Effectiveness of a Unified Command structure in anti-naxal operations

The frequency with which the Naxalites have succeeded in attacking the forces engaged in countering them makes one ponder over the preparedness of the security forces to deal with the situation. In the past three months 102 CRPF jawans have fallen victim to Naxal violence. According to figures over 10,000 civilians and security personnel in the last five years have been killed. This, despite the fact that the government has come up with several plans over the years, to meet the Naxal threat.

Under the current scenario, the decision to set up a unified command to deal with Naxalism by the four worst affected states needs examination. First, mere setting up of a unified command does not mean that there will be a single command for the entire Naxal affected states as that would amount to Central control of operations, which is not feasible under the current constitutional disposition. The creation of unified command, although a welcome step, needs critical scrutiny in terms of what it can realistically achieve on the ground since there are several nuances attached with the proposed system. So, what does such a structure entail?

Each state affected by Naxalism will appoint an officer of the rank of Inspector General of Police as IGP (anti-Naxal operations) who will be coordinating the anti-Naxal operations with their counterparts in the CRPF. The latter has already appointed officers for similar exclusive anti-Naxal duties. The unified inter-state command structure would be assisted by a retired Army Major General in the capacity of an advisor.

In such a unified system, the command will flow from three directions to be integrated into a coherent counter-naxal strategy later. First inputs would flow from IGPs of the states, second emanate from the officers commanding the CRPF and the BSF and third the overall assistance by the retired army advisor. The way these three different sources will be integrated into a comprehensive whole with responsibilities and accountability fixed at each level is yet to be spelt out by the government. 

Further, certain states like Orissa and West Bengal where the problem is confined to certain areas only might not be willing to set up a unified command structure. So, ultimately it will only be the state of Chattisgarh and Jharkhand, seriously affected by Left-Wing Extremism, will agree to have a unified command structure. Further, such unified command would face the problem of intelligence sharing and collaboration between the security forces and the Chief Minister of the state concerned owing to the constraints of centre-state jurisdictions.

Such a plan is also likely to lead to inter-state jurisdictional conflicts. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reiterated that while cooperation among states is significant in any counter-insurgency each state has a different set of problems, administrative arrangements, strengths, and weaknesses and therefore, there is a need for a state-specific approach. For example Bihar is one of the states where illegal arms factories are operational across several districts. There are over 1,500 illegal arms manufacturing units in the state. The Maoist forces are taking full advantage of these illegal arms factories. Therefore, any counter-Naxal strategy which does not strike at the roots of illegal arms trade in Bihar is doomed to fail.

Further, the experience of Assam and Jammu & Kashmir which has set up a unified command for fighting insurgency reveals marked differences in their operability. In Assam it has been found that the Chief Minister has often left the decisions to the Army whereas in Jammu & Kashmir the Chief Minister has played a more assertive role in decision-making except for border areas where the decisions have been left to the Army. The case of Naxalism is different in the sense that here, the Army has shown its unwillingness to be involved in internal problems except for providing training to the security forces involved in Naxalism.

The most important hurdle in the path of setting up the unified command structure is coordination between states. Naxals operate across the boundaries of states. Therefore, unified command of different states would be required to coordinate with each other for carrying out joint operations across the borders. Under the circumstances, the best alternative would be to set up a separate command structure which could act as a nodal agency for coordinating the activities of the unified command of each state, particularly in cases where joint operations against the Naxalites are involved. Again, ways in which this can be done has not been defined either by the Home Ministry or the states which have agreed to set up a unified command.

The problem, it appears would remain where it is even if a unified command is established unless the above mentioned concerns is met by the authorities concerned. Otherwise, like earlier stated policies of dealing with Naxalism, the creation of an unified command too could turn out to be a half-baked strategy, more likely to create hassles in the way of counter-insurgency forces rather than aiding them.

Vinita Priyedarshi is Research Associate at the United Service Institution of India (USI), New Delhi

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).