WikiLeaks and the Army Doctrine

The disclosure of US diplomats’ highly sensitive internal communications through ‘WikiLeaks’ pertaining to the Indian Army’s war fighting doctrine has thrown up a hornets’ nest of issues and has led to questions being raised of India’s capability and capacity to respond to acts of terror perpetrated on its soil. What exactly is the content and implications of this leaked information? The disclosures give an assessment of the Indian Army doctrine and the political leadership’s willingness or otherwise to use it. While one may debate the correctness of such assessments, they do provide an accurate barometer of how the world’s only super power perceives the state of India’s military and the will of its political and military leadership.

US Perception

The Indian strategy, referred to as ‘Cold Start’ in the disclosures, has been summarised as ‘a mixture of myth and reality, which may never be put on the battlefield because of resource constraints’.  Salient aspects of US perception are:

• India’s Cold Start doctrine envisages multiple thrusts on a wide front with limited objectives, which could begin within 72 hours of orders being received. The doctrine aims to obviate the ill effects of a slow mobilisation process which results in lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and reduces any element of surprise as witnessed by India’s response to the attack on its Parliament in 2001 by Pakistan-linked terrorists. India perceives this short time window of 72 hours as a shield from international pressure to refrain from taking military action. Also from the Indian perspective, the doctrine has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.

• The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood. GOI’s highly opaque decision-making process would likely prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment.

• Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement, due to resource challenges ranging from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, ‘Cold Start’s’ reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sind.

• Although Cold Start is designed to keep conflict below the nuclear threshold, GOI is uncertain whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. Indian failure to implement Cold Start even after the audacious and bloody Mumbai attack, calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt this option. Pakistan’s continuance of support to terror attacks against India calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India. It also calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to US Government officials.

• Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear.

Analysis

There appears to be a fundamental error in US perception. India’s strategy is not based on a reactive stance as perceived in the disclosures. It is designed to take the initiative in a proactive manner in case hostilities between the two countries break out. The term Cold Start while being erroneously used in some quarters is not the Army’s doctrine as clarified repeatedly by the present Army Chief. The doctrine signifies a proactive stance which has a different nuance. Also, the time window of starting hostilities cannot be related to the occurrence of any incident. It merely connotes readiness to begin operations within a specified time frame.

It is also not clear what has led the US to perceive that Indian military objectives will be population centric. The question of taking over major population centres is not an option which the Indian Army is likely to get engaged with. Threatening such centres is a different matter altogether. It is also erroneous to think that consolidation of initial gains would be a problem due to logistical difficulties. While India’s war waging potential is certainly not endless, it is adequate for achieving the tasks set out.

The US views on India’s decision making process cannot be brushed aside. Two issues stand out. Will India be continually subject to nuclear blackmail, and what is the nature of India’s decision making process?

On the nuclear issue, there is no alternative but to call the Pakistani bluff. Pakistan is not using its nuclear arsenal as a tool to deter India’s conventional military force but rather as a foil against any Indian reaction to Pakistan’s blatant support and complicity in terror activities in India. Perhaps the time has come to put a halt to nuclear blackmail, regardless of the consequences. In any event, the consequences to Pakistan will be far more disastrous. The decision makers on the Pakistani side may give the appearance of being irrational players but that is a highly debatable stance. We can succumb to nuclear blackmail no longer.

The decision making process too is cause for serious concern. The Indian armed forces have been continuously kept out of the decision making loop and concerns on security expressed by the military have been conveniently swept under the carpet. Indian bureaucracy, unfortunately, neither has the competence or the experience to advise on such matters. For a former NSA to state to the US ambassador as alleged in the disclosures that the GOI does not endorse a military response to terror is laughable, but tragic if true. While the military option may not be applied for problem resolution, to negate its use is a self defeating exercise.

The US assessment that India’s doctrine has not deterred Pakistani mischief inside India is self evident. However, Indian public opinion while not baying for war is unlikely to sit in the shadows if another serious terrorist incident takes place which can be traced back to Pakistan. From the Indian side, a clear message must go across to the world that we have taken enough and acts of terror will be responded to with all means available which may also include the use of force. Capability and capacity building to that effect should be a priority item on the Governments’ agenda. More importantly, political will to walk the talk must be enunciated and clearly exhibited. Towards that end, a speedy acquisition process to make up defence voids and the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff to render single point advice to the Government needs to be expedited.

Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, SM, VSM (Retd) is Additional Director, CLAWS

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).