Kashmir is yet again in the news, but not for the right reasons. However, seen in the context of violence in the past two decades, Kashmir today is passing through its best patch. It has a popularly elected government, its economy is growing, and the killings have reduced to historical lows. The times of peace, though, are the biggest enemy of extremist elements. Therefore, it has to be disrupted. Stones are a good weapon, as the image of the agitating youngsters grants them an aura of vulnerability and helplessness, especially when seen against heavily armed security forces.
In Kashmir, agitation has become part of the political culture. Therein lies a problem. The daily struggles of the citizens, the bleak future for the youngsters, have all compounded the problem. . Over and above, there are people with extra country loyalties who are always on the wait to stoke the fires of the simmering anger in the Valley.
The current agitation has targeted the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives men in uniform certain safeguards. Certain sections of Kashmiri society resents having to live in the shadow of the security forces, which they feel are no less than occupying forces. Thus, the people’s anger, which constantly bursts forth, now in the shape of stone-pelting youth, which come commentators have likened to a new intifada. Thus, the resentment against the AFSPA gets compounded.
It is to be noted that protest tactics in the Valley have changed, as can be seen from the latest crisis over killing of protestors. Instead of fighting with men and material, the goal is to tire out the security forces, and force them to react under pressure, leading to firing and deaths. After all, armed security forces against youth wielding stones, is a potent image that brings sympathy to the separatist cause.
With world opinion having changed by 9/11, portraying terrorists as revolutionaries has become unpalatable. It becomes all the more difficult for the terrorists who are state sponsored as in Kashmir or in Afghanistan. Therefore, new means had to be found for old battles. Thus, the Amarnath crisis, calls for demilitarisation or stone pelting.
People’s right to agitate for their demands is unquestionable. But why blame the Central Government for all the problems? Where are the representatives of the people in the State assemblies? Maybe the solution lies in making the elected representatives accountable. Instead, they are obsessed with the Central Government, laying all blame at their door. In Kashmir at times, what we see is the issues, which are critical, become a sheer mechanism of shadow boxing. Environment issues are important, but in Kashmir they become important only with respect to meeting basic needs of Amarnath pilgrims. Availability of public building in the form of schools, colleges, stadiums and market places is important, but they are raised only with respect to military occupation and the need is stressed for demilitarisation. Groups that are agitating against the AFSPA have a larger agenda than safeguarding of common people. In this agitation more than hundred people (108) have been killed, but most of them in police firings than Armed Forces personnel. So, why blame the Army?
Thus, the recent agitations are clearly an attempt by extremists to stay relevant, by exploiting people’s resentment and continuing to advance their vested interests. In this Omar Abdullah’s inexperience has become a contributing factor to the disturbance. But, then experience would not be such a mitigating factor, Kashmir’s body politic having acquired such a turbulent character. Even small issues have the tendency to lead to public protests. The Kashmiri leadership have to realise that many problems besetting them can be dealt satisfactorily at local level. As, in the recent Cabinet Committee on Security, has directed Kashmir Chief Minister to hold meeting of Unified Command to reassess security forces deployment.
Present options for the Central Government are few. The Army could be sparingly used. In fact, Army should also get its share of ‘peace dividend’ and go into barracks, which is reflective of the present security situation. Secondly, this will also save Army from becoming a part of state’s political struggles. Thirdly, a more efficient crowd management system is needed, which has to rely less on bullets than batons. The long-term trends of the state, indicate agitations over different issues are there to stay. Non-Fatal crowd management techniques, such as electric batons, rubber bullets and water cannons should be encouraged. This will have to go along with increasing responsibility taken up by local police.
Then, the larger issue is of Kashmir in its entirety, which is as difficult to resolve as it is difficult to categorise. Most important is that stakeholders are chasing shadows, when it comes to the most agreeable solution. Even when taking former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s broadest possible formulation of insaniyaat ka dayra. Hardliners like Syed Ali Shah Geelani will not budge from independence. It is likely that a scenario of ‘no solution is the best solution’ will emerge. The only option may be to help people in their economic betterment, which a number of governmental measures seek to do. Yet, it will be seen by hardliners as another attempt to buy out Kashmiris.
The effective solution possibly lies in focusing on issues of governance, and making the political set-up responsive. Chasing big ideas may lead to more problems, rather seeking to co-exist in the Indian Union would be the best bet. In terms of economic opportunity, education needs, and a thriving secular character, India is the best bet. Privately, many Kashmiris realise that future lies with India, and Indian public culture and public diplomacy. Pakistan’s brand of virulent nationalism is passé, and quite contradictory with Kashmiriyat. Therefore, it will be of lasting benefit, if Kashmiri citizens demand their rights from the state’s elected representatives, without portraying the Central Government as a villain by proxy.
Dr Narendra Kumar Tripathi works in the area of strategic studies
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
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