Communication and Counter-Terrorism Operations In Kashmir

In the late 1980s when terrorism erupted in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the terrorists were equipped with citizen-band radio sets for communication by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.  For terrorists, the possession of a radio set was a status symbol as mostly the commanders (self-styled) had a radio set to flaunt. “It was a well-laid out communication network, with control stations located in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), and outstations and repeater stations spread across the entire Valley”, recalls Colonel T.K. Tikoo,  a veteran of counter-insurgency operations in J&K and the North-East.

Despite its having been through a similar situation in Sri Lanka against the LTTE, Indian Army took time to counter the tactical advantage enjoyed by the terrorists. Expensive direction finding and interception equipments were imported and deployed in the Valley to locate and eavesdrop on terrorist communications.  It was a revelation that their communication system smoothly ran the entire business of terror –recruitment, indoctrination, training, infiltration, terror strikes and feedback. Radio stations located on the Pir Panjal and Shamshabari ranges covered the entire Valley and where communications faltered due to the screening effect of mountains, repeater stations were discretely deployed.

“At first it was pretty difficult to intercept terrorists’ communication as their radio sets such as ICOM, Yeasu, Kenwood etc. had better technical features and could hop frequencies faster than our interceptors,” reminisces Col Tikoo. Even if one managed to eavesdrop, it was very difficult to decipher the message as it was coded and delivered in local languages and dialects – Kashmiri, Gojri, Pahari and even in Balti. It took time for the Indian Army to avail the services of language specialists. Slowly, the codes were broken when terrorists were caught or a list of codes was recovered on dead terrorists. However, they changed their codes with amazing speed and ease. As soon as a commander was killed, the secret codes were discarded.

In 2002, a telecom revolution came about when mobile telephony was introduced in J&K, first by the BSNL, then by Airtel - a private telecom major in 2004, and then by Aircel, a small company in 2006. By mid-2007, there were 19 lakh telephone connections in J&K - a tele-density of one connection per 6.8 persons.  Kashmir, including Ladakh, accounts for 55 per cent of the state’s telephones. There are about 14.5 lakh mobile subscribers in the State.

In order to expand their customer base, service providers initially distributed connections without verification of customers. Making use of this, a large number of SIM cards were obtained by terrorists and their sympathisers. “Clearly corporate greed had overtaken business ethics; and by a modest estimate, there must be around 50,000 bogus connections in Kashmir itself being used by terrorists and weeding them out is a big challenge for the government and service providers”, says a Srinagar-based telecom official on condition of anonymity.

Slowly, the conduct of business of terror in the Valley has shifted from citizen-band radio sets to sleek mobile phones which are very handy for other purposes too. According to Brig Seethapathy, former Force Commander of National Security Guards, the mobile can be used to freely communicate or to trigger an IED by dialling the number of the mobile phone strapped to the IED. This development is worrisome for the security agencies as limitations of range and line of sight of erstwhile remote controlled IEDs has been overcome. Today, an IED planted in Bakhshi Stadium, Srinagar can be triggered off by a terrorist sitting in Islamabad.  Terrorists are juggling with phones and SIM cards to dodge interception efforts. Over-ground workers of terrorist outfits regularly arrange new SIM cards under fake identity.
Of late, however, telecom service providers in J&K have become stricter. A person needs to produce two witnesses for getting a mobile connection. Address and identity verification of not only the applicant but in some cases, of the witnesses is also being carried out. But old fake connections still abound to sustain terrorist activities.
Every technology has a loophole. Like radio transmissions, cell phone transmissions are also prone to interception. The problem lies in establishing monitoring agents along with the towers. Terrorists communicating on radio sets have the advantage of moving away quickly by the time security forces vector in. In cell phones, there is a matrix of relay towers where precise data of every call is available and can be culled for analysis or as evidence. Mobile telephony is easier to track through SIM cards or the details of the hand set (International Mobile Equipment Identity number) being used.
 
However, phone tapping procedure in India is lengthy and over centralised. It is more a ‘political issue’ than a ‘security imperative’. Central Home Secretary personally clears phone tapping for a particular number and for a definite duration. Prevailing red tape favours the wrong doer. In a scenario where terrorists are using multiple numbers, it means running to Delhi every time a new number is detected. “In states where Armed Forces’ Special Powers Act is in force, why can’t the authority to order phone tapping be with the State Home Secretary?” questions Brig. Seethapathy.

Meanwhile, mobile telephony is not the latest in the terrorist’s techno-armoury. They have moved ahead to use satellite phones to avoid interception and also rely upon Bluetooth technology for communication and data swapping. Valley’s nascent BPO industry is also being misused by terrorists. Cyber communication which is difficult to scan and monitor is the new modus operandi. And, we are still not fully equipped, legally or technologically, to deal with this budding menace.

(Raunaq Rathore is pursuing his Masters in mass communication and journalism from Amity University and is an avid watcher of defence and security matters.)