Enter US as Myanmar-China Irritants Surface

Diplomatic equations in South East Asia are undergoing a tail spin. The United States has already warmed up towards Vietnam and is negotiating a nuclear deal with this once-inimical country. Needless to say that Washington’s tectonic shift in its Vietnam policy has come about as a shrewd counter-balancing move vis-a-vis China. Another interesting development that is unravelling is increasing fissures between China and Myanmar and the unfolding US-Myanmar bilateral ties.

The US has immense strategic interest in seeing Myanmar shaking off its Chinese strait-jacket. Japan, India, South Korea and Vietnam also would like to play on the faultlines plaguing China-Myanmar bilateral relations. Washington smelt a chance when the Myanmar military launched an offensive into Kokang in August 2009 that sent more than 30,000 refugees into China’s Yunnan province. China was completely taken by surprise by the Myanmar junta’s unprecedented act of using force against ethnic Chinese groups and moves to seize territory.

Suddenly China was facing its largest refugee crisis on its borders since the Sino-Vietnam war. Naypyidaw’s attack on ethnically Chinese troops of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA Shan State-North, Special Region-1) proved to be a game changer. For the first time in two decades, China was forced to deploy its army units in the border region as the ceasefire agreements in existence since 1989 were broken by Naypyidaw’s action.

On September 21, 2010 the International Crisis Group released an interesting new report on China's relationship with Myanmar. The ICG report talks of cross-border issues, the increasingly complex nature of China's relations with various ethnic groups in Myanmar and rising tensions between Beijing and Kunming over management of relationships with Myanmar’s junta as well as ethnic nationalities. The report also takes note of the growing phenomenon of anti-Chinese sentiment within Myanmar.

It was with China in mind that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February 2009 a comprehensive review of US policy towards Myanmar. The policy review expressly stated that the Obama administration would like to contain Chinese influence in Myanmar and the region.

As part of Washington’s new Myanmar policy, the first direct senior-level meeting between the US and Myanmar took place in September 2009 in New York. This engagement policy gained further momentum when East Asian and Pacific Affairs Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell travelled to Myanmar in November 2009 and May 2010 and held talks with government officials. Campbell also met Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic opposition politicians and ethnic leaders during these two trips.

China got a whiff of increased back-channel diplomatic contacts between the US and Myanmar and started courting Naypyidaw in right earnest a month after Clinton’s policy review announcement and six months before the first direct US-Myanmar official meeting took place in New York. From 2001 to early 2009 no senior official of the Chinese Communist Party had cared to visit Myanmar as the iron-curtain country was a pariah for the West and firmly in Beijing’s clutches.

This changed dramatically and three members of the Politburo Standing Committee visited Myanmar between March 2009 and June 2010 and acted as Santa Claus, offering the backward country major deals in hydropower, mining and construction sectors. Close on the heels of the New York meeting, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in December 2009. In June 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to Myanmar and signed an agreement “on protecting peace and stability of the border regions”. China shares a 2,192 km-long border with Myanmar. This was followed by Myanmar’s strongman Senior General Than Shwe’s visit to Beijing (September 7-11, 2010), though the diplomatic symbolism of General Shwe visiting India in July 2010 would not have been lost on Beijing.

China’s hubris and complacence have given a toehold to the US and other powers in Myanmar. For decades Beijing took Myanmar for granted. However, the August 2009 border episode changed it all. China-Myanmar relations are not as hunky dory as they used to be and since the August 2009 border incident Beijing has started looking at Naypyidaw as a mercurial and temperamental neighbour.

Not too long ago, Beijing used to view the ethnic Chinese groups as the strategic buffer. But now China looks at these groups as a liability because they openly oppose Chinese development projects. China may well take some corrective measures and abandon armed ethnic groups like the Kachin and Wa with whom it has had long-standing ties.

Besides, there is a groundswell of opposition to Chinese workers and companies in Myanmar. The Chinese are increasingly being seen as a corrupting influence over Burmese society. The Burmese media is full of stories of how Chinese workers are gradually destroying the country’s social fabric by their addiction to alcohol, gambling, prostitution and drugs. Moreover, the Chinese companies have scant regard for Myanmar’s environment and heritage and are seen by the locals as rapacious mercenaries which are more interested in filling their own coffers, giving a raw deal to the locals in the process.

The massive Myitsone Dam in Kachin State is a classic example. The dam is expected to send most of the power generated to China after its scheduled completion in 2017. No wonder then that a series of bombs exploded at the Myitsone dam construction site in April 2010.

The Shakespearean dictum “Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown” is apt for today’s China. As China is rising, so are its problems. After Myanmar, China had an ugly diplomatic face-off with Japan wherein China was brashly aggressive and bared its fangs at the Japanese. In contrast, China tackled the far more serious Kokang crisis with Myanmar with kid gloves.

Since the August 2009 border episode, China-Myanmar relations have ebbed. Not too long ago, Beijing used to view the ethnic Chinese groups as the strategic buffer. But now China looks at these groups as a liability because they openly oppose Chinese development projects. China is going to find it increasingly difficult to deal with the Kachin, Wa and other marginalised armed ethnic groups with whom it has long-standing relations and may well abandon them completely.

The writer is a New Delhi-based journalist-author and commentator on foreign policy, international relations, terrorism and security issues. He has authored five books on these subjects, the last being “Global Jihad: Current Patterns and Future Trends”.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).