“India’s growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca …..India has exploited the fluidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness.”
PM Dr Manmohan Singh (2006)
India as the largest maritime power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has the onerous responsibility to contribute to the safe passage of trade and energy needs of the world, in the sea lines of communications(SLOCs) and through the choke points of Malacca, Hormuz and Bab El Mandeb. This directive has been articulated by India’s Prime Minister and is the starting block for strategic planning to protect India’s national interests. India is endowed with island territories in the IOR on the East and West, which need to be studied for their attributes, and the threats and challenges the islands pose.
The great American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who contributed much to US strategic outlook, had said way back in the last century that the future of the world in the 21st century may well be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean. USA itself recognising the importance of the IOR made its presence felt in the Indian Ocean, by establishing a base on the leased island of Diego Garcia during the Cold War, to support forward military operations, and as a logistic post. Island territories when exploited can be assets.
India’s island territories in the west with just 400,000 inhabitants comprise the 572 heavily forested Andaman and Nicobar islands which have been called ‘India’s Gateway to the East’, 800 nautical miles from the Indian coast and just 75 nm from the tip of Indonesia, in the Bay of Bengal. The islands cover 8249 sq km, 700 nm in length and only 37nm at the widest, and are strategically positioned at the confluence of the vital Malacca Straits. This translates into challenges, opportunities and threats for India. In 1947 the General Staff in Whitehall was keen to hold on to the islands as a part of British Malaya, or divide the islands between India and Pakistan, which desired a fuelling station for ships transiting from West to East Pakistan, but Pandit Nehru’s insistence ensured the islands came to India.
During the Second World War the Japanese built airfields on the A&N islands and successfully attacked Allied forces. That lesson tells us the islands can be India’s floating aircraft carriers for planes on extended missions for surveillance in peace, assistance in humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) as the area is susceptible to Tsunamis, and also offer offensive punch in India’s war plans, and as forward airfields. The proximity of the Islands to Malacca Straits is of concern to China, and Chinese naval analyst Zhang Ming, contends India’s A&N islands could be a ‘metal chain’ to block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca, known as China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and argues India is building an ‘Iron Curtain’ with its influence in the IOR.
The economic advantage of the A&N has been spelt out in position papers for operating off shore banking, shipyards, refineries and tourism but these can only be achieved if large Indian and foreign direct investment is permitted. This has not been pursued, and the archipelago people have been subsidised and traditionally viewed with vulnerability due to their remote location, and demands for preservation of the aborigines and their natural habitat. In earlier times there was a fear that the islands could be easily occupied and also become a haven for terrorism, but with the augmentation of a tri-service Andaman and Nicobar military Command with ambitious plans, this is no longer valid and adequate measures have been taken for their defence. The island chain can now play a greater role in India’s ‘Look East’ policy. The littoral navies including Australia are invited bi-annually to take part in Exercise Milan and the PLA Navy could be considered as an observer for confidence building.
India has shown remarkable growth in various sectors in past decade and is expected to be on the high growth path. Investments in port infrastructure would therefore be needed to facilitate and promote trade beyond merely protecting the islands. The first step was taken recently by making Port Blair, India’s 13th major port and to establish a container port at Cambell Bay. The islands have 8 small deep water ports, large bays for ships to anchor and development will lead to more habitation, avoid poaching and infiltration by non-state actors. However distance from New Delhi and pre-occupation with many more pressing challenges has let the development plans slip, but the potential is vast and construction of Tsunami proof buildings, tapping of water which is in short supply can be over come by technological advances.
In the West 220nm from Cochin lie the smaller Lakshadweep, Minicoy and Amindivi archipelago group of coral islands in the Arabian Sea with just 32Sq.Km of land space, one third of Singapore, which like the Maldives is sinking. It is difficult to support the people well, as the islands consist of 12 atolls, three reefs and five submerged banks and of the 36 islands only 10 are inhabited, and many sea farers come from the islands. The isolation of the islands and the large Muslim identity of the 60,000 population poses non-state security challenges of sectarianism, which India is encountering in areas, can be facilitated via the ‘watery medium’. Hence the islands pose a challenge for Indian economic and security planners. Once again, with the use of technology and at some cost small helicopter airfields can be built, and internal tourism be encouraged, and the small naval detachments increased with a tri-service approach.
Piracy on the high seas is a threat near India’s island territories, but so far it has raised its head in only two cases, reported some years ago. The quest for India’s island territories has to be defence to development to economy.
Commodore Ranjit Rai (Retd) is an independent defence analyst and former DNI and DNO, Naval HQ
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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