favour of his proposal. This implies that courage of conviction is required and a willingness to engage in the ‘push and shove’ of bureaucratic politics when necessary. The most significant accolade that the general received on his departure was the Afghan defence minister’s comment that McChrystal was one officer willing to lay his career on line for the success of his mission.

Operationally, the fact that the highest number of deaths among foreign troops in a month occurred this June, crossing a hundred indicates less the failure of his strategy than the challenges in Afghanistan. The Moshtarak operation has been taken as only a partial success since the administration that has been implanted has not worked. The Taliban has only relocated. The impending Kandahar operation, the purpose of the surge, has been postponed to September. The Kandahar operation was to have a different operational design, quite like the earlier vacation of the bastion in Helmand province. The advantage is that a repeat of the notorious Fallujah operation in Iraq does not take place resulting in an operational success, but strategic failure.

Doctrinally, his strategy for counter insurgency, based on the document prepared in 2006 by his superior and now successor David Petraeus in the context of Iraq, has much to commend it. The remarkable convergence with India’s own approach needs noting.

It was people centric and required the Americans to change their operating style from being firepower reliant to exercising self-restraint. He formulated strict rules of engagement, knowing that the strategic purpose is defeated in case alienation brought on by collateral damage and civilian casualties. On his departure, his strict control has been revealed by the issue surfacing of Americans being unwilling to exercise self-restraint in favour of self-protection. This reveals the mindset that McChrystal had to contend with within his own force.

His other strategic initiative was in terms of Afghanisation, in particular to build credibility for the Karzai regime. He did this by facilitating and accompanying Karzai on visits across the country. This is in keeping with the Indian system in which the civil administration and police are projected. The third aspect is in the reaching out to the reconcilable Taliban to the extent possible. This issue is being pursued by the Karzai regime. While this has drawn wary attention in India, it bears noting that even Indian counter insurgency doctrine favours a political approach of reaching out to insurgents to the extent possible, dividing the opposition, encouraging surrenders etc.

The penultimate point is on military-media relations. Secretary Gates has already clamped down on the media’s easy access to the military in the US system. The facilitation of the media to the combat zone was deemed necessary to preclude the Vietnam syndrome, in which the home front was lost to adverse media coverage. Keeping the citizen back home engaged with the soldier’s travails was through measures such as embedded journalists. The McChrystal case indicates the pitfalls involved, since the media answers to its own professional sets of ethics and obligations. The military-media issue is of universal import, witness the recent stipulations that only the Home Ministry will interface with the media on the question of Naxalism. This was pursuant to the comments of the Army and Air Force Chiefs in wake of the Chintalnar ambush.

The last, but most important point is on civil-military relations. The professional obligation is to use military inputs at the strategic level. This may involve bruised between various agencies involved in national security decision making. However, once the decision is taken at the requisite level, then it is equally binding an obligation to execute it with commitment. In this the crucial aspect is that of the principle that ‘the civilian head has the right to be wrong’. The idea is that grand strategy is a civilian domain, in which the military input is one among others. Therefore, it is possible that the military input may not find fullest representation. Still, the military has to get on with the task of translation strategic policy into military aims and its operational execution. The challenge at the level of the theatre commander is grave. An example of how India has successfully met this is in the stipulation not to cross the LOC in the Kargil War.

McChrystal was known in India earlier for his seeming inclination towards Pakistan as reflected in his leaked report last year. However, the course correction has already been done by his successor, Petraeus, in his Congressional confirmation prior to taking over. The dimensions of the McChrystal episode, covered here, now can be looked at instead as a very useful case study in preparation of senior commanders at the War Colleges and the NDC.

Ali Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).