A New Year of Familiar Surprises in South Asia

 
Every new year has its share of modest surprises, but it takes big shocks to generate significant changes in national security policy.  “Familiar” surprise comes with the territory in South Asia – the kind of surprise that is more a matter of timing than of content.  Political machinations produce change, scandals erupt, extreme weather punishes the subcontinent and, alas, mass casualty acts of terror are likely to be front page news in 2011.  We can “count” on these familiar surprises; we just don’t know the dates and particulars when these headlines will appear in our newspapers.

Strategic surprise – the kind that can change a nation’s course and outlook – is extremely rare.  In India’s post-colonial history, strategic surprise has been associated with major wars, and the last major war India fought was four long decades ago.  Strategic surprises have antecedents, but in the noise of everyday events, it is hard for intelligence officials and national leaders to connect the dots to anticipate them.  Until major shocks happen, continuity in policy is a default condition of national capitals.  India can therefore be expected to remain on a familiar course in 2011 – not just because of the absence of strategic surprises, but because New Delhi’s policy choices over the past fifteen years have produced major dividends in national security and economic growth.

Policy continuity means that Indo-U.S. relations will continue to improve in 2011, having been well cultivated by different coalition governments in New Delhi and very disparate U.S. administrations led by Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barack Obama.  Complaints over Washington’s “dictation” and India’s loss of strategic autonomy will continue to be heard, but these increasingly isolated mental outposts have been swamped by a rising tide of mutual and complementary bilateral interests.   

Pakistan is also likely to remain on its current course in 2011, which would mean a further weakening of national cohesion, governance, and security.  Pakistan, no less than India, faces a million mutinies now, but with far less capacity than India to engage disaffected citizens.  Improvements in national life require improved economic fortunes that depend, in turn, on normal relations with India, a recognition that Pakistan’s military leadership has yet to internalize.

Only those but the most obtuse now recognize that ill-fated preoccupations with Kashmir and Afghanistan have badly mortgaged Pakistan’s future.  Current political contestants will continue to squabble for advantage and for the emoluments of public office, while being unable or unwilling to push for big changes that can re-gift the nation its future.  Those who are best positioned to engineer a course correction -- Pakistan’s military leaders – appear unwilling to do so.  As India gains and Pakistan loses ground, it becomes more necessary and more difficult for Pakistan’s military establishment to change ill-advised national security policies, including a growing dependence on nuclear weapon capabilities to counter other weaknesses.

The troubled, but unavoidable U.S.-Pakistan partnership seems destined to continue to bump along in 2011.  Another divorce would serve neither partner, and yet a happy marriage is simply not in the cards.  Mutual grievances and distrust are overblown, but they are not complete figments of fevered imaginations.  Pakistan’s national security managers, no less than India’s, are quite capable of deciding when to accept and when to resist Washington’s preferences.  The heavy U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, dependent on Pakistani logistical support, has given Rawalpindi increased leverage in bilateral relations, notwithstanding growing national dependencies.  Pakistan and the United States need each other, but cannot change each other.  Despite many areas of contention, they have no choice but to manage their differences, which are less consequential than their mutual interests.

Afghanistan remains a long story without a happy ending.  It would be very unwise to underestimate the resilience and skills of U.S. forces deployed there, but it is hard to envision an Afghan government capable of making good use of hard-won gains secured by U.S. and coalition forces in remote provinces.  Washington will be hard-pressed to help engineer a political settlement satisfactory to Afghans and their neighbors during 2011.

Mass casualty acts of terrorism are likely to continue plaguing Pakistan and India in 2011.  Bilateral relations will remain distant and cold until New Delhi calculates that its interests are best served by shifting gears.  India recovers after suffering grievous losses from acts of terrorism directed against iconic targets.  Pakistan does not recover when these attacks are traced back to its soil.  A national security establishment that merely inconveniences groups and individuals that engage in mass casualty attacks winds up hurting itself more than its adversary.  Judicial authorities in India as well as Pakistan have great difficulty securing convictions in high-profile cases.  India has found ways and means to recover national standing from such embarrassments; Pakistan has not.

Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center. This essay was published in the Chandigarh Tribune on 9 January 2011.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110109/yearreckon/main20.htm

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).